**Appendix**

Table 7

 Models in Table 7 use the Polity IV measure of Democracy instead of the V-dem polyarchy score used in the main models.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models-polity IV** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | Bivariate | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time | full model cubic polynomial |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.125\* | 0.218\*\* | 0.140 | 0.304\*\*\* | 0.244\*\* | 0.266\*\* |
|  | (0.061) | (0.083) | (0.086) | (0.085) | (0.090) | (0.089) |
| military power |  | -5.836 | -7.155 | 2.132 | 0.883 | 0.401 |
|  |  | (4.251) | (4.524) | (5.054) | (5.217) | (5.221) |
| great power |  | 2.530\* | 2.276\* | 2.045+ | 1.832+ | 1.949+ |
|  |  | (1.065) | (1.068) | (1.094) | (1.100) | (1.096) |
| democracy |  | -0.035\*\*\* | -0.036\*\*\* | -0.029\*\* | -0.031\*\* | -0.029\*\* |
|  |  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| log GDP |  | 0.272\*\*\* | 0.411\*\*\* | 0.317\*\*\* | 0.394\*\*\* | 0.377\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.054) | (0.096) | (0.057) | (0.100) | (0.096) |
| borders |  | 0.084 | 0.081 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.056 |
|  |  | (0.056) | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.064) |
| cold war |  | 0.053 | -0.190 | 0.085 | -0.407 | 0.358\* |
|  |  | (0.100) | (0.438) | (0.106) | (0.461) | (0.170) |
| oil and gas |  |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader |  |  |  | 0.635\*\*\* | 0.645\*\*\* | 0.648\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.119) | (0.119) | (0.118) |
| t |  |  |  |  |  | 0.004 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.035) |
| t2 |  |  |  |  |  | -0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.002) |
| t3 |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00004 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.00003) |
| Constant | 0.105 | -3.949\*\* | -4.513\*\* | -4.940\*\*\* | -4.984\*\* | -5.342\*\*\* |
|  | (0.150) | (1.333) | (1.494) | (1.448) | (1.598) | (1.469) |
|  |
| Observations | 5,471 | 4,500 | 4,500 | 4,369 | 4,369 | 4,369 |
| Log Likelihood | -2,330.688 | -1,826.010 | -1,795.116 | -1,759.543 | -1,731.773 | -1,754.362 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 4,969.377 | 3,954.020 | 3,972.231 | 3,819.087 | 3,843.545 | 3,814.724 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 8

 In Table 8, I use OLS regression models instead of Poisson models.

|  |
| --- |
| **OLS Models** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | bivariate | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.024+ | 0.051\*\* | 0.039\* | 0.072\*\*\* | 0.060\*\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| military power |  | -2.565 | -2.850 | 2.447 | 1.960 |
|  |  | (1.890) | (1.902) | (2.357) | (2.376) |
| great power |  | 0.251+ | 0.191 | 0.257 | 0.182 |
|  |  | (0.132) | (0.133) | (0.171) | (0.172) |
| democracy |  | -0.272\*\*\* | -0.294\*\*\* | -0.221\*\* | -0.238\*\* |
|  |  | (0.073) | (0.074) | (0.075) | (0.076) |
| log GDP |  | 0.057\*\*\* | 0.096\*\*\* | 0.068\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.012) | (0.022) | (0.013) | (0.023) |
| borders |  | 0.054\*\* | 0.057\*\* | 0.028 | 0.031 |
|  |  | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.020) |
| cold war |  | -0.002 | -0.026 | 0.005 | -0.051 |
|  |  | (0.022) | (0.097) | (0.023) | (0.100) |
| oil and gas |  |  |  | -0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader |  |  |  | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.201\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.033) | (0.033) |
| Constant | 1.078\*\*\* | 0.818\* | 0.635 | -0.056 | -0.226 |
|  | (0.078) | (0.357) | (0.393) | (0.457) | (0.485) |
|  |
| Observations | 5,471 | 4,567 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 |
| R2 | 0.259 | 0.260 | 0.269 | 0.269 | 0.278 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.237 | 0.235 | 0.237 | 0.244 | 0.245 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 9

