

Getting a High Heel in the Door:
An Experiment on State Legislator Responsiveness to Women's Issue Lobbying

Online Appendix

Elizabeth Wiener
Department of Political Science
Emory University
Atlanta, GA 30322
410-404-5954 (mobile/text)
Vacation: 7/18/20 – 7/25/20
Available via mobile phone and email

A Appendix

A.1 Texts from Emailed Meeting Requests

Mobilization Control Condition; Expertise Control Condition

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation

BODY:

Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across [STATE] to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization and share some of the work we are doing locally.

If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

Mobilization Treatment Condition;
Expertise Control Condition

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation

BODY:

Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across [STATE] to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization and share some of the work we are doing locally.

WAVE has been especially successful with our mobilization efforts in your district. In [DISTRICT COUNTIES] and in neighborhoods across your district, we have already gathered over [NUMBER CONSTITUTING 5% of DISTRICT REGISTERED VOTERS] hand-written signatures on a petition expressing urgent concern for the issue of sex trafficking in local communities, and we would love the opportunity to deliver our petition in person at the meeting as well.

If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

Combined Mobilization and Expertise
Treatment Condition

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation

BODY:

Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across Rhode Island to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state.

We work with experts in the field, and have some groundbreaking research we feel can help the constituents in [DISTRICT COUNTIES] specifically. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization, share some of the work we are doing locally, and discuss some of our policy research.

WAVE has been especially successful with our mobilization efforts in your district. In [DISTRICT COUNTIES] and in neighborhoods in your district, we have already gathered over [NUMBER CONSTITUTING 5% OF DISTRICT REGISTERED VOTERS] hand-written signatures on a petition expressing urgent concern for the issue of sex trafficking in local communities, and we would love the opportunity to deliver our petition in person at the meeting as well. If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

A.2 Results from Figure 1 in Table Form

[Table B.1]

A.3 Response Rates by State

[Table B.2]

A.3 Ethical Considerations and the Use of Deception

This experiment required a substantial degree of deception, and each design element was thus carefully considered with an eye towards ethics, no matter how small. Most broadly, there were two nontrivial and necessary elements of deception were incorporated. The first was the inability to pursue informed consent. By necessity, the information provided to legislators as the subjects of this experiment was limited and experimentally manipulated. This deception was unavoidable in order to validly observe legislator behavior. If legislators were informed that the requests for meetings were a part of an auditing study, especially one seeking to identify gender gaps in responsiveness to women as a marginalized group, it would have likely changed their behavior substantially.

The second necessary element of deception was the use of a fictitious organization (and thus a fictitious organizer and meeting request). The research design was rooted in a wide variety of past auditing experiments, but paid close attention to the experiment fielded by Kalla and Broockman (2016) on the influence of campaign contributions on access provision by federal lawmakers to an advocacy organization. Kalla and Broockman (2016) partnered with an actual organization, CREDO Action, in their experimental design, and I thus initially set out to do the same. I reached out to more than 20 state-level women's issue advocacy organizations across the country to discuss what a potential partnership might look like. Eight of these initial lines of inquiry resulted in further interest, and three of those resulted in in-person meetings for more in-depth discussions of logistics. However, none of these partnerships were able to eventuate.

While my efforts ultimately failed, this initial and extensive organizational outreach underlined the widespread and substantial benefits of pursuing the study.¹ Despite declining my invitation for participation, organizations were clear in their emphatic support of my research questions and objectives. One representative came from a local advocate speaking about her own state-level lobbying efforts with a women's organization focused on sex-trafficking,

“I feel confident about getting with women on these programs, and we have a confidence working together. But I know there must be men out there, too, who want to be leaders for the women in their districts. This research could help, I want to know what works, and I want to have some hope about that. There is an opportunity here, I think, and what you're doing could be really important.”

My initial organizational outreach also left me confident about the value of utilizing a fictitious organization as an alternative. The use of fictitious organizations minimizes the burden placed on legislators, as well as the potential harm caused by the experiment and its necessary deception. In his own experiment on public officials, Putnam (1993, 73) describes his own standard in this regard by attempting a balance in treatment that is “slightly deceptive, but innocuous and highly informative.” With this standard in mind, I designed an experiment that requests each legislator's time, but that never ultimately requires any of it. Once legislator responsiveness was recorded as the outcome variable for the study, each legislator received an email indicating that the organization was no longer seeking the meeting. Had the study moved forward working with actual advocacy organizations, it would have resulted in a potentially high number of relatively insubstantial meetings, conducted mainly for the sake of research. Such meetings could thus be considered a waste of time for both legislator and advocacy organization, time that might have been used for work on more imminent policymaking. Finally, utilizing a fictitious organization on which legislators could have no prior beliefs came with strong methodological advantages. Prior beliefs about an organization's capacity to mobilize potential voters or about

their resources and reputation in providing policy expertise in legislators would have seriously crippled the exogeneity of both treatments, rendering the experiment effectively meaningless.²

