

Appendix 1

Link Items Included in Additive Score (dichotomies)

The strongest possible type of links between a central party organization and union are those regulated by union/party statutes since they create overlapping organizational structures (e.g. collective affiliation of unions to party and mutual/one-sided formal representation in union/party decision-making bodies). To ensure comparability, however, only inter-organizational links are a part of our additive score, i.e. ‘joint arrangements/ agreements’ (reciprocal, durable links) and ‘Party-arranged meetings’ (one-way occasional links). These are the ties unions also might have to legislative party groups. The relevant dichotomous link items from the LPTU dataset that we have used, is presented in Table A1, in hierarchical order of strength. One-way occasional links initiated by unions are excluded due to our analytical focus on parties and their incentives. ‘Invitation to organization to participate in the party’s national congress’ is omitted as it only applies to the central party organization.

Table A1. Sub-groups of inter-organizational links a party unit (CPO/LPG) can have to unions with items listed in hierarchical order of strength.

Reciprocal, durable: Joint arrangements/ agreements	One-way, occasional: Party-arranged meetings
Tacit (de facto official) agreements about mutual representation in national decision-making bodies	Invitations to organization to participate in ordinary party meetings, seminars, and conferences
Permanent joint committee(s)	
Temporary joint committee(s)	Invitations to organization to special consultative arrangements initiated by the party
Formal (written) agreements about regular meetings between party and union	
Tacit (de facto official) agreements about regular meetings between party and union	
Joint conferences	
Joint campaigns	

Table A2 presents how common these kinds of links are in the LPTU dataset. The results below confirm that these links scale well and can be included in an index measuring the overall *Party link score* (number of links that parties have to unions).

Table A2. Mokken Scaling

Link	Type	Share	Hi
Organization has been invited to special consultative meetings and seminars	One-Sided	0.72	0.69
Organization has been invited to ordinary meetings and seminars	One-sided	0.55	0.79
Tacit (but official) agreements about regular meetings	Joint	0.32	0.74
Joint Campaigns	Joint	0.16	0.54
Tacit (but official) agreements about one-side or mutual representation in decision-making bodies	Joint	0.14	0.64
Temporary Joint Committee(s)	Joint	0.12	0.60
Permanent Joint Committee(s)	Joint	0.12	0.58
Joint Conferences	Joint	0.12	0.58
Formal (written) agreements about regular meetings	Joint	0.03	0.80
Entire scale			0.65

*Joint: Reciprocal, Durable, Joint Arrangements or Agreements

*One-sided: One-way, Occassional, Party-arranged meetings

Appendix 2

Coding information for public party subventions and traditional ally-variables

Size of public party subventions (in 1 000 000 euros): Overview of all 12 countries

Austria

Size of subventions: 13.11 (SPÖ). 12.19 (ÖVP). Only has permanent subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: 13.11 (SPÖ). 12.19 (ÖVP). 2011: NA. 2012: NA

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2010

Data source for size of subventions: PPDB

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election

Finland

Size of subventions: 5.87 (SDP). 2.03 (VAS). Only has permanent subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: NA. 2012: NA. 2015: 5.87 (SDP). 2.03 (VAS).

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2015

Data source for size of subventions: PAIRDEM-PPDB

Subsidy allocation reflects (from IDEA Political Finance Database): funding is proportional to seats won in previous election

France

Size of subventions: 2.94 (PCF). 22.9 (PS). Both permanent and electoral subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: NA. 2012: 22.9 (PS). NA (PCF). 2014: 2.94 (PCF).

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): PS: based on 2012. PCF: based on 2014

Data source for size of subventions: PS: PPDB. PCF: PAIRDEM-PPB.

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of votes received in last national election; proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature

Germany

Size of subventions: 40.69 (SPD). 11.48 (Linke). Only has permanent subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: 38.98 (SPD). 10.83 (Linke). 2011: 42.41 (SPD). 12.13 (Linke). 2012: NA

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2010-2011

Data source for size of subventions: PPDB

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of votes received in last national election; number of party members; amount of funds received by party from non-subsidy sources

Italy

Size of subventions: 57.83 (PD). Only has electoral subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 57.83. 2012: NA

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2011

Data source for size of subventions: PPDB.