 There might be an interaction effect between democracy and civilian control. Thus, Table 9 includes the interaction term democracy\*civil control in the models. Interestingly, the interaction term itself is statistically insignificant in models 3-6, but civilian control is significant in models 4-6.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: democracy X civil control** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | Bivariate | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time | full model cubic polynomial |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  |
| civil control | -0.100 | 0.190 | 0.163 | 0.312\* | 0.303\* | 0.330\*\* |
|  | (0.093) | (0.118) | (0.121) | (0.122) | (0.126) | (0.125) |
| Democracy | -0.487+ | -1.591\*\*\* | -1.695\*\*\* | -1.528\*\*\* | -1.630\*\*\* | -1.580\*\*\* |
|  | (0.268) | (0.357) | (0.363) | (0.358) | (0.364) | (0.361) |
| military power |  | -6.816 | -7.950+ | 1.626 | 0.705 | 0.164 |
|  |  | (4.298) | (4.562) | (5.148) | (5.346) | (5.349) |
| great power |  | 2.343\* | 2.115\* | 1.799 | 1.611 | 1.746 |
|  |  | (1.066) | (1.068) | (1.094) | (1.101) | (1.097) |
| log GDP |  | 0.314\*\*\* | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.368\*\*\* | 0.418\*\*\* | 0.393\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.056) | (0.096) | (0.060) | (0.100) | (0.096) |
| Borders |  | 0.073 | 0.065 | 0.021 | 0.012 | 0.029 |
|  |  | (0.055) | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.064) |
| cold war |  | 0.040 | -0.177 | 0.055 | -0.544 | 0.322+ |
|  |  | (0.103) | (0.426) | (0.108) | (0.462) | (0.171) |
| oil and gas |  |  |  | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader |  |  |  | 0.622\*\*\* | 0.638\*\*\* | 0.639\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.118) | (0.118) | (0.117) |
| T |  |  |  |  |  | 0.009 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.035) |
| t2 |  |  |  |  |  | -0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.002) |
| t3 |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00004 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.00003) |
| civXdem | 1.402\*\*\* | 0.635\* | 0.464 | 0.522 | 0.364 | 0.349 |
|  | (0.274) | (0.324) | (0.326) | (0.332) | (0.335) | (0.333) |
| Constant | 0.710\*\* | -2.927\* | -3.318\* | -4.015\*\* | -3.833\* | -4.220\*\* |
|  | (0.272) | (1.354) | (1.515) | (1.470) | (1.622) | (1.495) |
|  |
| Observations | 5,453 | 4,567 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 | 4,394 |
| Log Likelihood | -2,308.004 | -1,837.287 | -1,807.634 | -1,754.722 | -1,727.433 | -1,750.514 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 4,928.008 | 3,980.574 | 4,001.268 | 3,811.444 | 3,836.865 | 3,809.027 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 10

 An alternative strategy for count data is to use negative binomial models instead of Poisson regression. Table 10 presents negative binomial models for MID initiation. Civilian control is statistically significant and positive.

|  |
| --- |
| **Negative binomial models** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | Bivariate | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time | full model cubic polynomial |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.122+ | 0.349\*\*\* | 0.280\*\* | 0.450\*\*\* | 0.397\*\*\* | 0.420\*\*\* |
|  | (0.064) | (0.089) | (0.092) | (0.092) | (0.096) | (0.097) |
| democracy |  | -8.311+ | -9.286+ | -0.098 | -0.820 | -1.244 |
|  |  | (4.655) | (4.802) | (5.476) | (5.449) | (5.617) |
| military power |  | 2.379\* | 2.145\* | 1.853+ | 1.655 | 1.771 |
|  |  | (1.074) | (1.073) | (1.103) | (1.105) | (1.105) |
| great power |  | -1.824\*\*\* | -1.846\*\*\* | -1.722\*\*\* | -1.744\*\*\* | -1.715\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.358) | (0.358) | (0.359) | (0.359) | (0.361) |
| log GDP |  | 0.307\*\*\* | 0.431\*\*\* | 0.361\*\*\* | 0.420\*\*\* | 0.399\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.059) | (0.099) | (0.062) | (0.102) | (0.100) |
| borders |  | 0.079 | 0.073 | 0.032 | 0.023 | 0.042 |
|  |  | (0.060) | (0.063) | (0.065) | (0.067) | (0.068) |
| cold war |  | -0.047 | -0.235 | -0.019 | -0.583 | 0.245 |
|  |  | (0.106) | (0.437) | (0.111) | (0.470) | (0.179) |
| oil and gas |  |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader |  |  |  | 0.629\*\*\* | 0.638\*\*\* | 0.640\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.124) | (0.121) | (0.123) |
| t |  |  |  |  |  | 0.015 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.036) |
| t2 |  |  |  |  |  | -0.002 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.002) |
| t3 |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00004 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.00003) |
| Constant | 0.104 | -2.495+ | -2.970+ | -3.613\* | -3.551\* | -3.980\* |
|  | (0.166) | (1.406) | (1.559) | (1.531) | (1.659) | (1.557) |
|  |
| Observations | 5,471 | 4,567 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 | 4,394 |
| Log Likelihood | -2,321.794 | -1,832.735 | -1,806.571 | -1,752.320 | -1,727.929 | -1,747.895 |
| theta | 4.615\*\*\* (1.301) | 4.908\*\* (1.573) | 7.770\* (3.485) | 6.431\* (2.519) | 13.116 (9.098) | 6.831\* (2.790) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 4,951.588 | 3,969.470 | 3,997.142 | 3,804.639 | 3,835.859 | 3,801.790 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 11

