Appendix 1: Robustness checks

First, critics might contend that the dependent variable is not normally distributed, thus the previously used OLS estimation choice might not be proper. In fact, the histogram of the NEP simple summated scale shows that the data are skewed to the right (Figure 3, Appendix 3). The Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia numerical tests suggest we can reject the null hypothesis of the variable's normal distribution ($p<0.001$). One way to address this limitation (i.e. the violation of the normality assumption) consists of treating the dependent variable as event data with a gamma distribution. As the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, there is overdispersion. Also, 58% of our observations are 0, suggesting that our data have excess zero counts. We have two types of zero cases individuals who did not engage in NEP activities: those who have and have not the potentials to do so (i.e. "did not participate but could do so" and "did not participate and would never do so"). Although the ISSP questionnaire does not allow us to distinguish between mobilization potentials and actual participation, we can fit a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model to account for overdispersed count data with excess zero counts.[1] The broad results of the ZINB specifications are consistent with OLS. There is a positive and significant relationship between belief in corruption and NEP (thereby confirming H.1.A and disconfirming H.1.B), which only emerges provided we implement interactive specifications (Table 5, Appendix 2). According to the ZINB full interactive specification (model 4, Table 5, Appendix 2), the predicted value in the NEP summated scale for a person who is not at all interested in politics is .38 if she believes that almost nobody in the public service is corrupt (=1; Figure 2.B, Appendix 3). This value becomes .54 provided she thinks that almost everyone is involved in corruption (=5). In sharp contrast, the effect of corruption on NEP is decreasing for a respondent who is very interested

[1] In order to compute the logistic model within the zero-inflated specifications, we include the key predictors (i.e. perceived corruption, educational level and political interest) plus the country dummies.

in politics: as the value of the corruption scales changes from 1 to 5, the value NEP fluctuates from 1.32 to 1.28. Based on the ZINB model choice, the effect of perceived corruption on the NEP scale also decreases on the maximum educational level attained by the respondent: for a person who has only completed primary school, the predicted value in the NEP scale ranges from .45 to .65 as perceived corruption changes from 1 to 5 (Figure 2.A, Appendix 3). These predicted values only fluctuate from .88 to .96 if the person holds a university degree though.

Second, some parametric evidence confirms that the direct coefficients for perceived corruption are statistically different across the models with the full additive and interactive specifications. We report the results of Wald tests that reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients for a number of variables (Table 6, Appendix 2). There is not only an interaction effect with political interest and education (Hypotheses 2), but the coefficients of perceived corruption show statistically significant different results when comparing additive and interactive model specifications. Moreover, the effects of the political interest and education variables that we use to build the interactive terms of perceived corruption are also different across models, suggesting that models which merely consider additive effects of belief in extensive corruption on NEP are underspecified.

Third, we have used ZINB models as an alternative to the OLS specifications. However, it is arguably more important the error terms are normally distributed than the dependent variable itself. Using country averages, we fit a bivariate regression between NEP and perceived corruption, and obtain a confidence interval based on the standard error of the forecast (Figure 4, Appendix 3). Country-wise, we cannot identify outliers. Based on the main full interactive specification with OLS (model 4, Table 5, Appendix 2), we zoom into individual-level residuals and outliers. Figure 5 (Appendix 3, left) shows the post-estimation added-variable for perceived corruption— after both the NEP scale and perceived corruption have been adjusted for all other predictors in the full interactive model—, which is useful to

ascertain whether we have unusual and influential observations. To further identify both potentially influential observations and outliers at the same time, we also report a plot that shows the residuals' leverage by the (normalized) residual squared (Figure 5, Appendix 3, right). While points to the right of the vertical line have larger-than-average residuals, those above the horizontal line have higher-than-average leverage (Williams, 2016). In absolute terms, our residuals are neither very large nor have a very high leverage. Yet, we can give them better than OLS efficiency by implementing robust regression routines (Hamilton, 2004: 239). We replicate the key OLS models (models 2 and 5, Table 3) with robust regressions (models 1-2, Table 7, Appendix 2), and observe that the results are consistent with prior findings: the effect of perceived corruption on the NEP simple summated scale with the full additive specification is null, but it becomes significant with the full interactive model. The coefficients of the interactive terms are robust.