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election

Netherlands

Size of subventions: 1.65 (CDA) 3.68 (SP). 2.84 (PvdA). 1.1 (GreenLeft). Only has permanent subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 1.81 (CDA) 3.7 (SP). 2.97 (PvDA). 1.09 (GreenLeft). 2012: 1.49 (CDA). 3.66 (SP). 2.7 (PvDA). 1.12 (GreenLeft).

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2011-2012

Data source for size of subventions: PPDB

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature; number of party members

Sweden

Size of subventions: 3.59 (VP). 15.45 (SAP). Only has permanent subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 3.59 (VP). 15.45 (SAP). 2012: NA

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2011

Data source for size of subventions: PPDB

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election; proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature

Switzerland

No public funding

UK

No public funding

United States

Size of subventions: 12.92 (Democratic Party). Only has electoral subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: 0. 2010: 0. 2011: 0. 2012: 68200000 (51690162 euro)

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2009-2012

Data source for size of subventions (from IDEA Political Finance Database):

<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43976.pdf> (p. 3-4). total federal funding supporting the 2012 presidential nominating conventions

Subsidy allocation reflects: presidential nominating convention (funding is earmarked to be used for presidential nominating conventions)

Australia

Size of subventions: 3.23 (ALP). Only has electoral subsidies.

Years: 2008: 0. 2009: 0. 2010: \$21 225 869.96 (16158549 euro). 2011: 0. 2012: 0.

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2008-2012

Data source for size of subventions:

http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/Reports_On_Federal_Electoral_Events/2010/fad-report.pdf (p. 7)

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election

Israel

Size of subventions: 1.85 (Labour). 4.43 (Likud). 0.63 (Histadrut). Both permanent and electoral subsidies.

Years: 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 1.85 (Labour). 4.43 (Likud). 0.63 (Histadrut). 2012: NA

Mean (in 1 000 000 euros): based on 2011

Data source for size of subventions: PPDB

Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB): proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature

Traditional ally variable

The LPTU dataset originally coded union confederations as ‘traditional left-of-centre union ally’ (0), ‘traditional right-of-centre union ally’ (1) and others (2), based on existing historical studies on organizational links. The pairs of historical allies identified are: SPÖ and both PRÖ-GE and ÖGB, ÖVP and GÖD in Austria, SDP and SAK in Finland, PCF and CGT, PS and both CFDT and FO in France, SPD and DGB, IG BCE, GEW, IGMetall, Ver.di in Germany, PD and CGIL in Italy, PvdA and FNV, CDA and CNV in the Netherlands, SAP and LO in Sweden, SP and SGB, CVP and

Travail.Suisse in Switzerland, the Labour Party and TUC, GMB, Unite, Unison, NUT and USDAW in the United Kingdom, the Democratic Party and AFL-CIO in the United States, the ALP and ACTU, ANMF, AWU and SDA in Australia, HaAvoda and Histadrut and Likud and HL in Israel. In this paper, these dyads are thus coded as traditional allies (=1) on this particular variable.

Appendix 3

Robustness tests with actual available numbers: Re-estimation of interaction effect as: donation/party budget * subsidy/party budget:

Table A3. The effect of donation/party budget, financial restrictions and public party subsidies/party budget on party link scores. Poisson regression.