 There might be a possibility that there is an interaction effect between the Great Power and CINC score variables. Table 11 includes the interaction term of those variables. Results for the interaction term appear mixed; statistical significance is found only in models 1 and 2. However, civilian control remains significant and positive in all models.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson models: Great Power X CINC score** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.339\*\*\* | 0.273\*\* | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.388\*\*\* |
|  | (0.086) | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.095) |
| military power | 41.209+ | 32.902 | 37.363+ | 32.092 |
|  | (21.412) | (21.499) | (21.963) | (22.070) |
| great power | 4.830\*\* | 4.193\*\* | 3.914\* | 3.446\* |
|  | (1.528) | (1.516) | (1.618) | (1.623) |
| democracy | -1.771\*\*\* | -1.824\*\*\* | -1.648\*\*\* | -1.705\*\*\* |
|  | (0.343) | (0.349) | (0.347) | (0.353) |
| log GDP | 0.278\*\*\* | 0.406\*\*\* | 0.340\*\*\* | 0.396\*\*\* |
|  | (0.060) | (0.099) | (0.064) | (0.102) |
| borders | 0.065 | 0.058 | 0.028 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.055) | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.066) |
| cold war | 0.024 | -0.182 | 0.049 | -0.539 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.425) | (0.107) | (0.462) |
| oil and gas |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader |  |  | 0.630\*\*\* | 0.645\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.118) | (0.118) |
| cinc:greatpower | -50.798\* | -43.049\* | -38.853+ | -33.837 |
|  | (21.624) | (21.544) | (22.245) | (22.228) |
| Constant | -4.549\*\* | -4.697\*\* | -5.304\*\* | -4.997\*\* |
|  | (1.578) | (1.701) | (1.705) | (1.828) |
|  |
| Observations | 4,567 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,836.473 | -1,806.665 | -1,754.451 | -1,726.877 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,978.945 | 3,999.330 | 3,810.901 | 3,835.754 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 12

Table 12 uses an alternative measurement of natural resources from that used in the main models. Instead of oil and gas, the models below include a measure of resource rents overall per country-year. Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral, and forest rents. The variable is drawn from the World Development Indicators, covering the years 1960-2001.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: resource rents** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.359\*\* | 0.350\*\* | 0.404\*\* | 0.412\*\* |
|  | (0.128) | (0.131) | (0.131) | (0.135) |
| military power | -16.109\* | -11.088 | -5.383 | -0.726 |
|  | (7.677) | (8.070) | (9.299) | (9.694) |
| great power | 1.984+ | 1.850+ | 1.396 | 1.238 |
|  | (1.076) | (1.079) | (1.107) | (1.121) |
| democracy | -2.331\*\*\* | -2.531\*\*\* | -2.233\*\*\* | -2.461\*\*\* |
|  | (0.426) | (0.434) | (0.429) | (0.438) |
| log GDP | 0.438\*\*\* | 0.310\* | 0.439\*\*\* | 0.283\* |
|  | (0.085) | (0.123) | (0.086) | (0.128) |
| Borders | 0.028 | -0.065 | -0.030 | -0.118 |
|  | (0.075) | (0.083) | (0.083) | (0.091) |
| cold war | -0.112 | -1.499\*\* | -0.113 | -1.612\*\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.459) | (0.113) | (0.466) |
| resources | -0.017\*\* | -0.019\* | -0.015\* | -0.016\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| radical leader |  |  | 0.467\*\* | 0.506\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.147) | (0.149) |
| Constant | -1.801 | -0.279 | -2.713 | -0.756 |
|  | (1.659) | (1.831) | (1.787) | (1.933) |
|  |
| Observations | 3,530 | 3,530 | 3,393 | 3,393 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,383.537 | -1,358.403 | -1,335.683 | -1,310.800 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,071.073 | 3,078.807 | 2,969.365 | 2,977.600 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 13