One consequence of the use of a fictitious organization, however, required additional attention in the final experimental design. While none of the legislative meetings with my fictitious organization could take place, the meeting request itself might have sparked legislative interest in the issue of sex trafficking that might have otherwise not arisen. Therefore, in order to ensure that any potential benefit to the victims of sex trafficking through increased legislative interest might be realized as a result of my experimental stimuli, I acquired the permission of state-level women's organizations working on issues of sex trafficking in each state to include their contact information in the study's final debriefing emails. This added measure ensured that should any legislator be interested in taking action with an organization on the issue of sex trafficking, he or she would have a clear avenue to do so. Each of the 600 debriefing emails thus included at least two state-specific organizational references and persons of contact would be open and available to meet on issues of sex trafficking for legislators' benefit. Notably, after debriefing all 600 legislators included in the experiment, I received only four responses- all of which were positive, expressing interest in participating in future research should I be pursuing it.

Another noteworthy element of deception resulting from my use of a fictitious organization relates to the email texts for the mobilization condition of my experimental treatments. Within this email text, I falsely claimed that .5% of registered voters within each state legislator's constituency had signed a petition underlining concern for local issues of sex trafficking. I chose this particular percentage of registered voters after considerable conversation with interest group activists and organizational advocates in each of the states included in the

study, with the intention of identifying a number that would not be considered by legislators to represent a widespread, pronounced, or overwhelming surge of constituent activity. The experimental treatment was designed to signal a group's interest in mobilization efforts rather than a groundswell of constituent behavior. I considered refraining from using any number at all, but background research with state-level lobbyists confirmed my suspicions that the lack of a numerical reference would detract from the experimental treatment's validity. The number of signatures referenced was estimated by me as well as by my organizational contacts as optimal for conveying my intended experimental signal while at the same limiting the level of necessary deception regarding activities within a legislative district. The debriefing emails sent to all legislators included in the study from my personal, institutional email address described this element of deception (and every element of deception more generally) in detail.

Importantly, thoughtful consideration of both non-trivial elements of deception guided me in a significant decision limiting the experimental design as it was originally conceived. My paper is careful to note that increased responsiveness of female legislators to a women's issue group might be driven by mechanisms other than intrinsic benefits; it is possible that women in office are more responsive to all issue groups, independent of the group's gendered issue area. My original research design spoke to this alternative mechanism and included a non-gendered fictitious group in addition to a women's issue fictitious organization. However, this doubled the size of the experiment, and thus doubled the degree of necessary deception. Given that my interest in this line of research stems predominately from a focus on increasing opportunities for political representation of women and marginalized groups more generally, I estimated that the added value of isolating the mechanism driving gender gaps was tangential to the underlying purpose of the research: to identify if gender gaps exist in women's issue group responsiveness,

and in turn how these gender gaps might be bridged with changes in group lobbying strategy. As such, I concluded that the ethical costs of doubling the size of the experiment and levels of deception exceeded the benefits offered and removed my investigation of this alternative mechanism from the research design.

In the end, all of the ethical considerations for necessary experimental deception were tantamount for IRB expedited review and approval process. Over the course of IRB review process, two main points emerged particularly important. First, it was vital to the IRB that my initial attempts to partner with a non- fictitious advocacy organization were exhaustive (which they were). These efforts ultimately spoke to the credibility of my assertion that a fictitious organization as an element of deception was, in fact, unavoidable and necessary. It was important to demonstrate that I had spent significant time and resources pursuing alternative experimental approaches.

Second, successful expedited IRB approval demanded a timely, detailed, and fully transparent debriefing process.³ More specifically, that the debrief be clear and place prominent emphasis on all deceptive procedures related to the use of a fictitious organization was paramount to IRB approval. Given that the experimental treatments required the provision of misinformation about district level activity and policy needs—not only for the constituent mobilization condition (as discussed above) but also the expertise provision condition— it was critical to IRB approval that these measures of deception be completely outlined. It was also important that they be sufficiently justified with regards to the study's larger purpose for research. Explicit clarity was also required regarding all experimental procedures and preparations. Ultimately, there were two rounds of reviews and changes before the final debriefing language could be approved.

A.4 Coding Protocol for Measuring Responsiveness

To measure the outcome variable of interest, I blindly coded three different measures of legislator responsiveness for each scheduling request administered:

1. A binary measurement for if there was any response from the legislator of their office at all
2. An additional binary measurement for if the legislator or his/her office responded positively to the email request, where 0 indicates no response whatsoever OR a decline of the request and 1 signifies a response that attempted to schedule some sort of meeting
3. A ranking from 1-6 that categorizes responses, measuring interest in a meeting by ranking with whom the meeting would be scheduled

Each email was carefully read and judged as to how the responses wording indicates with whom the meeting would take place. For instance, if the response came from the legislators scheduling staffer and stated, “I am emailing to schedule a meeting between you and Rep. X,” or “Rep. X requested that I touch base with you to schedule a meeting,” I coded this response as a 1 in the ranking below despite the fact that the response technically came from a staffer and not the legislator themselves.

