Supplementary Information

This appendix provides additional information related to the empirical analyses presented in the manuscript. Section 1 provides the wording of the survey experiment. Section 2 reports summary statistics for our samples. Section 3 presents balance tests for our two survey experiments. Section 4 presents heterogeneous effects of our treatment by gender. Section 5 includes a discussion of earlier, similar experiments we conducted to demonstrate consistency in the results. Section 6 provides examples of recruitment and propaganda materials used by rebel groups to highlight female participation. Section 7 provides descriptive statistics for our observational analysis. Section 8 presents the full results from the external support analysis. Section 9 presents the effects of female fighters on transnational support when accounting for rebel abusive behavior (sexual violence and forced recruitment). Section 10 shows the effect of TNSA support for rebels on state support by the visible presence of female combatants. Section 11 presents additional analyses of the Indonesia sample demonstrating the effects of the treatment on subsets of highly religious respondents.

Section 1: Experiment wording

1.1   U.S. sample

1.1.1   Introductory text (*seen by all groups*):

Around the world, there are several groups that are fighting the government to seek political or social change or gain independence. Examples of such groups include the Naxalites in India, the PKK in Turkey, and the Donetsk People's Republic in the Ukraine. Below, you will read some information about one such rebel group. For scientific validity, the situation is **general**, and is not about a specific conflict in the news today. **Please read carefully**, as we will be asking questions about the text at the end.

1.1.2   All male condition (Control Group)

For the past several months, a rebel group with a fighting force of several thousand men has been engaged in a violent struggle against its country's government. The group accuses the government of discrimination and violent repression against its people and seeks to establish an independent homeland that will guarantee their basic rights and freedoms. To date, the conflict has caused hundreds of deaths and forced thousands to flee from their homes.

A recent Newsweek article profiling the conflict interviewed Ayan, one such fighter. Ayan explained that he joined the rebels after his wife and daughter were killed in a government attack on his village. He added that since joining the group, he has only become more committed to the cause, and he will continue to fight until his people gain independence, freedom, and security.

1.1.3 Mixed gender condition

For the past several months, a rebel group with a fighting force of several thousand men and women has been engaged in a violent struggle against its country's government. The group accuses the government of discrimination and violent repression against its people and seeks to establish an independent homeland that will guarantee their basic rights and freedoms. To date, the conflict has caused hundreds of deaths and forced thousands to flee from their homes.

According to many observers, women make up as much as a third of the rebel fighters. A recent Newsweek article profiling the conflict interviewed Ayana, one such fighter. Ayana explained that she joined the rebels after her husband and daughter were killed in a government attack on her village. She added that since joining the group, she has only become more committed to the cause, and she will continue to fight until her people gain independence, freedom, and security.

1.2 Indonesia sample

1.2.1 Introductory text (*seen by all groups*):

Di berbagai belahan dunia, terdapat beberapa kelompok yang menentang pemerintah untuk mencapai perubahan politik , sosial, atau untuk mencari kemerdekaan. Beberapa contoh dari kelompok-kelompok tersebut adalah Naxalites di India, PKK di Turki, dan Donetsk People's Republic di Ukraina. Di bawah ini, terdapat beberapa informasi tentang kelompok pemberontak tersebut. Untuk menjamin kesahihan ilmiah, situasi yang digambarkan disini merupakan situasi umum, dan tidak merujuk ke konflik tertentu yang sedang beredar di berita-berita. **Mohon Anda baca dengan seksama**, karena kami akan mengajukan beberapa pertanyaan di akhir bacaan ini.

1.2.2 All male condition (Control Group)

Sejak beberapa bulan terakhir, sekelompok pemberontak yang memiliki beberapa ribu pasukan pejuang telah menantang pemerintah pusat dengan menggunakan metode kekerasan. Kelompok ini menuduh pemerintah melakukan tindakan diskriminasi dan represi yang kekerasan terhadap

komunitas etnis kelompok itu. Kelompok itu ingin melepaskan diri dari negaranya dan membentuk negara independen di teritorinya yang merupakan upaya menjamin hak asasi dan kebebasan mereka. Hingga kini, konflik antara kelompok ini dengan pemerintah telah memakan ratusan korban jiwa dan memaksa ribuan orang mengungsi.