Models in Table 13 include a dichotomous measure of nuclear weapon ownership (1=yes, 0=no) instead of the natural resources variable.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: nuclear weapons ownership** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.351\*\*\* | 0.278\*\* | 0.458\*\*\* | 0.399\*\*\* |
|  | (0.086) | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.095) |
| military power | -8.235+ | -9.425\* | 0.706 | -1.254 |
|  | (4.300) | (4.576) | (4.783) | (4.991) |
| great power | 2.390\* | 2.141\* | 1.878+ | 1.654 |
|  | (1.066) | (1.068) | (1.094) | (1.101) |
| democracy | -1.791\*\*\* | -1.839\*\*\* | -1.660\*\*\* | -1.700\*\*\* |
|  | (0.342) | (0.348) | (0.347) | (0.353) |
| log GDP | 0.330\*\*\* | 0.459\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.441\*\*\* |
|  | (0.056) | (0.096) | (0.058) | (0.099) |
| borders | 0.069 | 0.063 | 0.011 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.055) | (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.064) |
| cold war | 0.003 | -0.168 | 0.016 | -0.452 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.429) | (0.103) | (0.466) |
| nuclear weapon | 0.058 | 0.142 | 0.407+ | 0.465+ |
|  | (0.227) | (0.233) | (0.245) | (0.251) |
| radical leader |  |  | 0.674\*\*\* | 0.684\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.118) | (0.119) |
| Constant | -2.843\* | -3.404\* | -4.347\*\* | -4.229\*\* |
|  | (1.363) | (1.536) | (1.435) | (1.592) |
|  |
| Observations | 4,567 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,839.175 | -1,808.461 | -1,754.756 | -1,726.297 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,984.350 | 4,002.922 | 3,809.512 | 3,832.594 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 14

 Table 14 presents Poisson models where I include both the alternative measure of natural resource rents from Table 12 and the nuclear weapon ownership variable from Table 13.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: nuclear+resources** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.372\*\* | 0.363\*\* | 0.421\*\* | 0.430\*\* |
|  | (0.128) | (0.132) | (0.132) | (0.136) |
| military power | -16.719\* | -11.989 | -6.471 | -2.334 |
|  | (7.766) | (8.217) | (9.392) | (9.821) |
| great power | 1.994+ | 1.857+ | 1.405 | 1.243 |
|  | (1.076) | (1.079) | (1.107) | (1.122) |
| democracy | -2.353\*\*\* | -2.545\*\*\* | -2.244\*\*\* | -2.460\*\*\* |
|  | (0.427) | (0.435) | (0.431) | (0.440) |
| log GDP | 0.433\*\*\* | 0.314\* | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.288\* |
|  | (0.085) | (0.123) | (0.086) | (0.128) |
| borders | 0.033 | -0.056 | -0.020 | -0.101 |
|  | (0.075) | (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.092) |
| cold war | -0.103 | -1.467\*\* | -0.101 | -1.574\*\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.460) | (0.113) | (0.467) |
| resources | -0.018\*\* | -0.019\* | -0.015\* | -0.017\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| nuclear weapon | 0.299 | 0.313 | 0.389 | 0.426 |
|  | (0.301) | (0.306) | (0.304) | (0.310) |
| radical leader |  |  | 0.497\*\*\* | 0.540\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.150) | (0.151) |
| Constant | -1.965 | -0.525 | -2.918 | -1.056 |
|  | (1.671) | (1.851) | (1.798) | (1.951) |
|  |
| Observations | 3,530 | 3,530 | 3,393 | 3,393 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,383.042 | -1,357.878 | -1,334.865 | -1,309.857 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,072.083 | 3,079.755 | 2,969.729 | 2,977.713 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 15

