

Appendix 1. Experimental design and descriptive statistics

This appendix describes the design of the survey experiment, including the pre-test. In addition, it reports the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses.

Vignettes in Danish

The vignettes for the Danish survey were similar to those used in the U.S. sample, presented in the section “Survey experiment”, except from the obvious fact that they were formulated in Danish. In addition, as described in the article, we randomized the party sponsor (*Venstre* or *Socialdemokratiet*). The Danish vignettes are presented below.

Introduction

Nedenfor kan du se et uddrag fra [Venstres/Socialdemokratiets] hjemmeside, som handler om partiets holdning til indvandring. Tag dig god tid om at læse uddraget. Tryk på knappen ”Fortsæt” når du er færdig med at læse om partiets holdning.



Text – 1a: Economy

Indvandrere er en udgift for den danske økonomi

Indvandrere, som kommer til Danmark for at slå sig ned, påvirker den danske økonomi negativt. Mange indvandrere arbejder ikke under danske arbejdsforhold, og de presser danske lønninger og tager danske jobs. Samtidig er der indvandrere, som ikke har de kvalifikationer, som kræves på arbejdsmarkedet og derfor ender på offentlig forsørgelse. Kort sagt er mange indvandrere en økonomisk udgift. Vi i [Venstre/Socialdemokratiet] mener derfor, at det skal være sværere for indvandrere at komme til Danmark.

Text – 1b: Economy-moral

Udlændinge skader den danske økonomi

Udlændinge, som kommer til Danmark for at slå sig ned, skader den danske økonomi. Mange udlændinge nægter at respektere danske arbejdsforhold, de presser danske lønninger i urimelig grad og tager hensynsløst danske jobs. Samtidig er der udlændinge, som er ude af stand til at opfylde kravene på det danske arbejdsmarked og som følge deraf grådigt misbruger vores velfærdssystem. Kort sagt er mange udlændinge en økonomisk belastning. For at beskytte vores nation, mener vi i [Venstre/Socialdemokratiet], at det eneste rigtige er at begrænse deres adgang til Danmark.

Text – 2a: Culture***Indvandrere passer ikke ind i den danske kultur***

Indvandrere, som kommer til Danmark for at slå sig ned, påvirker den danske kultur negativt. Mange indvandrere er kulturelt set anderledes og fastholder deres traditioner i stedet for at følge dansk levevis. De taler ofte kun lidt dansk, og har derfor svært ved at integrere sig i samfundet. Kort sagt passer mange indvandrere ikke ind i den danske kultur. Vi i [Venstre/Socialdemokratiet] mener derfor, at det skal være sværere for indvandrere at komme til Danmark.

Text – 2b: Culture-moral***Udlændinge skader den danske kultur***

Udlændinge, som kommer til Danmark for at slå sig ned, skader den danske kultur. Mange udlændinge er kulturelt set fremmede, og de fastholder uden respekt deres traditioner i stedet for at indordne sig efter dansk levevis. De nægter ofte at lære ordentligt dansk og de tager dermed afstand og ekskluderer sig fra fællesskabet. Kort sagt er mange udlændinges kultur fremmed og ødelæggende over for det danske. For at beskytte vores nation, mener vi i [Venstre/Socialdemokratiet], at det eneste rigtige er at begrænse deres adgang til Danmark.

Pre-test results

The vignettes were pre-tested to ensure that the manipulations measured the intended phenomena and the selected party sponsors in the two countries were seen by respondents as credible.

The pre-test for the American survey was conducted with 606 MTurk respondents who were paid \$0.30 to take part in the survey. The pre-test for the Danish survey was administered by YouGov with a sample of 205 respondents. Danish respondents were asked to evaluate two vignettes in turn to increase the number of observations. The pre-test samples are not included in the main study.

Language usage

In the U.S. pre-test, respondents were asked three follow-up questions about their judgment of the language usage in the vignette (question order was randomized). The results show that respondents perceive the moral vignettes to use words that “appeal to people’s moral beliefs and convictions” and that “make distinctions between what is right and wrong” to a higher degree than the non-moral vignettes. Moral vignettes were also judged to use stronger words than the non-moral vignettes. This suggests that the experimental manipulations represent sufficiently valid and strong measures of moral framing to be recognized as such by the respondents (we do not claim that moral language is always consciously perceived as moral by the audience, but that this was the case in our vignettes reassures us about the quality of our experimental primes).