Baru-baru ini, sebuah artikel di situs web Al-Jazeera mengangkat berita mengenai konflik ini dan mewawancarai Ayan, salah satu anggota pasukan pejuang. Ayan menjelaskan bahwa dia bergabung dengan pasukan pemberontak setelah istri dan anaknya terbunuh dalam serangan pemerintah ke desanya. Bapak Ayan menambahkan bahwa sejak bergabung dengan kelompok ini, dia menjadi semakin berkomitmen untuk berjuang dan bertempur demi kemerdekaan, kebebasan dan keamanan anggota masyarakat kelompoknya

1.2.3   Mixed gender condition

Sejak beberapa bulan terakhir, sekelompok pemberontak yang memiliki beberapa ribu pasukan pejuang laki-laki dan perempuan telah menantang pemerintah pusat dengan menggunakan metode kekerasan. Kelompok ini menuduh pemerintah melakukan tindakan diskriminasi dan represi yang kekerasan terhadap komunitas etnis kelompok itu. Kelompok itu ingin melepaskan diri dari negaranya dan membentuk negara independen di teritorinya yang merupakan upaya menjamin hak asasi dan kebebasan mereka. Hingga kini, konflik antara kelompok ini dengan pemerintah telah memakan ratusan korban jiwa dan memaksa ribuan orang mengungsi.

 Menurut banyak pengamat, hampir sepertiga dari pasukan pemberontak adalah perempuan. Baru-baru ini, sebuah artikel di situs web Al-Jazeera mengangkat berita mengenai konflik ini dan mewawancarai Ayana, salah satu anggota pasukan pejuang. Ayana menjelaskan bahwa dia bergabung dengan pasukan pemberontak setelah suami dan anaknya terbunuh dalam serangan pemerintah ke desanya. Ibu Ayana menambahkan bahwa sejak bergabung dengan kelompok ini, dia menjadi semakin berkomitmen untuk berjuang dan bertempur demi kemerdekaan, kebebasan dan keamanan anggota masyarakat kelompoknya.

Section 2: Summary Statistics for Samples

2.1 US sample

Table 1: U.S. Sample Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Age				
18-24	0.14	0.34	0	1
25-34	0.19	0.39	0	1
35-44	0.17	0.38	0	1
45-54	0.17	0.38	0	1
55-64	0.16	0.37	0	1
65 and above	0.17	0.38	0	1
Female	0.54	0.50	0	1
Race/Ethnicity				
Asian/Asian-American	0.06	0.24	0	1
African-American	0.14	0.35	0	1
Latino	0.18	0.38	0	1
White	0.59	0.49	0	1
Education				
Less than high school	0.13	0.34	0	1
High school / GED	0.28	0.45	0	1
Some college	0.21	0.41	0	1
Associate's degree	0.09	0.28	0	1
Bachelor's degree	0.18	0.39	0	1
Graduate degree	0.11	0.31	0	1

N=792

2.2   Indonesia sample

Table 2: Indonesia Sample Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Age				
18-24	0.43	0.50	0	1
25-34	0.33	0.47	0	1
35-44	0.19	0.39	0	1
45-54	0.04	0.20	0	1
55-64	0.01	0.07	0	1
65 and above	0.004	0.06	0	1
Female	0.50	0.50	0	1
Religion				
Muslim	0.81	0.39	0	1
Protestant	0.10	0.30	0	1
Catholic	0.05	0.22	0	1
Other	0.04	0.19	0	1
Education				
Elementary	0.01	0.10	0	1
Junior high / vocational	0.37	0.48	0	1
Some high school	0.05	0.22	0	1
Graduated high school	0.07	0.26	0	1
Some college	0.10	0.30	0	1
Undergraduate degree	0.35	0.48	0	1
Graduate degree	0.04	0.19	0	1

N=754

Section 3: Balance tests for Samples

3.1 Balance Table – U.S. sample

Table 3: U.S. Sample Balance Table

	Control Mean	**Treatment Mean**	**Difference of Means**	**P-value for Difference of Means**
Female	0.527	0.544	-0.017	0.629
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)	
Age	3.595	3.514	0.082	0.493
	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.119)	
Education	3.209	3.276	-0.067	0.556
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.114)	
White	0.608	0.581	0.027	0.445
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)	
Income	2.288	2.346	-0.058	0.524
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.091)	
International news consumption	3.183	3.193	-0.010	0.914
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.091)	
Political interest	3.491	3.539	-0.048	0.567
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.083)	
Republican	0.323	0.326	-0.003	0.936
	(.024)	(0.023)	(0.033)	
Democrat	0.412	0.439	-0.026	0.453
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)	
N	393	399	792	

3.2 Balance Tests – Indonesia sample

Table 4: Indonesian Sample Balance Table

	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference of Means	P-value for Difference of Means
Female	0.496	0.504	-0.008	0.827
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.036)	
Age	1.860	1.889	-0.029	0.671
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.069)	
Education	6.142	6.064	0.078	0.565
	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.136)	
Muslim	0.805	0.810	-0.004	0.881
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.029)	
Income	2.627	2.627	0.000	0.999
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.103)	
International news consumption	3.537	3.427	0.110	0.164
	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.079)	
Urban	2.748	2.704	0.044	0.533
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.070)	
N	365	389	754	

Section 4: Heterogeneous Effects by Gender

In this section we show how the effects of our treatment vary by respondent gender. In general, we find stronger effects for women than for men, though this varies somewhat by outcome.

