**Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions**

*Individual level variables:*

* Satisfaction with democracy. “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?” Very satisfied or satisfied (1), not very satisfied or not at all satisfied (0).
* Education. “What is the highest level of education that you attained?” Respondents were coded on a 0 to 5 scale, where 5 denotes the highest level of education.
* Age. Actual age of respondent.
* Female. Female (1), male (0).
* Country’s financial condition. “How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?” Very good (5), good (4), not good nor bad (3), bad (2), very bad (1).
* Household’s financial condition. “How would you rate the overall economic condition of your household today?” Very good (5), good (4), not good nor bad (3), bad (2), very bad (1).
* Interest in politics. “How interested would you say you are in public affairs?” Very interested (4), Somewhat interested (3), Not very interested (2), Not at all interested (1).
* Vote choice. “[For respondents who answered that they voted in the most recent national election,] Which party (or candidate for president if it was presidential election) did you vote for?”

*Party level variables:*

* Clientelism. Sum of experts’ evaluations of “How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods?”; “How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?”; “How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities?”; “How much effort do candidates or parties expend to at- tract voters by offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities?”; “How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favor?” A major effort (4), a moderate effort (3), a minor effort (2), a negligible effort or none at all (1).
* Reliance on local intermediaries. “Do the following parties have local intermediaries who operate in local constituencies on the parties’ behalf, and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters?” Yes, they have local representatives in MOST constituencies (3); Yes, they have local representatives in SOME constituencies (2); No, they have almost no local representatives (1).

**Table A.1: Descriptive statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **N** | **Mean** | **Sd** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 62975 | 0.61 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 62975 | 2.63 | 1.64 | 0 | 5 |
| Age | 62975 | 46.24 | 16.93 | 0 | 110 |
| Female | 62975 | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Country’s financial condition | 62975 | 2.56 | 1.22 | 1 | 5 |
| Household’s financial condition | 30326 | 2.85 | 0.97 | 1 | 5 |
| Interest in politics | 62775 | 2.58 | 0.95 | 1 | 4 |
| Party level clientelism | 333 | 11.48 | 3.85 | 5.17 | 19.86 |
| Programmaticism | 331 | 0.26 | 0.16 | 0 | 0.88 |
| Governmental party | 333 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Seat share | 333 | 16.27 | 15.07 | 0 | 87.46 |
| Reliance on local intermediaries | 333 | 1.13 | 0.44 | 0 | 2 |
| Country level clientelism (weighted country mean) | 69 | 13.15 | 3.57 | 5.77 | 18.66 |
| Polity | 69 | 8.01 | 2.48 | -2 | 10 |
| Democracy stock | 69 | 91 | 303.03 | -340.96 | 637.63 |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | 69 | 9.22 | 1.11 | 6.63 | 10.81 |
| GDP pc growth | 69 | 3.88 | 2.25 | -0.36 | 10.39 |
| Electoral formula proportionality | 69 | 2.26 | 0.92 | 0 | 3 |
| Presidentialism | 69 | 0.54 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |

**Appendix 2: Additional Analyses**

This appendix includes additional analyses to explore the robustness of findings reported in the main text. Models in Table A.2 supplement analyses in Table 2 by excluding OECD countries (Models 1-3) and including additional controls (Models 4-6). Table A.3 includes ordered logistic models with the four-point scale dependent variable.

Models in Table A.4 include individuals who did not provide answers to the vote choice question. Since we do not have information about the party leanings of these respondents, they are treated as non-partisan, and the matched party-level variables take the values of country averages. For examples, the variable of exceptional clientelism takes the value of 0 (equal to country mean) for these respondents.

Models in Tables A.5 and A.6 include an additional control for respondents’ income levels. The public opinion surveys include relevant instruments. In ESS and LAPOP, respondents were asked to indicate the income range within which the annual income of their household fits on a 10-category scale. Asianbarometer includes a similar question on a 5-point scale. Afrobarometer includes five questions on how often the respondents have gone without enough food, clean water, medical treatment, cash income, and fuel over the past year. Each item is coded from 0 to 4. The summation of these five responses is calculated to capture the income level of respondents. For all surveys, this variable is standardized within the given survey. That is, each individual score represents the difference from the survey mean in number of standard deviations (of the original income variable). Models in A.5 includes the dummies of survey sources (Afrobarometer as the base category), while models in A.6 includes regional dummies (Advanced capitalist as the base category). Consistent with the literature, respondents’ income is positively associated with democratic satisfaction.

The analyses in Tables A.7 and A.8 are weighted. In Table A.7, the data are weighted with design weights provided by each survey project to account for unequal selection probabilities within countries. In Table A.8, the data are weighted with the product of within-country design weights and across-country weights. The across-country weight adjusts all country samples to the same size (n=1200).

For models included in Table A.9, multiple imputation is conducted using the Amelia II program[[1]](#footnote-1) for observations that contain missing values. Five imputed datasets are generated.

In models shown in Tables A.3-9, the results are consistent with those reported in the main text.