Fourth, we replicate the full additive and interactive model specifications with the summated rating index of NEP as the dependent variable (models 3-4, Table 7, Appendix 2). In line with prior findings, while the effect of perceived corruption in the full additive model is null, the key predictor— and the interaction terms— become significant in the full interactive specification: a one unit change in the perceived corruption indicator leads to a .09 unit increase in the NEP summated rating scale (model 4, Table 7, Appendix 2)— note that the NEP summated rating scale ranges only from 0 to 2.64 units (Table 2). Alternatively, we use a binary indicator of NEP as dependent variable (1= if the respondent has participated in at least two of the seven possible forms of NEP considered throughout; 0= otherwise), and replicate the main model specifications with a logit regression (models 5-6, Table 7, Appendix 2). Likewise, our results are robust.

Fifth, country level aspects such as the overall economic performance and institutional settings are likely to affect individual NEP (Braun and Hutter, 2016; Vráblíková, 2014).

Building on the full additive and interactive specifications (models 2 and 5, Table 3), we perform some multi-level regression analyses including the country-level indicators as predictors. Specifically, we include GDP per capita,[2] unemployment,[3] and regional autonomy[4] at the country level without and with the individual-level interactions (models 7-8, Table 7, Appendix 2). On top of these aggregate predictors, in model 9 (Table 7, Appendix 2) we include country-level corruption,[5] plus the cross-level interaction between individual perceptions of corruption and the aggregate-level measurement of corruption.[6] These country-level factors do not seem to explain NEP. Moreover, our overall results hold robust: the effect of perceived corruption is significant, and the individual-level interactions between belief in extensive corruption and political interest and education are robust.

Sixth, one may contend that our findings are a by-product of the Great Recession that has hit many countries since 2008, and the wave of mobilizations against inequality and the political status quo that sprung across the world. In order to assess whether the main results displayed throughout hold in a different time setting, we replicate the main OLS, ZINB and multi-level regression analyses and (the full— additive and interactive— models 2 and 5, Table 3; models 1 and 4, Table 5, Appendix 2; models 7 and 9, Table 7, Appendix 2) with the data from the ISSP Citizenship 2004 module (ISSP research Group, 2012; models 1-6, Table 8,

[2] GDP per capita measures the yearly difference in 2014 relative to 2013 (based on PPP, current international dollars, as reported by the IMF Database).

[3] the unemployment rate refers to the proportion of unemployed people as percentage of total labor force (source: IMF Database).

[4] The level of institutional decentralization might be positively associated with political participation (Braun and Hutter, 2016). We use the most recent aggregate measurement of the Regional Authority Index at the country level (Hooghe et al., 2016). This index measures the authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region and the country as a whole, including fiscal, juridical, budget and policy-related aspects.

[5] we take the country-level scores in the 2014 CPI elaborated by Transparency International as a measurement of country-level corruption. Based on analysts and country experts' views, it is one of the few available cross-national indicators on how corrupt public sectors are supposed to be.

[6] As the level of correlation between general corruption and belief in extensive corruption is moderate (Pearson's r= -.36), we exclude the aggregate-level predictor from model 8 (Table 7, Appendix 2). Results do not change substantially.

Appendix 2).[7] Overall, our results are confirmed.[8] Although the direct effect of perceived corruption on non-electoral behavior is significant in the full additive specifications, it is small in substantive terms (models 1, 3, and 5, Table 8, Appendix 2). Moreover, the strength of the effect of belief in extensive corruption on NEP increases dramatically as we include the significant interaction with political interest (models 2, 4, and 6, Table 8, Appendix 2). Although the other interactions hold robust with the OLS and multi-level modelling strategies, the interaction between perceived corruption and education vanishes in the ZINB specification (model 4, Table 8, Appendix 2). In light of the 2004 wave, which is an exogenous source of variation to the 2014 dataset, we cannot confirm H.2.1.B, nuancing our argument. Still, results with 2004 data make the case for implementing interactive to the detriment of additive modelling approaches to study the impact of belief in corruption on NEP.

References of Appendix 1

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[7] The Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia numerical tests suggest that the dependent variable is not normally distributed. Unsurprisingly, we have again both overdispersion and excess zero counts in the NEP simple summated scale, so the ZINB specifications seem the best fitting modelling strategy.

[8] Relative to 2014 ISSP, the measurement of political information in the 2004 wave changes slightly. We have information on the frequency of use of four different items to get political information: reading newspapers, watching TV, listening to radio, and accessing Internet. All of them are measured in 1-5 scales that range from "everyday" to "never". The four items load strongly on one single dimension, offering a one-component solution (Eigenvalue= 1.92), thus we build a political information index through principal component analysis (Cronbach's α= .64). We do not report it in the models in Table 8 (Appendix 2) for the sake of parsimony— additionally, the level of correlation between the PCA index of political information and political interest is moderate-to-high (Pearson's $r < -.48$). See codebook (Appendix 4).

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Appendix 2: Table 4. Country fixed effects (continued, Table 3). Reference category: AT.

