

Legislature Size and Interest Mobilization

Online Appendix

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A1 Comparison of Treated and Control State Means

Figure A1 compares interest populations for my three treated states to the average populations for control states. The figure shows that populations for Illinois and control states did not display parallel trends before or after the Cutback Amendment’s implementation in 1983. The panels for Massachusetts and Rhode Island show more consistency between treated and control states, but with some deviation. Note that the third panel uses two vertical axes, including one for Rhode Island and another for all nineteen control states.

A2 Historical Interest Populations in Treated States

Figures A2 and A3 present longer series of observations of interest populations in my three reformed states: Massachusetts, Illinois, and Rhode Island. Rhode Island is presented separately given the different years from which observations were gathered there. In Figure A2, a solid horizontal line represents the number of interest groups that registered to lobby every year in Massachusetts, while a dashed horizontal line provides the same information for Illinois. The solid vertical line demarcates the year when downsizing was first in effect in Massachusetts, and the dashed vertical line shows the year when downsizing was first in effect in Illinois. In neither state does a surge in lobbying occur more than two election cycles prior to the implementation of downsizing.¹ In Massachusetts, a petition to downsize the legislature first began to circulate in 1967, and voters approved the measure in 1974. Although a surge might have occurred the year after voters approved the House Cut Amendment, additional synthetic control analyses cannot be performed to test this proposition since pre-1970 observations from control states are not all available. Such a result, nevertheless, would provide evidence supporting my narrative. In Illinois, the legislature first approved a large pay

¹Given that campaign finance activities are expected to link legislature size with interest mobilization, any surge in lobbying that would have occurred before voters approved of a downsizing event would provide evidence contradicting my expectations. Since the three downsizing events examined in the study were all implemented at least one election after voters approved of downsizing amendments, incumbent legislators serving in the interim period between voter approval and implementation would begin to fundraise for reelection in chambers soon to be downsized.

Figure A1: Interest Groups in Treated and Control States




Figure A2: Interest Groups in Massachusetts and Illinois





Figure A3: Interest Groups in Rhode Island



raise for itself in 1978, and a campaign to downsize the assembly was subsequently initiated. Voters approved the Cutback Amendment in 1980. From the figure, no surge in lobbying occurred in 1978 or even 1980. Similarly, no pre-referendum surge occurred in Rhode Island, either. In that state, talk of legislative downsizing first began in earnest in 1992, and voters approved an amendment in 1994. While interest populations increased throughout the early 1990s, these trends reflect long-term growth that was occurring in that state. Observations of Rhode Island interest populations from before 1990 are not all available.

A3 Interest Diversity in Illinois

Interest diversity is more difficult to measure than overall group numbers. Walker (1983) argues that an interest community diverse in terms of numbers of interest types may still reflect a narrow number of socio-economic classes or geographic regions. For example, even though there were many different substantive interests active in Congress, Schattschneider (1960) argued that the interests generally reflected the business and upper-class communities more than anyone else. Building on this work, Gray and Lowery (1993, 88) define diversity as the “extent to which a variety of economic and noneconomic interests are articulated by organized groups.” The connection between group numbers and overall diversity (as measured with, say, a Herfindahl index) remains unclear since some types of interests may grow more quickly over time than others (perhaps in response to legislative downsizing, as proposed) and because individual business firms may splinter from larger associations such as chambers of commerce (Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2005).

To understand how interest groups changed in Illinois, Table A1 presents the numbers of businesses, associations of businesses and professionals, labor unions, various cause-based groups, and other interests active in Illinois’ legislature for every fourth year between 1971 and 1987. The interests are generally coded into Gerber’s (1999) typology, although (for simplicity) professional associations are presented as monetary-based interests. From the table, all types of interests saw significant increases over time, particularly from 1979 before voters approved to Cutback Amendment to 1983 when the downsized legislature first convened. An overall measure of diversity based on the 10 subcategories of interests, the Herfindahl index, changes only slightly over those years.

In more tests of my proposed link between legislative downsizing and interest populations, I explore whether the Cutback Amendment truly did affect the mix of interests active in Illinois’ legislature by increasing numbers of monetary interests in particular. I code the interest organizations that were active in 1983 into one of three categories using Gerber’s (1999, 65-71) typology: monetary-based interests (which, again, includes professional asso-

Table A1: Interest Diversity in Illinois, 1971 - 1987

Interest Type	1971	1975	1979	1983	1987
Monetary Interests	129	226	281	404	525
Institution	18	66	107	193	268
Association	111	160	174	211	257
Personnel Interests	34	60	48	77	82
Labor Union	20	24	18	30	30
Environmental	2	4	3	5	7
Legal Reform	7	23	19	28	31
Women's Issue	2	6	5	8	9
Religious	3	3	3	6	5
Other Interests	14	34	45	61	97
Government	7	11	13	32	53
Utility	2	9	11	11	13
Other / Unknown	5	14	21	18	31
Grand Total	178	319	542	548	704
<i>Herfindahl</i>	0.416	0.310	0.312	0.287	0.290

ciations), personnel-based interests, and other interests that cannot be clearly classified into either category (i.e., local governments and utilities, primarily, which cannot be argued to corral either monetary or personnel resources). I also code interests according to whether they had registered to lobby members of the Illinois legislature in 1979, before the Amendment was approved by voters. Table A2 presents percentages of interests that were new across each category.

Using this information, I then performed various tests for whether interests in some categories were more or less likely to appear anew at the 1983 session (i.e., were not registered to lobby 1979) than others. The results of those multiple comparisons with Bonferroni correction for different distributions are presented in Table A3. The results do not support my proposed link between downsizing and interest populations. Whereas 52.48 percent of monetary interests were new, 46.75 percent of personnel interests were new (which produces a difference of 0.057 reported in Table A3, which is not statistically discernible). In contrast, higher percentages of other interests than monetary and personnel interests were new, and those differences are discernible. Table A4 presents the same tests but with slightly different categories of interests. The results presented in this table also do not support my proposed link: associational interests were less likely than institutions to mobilize anew, but there are no discernible differences between the mobilization of institutions and that of labor unions and public interests (although the differences are negative, as expected), or other interests (which were more likely to mobilize than associations).

Table A2: Interest Growth in Illinois, 1979 to 1983

Interest Type	Total in 1983	Percent New
Total Interests	542	53.51
Monetary Interests	404	52.48
Personnel Interests	77	46.75
Others	61	68.85

Table A3: Multiple Comparison Tests of New Interests, 1983

Interest Type	Monetary Interests	Personnel Interests
Personnel Interests	-0.057	-
Other Interests	0.164**	0.221**

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A4: Multiple Comparison Tests of New Interests, 1983

Interest Type	Institutional Interests	Associational Interests	Labor Unions	Public Interest Groups
Associational Interests	-0.255***	-	-	-
Labor Unions	-0.225	0.030	-	-
Public Interest Groups	-0.169	0.087	0.056	-
Other Interests	0.030	0.286***	0.255	0.199

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A4 Works Cited

- Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. *The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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