4.1 U.S. Sample

Table 5: Attitudes Towards Rebel Groups

	Female Respondents				Male Respondents			
	Mean		ATE	T-statistic	Mean		ATE	T-statistic
	Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)			Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)		
Interest in group	3.51	3.77	0.26	2.27*	3.91	3.84	-0.07	-0.69
Legitimacy of goals	3.67	3.82	0.15	1.69*	3.78	3.91	0.12	1.49†
Violence legitimate	3.45	3.62	0.17	1.89*	3.63	3.70	0.06	0.72

Note: Mean score denotes the average view of respondents on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
The t-statistic is obtained from a t-test comparing the treatment and control groups.
†=$p \leq 0.10$; *=$p \leq 0.05$; **=$p \leq 0.01$ (one-tailed tests).

Table 6: Beliefs about fighter's motivations

	Female Respondents				Male Respondents			
	Mean		ATE	T-statistic	Mean		ATE	T-statistic
	Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)			Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)		
Ideological commitment	3.98	4.25	0.28	2.84**	3.95	4.23	0.28	2.82**
Thrill and adventure	2.70	2.54	-0.16	-1.23	2.34	2.52	0.17	1.27
Profit-seeking	3.05	2.56	-0.50	-3.88**	2.44	2.5	0.06	0.43

Note: Mean score denotes the average view of respondents on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
The t-statistic is obtained from a t-test comparing the treatment and control groups.
†=$p \leq 0.10$; *=$p \leq 0.05$; **=$p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed test).

4.2 Indonesia Sample

Table 7: Attitudes Towards Rebel Groups

	Female Respondents				**Male Respondents**			
	Mean		ATE	T-statistic	Mean		ATE	T-statistic
	Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)			Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)		
Interest in group	3.91	4.04	0.13	1.39†	4.14	4.19	0.05	0.55
Legitimacy of goals	3.04	3.02	-0.02	-0.21	3.11	3.18	0.07	0.64
Violence legitimate	2.87	3.03	0.15	1.17	2.89	3.07	0.18	1.40†

Note: Mean score denotes the average view of respondents on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
The t-statistic is obtained from a t-test comparing the treatment and control groups.
†=$p \leq 0.10$; *=$p \leq 0.05$; **=$p \leq 0.01$ (one-tailed tests).

Table 8: Beliefs about fighter's motivations

	Female Respondents				**Male Respondents**			
	Mean		ATE	T-statistic	Mean		ATE	T-statistic
	Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)			Control (All male)	Treatment (Female)		
Ideological commitment	4.09	4.04	-0.05	-0.58	4.12	3.95	-0.17	-1.78†
Thrill and adventure	3.34	3.04	-0.30	-2.43*	3.41	3.06	-0.35	-2.71**
Profit-seeking	3.40	2.94	-0.46	-3.68**	3.52	2.97	-0.54	-4.12**

Note: Mean score denotes the average view of respondents on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
The t-statistic is obtained from a t-test comparing the treatment and control groups.
†=$p \leq 0.10$; *=$p \leq 0.05$; **=$p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed test).

Section 5: Pilot and Related Studies

Prior to analysis presented in this manuscript, the authors conducted two closely related studies. The first of these used a sample of undergraduates at an urban public university in the United States (n=429), while the second used a national sample of US respondents recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI) (n=1741). The results from these studies are reported in Wood (2019). We briefly discuss them here, in order to highlight the consistency of the results across different sample populations and using somewhat different questions and instruments.

The most notable difference between the earlier studies and the one presented in this manuscript is that former utilized a 2x2 factorial design that included conditions for both the gender composition of the group (male vs. mixed gender) and a characterization of the group's behavior toward local civilians (cooperative vs. abusive). This design choice based was based on expectations that the presence of female fighters might condition the relationship between negative characterizations of the group and respondent attitudes toward it.

In addition, the previous studies employed a different description of the hypothetical armed rebellion and used different images of armed groups. Lastly, we included a number of different questions in each study. However, each wave of the experiment included questions that probed respondents' levels of interest in the story and attitudes toward the hypothetical movement described in the vignette. One key difference in these questions is worth noting. While we explicitly asked respondents about their perceptions a group's *legitimacy* in the survey discussed in this manuscript, we explicitly asked them about their *support* for the group and its goals in the earlier studies.

