

Online Supplemental Material for

“A Quiet Revolution in State Lobbying:  
Government Growth and Interest Populations.”

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## A. Average Interest Groups per Decade

Figure A.1 tracks the average number of groups registered to lobby in Wisconsin and all the remaining states listed in Figure 2 of the main text. Figure A.1 shows that Wisconsin generally bucked the nationwide trend of lobbying growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Figure A.2 tracks the average number of groups registered to lobby in six states with observations available from every decade since the 1910s. The six states include Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and South Dakota. The line chart shows that the average number of interest groups began to grow in the 1960s and 1970s, even to the exclusion of totals from New York.

Figure A.1: Average Interest Groups per Decade





Figure A.2: Average Interest Groups per Decade, Six States



## B. When States Adopted Lobbyist Registration

Table A.1 shows the years when each U.S. state first began to register lobbyists, the method of enactment, and the state entity or agency first delegated with implementing registration. All the initial lobby laws were strengthened over time as states added details and improved enforcement.

Table A.1: Enactment Year of Lobbyist Registration

State	Year	Method of Passage	Delegated Authority
Massachusetts	1890	Legislation	Sergeant at Arms
Wisconsin	1899	Legislation	Secretary of State
Maryland	1900	Legislation	Secretary of State
New York	1906	Legislation	Secretary of State
Idaho	1907	Legislation	Secretary of State
Nebraska	1907	Legislation	Secretary of State
South Dakota	1907	Legislation	Secretary of State
Kansas	1909	Legislation	Secretary of State
New Hampshire	1909	Legislation	Secretary of State
Georgia	1911	Legislation	Secretary of State
Rhode Island	1912	Legislation	Secretary of State
Alaska	1913	Legislation	Secretary of the Territory
Ohio	1913	Legislation	Secretary of State
Illinois	1915	Senate Resolution	Secretary of State
Indiana	1915	Legislation	Secretary of State
Kentucky	1916	Legislation	Attorney General
Mississippi	1916	Legislation	Secretary of State
Maine	1919	Legislation	Secretary of State
California	1925	Chamber Rule	Senate Secretary
North Carolina	1933	Legislation	Secretary of State
South Carolina	1935	Legislation	Secretary of State
Connecticut	1936	Legislation	Secretary of State
Virginia	1938	Legislation	Secretary of State
Vermont	1939	Legislation	Secretary of State
North Dakota	1941	Legislation	Secretary of State
Colorado	1947	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Florida	1947	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Michigan	1947	Legislation	Secretary of State
Iowa	1949	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Oklahoma	1949	Chamber Rule	Senate Secretary
Texas	1949	Chamber Rule	House Representation Committee
Montana	1959	Legislation	Secretary of State
Washington	1959	Chamber Rule	House Speaker
Pennsylvania	1961	Legislation	Secretary of State
Minnesota	1963	Legislation	House Clerk
New Jersey	1964	Legislation	Secretary of State
Missouri	1965	Legislation	Senate Secretary and House Clerk
Tennessee	1965	Legislation	Secretary of State
Oregon	1965	Legislation	Legislative Counsel
Arkansas	1967	Legislation	Senate Secretary and House Clerk
New Mexico	1967	Legislation	Secretary of State
Delaware	c.1970	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Arizona	1971	Chamber Rule	House Rules Committee
Wyoming	1971	Legislation	Legislative Service Agency
Louisiana	1972	Legislation	Senate Secretary and House Clerk
Alabama	1973	Legislation	Ethics Commission
Nevada	1973	Legislation	Secretary of State
West Virginia	1974	Chamber Rule	Senate Clerk
Hawai'i	1975	Legislation	Senate and House Clerks
Utah	1975	Legislation	Secretary of State

### C. Comparison of Means Across States

Along various dimensions, the 30 states I draw observations from are like the remaining non-sampled states. Table A.2 shows the average value for both sampled and non-sampled states for each of my explanatory variables for 2009, the last year included in my data set.<sup>1</sup> The second and third columns report the means of the sampled and non-sampled states, respectively. The fourth column reports the absolute difference along with the results of *t* tests for equality of means. For nearly every variable, I do not find statistically discernible differences in means between sampled and non-sampled states. However, there are discernible differences for session days and for lobby law age. These differences likely do not affect the results presented in the main text. Session length is an inconsistent predictor of interest populations. It is unsurprising that there is a significant difference between the average age of lobby laws in sample states and the average in non-sample states. Non-sample states are mostly late adopters of lobby transparency and therefore are not included in my data set, which examines interest populations dating from the late 1940s. Importantly, the results presented in Table A.2 show that these late adopters do not differ from early adopters (i.e., sampled states) in any meaningful way.