Table A1.1. Evaluations of language usage

	Moral beliefs and convictions (1-5)	Right and wrong (1-5)	Strong words (0-10)	
	U.S. sample			DK sample
Economy	3.12 (.09)	3.30 (.09)	6.64 (.18)	5.40 (.29)
Economy-moral	3.52 (.10)	3.64 (.10)	7.30 (.16)	6.10 (.30)
Culture	3.02 (.10)	3.07 (.10)	5.94 (.20)	5.53 (.27)
Culture-moral	3.33 (.10)	3.50 (.10)	7.43 (.15)	5.58 (.33)
N	150-154			101 – 104


Note: Standard errors in parentheses

In the Danish pre-test, respondents were only asked to rate the strength of the wording of the vignette.¹ Pre-test results show that the moralized economic vignette was perceived as more

¹ The Danish pre-test (as well as the Danish main study) was administered before the U.S. one, and we only decided later – i.e. in time for the U.S. pre-test – to ask respondents explicitly to assess the vignettes’ use of moralizing language. In addition, the question for assessing the language usage was more difficult to formulate in Danish. The question asked whether the vignette was “hårdt formuleret” = harshly worded; a formulation that has some extra connotations in comparison with the “strongly worded” phrase in English (i.e. stronger sense of

strongly worded than the non-moral economic vignette (means on 0-10 scale: 6.1 vs. 5.4, and 6.3 vs. 5.1 for those who received these vignettes as their first). This confirms the usefulness of this vignette pair for the study. The moralized and non-moral cultural vignettes were less easy for the respondents to distinguish (mean scores 5.6 vs. 5.5.). However, this masks the fact that the distribution is more skewed toward the right for the moralized version, while approaching a normal distribution around the mid-point on the scale for the non-moral version (see Figures A1.1-A1.2; note: the same types of distributions also apply for the moralized and non-moral economic vignettes). This is also revealed in the fact that the median value for the moralized cultural vignette is 6, and 5 for the non-moral cultural vignette. This shows that many respondents do perceive the former as more strongly worded than the latter.


Figure A1.1. Histogram for “strongly worded” scores, moralized culture



N=103

normative judgment). This may mean that Danish respondents were more hesitant than U.S. respondents to give a high score on the question.

Figure A1.2. Histogram for “strongly worded” scores, culture



N=102

Party sponsor

In the pre-tests, the vignettes were not accompanied by party sponsor information. Instead, respondents were told that the vignette was “an excerpt from a U.S. [Danish] political party’s webpage that describes the party’s position on immigration.” After having read the vignette and assessed the language usage, U.S. respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that the vignette resembled an official statement made by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party (randomized assignment). Danish respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that the vignette resembled a statement made by *Venstre* or *Socialdemokratiet*.

In the U.S. pre-test, the Republican Party was rated to be a credible sponsor of all four vignettes (mean perceived likelihood: 4.1-4.5 on a 1-5 scale), while the Democratic Party was rated as unlikely to have sponsored the anti-immigrant messages (mean perceived likelihood: 1.8-2 on a 1-5 scale). This underscores the validity of using the Republican Party as the sole party sponsor in the survey experiment.

Danish respondents rated the two parties at around the mid-point on the 1-5 likelihood scale for all vignettes, suggesting that none of the vignettes stand out as unlikely to have been written by the two parties.

Table A1.2. Mean assessed credibility of *Socialdemokratiet* and *Venstre* as party sponsors

	<i>Socialdemokratiet</i>	<i>Venstre</i>
Economy	2.61 (.16)	3.10 (.15)
Economy-moral	2.36 (.16)	2.88 (.15)
Culture	2.68 (.18)	2.87 (.15)
Culture-moral	2.65 (.16)	2.61 (.14)