**Table A.2: Logistic regression analysis of the contingent effect of clientelism on satisfaction with democracy**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | OECD excluded | | |  |  |  |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism | -0.00378 | -0.0858\*\* | 0.148\*\*\* | 0.0312 | -0.0622 | 0.166\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) | [0.0296] | [0.0398] | [0.0317] | [0.0276] | [0.0408] | [0.0231] |
| Governmental party | 0.248\*\*\* | 0.250\*\*\* | 0.270\*\*\* | 0.207\*\* | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.241\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0751] | [0.0745] | [0.0706] | [0.0976] | [0.0862] | [0.0918] |
| Seat share | 0.00257 |  |  | 0.00148 |  |  |
|  | [0.00299] |  |  | [0.00316] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  | 0.139 |  |  | 0.0788 |  |
| intermediaries |  | [0.0988] |  |  | [0.119] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism | 0.00379\*\*\* |  |  | 0.00327\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share | [0.00113] |  |  | [0.00120] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.120\*\*\* |  |  | 0.125\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  | [0.0268] |  |  | [0.0283] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | -0.0119\*\*\* |  |  | -0.0110\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  | [0.00430] |  |  | [0.00317] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.112\*\*\* | -0.113\*\*\* | -0.104\*\*\* | -0.0894\*\* | -0.0888\*\* | -0.0867\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0365] | [0.0369] | [0.0362] | [0.0417] | [0.0424] | [0.0413] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.0899 | -0.0981 | -0.0906 | -0.0970 | -0.105 | -0.101 |
|  | [0.149] | [0.151] | [0.144] | [0.169] | [0.174] | [0.168] |
| GDP pc growth | 0.0128 | 0.0112 | 0.0155 | 0.0895\* | 0.0878\* | 0.0955\* |
|  | [0.0360] | [0.0364] | [0.0356] | [0.0521] | [0.0530] | [0.0523] |
| Polity | 0.0201 | 0.0160 | 0.00717 | 0.0268 | 0.0215 | 0.0137 |
|  | [0.0382] | [0.0386] | [0.0402] | [0.0364] | [0.0374] | [0.0385] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000825\*\* | 0.000886\*\* | 0.000911\*\* | 0.0000502 | 0.000152 | 0.0000845 |
|  | [0.000374] | [0.000369] | [0.000366] | [0.000668] | [0.000641] | [0.000647] |
| Electoral formula | -0.155 | -0.154 | -0.163 | -0.107 | -0.0993 | -0.103 |
| proportionality | [0.108] | [0.106] | [0.106] | [0.114] | [0.114] | [0.111] |
| Presidentialism | 0.163 | 0.161 | 0.167 | -0.0889 | -0.0860 | -0.128 |
|  | [0.165] | [0.158] | [0.161] | [0.270] | [0.265] | [0.253] |
| Education | -0.0383\*\*\* | -0.0379\*\*\* | -0.0383\*\*\* | -0.0611\*\*\* | -0.0609\*\*\* | -0.0611\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0146] | [0.0146] | [0.0147] | [0.0174] | [0.0174] | [0.0174] |
| Age | 0.00302\*\*\* | 0.00304\*\*\* | 0.00305\*\*\* | 0.00576\*\*\* | 0.00576\*\*\* | 0.00578\*\*\* |
|  | [0.00104] | [0.00103] | [0.00104] | [0.00100] | [0.00100] | [0.00100] |
| Female | -0.0375 | -0.0374 | -0.0374 | 0.00714 | 0.00743 | 0.00697 |
|  | [0.0261] | [0.0262] | [0.0262] | [0.0295] | [0.0295] | [0.0294] |
| Country’s financial | 0.574\*\*\* | 0.574\*\*\* | 0.574\*\*\* | 0.382\*\*\* | 0.382\*\*\* | 0.382\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0435] | [0.0435] | [0.0435] | [0.0303] | [0.0302] | [0.0302] |
| Household financial |  |  |  | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* |
| condition |  |  |  | [0.0275] | [0.0275] | [0.0275] |
| Interests in politics |  |  |  | 0.124\*\*\* | 0.124\*\*\* | 0.124\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | [0.0220] | [0.0219] | [0.0219] |
| Constant | 1.018 | 1.040 | 1.126 | 0.204 | 0.214 | 0.370 |
|  | [1.577] | [1.620] | [1.546] | [1.775] | [1.865] | [1.773] |
| Country level variance | 0.219 | 0.225 | 0.227 | 0.254 | 0.271 | 0.271 |
| Party level Variance | 0.104 | 0.102 | 0.107 | 0.107 | 0.0985 | 0.104 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 42498/228/52 | 42498/228/52 | 42498/228/52 | 30197137/39 | 30197137/39 | 30197137/39 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 49882.4 | 49880.9 | 49886.9 | 35819.9 | 35816.7 | 35819.3 |
| log likelihood | -24923.2 | -24922.5 | -24926.4 | -17889.9 | -17888.4 | -17890.7 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.3: Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of clientelism on satisfaction with democracy**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0552\*\*\* | -0.0260 | -0.0746\*\* | 0.183\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0159] | [0.0221] | [0.0347] | [0.0260] |
| Governmental party | 0.439\*\*\* | 0.349\*\*\* | 0.301\*\*\* | 0.321\*\*\* | 0.350\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0613] | [0.0609] | [0.0610] | [0.0642] | [0.0574] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00548\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00278] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.154\* |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0889] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00446\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.000927] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.103\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0251] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0170\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00370] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0946\*\*\* | -0.0937\*\*\* | -0.109\*\*\* | -0.103\*\*\* | -0.0953\*\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0281] | [0.0276] | [0.0288] | [0.0289] | [0.0279] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.244\* | -0.245\* | -0.245\* | -0.254\* | -0.245\* |
|  | [0.128] | [0.127] | [0.132] | [0.131] | [0.128] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.0319 | -0.0301 | -0.0322 | -0.0320 | -0.0284 |