Despite the differences in the studies, the similarities in the questions related to respondent interest and attitudes provide us some insights into the robustness of our results. In each of the earlier studies, we observed a positive relationship between the gender treatment and observer attitudes toward the group and their interest in the story. The effect is not statistically significant in the student pilot but achieves significance in the national SSI sample. We also observed a positive effect of the gender treatment on respondent support for the rebel group. The effect was significant and positive in the student sample but only borderline significant in the larger SSI sample. Thus, the presence of female combatants generally leads to greater audience interest and improved audience attitudes toward group.

As noted, our earlier studies had a 2x2 design, reflecting our hypothesis that the effects of gender may be conditioned by the behavior of the rebel group towards civilians. We find mixed evidence for an interaction effect between gender and civilian abuse: In the student sample, the presence of female combatants appears to exert no moderating influence on the relationship between the abusive condition and observer interest, but it does appear to moderate the relationship between the abusive condition and support in the expect manner, generally increasing observer support for abusive groups. Conversely, in the national SSI sample we find no evidence of a conditioning effect on support, and while the results suggest a conditioning effect on the relationship between the abusive condition and observer interest, it is in the opposite direction that we expect.

To summarize, the results of two previous experimental studies employing a similar treatment and posing similar questions to respondents are broadly consistent with the results we present in this manuscript. Across multiple, highly diverse samples, we consistently find a positive main effect of

the presence of female combatants on observer attitudes and interest in an armed group. This consistency provides us greater certainty in the robustness of the results presented in the.

Section 6: Images of Female Fighters Used for Propaganda Purposes

Here we include the examples of female fighters represented in the propaganda material of armed groups or their overseas allies/partners. As these images illustrate, such depictions are found across a diverse range of cultural and geographic contexts.

Namibia/South West Africa (SWAPO)

Vietnam (NLF/Viet Cong)

Turkey/Syria (YPG/YPJ)

Northern Ireland (PIRA)

El Salvador (FMLN)

Section 7: Descriptive Statistics for Observational Analyses

Table 9:

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
TNSA Support	308	0.315	0.465	0	1
Rebel Factions	305	3.213	2.352	1	10
Democracy	309	0.252	0.435	0	1
Leftist	298	0.225	0.418	0	1
Nationalist	298	0.493	0.501	0	1
Religious	298	0.195	0.397	0	1
Ethnic Kinship	309	0.395	0.490	0	1
Weak Rebels	304	0.405	0.492	0	1
(Pro-rebel) State Support	304	0.428	0.496	0	1
Separatist Conflict	307	0.378	0.486	0	1
Female Combatants	280	0.336	0.473	0	1
GDPpc[‡]	306	10.467	1.770	6.285	15.15
Population[‡]	306	9.858	1.461	6.254	14.00
Interstate Rivalry	307	0.658	0.475	0	1
Duration[‡]	307	0.825	0.519	0	1.607
Islamist Support	307	0.068	0.253	0	1
Diaspora Support	307	0.205	0.405	0	1
NGO Support	307	0.049	0.216	0	1
Other Support	306	0.098	0.298	0	1

Section 8: Full Results and Figures for External Support Models (for Figure 1)

In the manuscript we limited our presentation to the marginal effect of a single set of models analyzing the effect of *Female Combatants on Transnational Support* and *State Support* respectively. We present the full results from alternative models here. In this section we also report the results for models including controls for *Conflict Severity* (Model 5), (2) for *Separatist Conflict*Female Combatant* interaction (Model 6), and *Explicit* vs. *Tacit TNSA Support* (Models 7-8). Finally, we include results for models predicting state support for foreign governments experiencing conflict (Model 9), sanction threat (Model 10), and sanctions imposition (Model 11).