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Donation/party budget	40.62*** (7.77)	15.51 (15.58)	44.26*** (13.17)
Financial restrictions	-0.82*** (0.17)	-0.30* (0.17)	-0.14 (0.17)
Subsidy/party budget	-0.66* (0.39)	-1.31*** (0.37)	-1.43*** (0.34)
Strength of union		2.84** (1.25)	3.20*** (1.16)
Traditional union ally		0.38*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.11)
Union organization type		-0.65*** (0.25)	-0.62*** (0.23)
Party unit type		-0.15* (0.09)	-0.18** (0.09)
State party autonomy: moderate		0.37* (0.20)	0.46** (0.19)
State party autonomy: high		-0.42 (0.31)	-0.32 (0.28)
Corporatism		0.27** (0.14)	0.48*** (0.17)
Donation/party budget*subsidy/party budget			-88.89*** (30.25)
Constant	1.25*** (0.22)	1.07*** (0.26)	0.73** (0.31)
Observations	142	142	142

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Note: Here we lose 6 observations (dyads with CVP, Switzerland) because missing info on party budget and 6 observations due to missing values on Finnish donations. The size of the actual donations/direct financial contributions vary from a yearly average of 4096 euros to a yearly average of 934 801 euros during the time frame 2008-2012 (we take the average corresponding to the time frame (for the direct financial contribution-question) asked about in the survey). Trade unions in Australia, Finland, Sweden and UK donated money. We have identified the actual values through the Australian Electoral Commission (donor and party reports), the British Electoral Commission (donations to parties), GMB's annual returns, Unite's annual returns, and the Swedish Social Democratic Party's annual returns. The Finnish donations were validated on basis of sources used in

Allern and Bale (2017) but the exact (albeit modest) numbers are not available and thus coded as missing in this particular analysis.



Party links score as a function of subsidies at no donations (black line) and the highest level of donations (grey line). Estimated values with 95% confidence interval.

Figure A1. The effect of donations as share of party income on parties' total union link score for different levels of public party subsidies as share of party income (budget). Both substantial variables as share of party budget to account for both national economic factors and party size (larger parties = larger budget). Because there are not many cases at the highest level of donations, the uncertainty is quite large.



Party links score as a function of donations at no subsidies (black line) and the highest level of subsidies (grey line). Estimated values with 95% confidence interval.

Figure A2. The effect of subsidies as share of party income on parties' total union link score for different levels of donations as share of party income (budget). Both substantial variables as share of party budget to account for both national economic factors and party size (larger parties = larger budget).

Appendix 4

Robustness tests with less computationally demanding statistical models: Linear model and Poisson model without clustered standard errors and models with substantial variables only

Table A4. Linear regression model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Direct financial contribution	4.26*** (0.55)	3.74*** (0.64)	4.71*** (0.64)
Financial contribution: none			
Financial restrictions	-1.31*** (0.32)	-1.13** (0.41)	-1.00** (0.38)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Strength of union		1.69 (1.87)	1.96 (1.88)
Traditional union ally		0.99** (0.35)	1.05** (0.37)
Union organization type		-0.47 (0.57)	-0.37 (0.54)
Party unit type		-0.56** (0.21)	-0.56** (0.21)
State party autonomy: moderate		1.25 (0.86)	1.37 (0.87)
State party autonomy: high		0.53 (0.56)	0.64 (0.56)
Corporatism		-0.13 (0.37)	0.03 (0.39)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies			-0.18** (0.07)
Constant	2.42*** (0.49)	2.58*** (0.60)	2.20*** (0.66)
Observations	154	154	154
R-squared	0.52	0.63	0.64

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5. Poisson results without clustered standard errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Direct financial contribution	1.24*** (0.13)	1.06*** (0.19)	1.51*** (0.24)
Financial restrictions	-0.75*** (0.10)	-0.46*** (0.15)	-0.44*** (0.15)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Strength of union		0.59 (0.60)	1.02* (0.61)
Traditional union ally		0.47*** (0.15)	0.51*** (0.15)
Union organization type		-0.27* (0.16)	-0.20 (0.16)
Party unit type		-0.27** (0.11)	-0.27** (0.11)
State party autonomy: moderate		0.59*** (0.18)	0.69*** (0.18)
State party autonomy: high		0.50** (0.21)	0.64*** (0.21)
Corporatism		0.25 (0.16)	0.38** (0.16)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies			-0.08*** (0.03)
Constant	0.82*** (0.08)	0.47* (0.25)	0.15 (0.27)
Observations	154	154	154

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Poisson results with substantial variables only