N=49-53

Manipulation checks

To make sure that respondents were actually exposed to the treatments, we included several manipulation checks. The first manipulation check involved delay, preventing respondents from moving on to subsequent questions within the first 20 seconds of being presented with the vignette. To check respondents' attentiveness (and thus exposure to treatment), we also included two factual questions about the experimental material at the end of the survey. By placing these questions after our outcome measures in the questionnaire, we avoid the risk of the manipulation checks (rather than, or in addition to, the actual treatments) affecting respondents' answers to the central questions of interest. The first manipulation check question asked respondents to indicate the topic of the text they read earlier in the survey (immigration and four other political topics). This question is treatment-irrelevant in the sense that it does not help distinguish between experimental groups but rather checks all respondents' attentiveness and understanding of the material (Kane & Barabas, 2019). The second question asked which party wrote the text (+ the option to indicate that no party had written the text). This question is treatment-relevant in that it helps check respondent attentiveness across treatment groups. 213 U.S. respondents and 325 Danish respondents failed the manipulation checks. Failure to pass these manipulation checks is not patterned across treatment groups but respondents who failed the manipulation checks did appear to be somewhat younger, lower educated, and display lower levels of political knowledge than those who passed these checks, confirming past research (Alvarez, Atkeson, Levin, & Li, 2019). As pointed out by reviewers, these respondents should not be discarded (see also (Aronow, Baron, & Pinson, 2019)), as otherwise stated in the preregistration report. Instead, we include in our models a control for whether respondents passed or failed the manipulation checks. As can be seen, e.g. in Table A2.1 (Appendix 2), this control often exerts a statistically significant effect on the relevant outcomes, suggesting that its inclusion adds precision to estimates of the treatment effects. Models that discard these respondents produce substantially similar results.

Descriptive statistics, survey measures and index construction

Social distance indices, details: U.S. survey

Table A1.3. Correlation matrix

	President	Mayor	Neighbor	Colleagu e	Family	Spouse	Friend	Shop owner	Teacher
President	1.0000								
Mayor	0.7411	1.0000							
Neighbor	0.3645	0.4805	1.0000						
Colleagu e	0.4091	0.5239	0.8257	1.0000					
Family	0.4335	0.5182	0.7799	0.7934	1.0000				
Spouse	0.6066	0.6039	0.5668	0.5915	0.6639	1.0000			
Friend	0.4761	0.5238	0.7315	0.7690	0.8097	0.7066	1.0000		
Shop owner	0.4098	0.5103	0.7943	0.8034	0.7392	0.5743	0.7228	1.0000	
Teacher	0.6364	0.6681	0.5648	0.5875	0.5868	0.6332	0.5827	0.5862	1.0000

N=1,322

Table A1.4. Principal components factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation

Factor	Variance	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.99361	1.58819	0.6402	0.6402
Factor2	2.40542	2.13218	0.3856	1.0258
Factor3	0.27324	.	0.0438	1.0696

N=1,322

Table A1.5. Rotated factor loadings and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
President	0.2144	0.7962	0.0986	0.3104
Mayor	0.3419	0.7650	0.0245	0.2974
Neighbor	0.8617	0.2379	0.0109	0.2008
Colleague	0.8616	0.2842	0.0314	0.1759
Family	0.8024	0.3078	0.2432	0.2023
Spouse	0.5021	0.5660	0.3141	0.3289
Friend	0.7528	0.3502	0.3178	0.2097
Shop owner	0.8163	0.3008	-0.0067	0.2432
Teacher	0.4659	0.6487	0.0543	0.3592

N=1,322

Cronbach's alpha political leaders index: .84

Cronbach's alpha personal relationships index: .94

Social distance indices, details: Danish survey

Table A1.6. Correlation matrix

	Prime minister	Mayor	Neighbor	Colleagu e	Family	Spouse	Friend	Shop owner	Teacher
Prime minister	1.0000								
Mayor	0.7817	1.0000							
Neighbor	0.3805	0.4972	1.0000						
Colleagu e	0.3670	0.4838	0.8205	1.0000					
Family	0.4298	0.5237	0.7286	0.7474	1.0000				
Spouse	0.5999	0.6173	0.5777	0.5730	0.6851	1.0000			
Friend	0.4534	0.5510	0.7557	0.7646	0.7688	0.6959	1.0000		
Shop owner	0.3674	0.4899	0.7309	0.7370	0.6560	0.5219	0.6681	1.0000	
Teacher	0.5558	0.6288	0.6611	0.6700	0.7050	0.6690	0.6835	0.6510	1.0000