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6		MODEL 7		MODEL 8		MODEL 9	
	Coef.	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**
Australia	−.08	.06	−.05	.06	−.07	.06	−.06	.06	−.07	.06	−.01	.06	−.02	.06	−.02	.06	−.02	.06
Belgium/Flanders	−.29***	.06	−.21***	.05	−.22***	.05	−.21***	.05	−.22***	.06	−.07	.06	−.07	.06	−.07	.06	−.07	.06
Switzerland	−.01	.05	.00	.06	−.01	.06	−.00	.06	−.01	.06	.01	.06	.01	.06	.00	.06	.00	.06
Chile	−.87***	.05	−.54***	.06	−.55***	.06	−.55***	.06	−.55***	.06	−.21*	.09	−.21*	.09	−.22*	.09	−.22*	.09
Czech Republic	−.70***	.05	−.60***	.05	−.61***	.05	−.60***	.05	−.60***	.05	−.27***	.07	−.27***	.07	−.28***	.07	−.28***	.07
Germany	−.11*	.05	−.16**	.05	−.17**	.05	−.17**	.05	−.18**	.05	−.14*	.06	−.14*	.06	−.15*	.06	−.15*	.06
Denmark	−.37***	.05	−.40***	.05	−.43***	.06	−.42***	.05	−.42***	.06	−.31***	.06	−.32***	.06	−.32***	.06	−.32***	.06
Spain	−.28***	.05	−.16**	.05	−.17**	.05	−.15**	.05	−.16**	.05	−.00	.05	−.00	.06	−.00	.06	−.00	.06
Finland	−.50***	.06	−.36***	.06	−.38***	.06	−.36***	.06	−.37***	.06	−.19***	.07	−.19***	.07	−.19***	.07	−.19**	.07
France	−.04	.06	−.13*	.06	−.13*	.06	−.13*	.06	−.13*	.06	−.09	.07	−.09	.07	−.10	.07	−.10	.07
Georgia	−.82***	.05	−.47***	.06	−.49***	.06	−.46***	.06	−.48***	.06	−.01	.08	−.01	.08	−.02	.08	−.02	.08
Croacia	−.53***	.06	−.35***	.06	−.36***	.06	−.35***	.06	−.35***	.06	−.27***	.07	−.27***	.07	−.28***	.07	−.28***	.07
Hungary	−1.09***	.06	−.89***	.06	−.89***	.06	−.88***	.06	−.89***	.06	−.39**	.15	−.40**	.15	−.39**	.15	−.39**	.15
Iceland	−.76***	.06	−.61***	.06	−.61***	.06	−.60***	.06	−.60***	.06	−.28***	.08	−.27***	.08	−.28***	.08	−.28**	.08
India	−.23***	.06	−.27***	.07	−.27***	.07	−.27***	.07	−.27***	.07	.07	.09	.07	.09	.07	.08	.07	.08

Israel	.11*	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06	.07	.06	.06	.06	.02	.06	.02	.06	.02	.06	.02	.06
Japan	−1.03***	.06	−1.00***	.06	−1.00***	.06	−.99***	.06	−1.00***	.06	−.80***	.13	−.79***	.13	−.79***	.13	−.79***	.13
South Korea	−.80***	.05	−.66***	.06	−.66***	.06	−.65***	.06	−.65***	.06	−.34***	.09	−.33***	.09	−.34***	.09	−.34***	.09
Lithuania	−1.05***	.06	−.89***	.06	−.89***	.06	−.88***	.06	−.88***	.06	−.87***	.14	−.86***	.14	−.89***	.14	−.87***	.14
Netherlands	−.41***	.05	−.42***	.05	−.43***	.05	−.43***	.05	−.43***	.05	−.21***	.06	−.21***	.06	−.22**	.06	−.22**	.06
Norway	−.20***	.06	−.19***	.06	−.20***	.06	−.19**	.06	−.21**	.06	−.19**	.06	−.19**	.06	−.19**	.06	−.20**	.06
Philippines	−.92***	.05	−.86***	.06	−.86***	.06	−.85***	.06	−.85***	.06	−.39***	.09	−.40***	.09	−.39***	.09	−.40***	.09
Poland	−1.04***	.05	−.81***	.05	−.81***	.05	−.80***	.05	−.81***	.05	−.31**	.09	−.31**	.09	−.32**	.09	−.31**	.09
Russia	−.13***	.05	−1.00***	.06	−.99***	.06	−.99***	.06	−.98***	.06	−.47***	.13	−.47**	.13	−.48***	.13	−.47***	.13
Sweden	−.02	.06	.05	.06	.04	.06	.05	.06	.05	.06	.01	.06	.00	.06	.00	.06	.00	.06
Slovenia	−.77***	.06	−.52***	.06	−.53***	.06	−.52***	.06	−.52***	.06	−.27**	.08	−.27**	.08	−.28**	.08	−.28**	.08
Slovakia	−.90***	.06	−.66***	.06	−.67***	.06	−.66***	.06	−.66***	.06	−.55***	.10	−.55***	.10	−.56***	.10	−.56***	.10
Turkey	−.97***	.05	−.76***	.06	−.77***	.06	−.76***	.06	−.76***	.06	−.10	.10	−.10	.10	−.09	.10	−.10	.10
Taiwan	−.89***	.05	−.57***	.05	−.57***	.05	−.55***	.05	−.56***	.05	−.22**	.08	−.22**	.08	−.23**	.08	−.22**	.08
United States	−.28***	.05	−.32***	.06	−.32***	.06	−.32***	.06	−.31***	.06	−.17*	.07	−.16*	.07	−.17*	.07	−.16*	.07
Venezuela	−.30***	.06	−.56***	.06	−.57***	.06	−.55***	.06	−.56***	.06	−.36***	.08	−.37***	.08	−.36***	.08	−.37***	.08
South Africa	−.86***	.05	−.86***	.05	−.87***	.05	−.87***	.05	−.87***	.05	−.14*	.07	−.16*	.07	−.16*	.07	−.17*	.07