	(1)
Direct financial contribution	1.40*** (0.22)
Financial restrictions	-0.75*** (0.18)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.01** (0.01)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies	-0.03* (0.02)
Constant	0.81*** (0.20)
Observations	154
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Table A7. Linear regression results with substantial variables only

	(1)
Direct financial contribution	5.15*** (0.67)
Financial restrictions	-1.31*** (0.30)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.02 (0.02)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies	-0.15** (0.06)
Constant	2.41*** (0.49)
Observations	154
R-squared	0.53
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Appendix 5

Robustness tests with two different measures of union's 'strike potential'

Table A8 utilizes the country based union strike fund-variable from Visser (2016). Here, 0 = union has no strike fund, 1 = union has small strike funds from which some reimbursement (at less than 70% of the base wage) is guaranteed, and 2 = union has a large strike fund from which striking members are reimbursed at 70% or more of their base wage for each day of strike.

Table A9 uses a survey item from the LPTU data set measuring the type of organized employees. To measure the union's 'strike potential' we separate between unions having (mainly) members that are particularly vital for the functioning of the service sector (i.e. confederations/unions organizing doctors, nurses, teachers etc.) and other unions. The former is coded as 1 and the latter as 0.

Results are robust across both types of measures.

Table A8. The effect of direct financial contributions to party, financial restrictions and absolute size of public party subsidies on party link scores with union strike fund included as control. Poisson regression.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Direct financial contribution	1.17*** (0.21)	0.90*** (0.26)	1.48*** (0.34)
Financial restrictions	-0.74*** (0.12)	-0.62*** (0.14)	-0.44*** (0.16)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)
Strength of union		0.41 (0.77)	0.95 (0.80)
Traditional ally		0.47*** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.15)
Union organization type		-0.20 (0.25)	-0.17 (0.23)
Party unit type		-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.07)
State party autonomy: moderate		0.68** (0.29)	0.69** (0.29)
State party autonomy: high		0.73*** (0.25)	0.63** (0.26)
Corporatism		0.34* (0.19)	0.36** (0.18)
Union strike fund: small	0.36 (0.35)	0.33 (0.38)	0.13 (0.40)
Union strike fund: large	0.23 (0.19)	-0.17 (0.33)	0.09 (0.30)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies			-0.08*** (0.03)
Constant	0.57** (0.22)	0.41 (0.38)	0.07 (0.39)
Observations	154	154	154
Pseudo log likelihood	-246.04	-229.63	-227.21

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, ref. cat. Union strike fund: no strike fund.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A9. The effect of direct financial contributions to party, financial restrictions and absolute size of public party subsidies on party link scores with union: type of organized employees (1 = members particularly vital for functioning of service sector) included as control. Poisson regression.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Direct financial contribution	1.24*** (0.16)	1.04*** (0.24)	1.50*** (0.20)
Financial restrictions	-0.76*** (0.18)	-0.48*** (0.14)	-0.44*** (0.11)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Strength of union		0.64 (0.74)	1.03 (0.72)
Traditional ally		0.47*** (0.14)	0.51*** (0.15)
Union organization type		-0.26 (0.24)	-0.20 (0.22)
Party unit type		-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.07)
State party autonomy: moderate		0.59** (0.28)	0.69** (0.29)
State party autonomy: high		0.50** (0.22)	0.64*** (0.22)
Corporatism		0.23 (0.16)	0.37** (0.16)
Union: type of organized employees	0.02 (0.23)	0.05 (0.17)	0.01 (0.14)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies			-0.08*** (0.02)
Constant	0.82*** (0.20)	0.48* (0.25)	0.16 (0.27)
Observations	154	154	154
Pseudo log likelihood	-247.36	-231.58	-227.35

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 6

Robustness test with central party organizations and legislative party organizations in separate analyses and as one (mean value across party faces if both answered).