Table 10: Full Results for Models Presented in Figure 1

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	TNSA Support	*TNSA Support*	*State Support*	*State Support*
Female Combatants	0.860**	0.994**	0.205	0.199
	(0.343)	(0.417)	(0.317)	(0.359)
Weak Rebels	-0.578	-0.715	-0.605*	-0.404
	(0.374)	(0.462)	(0.279)	(0.291)
Leftist	-0.059	-0.368	-0.117	0.142
	(0.479)	(0.632)	(0.448)	(0.459)
Religious	1.590**	1.692**	-0.606	-0.280
	(0.501)	(0.520)	(0.508)	(0.498)
Nationalist	0.882*	0.291	-0.166	-0.105
	(0.408)	(0.420)	(0.368)	(0.467)
Ethnic Kinship	1.168**	0.928**	0.198	0.042
	(0.352)	(0.379)	(0.403)	(0.425)
Interstate Rivalry	0.226	0.462	0.995**	1.349**
	(0.505)	(0.516)	(0.388)	(0.371)
Democracy		0.760*		-0.757*
		(0.387)		(0.341)
Population‡		-0.442*		-0.581**
		(0.206)		(0.207)
GDPpc‡		0.115		0.044
		(0.224)		(0.182)
Separatist Conflict		1.411**		0.562
		(0.461)		(0.502)
Rebel Factions		-0.163*		0.102
		(0.073)		(0.087)
Duration‡		0.112		0.400
		(0.352)		(0.319)
TNSA Support			1.020**	0.970**
			(0.364)	(0.348)
Constant	-2.191**	0.900	-0.840*	3.332**
	(0.497)	(1.214)	(0.407)	(1.137)
Observations	269	268	269	268

‡=natural log

Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed)

Table 11: Results with Additional Controls

|	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	TNSA Support	TNSA Support	State Support	State Support
Female Combatants	0.981*	0.576	0.301	0.199
	(0.431)	(0.508)	(0.351)	(0.359)
Weak Rebels	-0.577	-0.681	-0.450	-0.403
	(0.477)	(0.464)	(0.278)	(0.290)
Leftist	-0.335	-0.294	0.144	0.143
	(0.702)	(0.612)	(0.470)	(0.459)
Religious	1.622**	1.642**	-0.049	-0.279
	(0.525)	(0.510)	(0.456)	(0.501)
Nationalist	0.286	0.267	-0.075	-0.105
	(0.448)	(0.405)	(0.461)	(0.467)
Ethnic Kinship	0.939**	0.986**	0.188	0.042
	(0.400)	(0.383)	(0.403)	(0.424)
Interstate Rivalry	0.311	0.439	1.364**	1.349**
	(0.520)	(0.517)	(0.351)	(0.372)
Democracy	0.813*	0.837*	-0.680*	-0.759*
	(0.387)	(0.405)	(0.337)	(0.349)
Population	-0.444*	-0.412*	-0.566**	-0.579**
	(0.224)	(0.206)	(0.198)	(0.210)
GDPpc	0.138	0.091	0.001	0.042
	(0.243)	(0.223)	(0.181)	(0.184)
Separatist Conflict	1.261**	1.026*	0.751	0.563
	(0.481)	(0.587)	(0.485)	(0.504)
Rebel Factions	-0.185*	-0.171*	0.076	0.102
	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.087)
Duration	0.118	0.048	0.375	0.399
	(0.383)	(0.350)	(0.318)	(0.320)
Female Combatants* Separatism		1.122		
		(0.701)		
Annual Battle Deaths‡	0.022			
	(0.098)			
Explicit Support			0.654*	0.983*
			(0.392)	(0.437)
Tacit Support				0.959**
				(0.381)
Constant	0.696	1.078	3.735**	3.335**
	(1.677)	(1.257)	(1.094)	(1.138)
Observations	252	268	268	268

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed)

Table 12: Alternative Measures of External Support

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
	Pro-Government State Support	*Sanctions Threat*	*Sanctions Imposition*
TNSA Support	0.309	0.671*	0.389
	(0.373)	(0.356)	(0.395)
Female Combatants	-0.635*	0.700	0.537
	(0.339)	(0.459)	(0.406)
Weak Rebels	-0.256	0.548	-0.437
	(0.346)	(0.480)	(0.479)
Leftist	0.657	1.401**	0.872*
	(0.605)	(0.595)	(0.515)
Religious	0.195	0.286	-0.538
	(0.436)	(0.499)	(0.522)
Nationalist	0.051	-0.724	-0.214
	(0.391)	(0.467)	(0.562)
Ethnic Kinship	-0.494	0.326	0.092
	(0.389)	(0.450)	(0.414)
Interstate Rivalry	0.393	-0.005	0.991*
	(0.368)	(0.562)	(0.556)
Democracy	0.851*	0.568	0.194
	(0.471)	(0.548)	(0.557)
Population‡	-0.386*	0.455*	-0.119
	(0.229)	(0.221)	(0.257)
GDPpc‡	-0.280	-0.200	0.181
	(0.211)	(0.232)	(0.235)
Separatist Conflict	-0.438	1.628*	1.450**
	(0.501)	(0.661)	(0.550)
Rebel Factions	0.020	-0.010	0.108
	(0.104)	(0.131)	(0.110)
Trade Openness		-0.001	-0.006
		(0.005)	(0.006)
Duration‡	0.970**	1.513*	1.454**
	(0.318)	(0.606)	(0.488)
Constant	6.052**	-6.044**	-4.348**
	(1.372)	(1.555)	(1.338)
Observations	268	249	249

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed)

Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Female Fighters on Transnational Support by Conflict Type

Average marginal effects (90% confidence intervals) from results presented in **Model 6** of this section.