Appendix 2: Table 5. Zero inflated negative binomial regressions. DV: NEP simple summated scale. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Coef.	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**
Perceived corruption	.03**	.03	.11***	.03	.14***	.03	.21***	.03
Biographical availability								
Sex	−.14***	.01	−.14***	.01	−.14***	.01	−.14***	.01
Age	.01***	.00	.01***	.00	.01***	.00	.01***	.00
Age squared	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00
Education	.13***	.01	.20***	.03	.13***	.01	.19***	.03
Partner cohabitation	−.03*	.02	−.03*	.02	−.03*	.02	−.03*	.02
Grievances								
Income decile	−.00	.00	−.01	.00	−.01	.00	−.01	.00
Job status (ref. paid work/pensioner)								
I_Unemployed	.01	.03	.01	.03	.01	.03	.01	.03
I_Student	.02	.03	.02	.03	.02	.03	.02	.03
I_Others	−.03	.03	−.03	.03	−.03	.03	−.03	.03
Political values								
Trust gov	.06***	.01	.06***	.01	.06***	.01	.06***	.01
Interest	.30***	.01	.30***	.01	.41***	.03	.40***	.03
Efficacy	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
Information	−.07***	.01	−.07***	.01	−.07***	.01	−.07***	.01
Party policy	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01
Social capital & networks								
Interpersonal trust	−.12***	.01	−.12***	.01	−.12***	.01	−.12***	.01
Union membership	.08***	.02	.08***	.02	.08***	.02	.08***	.02
Party membership	.83***	.03	.83***	.03	.83***	.03	.83***	.03
Organisational membership	.24***	.01	.24***	.01	.24***	.01	.24***	.01
Corruption*education			−.03***	.01			−.02**	.01
Corruption*interest					−.04***	.01	−.04***	.01
Constant	−1.08***	.12	−1.30***	.13	−1.39***	.13	−1.56***	.14
Adjusted R2								
Country fixed effects (dummies)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
N individuals	30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186	

*Appendix 2: Table 6. Wald tests scale. *p<0.5, **p<0.1, ***p<0.01.*

	NEP summated scale (model 5 vs model 2, Table 3)	**NEP rating scale (model 2 vs model 1, Table 7, Appendix 2)**
Main predictor	Corruption***	Corruption***
Biographical availability	Education***, Sex*, Age**, Age squared*	Education***, Sex*, Age**, Age squared*
Grievances	Income decile*, Job status (ref. paid work/pensioner): I_Unemployed**	Income decile*, Job status (ref. paid work/pensioner): I_Unemployed**
Political values	Interest***, Efficacy***, Party policy***	Interest***, Efficacy***, Party policy***
Social capital & networks	Interpersonal trust***, Party membership*	Interpersonal trust***, Party membership*

Appendix 2: Table 7. Models 1-2: robust regressions. DV: NEP simple summated scale. Models 3-4: OLS regressions. DV: NEP summated rating scale. Models 5-6: Logit regressions. DV: dummy NEP. Models 7-9: multi-level regressions. DV: NEP simple summated scale. Source: ISSP (2014) data. *p<0.5, **p<0.1, ***p<0.01.