|  | [0.0337] | [0.0331] | [0.0342] | [0.0338] | [0.0335] |
| Polity | 0.0354 | 0.0319 | 0.0347 | 0.0328 | 0.0197 |
|  | [0.0314] | [0.0329] | [0.0314] | [0.0319] | [0.0371] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000651\*\* | 0.000658\*\* | 0.000534\* | 0.000629\*\* | 0.000663\*\* |
|  | [0.000306] | [0.000292] | [0.000317] | [0.000298] | [0.000296] |
| Electoral formula | -0.00664 | -0.00277 | 0.0112 | 0.00458 | -0.00324 |
| proportionality | [0.0782] | [0.0784] | [0.0810] | [0.0777] | [0.0785] |
| Presidentialism | 0.0415 | 0.0499 | 0.0318 | 0.0400 | 0.0523 |
|  | [0.144] | [0.139] | [0.149] | [0.139] | [0.140] |
| Education | -0.0157 | -0.0151 | -0.0150 | -0.0149 | -0.0152 |
|  | [0.0136] | [0.0136] | [0.0136] | [0.0136] | [0.0136] |
| Age | 0.000600 | 0.000590 | 0.000579 | 0.000588 | 0.000602 |
|  | [0.000779] | [0.000777] | [0.000776] | [0.000776] | [0.000778] |
| Female | -0.0151 | -0.0151 | -0.0152 | -0.0152 | -0.0152 |
|  | [0.0194] | [0.0194] | [0.0194] | [0.0194] | [0.0194] |
| Country’s financial | 0.591\*\*\* | 0.591\*\*\* | 0.591\*\*\* | 0.591\*\*\* | 0.591\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0367] | [0.0366] | [0.0367] | [0.0366] | [0.0366] |
| Interests in politics | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0176] | [0.0175] | [0.0175] | [0.0175] | [0.0175] |
| Cut 1 | -8.248\*\*\* | -8.318\*\*\* | -8.328\*\*\* | -8.300\*\*\* | -8.432\*\*\* |
|  | [1.612] | [1.605] | [1.646] | [1.653] | [1.630] |
| Cut 2 | -3.307\*\* | -3.377\*\* | -3.388\*\* | -3.359\*\* | -3.492\*\* |
|  | [1.370] | [1.366] | [1.406] | [1.420] | [1.392] |
| Cut 3 | -1.621 | -1.690 | -1.702 | -1.672 | -1.805 |
|  | [1.368] | [1.364] | [1.404] | [1.418] | [1.390] |
| Cut 4 | 0.964 | 0.894 | 0.883 | 0.912 | 0.779 |
|  | [1.364] | [1.359] | [1.396] | [1.412] | [1.384] |
| Country level variance | 0.229 | 0.229 | 0.240 | 0.237 | 0.242 |
| Party level Variance | 0.146 | 0.133 | 0.115 | 0.122 | 0.122 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 62872/333/69 | 62872/333/69 | 62872/333/69 | 62872/333/69 | 62872/333/69 |
| log likelihood | -70983.2 | -70975.0 | -70962.7 | -70968.8 | -70967.8 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.4: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (including non-voters)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0440\*\*\* | -0.0156 | -0.0704\*\* | 0.134\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0156] | [0.0207] | [0.0288] | [0.0312] |
| Governmental party | 0.462\*\*\* | 0.393\*\*\* | 0.341\*\*\* | 0.363\*\*\* | 0.394\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0607] | [0.0624] | [0.0609] | [0.0640] | [0.0600] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00438\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00247] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.125\* |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0742] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00342\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.000972] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0927\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0221] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0119\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00374] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0884\*\*\* | -0.0884\*\*\* | -0.0966\*\*\* | -0.0945\*\*\* | -0.0890\*\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0295] | [0.0293] | [0.0302] | [0.0300] | [0.0295] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.0745 | -0.0741 | -0.0703 | -0.0768 | -0.0737 |
|  | [0.141] | [0.141] | [0.149] | [0.147] | [0.142] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.0151 | -0.0138 | -0.0149 | -0.0156 | -0.0133 |
|  | [0.0362] | [0.0359] | [0.0368] | [0.0363] | [0.0360] |
| Polity | 0.00596 | 0.00436 | 0.00517 | 0.00473 | -0.000586 |
|  | [0.0352] | [0.0361] | [0.0359] | [0.0364] | [0.0377] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000529\* | 0.000532\* | 0.000450 | 0.000504 | 0.000532\* |
|  | [0.000319] | [0.000313] | [0.000325] | [0.000311] | [0.000314] |
| Electoral formula | -0.0172 | -0.0153 | -0.00388 | -0.0104 | -0.0157 |
| proportionality | [0.0768] | [0.0768] | [0.0809] | [0.0774] | [0.0769] |
| Presidentialism | -0.0479 | -0.0406 | -0.0495 | -0.0420 | -0.0391 |
|  | [0.138] | [0.136] | [0.142] | [0.134] | [0.136] |
| Education | -0.0467\*\*\* | -0.0462\*\*\* | -0.0462\*\*\* | -0.0462\*\*\* | -0.0463\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0118] | [0.0118] | [0.0118] | [0.0117] | [0.0118] |
| Age | -0.00145\* | -0.00144\* | -0.00148\* | -0.00147\* | -0.00144\* |
|  | [0.000870] | [0.000871] | [0.000869] | [0.000870] | [0.000871] |
| Female | 0.00960 | 0.00951 | 0.00941 | 0.00946 | 0.00946 |
|  | [0.0160] | [0.0160] | [0.0160] | [0.0160] | [0.0160] |
| Country’s financial | 0.630\*\*\* | 0.630\*\*\* | 0.630\*\*\* | 0.630\*\*\* | 0.630\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0326] | [0.0326] | [0.0327] | [0.0326] | [0.0326] |
| Interests in politics | 0.102\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0159] | [0.0159] | [0.0160] | [0.0159] | [0.0159] |
| Constant | 0.372 | 0.412 | 0.368 | 0.347 | 0.453 |
|  | [1.451] | [1.453] | [1.518] | [1.512] | [1.467] |
| Country level variance | 0.229 | 0.228 | 0.237 | 0.235 | 0.234 |
| Party level Variance | 0.104 | 0.0969 | 0.0871 | 0.0910 | 0.0932 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 109241/402/69 | 109241/402/69 | 109241/402/69 | 109241/402/69 | 109241/402/69 |
| log likelihood | -62032.0 | -62025.7 | -62015.4 | -62019.1 | -62021.5 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.5: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (with survey source dummies)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0518\*\*\* | -0.0174 | -0.0709\*\* | 0.131\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0161] | [0.0233] | [0.0354] | [0.0302] |