N=1,538

Table A1.7. Principal components factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation

Factor	Variance	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.95510	1.66868	0.6400	0.6400
Factor2	2.28642	1.93008	0.3700	1.0099
Factor3	0.35633	0.34971	0.0577	1.0676
Factor4	0.00663	.	0.0011	1.0687

N=1,538

Table A1.8. Rotated factor loadings and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4
Prime minister	0.1965	0.8155	0.0902	-0.0002
Mayor	0.3388	0.7943	0.0518	0.0055
Neighbor	0.8455	0.2560	0.0576	-0.0059
Colleague	0.8634	0.2342	0.0705	0.0004
Family	0.7410	0.3280	0.3093	0.0186
Spouse	0.4975	0.5512	0.3625	0.0020
Friend	0.7532	0.3496	0.2820	-0.0232
Shop owner	0.7640	0.2788	-0.0004	0.0426
Teacher	0.6276	0.5086	0.1751	0.0621

N=1,538

Cronbach's alpha political leaders index: .86

Cronbach's alpha personal relationships index: .93

Table A1.9. Mean values for control group

	U.S. sample	DK sample
Moral conviction (0-1)	.63 (.02) [270]	.59 (.02) [193]
Immigration sentiment (1-7) ²	4.60 (.12) [288]	5.07 (.11) [215]
Attitude extremity (0-3)	1.74 (.07) [288]	1.55 (.08) [215]
Social dist pol leaders (0-1)	.66 (.02) [293]	.63 (.02) [202]
Social dist soc interact (0-1)	.46 (.02) [283]	.52 (.02) [183]

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, Ns in square brackets.

Correlations between outcome measures for control groups

To address how moral conviction is connected to the polarization measures, we calculated the relevant correlations using the control groups in the two country samples. The results highlight the importance of moral conviction for polarization processes, outside of the experimental set-up.

Table A1.10. Correlation matrix based on control group, U.S. sample

	Moral conviction	Attitude extremity	Social dist pol leaders	Social dist soc interact
Moral conviction	1.0000			
Attitude extremity	0.3094	1.0000		
Social dist pol leaders	0.1552	0.1027	1.0000	
Social dist pers relations	0.2824	0.1971	0.6012	1.0000

N = 247

Table A1.11. Correlation matrix based on control group, Danish sample

	Moral conviction	Attitude extremity	Social dist pol leaders	Social dist soc interact
Moral conviction	1.0000			
Attitude extremity	0.3640	1.0000		
Social dist pol leaders	0.1878	0.0369	1.0000	
Social dist pers relations	0.1681	0.0838	0.5758	1.0000

² This measure is not used in the analyses but only reported here as contextual information. Respondents were asked whether immigration to the country should be increased or reduced in the current situation, with seven response categories, ranging from "1-increase a lot" to "7-reduce a lot." The question is used as a basis for constructing our measure of attitude extremity as described in the section "Outcome measures" in the article.

In both the Danish and U.S. samples, moral conviction is moderately to strongly correlated with attitude extremity. Thus, while we do not find evidence for an experimental effect of moralized political framing on this outcome, these patterns suggests that people already high in moral conviction tend to have more extreme views on immigration. Whether these associations are the result of basic human psychology or of living in political environments in which immigration has been moralized over an extended period of time is impossible to say with the data at hand. The latter scenario would suggest that respondents are already extensively pre-treated with moral frames, thereby making it more difficult for us to observe additional effects of moralization on attitude extremity in our survey experiments.

The fact that correlations between attitude extremity and each of the two social distance measures are substantively lower than between moral conviction and these two measures, suggest moral conviction regarding immigration should be a stronger predictor of affective polarization. In this way, our data from two distinct national contexts support the view recently advocated in the polarization literature that attitudinal and affective polarization are distinct phenomena (with one being a poor predictor of the other; see our discussion in the manuscript). Instead, the level of people's moral conviction – and as our experimental evidence suggests, the moralized rhetoric they have been exposed to – provides a better foundation for understanding affective polarization.³

³ The correlations between the social distance measures and attitude extremity are much lower in the Danish sample than in the U.S. sample, suggesting that disagreements over immigration are not as consequential for Danes' view of their political leaders and social interaction partners as they are for people in the U.S. This observation provides an interesting starting point for future empirical studies on cross-national differences in the connection between different domains of political disagreement and affective polarization.