 The models in Table 15 include a variable measuring power projection capabilities. The variable included here is a proxy: relative level of a state’s naval tonnage relative to its GDP. Higher tonnage means higher spending on naval power, which translates to higher power projection capabilities. The variable includes data only for non-landlocked countries. Land-locked countries are coded as NA and drop as observations from the models. Civilian control is not statistically significant in any of these models, but the sample of observations is biased: more than half of the country-year observations cannot be accounted for as they lack data on power projection capabilities using the tonnage variable.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: power projection capability** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.171 | 0.101 | 0.243+ | 0.192 |
|  | (0.130) | (0.136) | (0.134) | (0.141) |
| military power | -13.030\*\* | -16.208\*\* | -3.584 | -6.881 |
|  | (4.700) | (5.123) | (5.355) | (5.760) |
| great power | 2.309\* | 2.063+ | 1.709 | 1.522 |
|  | (1.069) | (1.073) | (1.096) | (1.107) |
| democracy | -1.727\*\*\* | -1.757\*\*\* | -1.710\*\*\* | -1.711\*\*\* |
|  | (0.426) | (0.433) | (0.433) | (0.436) |
| log GDP | 0.487\*\*\* | 0.640\*\*\* | 0.529\*\*\* | 0.521\*\*\* |
|  | (0.078) | (0.135) | (0.079) | (0.139) |
| borders | 0.069 | 0.090 | 0.018 | 0.038 |
|  | (0.061) | (0.069) | (0.065) | (0.074) |
| cold war | 0.016 | -0.260 | 0.045 | -0.761 |
|  | (0.137) | (0.570) | (0.138) | (0.610) |
| tonnage | 0.293\*\* | 0.351\*\* | 0.202+ | 0.277\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.113) | (0.109) | (0.115) |
| radical leader |  |  | 0.583\*\*\* | 0.573\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.145) | (0.148) |
| Constant | -3.522\* | -3.876\* | -4.694\*\* | -3.411+ |
|  | (1.461) | (1.767) | (1.536) | (1.810) |
|  |
| Observations | 1,741 | 1,741 | 1,699 | 1,699 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,003.872 | -971.771 | -968.459 | -940.641 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 2,143.743 | 2,159.542 | 2,072.917 | 2,097.282 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 16

 To solve the problem of missing data, I dichotomize the power projection variable, 1=a country-year is coded as having power projection capabilities, 0=a country-year observation does not have power projection capabilities. Table 16 shows that most observations are no longer dropped from the models, and civilian control is once again statistically significant and positive.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: projection binary measure** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | partial model | time fixed effects | full model | full model+time |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.341\*\*\* | 0.267\*\* | 0.438\*\*\* | 0.386\*\*\* |
|  | (0.086) | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.095) |
| military power | -8.027+ | -8.851\* | 1.291 | -0.101 |
|  | (4.277) | (4.514) | (4.755) | (4.944) |
| great power | 2.361\* | 2.107\* | 1.838+ | 1.625 |
|  | (1.066) | (1.068) | (1.093) | (1.100) |
| Democracy | -1.800\*\*\* | -1.863\*\*\* | -1.692\*\*\* | -1.766\*\*\* |
|  | (0.343) | (0.348) | (0.347) | (0.353) |
| log GDP | 0.339\*\*\* | 0.455\*\*\* | 0.382\*\*\* | 0.431\*\*\* |
|  | (0.056) | (0.095) | (0.058) | (0.099) |
| Borders | 0.060 | 0.047 | 0.006 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.055) | (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.065) |
| cold war | -0.016 | -0.260 | -0.002 | -0.616 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.426) | (0.104) | (0.463) |
| Projection | -0.391\* | -0.483\* | -0.357+ | -0.430\* |
|  | (0.191) | (0.191) | (0.197) | (0.199) |
| radical leader |  |  | 0.620\*\*\* | 0.619\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.117) | (0.117) |
| Constant | -2.448+ | -2.704+ | -3.760\*\* | -3.255\* |
|  | (1.367) | (1.532) | (1.435) | (1.591) |
|  |
| Observations | 4,567 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,837.144 | -1,805.518 | -1,754.556 | -1,725.729 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,980.288 | 3,997.035 | 3,809.111 | 3,831.457 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 17

 Table 17 presents miscellaneous model specifications in which one or more control variables are excluded from the models.