	MODEL 1		**MODEL 2**		**MODEL 3**		**MODEL 4**		**MODEL 5**		**MODEL 6**		**MODEL 7**		**MODEL 8**		**MODEL 9**	
	Coef.	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**
Perceived corruption	.00	.00	.16***	.02	.00	.00	.09***	.01	.03	.02	.32***	.07	.01	.01	.23***	.02	.21***	.03
Biographical availability																		
Sex	−.10***	.00	−.10***	.01	−.04***	.00	−.04***	.00	−.30***	.03	−.30***	.03	−.12***	.01	−.12***	.01	−.12***	.01
Age	.01**	.00	.00**	.00	.00***	.00	.00***	.00	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.01***	.00	.01***	.00	.01***	.00
Age squared	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00
Education	.08***	.00	.16***	.01	.04***	.00	.08***	.01	.30***	.02	.43***	.06	.12***	.01	.21***	.02	.21***	.02
Partner cohabitation	−.00	.01	−.00	.01	−.01**	.01	−.01**	.01	−.10**	.04	−.10**	.04	−.04**	.01	−.04**	.01	−.04**	.01
Grievances																		
Income decile	−.00	.00	−.00	.00	−.00	.00	−.00	.00	−.01	.01	−.01	.01	−.01	.00	−.01	.00	−.01	.00
Job status (ref. paid work/pensioner)																		
I_Unemployed	−.02	.02	−.02	.02	.00	.01	.00	.01	−.02	.07	−.02	.07	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
I_Student	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.04	.08	.04	.08	.03	.03	.03	.03	.03	.03
I_Others	−.05**	.02	−.05**	.02	−.01	.01	−.01	.01	−.12	.06	−.12*	.06	−.03	.02	−.03	.02	−.03	.02
Political values																		
Trust gov	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.11***	.02	.11***	.02	.06***	.01	.06***	.01	.06***	.01
Interest	.14***	.01	.26***	.02	.10***	.00	.17***	.01	.60***	.02	.76***	.06	.28***	.02	.46***	.02	.46***	.02
Efficacy	.03***	.00	.03***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.13***	.01	.13***	.01	.06***	.01	.06***	.01	.06***	.01
Information	−.02***	.00	−.02***	.00	−.01***	.00	−.01***	.00	−.10***	.02	−.10***	.02	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01
Party policy	−.02***	.00	−.02***	.00	−.01***	.00	−.01***	.00	−.08***	.02	−.08***	.02	−.02***	.01	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01
Social capital & networks																		
Interpersonal trust	−.05***	.01	−.05***	.01	−.04***	.00	−.03***	.00	−.23***	.02	−.23***	.02	−.10***	.01	−.10***	.01	−.10***	.01
Union membership	.05***	.01	.05***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.13**	.04	.13***	.01	.11***	.02	.11***	.02	.10***	.02
Party membership	.62***	.02	.63***	.02	.52***	.01	.52***	.02	1.79***	.08	1.79***	.08	1.35***	.09	1.35***	.03	1.35***	.03
Organisational membership	.21***	.01	.21***	.01	.11***	.00	.11***	.00	.49***	.02	.49***	.02	.30***	.01	.30***	.01	.30***	.01
Perceived corruption*education			−.03***	.00			−.01***	.00			−.04*	.02			−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01
Perceived corruption*interest			−.04***	.00			−.02***	.00			−.05**	.02			−.06***	.01	−.06***	.01
Aggregate-level indicators																		
GDPpc													−.02	.02	−.02	.02	−.02	.02
Unemployment													−.01	.01	−.01	.01	−.00	.01

Regional autonomy									.01*	.00	.01*	.00	.01	.00
Country-level corruption													.01	.00
Perceived corrup.*Country-l. corrup.													.00	.00
Constant	.31***	.06	−.18*	.08	.01	.03	−.24***	.04	−3.16***	.23	−3.98***	.31	−.41*	.17	−1.09***	.18	−1.45***	.24
Adjusted R2					.2756		.2784		.2192		.2198							
Country fixed effects (dummies)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes							
N individuals	30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186		30,186	
N groups													33		33		33	
Log likelihood													−45086.72		−4526.58		−45022.80	
Sigma u													.08		.08		.06	

Appendix 2: Table 8. Models 1-2: OLS regressions. Models 3-4: ZINB regressions. Models 5-6: multi-level regressions. DV: NEP simple summated scale. Source: ISSP (2004) data. *p<0.5, **p<0.1, ***p<0.01.