Table A.2: Means of Sample and Non-Sample States, 2009

Variable	Sample States	Non-Sample States	Absolute Difference
Expenditures ( <i>billions</i> )	36.497	21.1	13.396
Enactments	379.033	465.95	86.917
Session Length ( <i>days</i> )	174.867	122.5	52.367*
Policy Liberalism	0.277	-0.208	0.485
Policy Innovation	0.111	0.069	0.043
Legislative Spending	70.483	40.668	29.815
One-Party Dominance	0.513	0.534	0.021
Lobby Law Age	82.767	46.9	35.867***
Population ( <i>millions</i> )	6.997	4.753	2.245

\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  on one-tailed tests

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<sup>1</sup> Observations for Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Virginia are from 2010 since legislatures in these states meet during even-numbered years.

#### D. Alternative Model Specifications

In the main text, regression results are presented using general expenditures that exclude spending on utilities, insurance social trusts, and liquor stores. Table A.3 presents the same model specifications, but with total expenditures that include those missing components. The results all remain substantively unchanged.

Table A.4 presents results from alternative versions of one of the models from the main text, but with a different measure of state spending and a different dependent variable. All four models in Table A.4 use state spending per capita (i.e., billions divided by millions of residents) as an explanatory variable. Since spending is divided by resident population, coefficients for resident population are excluded from the models. Models A.7 and A.8 predict group totals and present negative-binomial coefficients. Models A.9 and A.10 estimate group totals per million residents, and present least-squares coefficients. In models without state and year effects, standard errors are clustered by state. The substantive results presented in Table A.4 remain the same as for other model specifications presented in the main text.

Table A.5 reports the results from models like those presented in the main text. Whereas models in the main text are estimated with state and year effects, the models in Table A.5 include time trends unique to each state. Specifically, unique identifiers for every state (FIPS numbers) are multiplied by years and employed as 29 explanatory variables. The coefficients from these variables are not reported. My main effects all remain substantively the same.

Table A.3: Government Growth and Lobbying by Interest Groups

VARIABLES	Model A.1	Model A.2	Model A.3	Model A.4	Model A.5	Model A.6
State Spending ( <i>billions</i> )	0.011*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.012 (0.047)	0.006*** (0.001)
Enactments / 100	0.0205* (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)	0.013 (0.014)	0.000 (0.015)	-0.023** (0.01)	-0.005 (0.011)
Session Days / 100	0.140** (0.069)	0.078 (0.067)	0.154** (0.077)	0.062 (0.075)	0.102 (0.092)	-0.01 (0.077)
Policy Liberalism	-0.088 (0.067)	-0.135** (0.067)	-0.041 (0.074)	-0.113 (0.075)	-0.457*** (0.112)	0.121** (0.053)
Policy Innovation	-0.573* (0.335)	-0.199 (0.26)	-0.762* (0.4)	-0.193 (0.296)	0.183 (0.814)	-0.464*** (0.179)
One-Party Dominance	0.963*** (0.285)	-	1.282*** (0.319)	-	1.558*** (0.282)	0.215 (0.208)
State Spending ( <i>billions</i> )	0.011*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.012 (0.047)	0.006*** (0.001)
Legis. Spending ( <i>millions</i> )	-0.757*** (0.275)	-0.735*** (0.276)	-1.305*** (0.429)	-1.162*** (0.427)	0.822 (2.467)	-0.698*** (0.169)
Age of First Lobby Law	-0.005 (0.035)	0.015 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.039)	0.024 (0.04)	-0.031 (0.39)	0.003 (0.019)
Revised Lobby Law	0.322*** (0.114)	0.324*** (0.112)	0.36*** (0.13)	0.383*** (0.131)	-	-
Population ( <i>millions</i> )	0.139*** (0.037)	0.146*** (0.038)	0.126*** (0.039)	0.135*** (0.041)	0.166** (0.082)	0.143*** (0.036)
Population <sup>2</sup> ( <i>millions</i> )	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.002* (0.001)
Ln( $\alpha$ )	-2.596*** (0.119)	-2.546*** (0.117)	-2.55*** (0.135)	-2.443*** (0.13)	-5.306*** (0.384)	-4.187*** (0.145)
Constant	3.618*** (1.224)	3.751*** (1.24)	2.431** (1.085)	3.127*** (1.132)	4.085 (14.23)	5.206*** (0.709)
<i>Observations</i>	197	204	161	168	79	118
<i>No. of States</i>	29	30	23	24	26	27
<i>Years Covered</i>	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-1990	1951-2010
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-1182.378	-1226.642	-959.063	-1006.353	-321.91	-674.692
<i>AIC</i>	2504.756	2593.284	2044.125	2138.706	757.82	1467.383

Note: coefficients are negative binomial coefficients. State and year effects included in all models but not reported.