| Governmental party | 0.481\*\*\* | 0.400\*\*\* | 0.360\*\*\* | 0.382\*\*\* | 0.400\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0633] | [0.0661] | [0.0638] | [0.0655] | [0.0640] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00415 |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00271] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.0979 |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0888] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00368\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00109] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0986\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0266] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0106\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00351] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0784\*\* | -0.0755\*\* | -0.0921\*\*\* | -0.0841\*\*\* | -0.0761\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0308] | [0.0302] | [0.0313] | [0.0308] | [0.0304] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.0339 | -0.0158 | -0.0648 | -0.0358 | -0.0139 |
|  | [0.159] | [0.159] | [0.167] | [0.162] | [0.160] |
| GDP pc growth | 0.00154 | 0.00392 | 0.00184 | 0.00295 | 0.00452 |
|  | [0.0373] | [0.0371] | [0.0379] | [0.0376] | [0.0373] |
| Polity | 0.0209 | 0.0209 | 0.0182 | 0.0211 | 0.0144 |
|  | [0.0372] | [0.0382] | [0.0387] | [0.0388] | [0.0402] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000539 | 0.000543 | 0.000481 | 0.000527 | 0.000541 |
|  | [0.000375] | [0.000368] | [0.000382] | [0.000367] | [0.000370] |
| Electoral formula | 0.00782 | 0.0118 | 0.0192 | 0.0136 | 0.0105 |
| proportionality | [0.0696] | [0.0690] | [0.0727] | [0.0705] | [0.0694] |
| Presidentialism | -0.0761 | -0.0519 | -0.0780 | -0.0703 | -0.0513 |
|  | [0.151] | [0.152] | [0.158] | [0.152] | [0.153] |
| Education | -0.0215 | -0.0208 | -0.0207 | -0.0206 | -0.0209 |
|  | [0.0148] | [0.0148] | [0.0148] | [0.0148] | [0.0148] |
| Age | 0.00220\*\* | 0.00217\*\* | 0.00216\*\* | 0.00217\*\* | 0.00218\*\* |
|  | [0.000891] | [0.000890] | [0.000889] | [0.000887] | [0.000891] |
| Female | -0.0254 | -0.0255 | -0.0257 | -0.0256 | -0.0257 |
|  | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] |
| Country’s financial | 0.582\*\*\* | 0.582\*\*\* | 0.581\*\*\* | 0.582\*\*\* | 0.582\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0336] | [0.0336] | [0.0336] | [0.0336] | [0.0336] |
| Interests in politics | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0176] | [0.0176] | [0.0176] | [0.0175] | [0.0175] |
| Income | 0.0408\* | 0.0411\* | 0.0409\* | 0.0411\* | 0.0411\* |
|  | [0.0217] | [0.0218] | [0.0218] | [0.0217] | [0.0218] |
| ESS | -0.332 | -0.389 | -0.230 | -0.356 | -0.390 |
|  | [0.334] | [0.331] | [0.343] | [0.332] | [0.331] |
| LAPOP | -0.279 | -0.350 | -0.193 | -0.295 | -0.349 |
|  | [0.281] | [0.278] | [0.283] | [0.282] | [0.278] |
| Asian Barometer | -0.212 | -0.257 | -0.114 | -0.249 | -0.266 |
|  | [0.369] | [0.366] | [0.373] | [0.360] | [0.365] |
| Constant | -0.200 | -0.325 | 0.123 | -0.204 | -0.281 |
|  | [1.484] | [1.481] | [1.554] | [1.518] | [1.492] |
| Country level variance | 0.196 | 0.198 | 0.212 | 0.209 | 0.206 |
| Party level Variance | 0.137 | 0.124 | 0.113 | 0.117 | 0.119 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 |
| log likelihood | -30127.6 | -30121.1 | -30114.3 | -30116.4 | -30118.5 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.6: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (with regional dummies)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0514\*\*\* | -0.0177 | -0.0707\* | 0.131\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0163] | [0.0237] | [0.0363] | [0.0303] |
| Governmental party | 0.485\*\*\* | 0.405\*\*\* | 0.363\*\*\* | 0.388\*\*\* | 0.404\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0632] | [0.0663] | [0.0642] | [0.0659] | [0.0642] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00413 |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00270] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.0879 |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0893] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00368\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00110] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0990\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0270] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0106\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00354] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0861\*\* | -0.0829\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.0916\*\*\* | -0.0837\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0350] | [0.0339] | [0.0351] | [0.0341] | [0.0340] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | 0.00125 | 0.0169 | -0.0299 | -0.00117 | 0.0190 |
|  | [0.156] | [0.158] | [0.165] | [0.160] | [0.158] |
| GDP pc growth | 0.0218 | 0.0252 | 0.0224 | 0.0231 | 0.0259 |
|  | [0.0387] | [0.0387] | [0.0398] | [0.0394] | [0.0389] |
| Polity | 0.0263 | 0.0268 | 0.0243 | 0.0268 | 0.0203 |
|  | [0.0402] | [0.0411] | [0.0419] | [0.0416] | [0.0429] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000245 | 0.000235 | 0.000172 | 0.000239 | 0.000231 |
|  | [0.000591] | [0.000582] | [0.000606] | [0.000572] | [0.000583] |
| Electoral formula | -0.0269 | -0.0230 | -0.0151 | -0.0205 | -0.0238 |
| proportionality | [0.0742] | [0.0738] | [0.0791] | [0.0760] | [0.0741] |
| Presidentialism | -0.168 | -0.145 | -0.167 | -0.158 | -0.144 |
|  | [0.157] | [0.156] | [0.161] | [0.154] | [0.157] |
| Education | -0.0213 | -0.0206 | -0.0205 | -0.0205 | -0.0207 |
|  | [0.0149] | [0.0149] | [0.0149] | [0.0148] | [0.0149] |
| Age | 0.00221\*\* | 0.00219\*\* | 0.00217\*\* | 0.00219\*\* | 0.00220\*\* |
|  | [0.000892] | [0.000890] | [0.000890] | [0.000888] | [0.000891] |