References

- Alvarez, R. Michael, Atkeson, Lonna Rae, Levin, Ines, & Li, Yimeng. (2019). Paying Attention to Inattentive Survey Respondents. *Political Analysis*, 27(2), 145-162. doi:10.1017/pan.2018.57
- Aronow, Peter M., Baron, Jonathon, & Pinson, Lauren. (2019). A Note on Dropping Experimental Subjects who Fail a Manipulation Check. *Political Analysis*, 27(4), 572-589. doi:10.1017/pan.2019.5
- Kane, John V., & Barabas, Jason. (2019). No Harm in Checking: Using Factual Manipulation Checks to Assess Attentiveness in Experiments. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(1), 234-249. doi:10.1111/ajps.12396

Appendix 2. Direct effects of message exposure

This appendix presents OLS regressions for the models behind Figure 1 and corresponding pairwise comparison plots.

Table A2.1. Does message exposure affect moral conviction and polarization outcomes? Results from OLS regressions, U.S. and DK samples

Message (ref: control)	Moral conviction		Attitude extremity		Distance, political leaders		Distance, social interaction partners	
	U.S.	DK	U.S.	DK	U.S.	DK	U.S.	DK
Economy	-.01 (.03)	.03 (.02)	-.10 (.10)	.02 (.10)	.04 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.02)
Economy-moral	.04 [#] (.03)	.04* (.02)	-.07 (.10)	-.05 (.10)	.07** (.02)	.03 (.02)	.05* (.02)	.01 (.02)
Culture	.04 (.03)	.04 [#] (.02)	-.17 [#] (.10)	.10 (.10)	.03 (.02)	.05* (.02)	.06** (.02)	.04 [#] (.02)
Culture-moral	.08** (.03)	.06** (.02)	-.04 (.10)	.06 (.10)	.02 (.02)	.05* (.02)	.04 [#] (.02)	.02 (.02)
Not passed manipulation check	-.13*** (.03)	-.01 (.02)	-.11 (.10)	-.03 (.08)	-.17*** (.03)	-.08*** (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.03 [#] (.02)
Constant	.63*** (.02)	.59*** (.02)	1.74*** (.07)	1.55*** (.08)	.66*** (.02)	.63*** (.02)	.46*** (.02)	.52*** (.02)
N	1,312	1,656	1,399	1,905	1,391	1,738	1,337	1,565

Note: [#]p<.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Control condition is reference category. Unstandardised coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Grey shade to highlight statistically significant coefficients.

Given that the regression models above do not allow between-vignette comparisons, we produced a number of comparison plots to determine whether exposure to different messages resulted in statistically significant differences in the relevant outcomes. Table A2.2 gives an overview of the comparisons that returned statistically significant differences (indicated in Figure 1 by co-occurring letters).

Table A2.2. Vignettes with statistically significant differences in means

Outcome	United States	Denmark
Moral conviction	Econ-moral (vs. Control [#] & Econ) Cult (vs. Econ) Cult-moral (vs. Control & Econ)	Econ-moral (vs. Control) Cult (vs. Control [#]) Cult-moral (vs. Control & Econ [#])
Attitude extremity	Control (vs. Cult [#])	Cult (vs. Econ-moral [#])
Social distance, political leaders	Econ-moral (vs. Control & Cult-moral [#])	Cult (vs. Control) Cult-moral (vs. Control)
Social distance, social interaction partners	Econ-moral (vs. Control & Econ [#]) Cult (vs. Control & Econ) Cult-moral (vs. Control [#])	Cult (vs. Control [#] & Econ [#])


Note: Based on pairwise comparisons of the five different experimental groups (four treatments and one control group). Treatment group has higher mean than the group(s) in parentheses. Unless otherwise indicated, all $p < .05$; however # $p < .1$.