Section 9: Effect of Rebel Abusive Behavior

In this section we present the results for models including controls for *Sexual Violence* (Model 1) and *Forced Recruitment* (Model 3), as well as the interactions of those terms with *Female Combatants* (Models 2 and 4).

Table 13: Sexual Violence and Forced Recruitment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	TNSA Support	*TNSA Support*	*TNSA Support*	*TNSA Support*
Female Combatants	0.753*	1.101*	0.747*	0.872
	(0.454)	(0.613)	(0.445)	(0.728)
Weak Rebels	-0.570	-0.559	-0.569	-0.574
	(0.477)	(0.482)	(0.478)	(0.474)
Leftist	-0.365	-0.499	-0.354	-0.337
	(0.737)	(0.734)	(0.742)	(0.720)
Religious	1.695**	1.652**	1.694**	1.697**
	(0.534)	(0.517)	(0.533)	(0.527)
Nationalist	0.234	0.172	0.239	0.237
	(0.415)	(0.412)	(0.422)	(0.420)
Ethnic Kinship	1.024**	1.047**	1.021**	1.030**
	(0.404)	(0.403)	(0.409)	(0.413)
Interstate Rivalry	0.445	0.433	0.451	0.445
	(0.509)	(0.509)	(0.517)	(0.523)
Democracy	0.796*	0.867*	0.799*	0.810*
	(0.394)	(0.397)	(0.398)	(0.409)
Population‡	-0.388*	-0.377*	-0.399*	-0.395*
	(0.221)	(0.217)	(0.233)	(0.235)
GDPpc‡	0.050	0.031	0.055	0.047
	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.241)	(0.240)
Separatist Conflict	1.438**	1.430**	1.444**	1.448**
	(0.512)	(0.503)	(0.514)	(0.504)
Rebel Factions	-0.169*	-0.165*	-0.169*	-0.170*
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Duration‡	0.203	0.196	0.201	0.195
	(0.368)	(0.370)	(0.373)	(0.368)
Sexual Violence	-0.060	0.207		
	(0.424)	(0.542)		
Female Combatants* Sexual Violence		-0.797		
		(0.814)		
Forced Recruitment			-0.010	0.051
			(0.355)	(0.504)
Female Combatants* Forced Recruitment				-0.203
				(0.852)
Constant	1.082	1.105	1.110	1.133
	(1.300)	(1.274)	(1.355)	(1.337)
Observations	245	245	245	245

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed)

Section 10: The Effect of Female Fighters on State Support by TNSA Support

In this section we present marginal effects plots from the interaction of *TNSA Support* and *Female Combatants* as a predictor of state support for rebels.

Figure 2. Conditional influence of *Female Combatants* on the relationship between *TNSA Support* and pro-rebel *State Support*

Section 11: Full Results for Supplementary Models (Figures 2 and 3)

In the manuscript we only included the marginal effects plots for the models examining the conditioning influence of observer worldview on the relationship between the gender treatment and attitudes toward an armed group (Figure 2) and the effects of female combatants on the likelihood of support from different categories of TNSAs (Figure 3). We include the complete results of these models in this section

Table 14: Effect of Gender Treatment on Observer Attitudes

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
	Interest	*Legitimacy of Group*	*Legitimacy of Tactics*
Gender Treatment	0.463	0.514	0.636
(1=mixed gender)	(0.238)*	(0.287)*	(0.336)*
Support for Sharia	0.135	0.267	0.323
	(0.055)**	(0.066)**	(0.077)**
Treatment * Sharia	-0.118	-0.143	-0.144
	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.106)
Age	-0.081	-0.174	-0.078
	(0.041)*	(0.049)**	(0.057)
Respondent Sex	-0.201	-0.069	0.078
(female=1)	(0.072)**	(0.087)	(0.057)
Education	0.002	-0.026	-0.064
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.030)*
Income	0.050	0.003	-0.030
	(0.028)*	(0.034)	(0.040)
News Consumption	0.123	-0.066	-0.104
	(0.034)**	(0.041)	(0.048)*
Urban	0.158	0.001	0.082
	(0.040)**	(0.048)	(0.056)
R^2	0.10	0.08	0.08
N	609	609	609

Coefficients from ordinary least squares models (OLS) * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$ (one-tailed test)