| Female | -0.0253 | -0.0255 | -0.0256 | -0.0255 | -0.0256 |
|  | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] |
| Country’s financial | 0.582\*\*\* | 0.582\*\*\* | 0.581\*\*\* | 0.582\*\*\* | 0.582\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0336] | [0.0336] | [0.0336] | [0.0336] | [0.0336] |
| Interests in politics | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.108\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0176] | [0.0175] | [0.0176] | [0.0175] | [0.0175] |
| Income | 0.0409\* | 0.0412\* | 0.0410\* | 0.0412\* | 0.0411\* |
|  | [0.0217] | [0.0218] | [0.0218] | [0.0218] | [0.0218] |
| Post Communist | -0.292 | -0.310 | -0.291 | -0.288 | -0.312 |
|  | [0.395] | [0.388] | [0.410] | [0.393] | [0.391] |
| Latin America | 0.149 | 0.123 | 0.146 | 0.156 | 0.124 |
|  | [0.268] | [0.264] | [0.268] | [0.258] | [0.265] |
| Africa | 0.361 | 0.405 | 0.274 | 0.388 | 0.407 |
|  | [0.363] | [0.362] | [0.376] | [0.362] | [0.364] |
| Asia/Mideast | -0.0378 | -0.0367 | -0.00314 | -0.0357 | -0.0385 |
|  | [0.264] | [0.258] | [0.269] | [0.268] | [0.263] |
| Constant | -0.683 | -0.843 | -0.245 | -0.704 | -0.800 |
|  | [1.592] | [1.590] | [1.672] | [1.619] | [1.600] |
| Country level variance | 0.192 | 0.194 | 0.207 | 0.204 | 0.202 |
| Party level Variance | 0.136 | 0.124 | 0.112 | 0.116 | 0.118 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 | 54154/321/67 |
| log likelihood | -30126.7 | -30120.4 | -30113.5 | -30115.5 | -30117.7 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.7: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (with within-country weights)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0459\*\*\* | -0.0260 | -0.0752\*\* | 0.129\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0168] | [0.0252] | [0.0370] | [0.0352] |
| Governmental party | 0.481\*\*\* | 0.406\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.378\*\*\* | 0.406\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0639] | [0.0655] | [0.0628] | [0.0676] | [0.0634] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00447 |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00283] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.152\* |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0894] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00401\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00113] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0950\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0262] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0110\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00434] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.101\*\*\* | -0.113\*\*\* | -0.110\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0294] | [0.0291] | [0.0304] | [0.0305] | [0.0293] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.163 | -0.162 | -0.161 | -0.168 | -0.161 |
|  | [0.141] | [0.141] | [0.150] | [0.148] | [0.143] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.00704 | -0.00524 | -0.00637 | -0.00686 | -0.00439 |
|  | [0.0372] | [0.0368] | [0.0381] | [0.0375] | [0.0370] |
| Polity | 0.0109 | 0.00849 | 0.0117 | 0.00924 | 0.00111 |
|  | [0.0374] | [0.0387] | [0.0382] | [0.0388] | [0.0404] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000626\* | 0.000632\* | 0.000531 | 0.000603\* | 0.000633\* |
|  | [0.000337] | [0.000328] | [0.000349] | [0.000329] | [0.000330] |
| Electoral formula | -0.0106 | -0.00862 | 0.00142 | -0.00267 | -0.00953 |
| proportionality | [0.0790] | [0.0793] | [0.0831] | [0.0795] | [0.0794] |
| Presidentialism | -0.0236 | -0.0125 | -0.0275 | -0.0220 | -0.0108 |
|  | [0.147] | [0.144] | [0.152] | [0.143] | [0.145] |
| Education | -0.0171 | -0.0165 | -0.0165 | -0.0164 | -0.0166 |
|  | [0.0143] | [0.0143] | [0.0143] | [0.0143] | [0.0143] |
| Age | 0.00186\*\* | 0.00184\*\* | 0.00183\*\* | 0.00183\*\* | 0.00184\*\* |
|  | [0.000893] | [0.000892] | [0.000891] | [0.000890] | [0.000892] |
| Female | -0.00471 | -0.00487 | -0.00491 | -0.00493 | -0.00493 |
|  | [0.0235] | [0.0235] | [0.0235] | [0.0235] | [0.0235] |
| Country’s financial | 0.596\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0358] | [0.0357] | [0.0358] | [0.0357] | [0.0357] |
| Interests in politics | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.111\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0167] | [0.0167] | [0.0167] | [0.0167] | [0.0167] |
| Constant | 1.100 | 1.145 | 1.122 | 1.092 | 1.201 |
|  | [1.446] | [1.449] | [1.521] | [1.522] | [1.469] |
| Country level variance | 0.217 | 0.217 | 0.230 | 0.226 | 0.227 |
| Party level Variance | 0.158 | 0.147 | 0.133 | 0.139 | 0.142 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 |
| log likelihood | -34627.2 | -34622.4 | -34614.5 | -34618.0 | -34619.9 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.8: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (with within- and across-country weights)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0525\*\*\* | -0.0198 | -0.0719\* | 0.132\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0169] | [0.0244] | [0.0383] | [0.0333] |
| Governmental party | 0.476\*\*\* | 0.390\*\*\* | 0.350\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.390\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0649] | [0.0655] | [0.0635] | [0.0669] | [0.0634] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00417 |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00273] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.145 |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0895] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00390\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00111] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0963\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0272] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0107\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00404] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.100\*\*\* | -0.100\*\*\* | -0.111\*\*\* | -0.108\*\*\* | -0.101\*\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0293] | [0.0290] | [0.0303] | [0.0305] | [0.0293] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.162 | -0.162 | -0.161 | -0.168 | -0.161 |