Table A10. Central party organizations (CPOs) only, all variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Direct financial contribution	1.41*** (0.27)	1.46*** (0.34)	1.47*** (0.37)	1.39*** (0.30)	1.70*** (0.29)
Financial restrictions	-0.73*** (0.18)		-0.73*** (0.18)	-0.30* (0.17)	-0.31** (0.15)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Strength of union				-0.36 (0.95)	0.05 (1.04)
Traditional union ally				0.62*** (0.14)	0.63*** (0.16)
Union organization type				-0.11 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.24)
State party autonomy: moderate				0.74*** (0.26)	0.79*** (0.26)
State party autonomy: high				0.71** (0.28)	0.80*** (0.26)
Corporatism				0.52** (0.22)	0.57*** (0.19)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies		-0.002 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		-0.05*** (0.02)
Constant	0.85*** (0.25)	0.53* (0.30)	0.85*** (0.25)	-0.11 (0.32)	-0.27 (0.27)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A11. Legislative party organizations (LPGs) only, all variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Direct financial contribution	0.99*** (0.22)	1.51*** (0.33)	1.32*** (0.16)	0.50 (0.36)	1.17*** (0.39)
Financial restrictions	-0.78*** (0.21)		-0.77*** (0.20)	-0.71*** (0.24)	-0.56*** (0.14)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Strength of union				1.91* (1.04)	2.19** (0.90)
Traditional union ally				0.29* (0.15)	0.39*** (0.15)
Union organization type				-0.48* (0.29)	-0.36 (0.23)
State party autonomy: moderate				0.40 (0.30)	0.58* (0.32)
State party autonomy: high				0.22 (0.24)	0.43 (0.28)
Corporatism				-0.11 (0.23)	0.16 (0.22)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies		-0.10** (0.05)	-0.07*** (0.01)		-0.12*** (0.04)
Constant	0.79*** (0.16)	0.41 (0.26)	0.76*** (0.16)	0.97*** (0.31)	0.38 (0.38)
Observations	76	76	76	76	76

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A12. Mean value between central party organizations (CPOs) and legislative party groups (LPGs), all variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Direct financial contribution	1.17*** (0.18)	1.42*** (0.31)	1.29*** (0.23)	1.03*** (0.22)	1.42*** (0.18)
Financial restrictions	-0.72*** (0.17)		-0.72*** (0.16)	-0.39*** (0.14)	-0.36*** (0.10)
Absolute size of public party subsidies	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Strength of union				0.42 (0.83)	0.84 (0.82)
Traditional union ally				0.55*** (0.14)	0.59*** (0.15)
Union organization type				-0.24 (0.22)	-0.17 (0.19)
State party autonomy: moderate				0.67** (0.27)	0.76*** (0.27)
State party autonomy: high				0.46** (0.21)	0.59*** (0.19)
Corporatism				0.28* (0.16)	0.40*** (0.14)
Direct financial contribution*absolute size of public party subsidies		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)		-0.07*** (0.02)
Constant	0.85*** (0.21)	0.52* (0.27)	0.84*** (0.22)	0.29 (0.23)	-0.02 (0.24)
Observations	79	79	79	79	79

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 7

Robustness test with direct financial contribution and country fixed effects

Table A13. The effect of direct financial contributions to party with country fixed effects. Poisson regression.

	(1)
Direct financial contribution	1.24*** (0.23)
Finland	-0.87** (0.34)
France	-1.52*** (0.33)
Germany	-0.08 (0.28)
Italy	-0.98** (0.42)
Netherlands	-0.78*** (0.29)
Sweden	-0.99*** (0.32)
Switzerland	0.00 (0.29)
United Kingdom	-0.56 (0.38)
United States	-1.47*** (0.39)
Australia	-1.01** (0.46)
Israel	-2.67*** (0.51)
Constant	1.39*** (0.25)
Observations	154
Pseudo log likelihood	-225.46

Standard errors in parentheses. Ref. cat. Country: Austria.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We have also tested whether the results are dependent on particular countries being included in the analysis. When omitting countries one by one, the interaction term is sensitive to remove some of the countries with donations from the analysis. This highlights the size-of-N issues. Apart from that, the results remain the same. Note also that models with standard errors clustered *by party* give similar results as *by country*.