Table 15: Effect of Female Combatants on Disaggregated TNSA Support Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Islamist Support	*Diaspora Support*	*NGO Support*	*Other Support*
Female Combatants	-0.607	0.648	4.677*	2.494**
	(1.039)	(0.425)	(2.393)	(0.613)
Nationalist	-1.158	0.010	4.017**	1.925**
	(1.170)	(0.463)	(1.553)	(0.709)
Leftist	*Dropped*	-0.240	-0.966	-0.164
		(0.671)	(0.942)	(0.792)
Religious	4.149**	0.278	*Dropped*	1.908*
	(1.258)	(0.584)		(0.897)
Weak Rebels	-0.471	-0.070	1.580*	0.315
	(0.684)	(0.424)	(0.820)	(0.582)
Ethnic Kinship	-1.262	1.678**	-2.864*	-1.215*
	(1.039)	(0.494)	(1.292)	(0.680)
Interstate Rivalry	-0.922	0.405	1.868*	0.855
	(0.990)	(0.564)	(0.972)	(0.765)
Democracy	2.404*	0.894*	0.253	0.365
	(1.420)	(0.523)	(0.636)	(0.518)
Population‡	-0.660	-0.316	-0.416	-0.402
	(0.844)	(0.209)	(0.467)	(0.300)
GDPpc‡	0.941*	-0.141	-0.441	-0.052
	(0.545)	(0.275)	(0.631)	(0.385)
Separatist Conflict	-2.339**	1.681**	-0.137	0.862
	(0.994)	(0.551)	(1.057)	(0.881)
Rebel Factions	-0.486	-0.127	-0.957*	-0.419**
	(0.311)	(0.099)	(0.565)	(0.129)
Duration‡	0.199	-0.037	0.573	1.005
	(0.786)	(0.418)	(0.647)	(0.694)
Constant	-5.598	1.399	1.001	-0.953
	(4.451)	(1.608)	(3.554)	(2.359)
Observations	208	266	212	265

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
The number of observations differs across the models based on missing values for the DV and the omission of some observations due to perfect prediction in the analysis.

Section 12: Figure 1 Results Using Alternative Measures of Female Combatants

Here we present additional specifications that use two alternative versions of the female combatants measure from WARD. Models 1 and 3 employ the "Best" measure of *Female Combatants*, which includes female suicide bombers. Models 2 and 4 include the "High" estimate, which both includes female fighters and uses a more liberal definition of "combatant" than the "Best" measure. Model 5 uses an unpublished indicator representing the presence of any female members.

Table 16: Alternative Measures of Female Combatants

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
	TNSA Support	*TNSA Support*	*State Support*	*State Support*	*TNSA Support*
Female Combatants ("Best")	0.788* (0.396)		0.054 (0.322)		
Female Combatants ("High")		0.789* (0.380)		0.140 (0.352)	
Female Members (any)					0.327 0.394
Weak Rebels	-0.713 (0.459)	-0.716 (0.459)	-0.409 (0.288)	-0.407 (0.290)	-1.014* (0.471)
Leftist	-0.224 (0.598)	-0.174 (0.567)	0.197 (0.439)	0.168 (0.422)	-0.368 (0.571)
Religious	1.554** (0.519)	1.615** (0.534)	-0.321 (0.485)	-0.306 (0.501)	1.414** (0.524)
Nationalist	0.307 (0.417)	0.275 (0.411)	-0.095 (0.468)	-0.109 (0.472)	0.367 (0.438)
Ethnic Kinship	0.941** (0.374)	0.920** (0.372)	0.041 (0.424)	0.037 (0.425)	1.079** (0.384)
Interstate Rivalry	0.436 (0.500)	0.476 (0.494)	1.339** (0.370)	1.347** (0.364)	0.103 (0.486)
Democracy	0.662* (0.367)	0.646* (0.364)	-0.764* (0.345)	-0.768* (0.346)	0.687* (0.378)
Population	-0.413* (0.204)	-0.375* (0.208)	-0.575** (0.211)	-0.568** (0.217)	-0.442* (0.218)
GDPpc	0.093 (0.224)	0.060 (0.230)	0.042 (0.184)	0.035 (0.188)	0.202 (0.215)
Separatist Conflict	1.392** (0.465)	1.391** (0.473)	0.541 (0.498)	0.550 (0.497)	1.068** (0.462)
Rebel Factions	-0.165** (0.070)	-0.182** (0.070)	0.097 (0.085)	0.097 (0.086)	-0.172* (0.082)
Duration	0.167 (0.343)	0.195 (0.338)	0.440 (0.326)	0.423 (0.328)	0.651* (0.389)
TNSA Support			0.989** (0.341)	0.980** (0.335)	
Constant	0.887 (1.206)	0.783 (1.175)	3.319** (1.147)	3.298** (1.156)	0.783 (1.175)
Observations	268	268	268	268	245