|  | [0.141] | [0.141] | [0.150] | [0.148] | [0.142] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.00682 | -0.00487 | -0.00569 | -0.00643 | -0.00437 |
|  | [0.0374] | [0.0371] | [0.0382] | [0.0378] | [0.0372] |
| Polity | 0.0100 | 0.00750 | 0.0111 | 0.00835 | 0.000815 |
|  | [0.0372] | [0.0388] | [0.0382] | [0.0388] | [0.0406] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000641\* | 0.000646\*\* | 0.000552 | 0.000619\* | 0.000644\* |
|  | [0.000338] | [0.000329] | [0.000347] | [0.000331] | [0.000331] |
| Electoral formula | -0.0102 | -0.00823 | 0.00112 | -0.00251 | -0.00888 |
| proportionality | [0.0786] | [0.0790] | [0.0825] | [0.0792] | [0.0791] |
| Presidentialism | -0.0283 | -0.0140 | -0.0284 | -0.0231 | -0.0126 |
|  | [0.148] | [0.145] | [0.153] | [0.144] | [0.146] |
| Education | -0.0182 | -0.0173 | -0.0174 | -0.0172 | -0.0175 |
|  | [0.0133] | [0.0133] | [0.0133] | [0.0132] | [0.0133] |
| Age | 0.00257\*\*\* | 0.00254\*\*\* | 0.00252\*\*\* | 0.00253\*\*\* | 0.00255\*\*\* |
|  | [0.000967] | [0.000966] | [0.000965] | [0.000964] | [0.000966] |
| Female | -0.00787 | -0.00806 | -0.00817 | -0.00815 | -0.00816 |
|  | [0.0227] | [0.0227] | [0.0227] | [0.0227] | [0.0227] |
| Country’s financial | 0.575\*\*\* | 0.574\*\*\* | 0.574\*\*\* | 0.574\*\*\* | 0.574\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0334] | [0.0333] | [0.0333] | [0.0333] | [0.0333] |
| Interests in politics | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0162] | [0.0162] | [0.0163] | [0.0162] | [0.0162] |
| Constant | 1.117 | 1.181 | 1.149 | 1.119 | 1.229 |
|  | [1.442] | [1.448] | [1.519] | [1.523] | [1.465] |
| Country level variance | 0.219 | 0.223 | 0.233 | 0.232 | 0.232 |
| Party level Variance | 0.141 | 0.127 | 0.115 | 0.119 | 0.122 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 |
| log likelihood | -24759.0 | -24752.8 | -24745.3 | -24748.4 | -24750.2 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.9: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (imputed sample)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0487\*\*\* | -0.0145 | -0.0745\*\* | 0.134\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0156] | [0.0256] | [0.0357] | [0.0320] |
| Governmental party | 0.446\*\*\* | 0.368\*\*\* | 0.326\*\*\* | 0.340\*\*\* | 0.368\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0600] | [0.0615] | [0.0589] | [0.0628] | [0.0593] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00482\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00270] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.152\* |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0839] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00334\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00110] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0970\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0255] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0114\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00387] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0963\*\*\* | -0.0953\*\*\* | -0.107\*\*\* | -0.105\*\*\* | -0.0963\*\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0278] | [0.0276] | [0.0286] | [0.0286] | [0.0278] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.163 | -0.162 | -0.161 | -0.170 | -0.161 |
|  | [0.127] | [0.127] | [0.135] | [0.134] | [0.128] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.00585 | -0.00488 | -0.00561 | -0.00580 | -0.00437 |
|  | [0.0340] | [0.0340] | [0.0345] | [0.0343] | [0.0343] |
| Polity | 0.0160 | 0.0131 | 0.0149 | 0.0143 | 0.00540 |
|  | [0.0335] | [0.0347] | [0.0347] | [0.0351] | [0.0366] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000617\*\* | 0.000622\*\* | 0.000519\* | 0.000592\*\* | 0.000620\*\* |
|  | [0.000299] | [0.000294] | [0.000308] | [0.000293] | [0.000297] |
| Electoral formula | -0.00764 | -0.00555 | 0.00640 | 0.000935 | -0.00632 |
| proportionality | [0.0735] | [0.0740] | [0.0775] | [0.0740] | [0.0742] |
| Presidentialism | -0.0393 | -0.0306 | -0.0450 | -0.0377 | -0.0291 |
|  | [0.135] | [0.132] | [0.139] | [0.131] | [0.133] |
| Education | -0.0322\*\* | -0.0315\*\* | -0.0315\*\* | -0.0314\*\* | -0.0316\*\* |
|  | [0.0141] | [0.0141] | [0.0141] | [0.0141] | [0.0141] |
| Age | 0.00225\*\*\* | 0.00224\*\*\* | 0.00222\*\*\* | 0.00223\*\*\* | 0.00225\*\*\* |
|  | [0.000780] | [0.000799] | [0.000798] | [0.000798] | [0.000799] |
| Female | -0.0150 | -0.0152 | -0.0154 | -0.0153 | -0.0152 |
|  | [0.0206] | [0.0206] | [0.0206] | [0.0206] | [0.0206] |
| Country’s financial | 0.526\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0316] | [0.0316] | [0.0316] | [0.0316] | [0.0316] |
| Household financial | 0.113\*\*\* | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.133\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0215] | [0.0215] | [0.0215] | [0.0215] | [0.0215] |
| Interests in politics | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.106\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0149] | [0.0149] | [0.0149] | [0.0149] | [0.0149] |
| Constant | 0.844 | 0.887 | 0.875 | 0.855 | 0.952 |
|  | [1.330] | [1.333] | [1.399] | [1.406] | [1.352] |
| Country level variance | 0.192 | 0.194 | 0.203 | 0.202 | 0.203 |
| Party level Variance | 0.139 | 0.127 | 0.116 | 0.119 | 0.122 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 67366/339/69 | 67366/339/69 | 67366/339/69 | 67366/339/69 | 67366/339/69 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Appendix 3: DALP and Robustness Checks**