|  |
| --- |
| **Poisson Models: alternative models** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | no resource | no rad leader | no borders | no cinc+great power | no cinc, great power, rad leader |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |
| civil control | 0.394\*\*\* | 0.281\*\* | 0.396\*\*\* | 0.397\*\*\* | 0.283\*\* |
|  | (0.095) | (0.090) | (0.095) | (0.095) | (0.090) |
| military power | -0.442 | -10.040\* | 0.071 |  |  |
|  | (4.944) | (4.646) | (4.490) |  |  |
| great power | 1.648 | 2.146\* | 1.640 |  |  |
|  | (1.100) | (1.068) | (1.100) |  |  |
| democracy | -1.728\*\*\* | -1.837\*\*\* | -1.741\*\*\* | -1.768\*\*\* | -1.814\*\*\* |
|  | (0.352) | (0.348) | (0.349) | (0.352) | (0.344) |
| log GDP | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.465\*\*\* | 0.431\*\*\* | 0.449\*\*\* | 0.435\*\*\* |
|  | (0.098) | (0.096) | (0.098) | (0.095) | (0.092) |
| borders | 0.015 | 0.071 |  | 0.007 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.064) | (0.061) |  | (0.056) | (0.055) |
| cold war | -0.560 | -0.198 | -0.590 | -0.557 | -0.328 |
|  | (0.462) | (0.426) | (0.445) | (0.455) | (0.421) |
| radical leader | 0.649\*\*\* |  | 0.648\*\*\* | 0.652\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.117) |  | (0.118) | (0.116) |  |
| oil and gas |  | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -3.773\* | -2.961+ | -3.756\* | -2.279\* | -2.074\* |
|  | (1.572) | (1.548) | (1.621) | (1.083) | (1.038) |
|  |
| Observations | 4,394 | 4,567 | 4,394 | 4,394 | 4,567 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,728.029 | -1,808.136 | -1,728.056 | -1,729.556 | -1,814.118 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,834.058 | 4,002.272 | 3,834.112 | 3,835.113 | 4,010.236 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 18

 Tables 18 and 19 run the main models presented in Table 3 of the main paper, with an important distinction: I use the specific components of the civil-control index as alternative measures for the civil-control independent variable, one indicator per model. These models serve as robustness checks, as the individual components have been used as stand-alone measures of civilian control in past research. Each model in Table 18 and 19 is labeled based on the author(s) where the indicator is drawn from.

 Unlike the Kenwick (2020) index, which measures the degree of civilian control per country-year from weakest to strongest, each of these indicators is measured from least to most militaristic; higher values indicate that civilian control is weaker. The direction of effect of the coefficients for most models, with exception of model 3, seem to confirm the results of the main models: if the leader has military experience (Model 1), holds military rank (Model 2), or if the national cabinet has more military members (Model 4), or if the military is more involved in politics (Model 5), the likelihood of initiating MIDs decreases. However, these results are only statistically significant in models 1 and 5.

|  |
| --- |
| **Robustness check #1** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | Horowitz and Stam | Beck et. al. | White | Svolik entry | Svolik mil involvement |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |
| leader mil experience | -0.164\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.064) |  |  |  |  |
| military leader |  | -0.170 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.185) |  |  |  |
| mil participation in govt |  |  | 0.038 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.065) |  |  |
| military entry |  |  |  | -0.227 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.152) |  |
| mil involvement in pol |  |  |  |  | -0.183\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.070) |
| military power | -1.478 | -5.660 | -2.176 | 13.760 | 5.408 |
|  | (5.234) | (10.850) | (5.888) | (12.078) | (12.432) |
| great power | 1.654 | 1.227 | 1.600 | 3.123\* | 3.170\* |
|  | (1.101) | (1.101) | (1.104) | (1.339) | (1.359) |
| democracy | -1.328\*\*\* | -2.021\*\*\* | -0.972\*\* | -0.547 | -0.397 |
|  | (0.332) | (0.451) | (0.328) | (0.621) | (0.641) |
| log GDP | 0.469\*\*\* | 0.329\* | 0.479\*\*\* | 0.496\*\*\* | 0.563\*\*\* |
|  | (0.099) | (0.134) | (0.102) | (0.141) | (0.150) |
| borders | 0.025 | -0.105 | 0.004 | -0.038 | 0.050 |
|  | (0.065) | (0.097) | (0.073) | (0.097) | (0.102) |
| cold war | -0.420 | -0.937\*\* | -0.377 | -0.368 | -0.303 |
|  | (0.460) | (0.326) | (0.414) | (0.733) | (0.730) |
| oil and gas | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000+ | -0.000\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader | 0.587\*\*\* | 0.695\*\*\* | 0.568\*\*\* | 0.762\*\*\* | 0.617\*\*\* |
|  | (0.117) | (0.174) | (0.121) | (0.143) | (0.145) |
| Constant | -4.123\* | -1.185 | -4.539\*\* | -7.023\*\*\* | -7.116\*\*\* |
|  | (1.628) | (1.976) | (1.665) | (1.259) | (1.328) |
|  |
| Observations | 4,378 | 3,091 | 4,109 | 2,607 | 2,483 |
| Log Likelihood | -1,732.472 | -1,213.554 | -1,617.053 | -1,007.049 | -962.485 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,844.944 | 2,777.109 | 3,606.106 | 2,326.098 | 2,226.971 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 19