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Coef.	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**	**Coef.**	**S.E.**
Perceived corruption	.03***	.01	.20***	.03	.09***	.01	.15***	.03	.03**	.01	.16***	.04
Biographical availability												
Sex	−.08***	.00	−.15***	.02	−.09***	.00	−.09***	.01	−.15***	.02	−.15***	.02
Age	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00	.02***	.00
Age squared	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00	−.00***	.00
Education	.12***	.01	.17***	.03	.14***	.01	.14***	.02	.12***	.01	.17***	.03
Partner cohabitation	−.02	.02	−.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	−.03	.02	−.02	.02
Grievances												
Income decile	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01**	.00	.01**	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01
Job status (ref. paid work/pensioner)												
I_Unemployed	.08	.04	.07	.04	−.02	.03	−.02	.03	.08	.04	.07	.04
I_Student	.27***	.05	.27***	.05	.20***	.04	.20***	.04	.27***	.05	.27***	.05
I_Others	−.01	.03	−.01	.03	−.01	.03	−.01	.03	−.01	.03	−.01	.03
Political values												
Trust gov	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Interest	.21***	.01	.35***	.03	.29***	.02	.34***	.03	.21***	.01	.39***	.03
Efficacy	.05***	.00	.05***	.01	.06***	.01	.06***	.01	.05***	.01	.05***	.01
Information	−.07***	.01	−.06***	.01					−.07***	.01	−.06***	.01
Party policy	−.01*	.00	−.01**	.01	−.03***	.01	−.03***	.01	−.01*	.01	−.01**	.01
Social capital & networks												
Interpersonal trust	−.11***	.01	−.11***	.01	−.11***	.01	−.11***	.01	−.11***	.01	−.11***	.01
Union membership	.15***	.02	.15***	.02	.10***	.02	.10***	.02	.14***	.02	.14***	.02
Party membership	1.62***	.05	1.61***	.14	.94***	.04	.94***	.08	1.62***	.05	1.61***	.05
Organisational membership	.32***	.01	.32***	.01	.26***	.01	.25***	.01	.33***	.01	.33***	.01
Perceived corruption*education			−.02*	.01			.00	.01			−.02*	.01
Perceived corruption*interest			−.06***	.01			−.02*	.01			−.05***	.01

Aggregate-level indicators												
GDPpc									.02	.04	.03	.04
Unemployment									.00	.02	.01	.02
Regional autonomy									.01	.01	.01	.01
Country-level corruption									.16***	.03	.13***	.04
Perceived corrup.*Country-l. corrup.											.01*	.00
Constant	.28*	.12	−.29	.15	−1.53***	.10	−1.66***	.13	−1.49**	.52	−1.92***	.52
Adjusted R2	.3366		.3383									
Country fixed effects (dummies)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes					
N individuals	17,441		17,441		13,681		13,681		17,749		17,749	
N groups									21		21	
Log likelihood									−26122.05		−26096.45	
Sigma u									.05		.05	

Appendix 2: Table 9. Cross-tabulation between perceived corruption and maximum educational level attained

Public service: involvement in corruption	**Education: Highest education level**				***Total***
	Primary school or lower	*Secondary school*	*A-level or equivalent*	*University degree or higher*	
Hardly anyone is involved	233	476	881	1,245	2,835
	8.22	16.79	31.08	43.92	100.00
	5.07	4.84	5.07	9.77	6.36
A small number is involved	894	2,406	4,426	4,611	12,337
	7.25	19.50	35.88	37.38	100.00
	19.44	24.46	25.49	36.17	27.69
A moderate number is involved	1,235	3,001	5,376	3,737	13,349
	9.25	22.48	40.27	27.99	100.00
	26.85	30.51	30.96	29.31	29.97
A lot of people are involved	1,489	2,826	4,898	2,400	11,613
	12.82	24.33	42.18	20.67	100.00
	32.38	28.73	28.21	18.83	26.07
Almost everyone is involved	748	1,128	1,782	755	4,413
	16.95	25.56	40.38	17.11	100.00
	16.26	11.47	10.26	5.92	9.91
Total	4,599	9,837	17,363	12,748	44,547
	10.32	22.08	38.98	28.62	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Appendix 2: Table 10. Cross-tabulation between perceived corruption and political interest