For each country covered by the DALP, around 10-20 experts were invited to provide judgements for various aspects of parties' organizational features and accountability strategies. The majority of these experts were scholars with specific knowledge, as evidenced by research or teaching experience, of elections and parties in their countries. For each country, 3-5 journalists who had covered elections for national newspapers were also recruited to provide ratings. It was expected that journalists would have direct access to on-the-ground partisan conduct. Overall, about 200 of the total of approximately 1400 experts were journalists. For the clientelism measures used in the paper, on average each party’s score is aggregated based on 13 experts’ ratings.

There are several potential sources of measurement uncertainty in an expert survey. First, experts may lack information about certain parties or may make mistakes when providing judgements. The DALP survey covered only parties holding at least 4% of the seats in national legislatures; experts were not asked to rate very small parties or new parties that had not yet won representation. Parties included in the analyses of this paper had an average 16% seat share at the time when the DALP survey was conducted. In addition, experts were able to provide a “don’t know” answer in the survey. These may help alleviate the concern that experts guessed the answers when they lacked the relevant information.

Another source of measurement uncertainty relates to the fact that experts may have different thresholds in mind when rating concepts on an ordinal scale. This issue is of particular concern in a cross-national survey, and to address it, at least in part, the DALP survey provided several examples of clientelistic exchanges as well as detailed definitions of each response category. For example, the category of “no (clientelistic) effort at all” indicates that “no one receives targeted benefits based on how they vote,” and a “moderate effort” refers to “not only core supporters but also some less strongly affiliated voters receive targeted benefits.”[[2]](#footnote-2) This information was provided in order to render experts’ interpretations of the scale of clientelism more consistent.