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 17: Effect of Female Combatants on Disaggregated TNSA Support Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Islamist Support	*Diaspora Support*	*NGO Support*	*Other Support*
Female Combatants ("Best")	-0.043	0.309	4.657*	1.624**
	(0.557)	(0.409)	(2.464)	(0.660)
Nationalist	-1.238	0.038	4.073**	1.883**
	(1.146)	(0.440)	(1.558)	(0.684)
Leftist	*Dropped*	-0.086	-0.951	0.222
		(0.657)	(0.945)	(0.718)
Religious	4.214**	0.160	*Dropped*	1.148
	(1.215)	(0.589)		(0.917)
Weak Rebels	-0.432	-0.100	1.663*	0.276
	(0.692)	(0.422)	(0.804)	(0.605)
Ethnic Kinship	-1.241	1.676**	-2.952*	-1.150*
	(1.034)	(0.489)	(1.296)	(0.618)
Interstate Rivalry	-1.007	0.384	1.797*	0.778
	(0.939)	(0.560)	(0.970)	(0.720)
Democracy	2.472*	0.835	0.249	0.099
	(1.358)	(0.515)	(0.593)	(0.515)
Population‡	-0.698	-0.300	-0.422	-0.264
	(0.799)	(0.220)	(0.445)	(0.287)
GDPpc‡	0.973*	-0.142	-0.412	-0.113
	(0.508)	(0.285)	(0.608)	(0.390)
Separatist Conflict	-2.422**	1.632**	-0.308	0.797
	(0.924)	(0.550)	(1.123)	(0.895)
Rebel Factions	-0.482	-0.135	-0.967*	-0.423**
	(0.319)	(0.096)	(0.537)	(0.110)
Duration‡	0.139	0.058	0.605	1.231*
	(0.723)	(0.414)	(0.666)	(0.727)
Constant	-5.552	1.351	0.820	-1.201
	(4.358)	(1.589)	(3.669)	(2.266)
Observations	208	266	212	265

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$
The number of observations differs across the models based on missing values for the DV and the omission of some observations due to perfect prediction in the analysis. "Dropped" indicates the variable and all observations coded as "1" excluded from analysis because of perfect prediction.

Table 18: Effect of Female Combatants on Disaggregated TNSA Support Variables

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
	Islamist Support	*Diaspora Support*	*NGO Support*	*Other Support*
Female Combatants ("High")	-0.366	0.381	*Dropped*	1.229*
	(0.504)	(0.414)		(0.630)
Nationalist	-1.259	0.028	3.427**	1.847**
	(1.123)	(0.441)	(1.208)	(0.640)
Leftist	*Dropped*	-0.075	-0.881	0.393
		(0.641)	(1.073)	(0.720)
Religious	4.182**	0.210	*Dropped*	1.175
	(1.233)	(0.592)		(0.817)
Weak Rebels	-0.437	-0.099	1.705**	0.292
	(0.685)	(0.418)	(0.663)	(0.609)
Ethnic Kinship	-1.271	1.659**	-2.741**	-1.123*
	(1.027)	(0.486)	(1.039)	(0.611)
Interstate Rivalry	-0.910	0.396	1.932*	0.858
	(0.940)	(0.554)	(1.052)	(0.726)
Democracy	2.567*	0.827	-0.004	0.078
	(1.376)	(0.511)	(0.769)	(0.503)
Population‡	-0.768	-0.270	-0.409	-0.265
	(0.829)	(0.234)	(0.479)	(0.301)
GDPpc‡	1.026*	-0.167	-0.384	-0.104
	(0.529)	(0.297)	(0.614)	(0.407)
Separatist Conflict	-2.419**	1.633**	-0.147	0.736
	(0.926)	(0.553)	(1.336)	(0.921)
Rebel Factions	-0.484	-0.146	-0.843**	-0.421**
	(0.314)	(0.098)	(0.349)	(0.099)
Duration‡	0.171	0.058	1.024	1.401*
	(0.739)	(0.412)	(0.675)	(0.731)
Constant		-0.075	-0.881	0.393
		(0.641)	(1.073)	(0.720)
	-5.427	1.271	4.263	-1.410
Observations	(4.376)	(1.555)	(3.932)	(2.269)

‡=natural log; Robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
The number of observations differs across the models based on missing values for the DV and the omission of some observations due to perfect prediction in the analysis. "Dropped" indicates the variable and all observations coded as "1" excluded from analysis because of perfect prediction.