 Table 19 is like Table 18, using the next five indicator components of the Kenwick (2020) index as alternative measures of civilian control over the military. Results are mixed: the direction of effect is negative for models 1-3, but in the opposite direction in models 4-5. The results are statistically significant only in models 1 and 3, suggesting that authoritarian regimes and being a current or past member of the armed forces, respectively, decreases the likelihood of initiating MIDs. Interpretation of these results must be done with caution; Weeks (2012) militarism index is a measure of authoritarian regimes and is missing data for democracies, so there is a significant drop in the number of observations for model 1.

|  |
| --- |
| **Robustness check #2** |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Revisionist |
|  | Weeks | Geddes et al. | Cheibub et al. | Hadenius and Teorell | GWF prior mil regime |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |
| militarism index | -0.143\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.067) |  |  |  |  |
| GWF military regime |  | -0.102 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.186) |  |  |  |
| CGV military regime |  |  | -0.493\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.149) |  |  |
| ARD military regime |  |  |  | 0.110 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.208) |  |
| prior mil regime |  |  |  |  | 0.235 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.183) |
| military power | 12.118 | -2.531 | -3.464 | -5.740 | -2.953 |
|  | (17.893) | (5.225) | (5.263) | (10.433) | (5.231) |
| great power | 4.106\*\* | 1.689 | 1.712 | 1.223 | 1.698 |
|  | (1.493) | (1.100) | (1.100) | (1.101) | (1.100) |
| Democracy | -1.026+ | -1.042\*\* | -1.511\*\*\* | -1.562\*\*\* | -1.136\*\*\* |
|  | (0.613) | (0.343) | (0.342) | (0.437) | (0.331) |
| log GDP | 0.205 | 0.518\*\*\* | 0.479\*\*\* | 0.422\*\* | 0.515\*\*\* |
|  | (0.168) | (0.097) | (0.098) | (0.129) | (0.097) |
| Borders | -0.155 | 0.038 | 0.042 | -0.141 | 0.044 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.065) | (0.066) | (0.095) | (0.065) |
| cold war | -1.468 | -0.304 | -0.453 | -0.926\*\* | -0.273 |
|  | (1.196) | (0.459) | (0.459) | (0.357) | (0.458) |
| oil and gas | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| radical leader | 0.687\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* | 0.638\*\*\* | 0.667\*\*\* | 0.597\*\*\* |
|  | (0.184) | (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.156) | (0.117) |
| Constant | -4.360\*\* | -4.972\*\* | -4.049\* | -2.517 | -4.821\*\* |
|  | (1.575) | (1.610) | (1.626) | (1.944) | (1.606) |
|  |
| Observations | 1,951 | 4,394 | 4,346 | 3,283 | 4,394 |
| Log Likelihood | -729.956 | -1,736.294 | -1,717.088 | -1,288.519 | -1,735.618 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,741.912 | 3,852.588 | 3,814.176 | 2,931.038 | 3,851.236 |
|  |
| *Note:* | + p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001 |

Table 20

To further assist readers in visualizing how countries are scored, Table 20 shows an example of the top 5 and bottom 5 civil-military scores for the year 2000, in descending order.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| top 5 countries | civil-military score | bottom 5 countries | Civil-military score |
| Denmark | 2.859902 | Gambia | -1.156607 |
| Switzerland | 2.818133 | Pakistan | -1.184555 |
| Norway | 2.790959 | Sudan | -1.234298 |
| Sweden | 2.749146 | Burundi | -1.290022 |
| Ireland | 2.735049 | Myanmar | -3.332510 |