Comparison plots behind Table A2.2

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals


MORAL CONVICTION

Figure A2.1. Pairwise comparisons, U.S. sample



N=1,312


Figure A2.2. Pairwise comparisons, Danish sample



N=1,656


ATTITUDE EXTREMITY

Figure A2.3. Pairwise comparisons, U.S. sample



N=1,399


Figure A2.4. Pairwise comparisons, Danish sample



N=1,905


SOCIAL DISTANCE, POLITICAL LEADERS

Figure A2.5. Pairwise comparisons, U.S. sample



N=1,391


Figure A2.6. Pairwise comparisons, Danish sample



N = 1,738


SOCIAL DISTANCE, SOCIAL INTERACTION PARTNERS

Figure A2.7. Pairwise comparisons, U.S. sample



N=1,337

Figure A2.8. Pairwise comparisons, Danish sample




N = 1,565

Appendix 3. U.S. analyses including African Americans


This appendix presents analyses that parallel those reported in the manuscript but expand the U.S. sample to whites and African Americans.

Figure A3.1. Moral conviction




N=1,441

Figure A3.2. Attitude extremity




N=1,541

Figure A3.3. Distance, political leaders




N=1,542

Figure A3.4. Distance, social interaction partners



N=1,475

Figure A3.5. Average marginal effects of exposure to non-moral and moral messages on moral conviction across groups of party identifiers



Note: Control group is reference category. Bars indicate 90 and 95% confidence intervals. * indicates statistically significant difference in effects of non-moral and moral messages at the $p < .1$ -level.

Appendix 4. Mediation analysis

This appendix reports the results of a series of mediation analyses, following the approach proposed by Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011), using the `medeff` package in Stata (Hicks & Tingley, 2011). We investigate whether the effects of treatment condition on the two social distance outcomes are mediated by moral conviction. Given that mediation analysis is meaningful only when total effects are statistically significant, we do not include analyses for attitude extremity. In the same vein, we only interpret on average causal mediation effects for treatments that produced statistically significant total effects.


Causal mediation analysis relies on the sequential ignorability assumption. The first part of this assumption is satisfied by design (because treatment assignment is randomized, it is ignorable, i.e. statistically independent of potential outcomes and potential mediators), whereas the second part pertaining to the ignorability of the mediator must be assumed (Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011). As a check on this assumption, we performed sensitivity analyses for each outcome and treatment condition in both samples. In keeping with the analyses reported in the article, we do not include pre-treatment controls (except from the control for manipulation check status) in the mediation analyses. Models that include controls for age, gender, and education do not alter the results reported below.

For each of the two outcomes and samples, the figures below report the estimated total effect of exposure to each of the four treatments compared to the control group (upper panel). In the lower panel of each figure, we report the average causal mediation effect (ACME) that moral conviction is estimated to account for.

We note that point estimates of total effects deviate slightly from those reported in Figure 1 and Table A2.1 (Appendix 2). This is due to the fact that the mediation analysis requires us to work with dummy variables (and thus to estimate total effects, direct effects and ACME separately for each treatment condition compared to the control group, instead of working with a categorical variable for all four treatment conditions in the same model). In addition, the mediation analysis is based on simulated data (we opted for 1000 resamples, based on standard procedures for mediation analysis). Importantly, substantive conclusions do not depart from those based on OLS regression. In addition, for our purposes the relevant entity in focus is the percentage of the total effect mediated by moral conviction (the ACMEs). We therefore focus on this entity in our analyses below.

Social distance, political leaders

Replicating results from Table A2.1 and the third panel of Figure 1, statistically significant total effects appear for the moralized economy vignette in the U.S. sample and for the non-moral and moralized culture vignette in the Danish sample (the latter at a marginally statistically significant level in the mediation analysis).



In the U.S. sample, mediation through moral conviction is estimated to account for 14 % of the total effect of the moralized economy vignette (with the point estimate for the ACME reaching marginal statistical significance).

In the Danish sample, mediation through moral conviction is estimated to account for 15 % of the total effect of the non-moral culture vignette (marginally statistically significant), and for 35 % of the moralized culture vignette. In other words, in line with our expectations, we see that heightened levels of moral conviction appears to account for a greater share of the total effect of the moralized version of the culture vignette compared to the non-moral version.

Social distance, social interaction partners

Replicating results from Table A2.1 and the fourth panel of Figure 1, statistically significant total effects appear for all vignettes except the non-moral economy vignette in the U.S. sample (the moralized economy vignette is statistically significant at the $p < .1$ level). In the Danish sample, as shown in Figure 1, the non-moral culture vignette is the only one to produce a statistically significant total effect.