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table A.4: Alternative Measures of Government Spending

VARIABLES	Model A.7 Groups	Model A.8 Groups	Model A.9 Groups per capita	Model A.10 Groups per capita
Enactments / 100	0.018 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.015)	-4.487* (2.423)	2.015 (1.912)
Session Days / 100	0.054 (0.099)	0.132* (0.08)	-39.70** (15.64)	-20* (10.34)
Policy Liberalism	-0.077 (0.119)	-0.112 (0.094)	20.84 (14.67)	-1.232 (12.02)
Policy Innovation	-0.635** (0.314)	-0.618* (0.317)	-63.86 (86.97)	-33.93 (43.96)
State Spending per capita	0.143*** (0.048)	-0.064 (0.088)	43.81*** (13.53)	41.95*** (11.72)
Legis. Spending ( <i>millions</i> )	1.262** (0.606)	0.271* (0.163)	-131.4*** (44.20)	-65.75*** (21.21)
Age of First Lobby Law	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.028 (0.042)	-1.005 (1.096)	-0.09 (5.494)
Revised Lobby Law	0.757*** (0.116)	0.405*** (0.143)	71.50*** (25.18)	32.91* (18.90)
Ln( $\alpha$ )	-0.956 (0.307)	-2.251*** (1.023)	-	-
Constant	4.858*** (0.354)	6.209*** (1.023)	189.7*** (53.34)	8.453 (133)
<i>Fixed Effects?</i>	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	168	168	168	168
<i>No. of States</i>	24	24	24	24
<i>Years Covered</i>	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-2010
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-1119.077	-1018.973	-	-
<i>AIC</i>	2258.154	2159.946	-	-
<i>R-squared</i>	-	-	0.468	0.924

Note: coefficients for models A.7 and A.8 are negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table A.5: Government Growth and Lobbying by Groups (Alternative Specification)

VARIABLES	Model A.11	Model A.12	Model A.13	Model A.14	Model A.15	Model A.16
Enactments / 100	0.02* (0.012)	0.014 (0.012)	0.011 (0.013)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.013)
Session Days / 100	0.089 (0.067)	0.047 (0.066)	0.075 (0.073)	0.02 (0.073)	-0.025 (0.092)	-0.005 (0.078)
Policy Liberalism	-0.086 (0.073)	-0.132* (0.074)	-0.064 (0.079)	-0.121 (0.081)	-0.279** (0.124)	0.114 (0.072)
Policy Innovation	-0.356 (0.35)	-0.264 (0.282)	-0.478 (0.418)	-0.29 (0.318)	1.450* (0.836)	-0.287 (0.234)
One-Party Dominance	1.080*** (0.273)	-	1.206*** (0.305)	-	0.754** (0.337)	0.395 (0.244)
State Spending ( <i>billions</i> )	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.076 (0.068)	0.008*** (0.002)
Legis. Spending ( <i>millions</i> )	-0.449 (0.299)	-0.527* (0.302)	-0.730 (0.457)	-0.744* (0.449)	1.325 (3.098)	-0.488** (0.227)
Age of First Lobby Law	-0.006 (0.032)	0.005 (0.033)	0.009 (0.036)	0.026 (0.037)	-0.071 (0.178)	0.004 (0.021)
Revised Lobby Law	0.466*** (0.095)	0.426*** (0.096)	0.5*** (0.108)	0.46*** (0.11)	-	-
Population ( <i>millions</i> )	0.104*** (0.039)	0.125*** (0.04)	0.089** (0.041)	0.112*** (0.042)	0.092 (0.105)	0.108** (0.046)
Population <sup>2</sup> ( <i>millions</i> )	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.002* (0.001)
Ln( $\alpha$ )	-2.346*** (0.116)	-2.284*** (0.113)	-2.282*** (0.13)	-2.204*** (0.126)	-3.76*** (0.212)	-3.484*** (0.139)
Constant	-46.85 (61.28)	-31.33 (62.63)	-18.93 (68.63)	6.712 (71.01)	-154.1 (341.3)	-32.87 (41.07)
<i>Observations</i>	197	204	161	168	79	118
<i>No. of States</i>	29	30	23	24	26	27
<i>Years Covered</i>	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-2010	1949-1990	1951-2010
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-1202.409	-1248.652	-976.199	-1022.634	-357.145	-713.817
<i>AIC</i>	2488.818	2581.304	2024.398	2117.269	792.289	1509.634

Note: coefficients are negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$