Public service: involvement in corruption	**Level of personal interest in politics**				***Total***
	Not at all interested	*Not very interested*	*Fairly interested*	*Very interested*	
Hardly anyone is involved	305	796	1,171	538	2,810
	10.85	28.33	41.67	19.15	100.00
	4.27	5.25	6.87	11.20	6.36
A small number is involved	1,343	3,976	5,539	1,422	12,280
	10.94	32.38	45.11	11.58	100.00
	18.81	26.20	32.52	29.61	27.81
A moderate number is involved	1,902	4,794	5,207	1,342	13,245
	14.36	36.19	39.31	10.13	100.00
	26.63	31.60	30.57	27.95	30.00
A lot of people are involved	2,321	4,278	3,836	1,031	11,466
	20.24	37.31	33.46	8.99	100.00
	32.50	28.19	22.52	21.47	25.97
Almost everyone is involved	1,270	1,329	1,281	469	4,349
	29.20	30.56	29.46	10.78	100.00
	17.78	8.76	7.52	9.77	9.85
Total	7,141	15,173	17,034	4,802	44,150
	16.17	34.37	38.58	10.88	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Appendix 3: Figure 2.A. Predicted values of the NEP simple summated scale across levels of perceived corruption for given levels of education. Graph based on the full ZINB interactive model specification (model 4, Table 5, Appendix 2).



Appendix 3: Figure 2.B. Predicted values of the NEP simple summated scale across levels of perceived corruption for given levels of political interest. Graph based on the full ZINB interactive model specification (model 4, Table 5, Appendix 2).



Appendix 3: Figure 3. Histogram of the NEP simple summated scale.



Appendix 3: Figure 4. Bivariate relationship between NEP and perceived corruption with 95% Confidence Intervals (country averages)— standard error of the forecast



Appendix 3: Figure 5. Added-variable plot for perceived corruption (left), and leverage against the normalized residuals squared plot (right). Source: model 5, Table 3.



Appendix 4: Codebook (original question wording and coding, authors' recoding, source and year of variables used in the analyses)

Variable	*Original question wording and coding*	*Authors' recoding*	*Source & Year*
Non-electoral participation	Here are some different forms of political and social action, that people can take. - Signed a petition; - Boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons; - Took part in a demonstration (any kind of demonstration); - Attended a political meeting or rally; - Contacted, or attempt to contact, a politician or a civil servant to express your views; - Donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity; - Contacted or appeared in the media to express your views; Please indicate, for each one, 1= whether you have done any of these things in the past year, 2= whether you have done it in the more distant past, 3= whether you have not done it but might do it, 4= or have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it.	For each action, we created a dummy variable grouping individuals: 1= who have engaged in it in the last year (original: 1) 0= otherwise (original: 2; 3; 4). We created both simple and rating summated scales. Also, we create a dummy (=1 if the person participated at least in two of the seven activities; 0= otherwise). See data section.	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Corruption	How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in [COUNTRY]? 1= Hardly anyone is involved 2= A small number is involved 3= A moderate number is involved 4= A lot of people are involved 5= Almost everyone is involved	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Biographical availability			
Sex	Sex of respondent (Male/Female)	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Age	Age of respondent	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Age squared	Age of respondent*age of respondent	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have attained? 0= No formal education 1= Primary school (elementary education) 2= Lower secondary (secondary completed does not allow entry to university: obligatory school) 3= Upper secondary (programs that allows entry to university) 4= Post-secondary, non-tertiary (other upper secondary programs toward labor market or technical formation) 5= Lower level tertiary, first stage (also technical schools at a tertiary level) 6= Upper level tertiary (Master, Doctor)	We grouped the seven original categories in four: 1= Primary school or lower (original: 0; 1) 2= Secondary school (original: 2) 3= A-level or equivalent, i.e. programs that allow entry to university (original: 3; 4) 4= University degree or higher (original: 5; 6)	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004) *(N.B. ISSP 2004 original coding was different but we recoded the data consistently with the 2014 wave).*

	Partner cohabitation	Do you have a spouse or a steady partner and, if yes, do you share the same household? 1= Yes, have partner; live in same household 2= Yes, have partner; don't live in same household 3= No partner	We analyzed whether respondents live in the same household with a spouse or steady life partner: 1= Yes (original: 1) 0= Otherwise (original: 2; 3).	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004) *(N.B. ISSP 2004 original coding was different but we recoded the data consistently with the 2014 wave).*
Grievances				
	Income decile	In our society, there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from the top to the bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale? 1= Lowest, Bottom … 10= Highest, Top	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004) *(N.B. Not available for Great Britain).*
	Job status (ref. paid work/pensioner) I_Unemployed I_Student I_Others	Which of the following best describes your current situation? 1= In paid work 2= Unemployed and looking for a job 3= In education 4= Apprentice or trainee 5= Permanently sick or disabled 6= Retired 7= Domestic work 8= In compulsory military service or community service 9= Other	First, we grouped the nine original categories in four: ▪ In paid work or retired (original: 1; 6) ▪ Unemployed (original: 2) ▪ In education or trainee (original: 3; 4) ▪ All the others (original: 5; 7; 8; 9) For our analyses, we use it as a multinomial variable with "in paid work or retired" as the baseline category.	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004) *(N.B. ISSP 2004 original coding was different but we recoded the data consistently with the 2014 wave).*
Political values				
	Trust government	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right". 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
	Interest	How interested would you say you personally are in politics? 1= Very interested 2= Fairly interested 3= Not very interested 4= Not at all interested	Scale reversed in our analyses	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)