In the U.S. sample, ACMEs are marginally statistically significant for the moralized economy vignette and the non-moral culture vignette, accounting for 14 % and 13 % of the total effect, respectively. For the moralized culture vignette, moral conviction is estimated to account for 23 % of the total effect. In parallel with the Danish results for social distance toward political

leaders, we see that mediation through moral conviction is somewhat stronger for the moralized version than the non-moral version of the culture vignette.

In the Danish sample, we see that the mediation effect for the non-moral culture vignette is very small in substantive terms and marginally statistically significant. Moral conviction is estimated to account for 15 % of the total effect.

Figure A4.3. U.S. sample





Figure A4.4. Danish sample



References

- Hicks, Raymond, & Tingley, Dustin. (2011). Causal mediation analysis. *Stata Journal*, 11(4), 605-619.
- Imai, Kosuke, Keele, Luke, Tingley, Dustin, & Yamamoto, Teppei. (2011). Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies. *American Political Science Review*, 105(4), 765-789.
doi:10.1017/S0003055411000414


Appendix 5. Partisan effects

This appendix examines whether partisanship moderates the effects of the experimental treatments. For the Danish sample, we supplement previous analyses of the interaction between the vignette party sponsor and respondents' party identification for the other outcomes that were not included in Figure 2 (i.e., attitude extremity and the two social distance measures). In other words, we investigate whether the effects of moral and non-moral messages vary across combinations of party sponsors (*Socialdemokratiet* vs. *Venstre*) and respondent party identification. For the U.S. sample, we report on the differences in effects of moral and non-moral messages (compared to the control group) by respondent party identification.

Denmark


The figures follow the same format as Figure 2 in the article. They investigate whether the effect of moral and non-moral messages on the relevant outcome depends on which of the two parties sponsored the messages, across respondents' party identification. In all figures, *Venstre* is the baseline. Models include controls for manipulation check status and argument type (economy or culture). Error bars correspond to 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure A5.1. Attitude extremity




N = 1,690

Figure A5.2. Social distance, political leaders



N = 1,536

Figure A5.3. Social distance, personal relationships




N= 1,382

The results demonstrate that party sponsorship mostly does not moderate the effect of moralized messages on any of the outcomes. The only exception is the tendency for SD identifiers to become more attitudinally extreme when exposed to a moralized message from *Socialdemokratiet* compared to *Venstre* (support for H5a); however, this effect is small and statistically significant at the 90%-level only. In addition, those who do not identify with a political party become more attitudinally extreme when exposed to non-moral messages sponsored by *Socialdemokratiet* rather than *Venstre*. The politically non-aligned fall outside of our theoretical expectations, and we therefore refrain from offering further interpretation of this finding.

United States


The figures follow the same format as Figure 3 in the article. They investigate whether the effects of non-moral and moral messages (compared to the control group) on the relevant outcome vary across groups defined by respondents' party identification. In contrast to the Danish survey, there is no variation in party sponsor (all messages were presented as stemming from the Republican Party). Error bars correspond to 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals. * indicates statistically significant difference in effects of non-moral and moral messages at the $p < .1$ -level.

Figure A5.4. Attitude extremity




N=1,399

Figure A5.5. Social distance, political leaders



N=1,391

Figure A5.6. Social distance, personal relationships



N=1,337

In parallel to the analysis reported in the article, which focused on moral conviction as the outcome, there is a general tendency for Independent identifiers to be affected by moral messages, and for Republican and Democratic identifiers to be unaffected. In addition to moral conviction (cf. Figure 3 in the article), this applies to the two measures of affective polarization (but not to attitudinal polarization).⁴ For social distance toward social interaction partners, there is also a tendency at the $p < .1$ -level for Democratic identifiers to be affected by moralized messages (compared to the control group). Finally, for social distance to political leaders, there is a tendency for those who do not identify with a political party to be affected by moral messages, but we hesitate to place too much weight on this finding as only few respondents belong in this category.

⁴ We note that for social distance toward political leaders, Independents appear to be affected by both non-moral and moral messages (cf. Figure A5.5). While the point estimate is larger for moral messages, the difference in effects between non-moral and moral messages is not statistically significant.