Admittedly, even with the incorporation of these practices, issues of measurement uncertainty that are inherent in an expert survey were not entirely resolved in the DALP[[3]](#footnote-3). To ensure that the potential uncertainty does not significantly affect the analyses, we conduct the following three sets of robustness checks shown in Tables A.10-12. The results are consistent with those reported in the main text. In models included in Table A.10, parties that had a very small number of expert responses (<7) for the clientelism measures are excluded from the analyses. In Table A.11, parties for which experts produced more diversified scores on the clientelism measures (standard deviation of ratings greater than 95% of the cases) are excluded. In Table A.12, we replace the country-level clientelism measure with similar variables from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project[[4]](#footnote-4). The variable “party linkage” measures either clientelism or programmaticism as the most common linkage strategy among the major parties in a country. The other variable, “particularistic or public goods”, assesses the extent to which social spending in the national budget is narrowly targeted on a small set of constituents. These variables are only available at country level.

**Table A.10: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (parties with a very small N of responses excluded)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0512\*\*\* | -0.0252 | -0.0802\* | 0.135\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0180] | [0.0314] | [0.0430] | [0.0326] |
| Governmental party | 0.480\*\*\* | 0.397\*\*\* | 0.357\*\*\* | 0.377\*\*\* | 0.395\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0651] | [0.0667] | [0.0643] | [0.0684] | [0.0646] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00477 |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00296] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.127 |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0994] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00373\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00124] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.103\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0285] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0114\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00406] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0812\*\* | -0.0725\*\* | -0.0816\*\* | -0.0755\*\* | -0.0737\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0320] | [0.0347] | [0.0366] | [0.0369] | [0.0351] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.106 | -0.0882 | -0.0793 | -0.0909 | -0.0877 |
|  | [0.150] | [0.152] | [0.163] | [0.160] | [0.154] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.0115 | -0.00649 | -0.00694 | -0.00744 | -0.00561 |
|  | [0.0361] | [0.0366] | [0.0381] | [0.0373] | [0.0368] |
| Polity | 0.00747 | 0.00174 | 0.00291 | 0.00307 | -0.00573 |
|  | [0.0378] | [0.0391] | [0.0395] | [0.0403] | [0.0409] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000760\*\* | 0.000820\*\* | 0.000740\*\* | 0.000828\*\* | 0.000820\*\* |
|  | [0.000317] | [0.000326] | [0.000345] | [0.000330] | [0.000328] |
| Electoral formula | 0.0271 | 0.0352 | 0.0513 | 0.0413 | 0.0348 |
| proportionality | [0.0762] | [0.0779] | [0.0813] | [0.0786] | [0.0779] |
| Presidentialism | 0.0319 | 0.0597 | 0.0545 | 0.0417 | 0.0629 |
|  | [0.141] | [0.143] | [0.149] | [0.145] | [0.144] |
| Education | -0.0173 | -0.0147 | -0.0148 | -0.0146 | -0.0149 |
|  | [0.0146] | [0.0146] | [0.0146] | [0.0146] | [0.0146] |
| Age | 0.00201\*\* | 0.00203\*\* | 0.00203\*\* | 0.00204\*\* | 0.00204\*\* |
|  | [0.000816] | [0.000826] | [0.000826] | [0.000824] | [0.000828] |
| Female | -0.0177 | -0.0160 | -0.0162 | -0.0161 | -0.0161 |
|  | [0.0218] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] | [0.0217] |
| Country’s financial | 0.594\*\*\* | 0.594\*\*\* | 0.594\*\*\* | 0.594\*\*\* | 0.594\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0339] | [0.0337] | [0.0337] | [0.0337] | [0.0337] |
| Interests in politics | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.107\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0163] | [0.0167] | [0.0167] | [0.0167] | [0.0166] |
| Constant | 0.222 | -0.0110 | -0.152 | -0.148 | 0.0565 |
|  | [1.514] | [1.587] | [1.678] | [1.666] | [1.607] |
| Country level variance | 0.203 | 0.216 | 0.227 | 0.230 | 0.224 |
| Party level Variance | 0.147 | 0.135 | 0.122 | 0.126 | 0.130 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 60737/316/67 | 60082/306/67 | 60082/306/67 | 60082/306/67 | 60082/306/67 |
| log likelihood | -33761.3 | -33332.9 | -33326.1 | -33328.5 | -33330.3 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.11: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (parties that experts have very diversified ratings excluded)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | | | | |
| Exceptional clientelism |  | 0.0560\*\*\* | -0.0118 | -0.0569 | 0.153\*\*\* |
| (country-mean centered) |  | [0.0166] | [0.0265] | [0.0381] | [0.0262] |
| Governmental party | 0.471\*\*\* | 0.400\*\*\* | 0.357\*\*\* | 0.369\*\*\* | 0.401\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0632] | [0.0680] | [0.0659] | [0.0714] | [0.0652] |
| Seat share |  |  | 0.00507\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | [0.00277] |  |  |
| Reliance on local |  |  |  | 0.153\* |  |
| intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0913] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  | 0.00376\*\*\* |  |  |
| \*Seat share |  |  | [0.00131] |  |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  | 0.0883\*\*\* |  |
| \*Local intermediaries |  |  |  | [0.0293] |  |
| Exceptional clientelism |  |  |  |  | -0.0130\*\*\* |
| \*Polity |  |  |  |  | [0.00357] |
| Country level clientelism | -0.0923\*\*\* | -0.0897\*\*\* | -0.0990\*\*\* | -0.0939\*\*\* | -0.0908\*\*\* |
| (country mean) | [0.0322] | [0.0320] | [0.0340] | [0.0340] | [0.0325] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.138 | -0.100 | -0.0968 | -0.104 | -0.101 |
|  | [0.151] | [0.151] | [0.161] | [0.158] | [0.153] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.0136 | -0.0131 | -0.0149 | -0.0145 | -0.0114 |
|  | [0.0374] | [0.0374] | [0.0389] | [0.0384] | [0.0377] |
| Polity | 0.0222 | 0.00285 | 0.00843 | 0.00720 | -0.00453 |
|  | [0.0385] | [0.0389] | [0.0400] | [0.0408] | [0.0416] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000600\* | 0.000597\* | 0.000492 | 0.000565\* | 0.000597\* |
|  | [0.000342] | [0.000338] | [0.000358] | [0.000343] | [0.000341] |
| Electoral formula | 0.00127 | 0.0307 | 0.0378 | 0.0291 | 0.0277 |
| proportionality | [0.0767] | [0.0757] | [0.0807] | [0.0785] | [0.0764] |
| Presidentialism | 0.00626 | 0.0250 | 0.00245 | 0.00396 | 0.0269 |
|  | [0.147] | [0.143] | [0.153] | [0.144] | [0.144] |
| Education | -0.0168 | -0.0158 | -0.0158 | -0.0157 | -0.0160 |
|  | [0.0144] | [0.0147] | [0.0147] | [0.0147] | [0.0147] |
| Age | 0.00187\*\* | 0.00175\*\* | 0.00173\*\* | 0.00175\*\* | 0.00176\*\* |
|  | [0.000858] | [0.000858] | [0.000857] | [0.000857] | [0.000858] |
| Female | -0.0130 | -0.0142 | -0.0143 | -0.0142 | -0.0142 |
|  | [0.0217] | [0.0209] | [0.0209] | [0.0209] | [0.0209] |
| Country’s financial | 0.593\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* | 0.592\*\*\* | 0.592\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* |
| condition | [0.0330] | [0.0334] | [0.0335] | [0.0334] | [0.0334] |
| Interests in politics | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.110\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.110\*\*\* | 0.110\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0163] | [0.0167] | [0.0168] | [0.0167] | [0.0167] |
| Constant | 0.650 | 0.396 | 0.317 | 0.263 | 0.480 |
|  | [1.514] | [1.508] | [1.600] | [1.590] | [1.537] |
| Country level variance | 0.211 | 0.210 | 0.225 | 0.227 | 0.223 |
| Party level Variance | 0.144 | 0.128 | 0.116 | 0.121 | 0.121 |
| N (individual/party/country) | 61960/329/68 | 59670/316/68 | 59670/316/68 | 59670/316/68 | 59670/316/68 |
| log likelihood | -34414.4 | -33339.1 | -33331.9 | -33335.3 | -33335.3 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.12: Logistic regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism (with V-Dem variables)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| DV | Satisfaction with Democracy | |
| Governmental party | 0.469\*\*\* | 0.468\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0626] | [0.0627] |
| Party linkages (low=clientelism) | 0.245\*\*\* |  |
|  | [0.0761] |  |
| Particularistic or public goods |  | 0.378\*\*\* |
| (low=particularistic goods) |  | [0.0802] |
| (ln) GDP pc PPP | -0.144 | -0.0376 |
|  | [0.122] | [0.101] |
| GDP pc growth | -0.0108 | -0.0106 |
|  | [0.0336] | [0.0332] |
| Polity | 0.0193 | -0.00772 |
|  | [0.0316] | [0.0301] |
| Democracy stock | 0.000852\*\*\* | 0.000667\*\* |
|  | [0.000306] | [0.000312] |
| Electoral formula proportionality | -0.0110 | -0.0382 |
|  | [0.0774] | [0.0685] |
| Presidentialism | -0.0346 | -0.0371 |
|  | [0.154] | [0.147] |
| Education | -0.0166 | -0.0166 |
|  | [0.0142] | [0.0143] |
| Age | 0.00180\*\* | 0.00179\*\* |
|  | [0.000845] | [0.000845] |
| Female | -0.0132 | -0.0133 |
|  | [0.0215] | [0.0215] |
| Country’s financial condition | 0.596\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0330] | [0.0330] |
| Interests in politics | 0.108\*\*\* | 0.108\*\*\* |
|  | [0.0161] | [0.0161] |
| Constant | -0.702 | -1.602\*\* |
|  | [0.970] | [0.812] |
| Country level variance | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.171\*\*\* |
| Party level Variance | 0.144\*\*\* | 0.144\*\*\* |
| N (individual/party/country) | 62775/333/69 | 62775/333/69 |
| log likelihood | -34845.6 | -34839.8 |

Clustered standard errors in brackets; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

1. Honaker, J., King, G., & Blackwell, M. (2011) Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data. *Journal of Statistical Software* 45(7): 1-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See <https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/files/2014/12/2008-01-democratic-linkages-survey.pdf> for concrete wording. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. A more sophisticated way to aggregate expert ratings and explicitly model the possibilities that experts may make mistakes and have divergent standards is to utilize item response theory (IRT) models. IRT requires that the same set of raters provide scores for the same item so that raters’ different precisions and standards can be estimated. However, DALP invites disjoint sets of experts to rate different (mostly their own) countries, and thus the levels of measurement uncertainty cannot really be quantified by IRT (or other similar approaches). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See https://v-dem.net for more information about the project and the codebook. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)