	Efficacy	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does". 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
	Information	How often do you use the media, including television, newspapers, radio and the internet, to get political news or information? 1= Several times a day 2= Once a day 3= 5-6 days a week 4= 3-4 days a week 5= 1-2 days a week 6= Less than 1 day a week 7= Never	We grouped the seven original categories in five: 1 = Every day (original: 1; 2) 2 = Not every day, but at least three days a week (original: 3; 4) 3 = 1-2 days a week (original: 5) 4 = Fewer than 1 day a week (original: 6) 5 = Never (original: 7)	ISSP 2014 *(N.B. ISSP 2004 original coding was different but we recoded the data as explained in fn. 10).*
	Party policy	Thinking now about politics in [COUNTRY], to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Political parties do not give voters real policy choices". 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Social capital & networks				
	Interpersonal trust	Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 1= People can almost always be trusted 2= People can usually be trusted 3= You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people 4= You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people	None	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
	Union membership	People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. Considering the type of group "trade union, business, or professional association", please indicate whether you: 1= Belong and actively participate 2= Belong but don't actively participate 3= Used to belong but do not any more 4= Never belonged to it	We grouped the four original categories in two: 1= Belong and participate (original: 1) 0= Otherwise (original: 2; 3; 4)	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
	Party membership	People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. Considering the type of group "political party", please indicate whether you: 1= Belong and actively participate 2= Belong but don't actively participate 3= Used to belong but do not any more 4= Never belonged to it	We grouped the four original categories in two: 1= Belong and participate (original: 1) 0= Otherwise (original: 2; 3; 4)	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)

	Organizational membership	People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. Considering the types of groups "Religious", "Sport/Leisure/Cultural", and "Other", please indicate whether you: 1= Belong and actively participate 2= Belong but don't actively participate 3= Used to belong but do not any more 4= Never belonged to it	For each of these three types of groups, we firstly grouped the four original categories in two: ▪ Belong and participate (original: 1) ▪ Others (original: 2; 3; 4) Then, we created a new variable that counts the number of types to which the respondent belongs: 1= Belong and participate to one type of association 2= Belong and participate to two types of association 3= Belong and participate to three types of association 0= Others	ISSP 2014 (and ISSP 2004)
Aggregated-level indicators				
	Regional autonomy	We use the most recent aggregate measurement of the Regional Authority Index at the country level. This index has updated —until 2010— information on the authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region and the country as a whole, including fiscal, juridical, budget and policy-related aspects.		Hooghe *et al.* (2016)
	Country-level corruption	Corruption Perception Index (continuous)		Transparency International (2004; 2014)
	Unemployment rate	Percent of total labor force (continuous)		International Monetary Fund Database (2004; 2014) Data for India come from the World Bank Database / ILO (2004; 2014)
	GDP pc	Relative growth of the gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) - Current International Dollar. The variables are computed using GDP per capita data as follows: ((GDP per capita 2014 – GDP per capita 2013) / GDP per capita 2013)*100 ((GDP per capita 2004 – GDP per capita 2003) / GDP per capita 2003)*100		International Monetary Fund Database (2003; 2004; 2013; 2014)

Appendix 5: List of countries participating in ISSP Citizenship modules

	2014	2004
Australia	X	X
Austria	X	X
Belgium/Flanders	X	X
Brazil		X
Bulgaria		X
Canada		X
Chile	X	X
Croatia	X	
Cyprus		X
Czech Republic	X	X
Denmark	X	X
Dominican Republic		X
Finland	X	X
France	X	X
Georgia	X	
Germany	X	X
Great Britain	X	X
Hungary	X	X
Iceland	X	
India	X	
Ireland (Republic)		X
Israel	X	X
Japan	X	X
Latvia		X
Lithuania	X	
Mexico		X
Netherlands	X	X
New Zealand		X
Norway	X	X
Philippines	X	X
Poland	X	X
Portugal		X
Russia	X	X
Slovakia	X	X
Slovenia	X	X
South Africa	X	X
South Korea	X	X
Spain	X	X
Sweden	X	X
Switzerland	X	X
Taiwan	X	X
Turkey	X	
United States	X	X
Uruguay		X
Venezuela	X	X