**APPENDIX**

**Appendix 1: Analyses of Representativity**

To the extent that it was possible, analyses of representativity were conducted using χ2-tests of gender and age in the samples. All Danish prisons are organized under the Danish Prison and Probation Service (Kriminalforsorgen) and thus have complete aggregate data on staff composition. The total population of prison employees does not differ significantly from those in the sample (gender χ2= 1.32 p=0.25) (age χ2=5.56 p=0.23).

< Insert Appendix Table 1 about here >

**Appendix 2: Factor Analysis**

We performed an exploratory factor analysis to test the internal consistency of the scale measuring the role identity of street-level bureaucrats, as recommended by Terwee et al. (2007, p. 36) for cases where an existing scale is applied to a new population. As illustrated in table 2, the variables (eigenvalue = 3.41) load highly on items characterizing the degree of formality of interaction (rule application As illustrated in table 2, the variables (eigenvalue = 2.53) load highly on items characterizing the degree of formality of interaction (rule application). Another factor (eigenvalue = 1.06) comprises items that reflect the proclivity to threaten to impose sanctions and the degree of trust placed in coercion.

< Insert Appendix Table 2 about here >

The best statistical fit of the factor analysis was obtained by means of a two-dimensional solution. These were the only factors with eigenvalues greater than one (RMSR=0.02, RMSEA = 0.04, 90 % ci = 0.01–0.07, TLI = 0.98, BIC = -56.12).

**Appendix 3: The Effect of Control Variables**

Table 3 shows regression models including only the control variables. When adding our explanatory variable, the explained variance increases.

< Insert Appendix Table 3 about here >

**TABLES**

**Appendix Table 1**

Response Rate

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | N | ResponseRate (%) | Gender (*%*) | Age (%) |
| Occupation |  |  | F | M | >30 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60< |
| Prison employee (sample) | 465 | 53 | 34.8 | 65.2 | 6.0 | 33.1 | 34.8 | 20.9 | 5.2 |
| Prison employee (population) | 1293 | - | 32.0 | 68.0 | 6.3 | 28.4 | 39.8 | 21.1 | 4.4 |
| The table shows the characteristics of the 465 participants in the study in relation to their gender, age and response rate.  |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Appendix Table 2** Results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis |  |
| **Dimensions of Role Identity (Interaction style)** |  | Loadings and structure for dimensions of Role Identity (interaction style) a |
|  | **Formalism****Dimension** |
| Informal rule application (citizen-agent) |  | Strict rule application (state-agent) |  |  |
| Cooperate with citizen-clients on solutions | vs. | Make decisions based on formal rules  |  | **.66** |
| Attach importance to outcomes | vs. | Attach importance to the letter of the law |  | **.80** |
| Occupied by influencing attitudes | vs. | Occupied by organizational rules |  | **.78** |
| May bend the rules if they do more harm than good for the citizen-clients | vs. | Is consistent in rule enforcement |  | **.60** |
| Seeking to achieve citizen-client confidentiality | vs. | Acting formally when facing clients |  | **.48** |
| **Model statistics**Eigenvalue |  |  |  | 2.53 |
| a Cell entries are Pearson correlation of role identity and items measuring the respondent ratings of the role identity of their day-to-day interaction with citizen-clients (each item on a scale of 1 to 5 with end points comprising different approaches).  |

|  |
| --- |
| **Appendix Table 3**The Effect of Control Variables on Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Discretionary Decision-making |
|  | HumbleOR (SE) | CooperativeOR (SE) | MiserableOR (SE) | ProvocativeOR (SE) | ObstructiveOR (SE) | TestyOR (SE) |
| Gender (reference: male) | .91 (.19) | .94(.16) | .90 (.17) | .62 (.11)\*\* | .68 (.12)\* | .67 (.12)\* |
| Seniority(reference: < 1 year) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *1-2* | 5.61 (4.52) | .49 (.37) | 9.20 (6.81)\*\* | 1.63 (1.15) | .79 (.56) | 1.27 (.93) |
| *3-5* | 4.27 (3.21) | .49 (.35) | 4.20(2.94)\* | .76 (.50) | 1.39 (.96) | .77 (0.53) |
| *6-10* | 3.83 (2.79) | .45 (.31) | 4.23 (2.86)\* | 1.11 (.72) | 1.04 (.69) | .95 (.64) |
| *11-15* | 3.82 (2.88) | .53(.38) | 5.01 (3.52)\* | 1.00 (.68) | 1.05 (.71) | .75 (.52) |
| *15<* | 4.50 (3.29) | .59 (.41) | 5.09 (3.47)\* | 1.29 (.84) | 1.61 (1.08) | 1.09 (0.73) |
| N | 465 | 465 | 465 | 465 | 465 | 465 |
| Prob> chi2 | .53 | .81 | .11 | .04 | .04 | .16 |
| Pseudo *R2* | .01 | .00 | .01 | .01 | .01 | .01 |
| \*\*\**p*<.01; \*\* *p*<.05:\*=.1 (two-tailed).Note: Entries are odd ratio coefficients and, in parentheses, standard errors. |