I used these state specific specifications to code within the 1-6 outcome measure outlined below:

1. A response indicating the intention to schedule a meeting with the Member of General Assembly or State Senator (best outcome)
2. A response indicating the intention to schedule a meeting with a Upper Level Staffer
3. A response indicating the intention to schedule a meeting with a Lower Level Staffer

4. A response limited to a simple clarification question as to whether meeting should be in district or capital. This specification is coded here because while it does not express interest in a meeting explicitly, the presence of a response is a step up from an outright no to the request or a failure to respond at all. The fact that there is a response does seem to imply an interest in some kind of meeting, but there is no way to know with whom in the legislative office the meeting would take place.
5. A response indicating that no meeting would be possible
6. No response (worst outcome)

Many legislators had automatic responses set up on their email accounts. These were largely uniform in their content, emphasizing that emailing is important and that one can expect a delay in response due to the high number of emails received each day. I did not consider these replies as “responses” in the measurements described above. In fact, I only coded responses that were directly addressed to the fictitious organizer for each state. If I received no other response outside the automatic reply, the legislator received a score of 6 in the measurement above. Further, in the first binary measurement for any response at all, I coded legislators from whom I only received the automatic reply as a 0.

In collecting data on responsiveness for later analysis, I anticipated problems in equating a non-response with a missing response; I wanted to avoid equating a legislator who did not see the organization’s email request with a legislator that opened the emailed request and chose not to respond. I thus sought out a email tracking service that could collect data on if and when each email was opened (and whether the link provided at the end of each email had been clicked). Unfortunately, the tracking service failed to provide complete data: approximately 70% of the data was lost.

A.5 Robustness Checks

[Table B.3]

For additional robustness checks, Table B.3 shows the results to models adding state fixed effects to those presented in Figure 1 (and Table B.1). Table B.3 does not include any individual legislator controls; the regressions in Table B.4 make this addition. Table B.3 shows that adding state fixed effects to the model does not result in any substantive changes to the results.

Evaluating the difference between the nested models produces a χ^2 value of 6.8117, which is statistically significant at a 10% level with a p-value of .07815.

[Table B.4]

The controls included then added in Table B.4 reflect legislator characteristics that are expected to influence a legislator's likelihood to respond to a women's advocacy group's request on sex trafficking. I thus include a control for membership in the Democratic party, as Democrats might be more inclined to view women as strong or critical constituency group than Republicans given partisan gender gaps; a control for lower chamber membership, as legislators in the lower chambers might have less demands on their time and thus an increased likelihood to respond to the organization's meeting request; and a third control for relevant committee membership, as legislators on committees that oversee issues of sex trafficking might be more likely to respond to a group working on such an issue. Both the baseline model as well as a model interacting treatment group by gender are displayed in columns one and two. Testing the statistical difference between these two models once again yields a significant χ^2 value of 7.8516 with a p-value of .0491. These results thus fall in line with those presented in the paper, strengthening my conclusion that men and women in office respond to the experimental treatments differently.

Finally, Table B.5 then uses state level controls rather than state fixed effects, and once again produces no substantive changes from the results discussed above.

[Table B.5]

A.6 Gender Gaps and Partisanship in Experimental Results

Tables B.5 and B.6 evaluate partisan differences in treatment effects within male and female legislators observed independently. Table B.6 interacts treatment group by legislator gender and Democratic party membership, while Table B.7 interacts treatment group by legislator gender and Republican party membership. Both Tables B.6 and B.7 are presented below.

[Table B.6]

Looking at the results interacting female gender by treatment group by Democratic party member in Table B.5, the coefficient estimated for Female refers to the difference between female Republicans vs. male Republicans in the control group. In other words, it speaks to the baseline gender differences within the Republican party. The difference is substantial, estimated at .260, and statistically significant with a p-value less than .05. The coefficient estimated for in Table B.5 for Female * Democrats compares female legislators in the control group across party and suggests that Democratic Females are not significantly more likely to respond to the control than Republican Female legislators.

[Table B.7]

The results estimated in Table B.7 interacting female gender by treatment group by Republican party member are quite similar. The coefficient estimated for Female now refers to the difference between female Democrats and male Democrats and is both statistically significant and

substantively similar to the estimate for Female in Table B.7. And similarly to regression results presented in Table B.7, the interaction term Female * Republicans shows no significant difference between Republican and Democratic female legislators. Paying respect to the limitations of these analytic findings, these combined results do provide some evidence in support of the conclusion that partisan differences between women are not driving the trends exhibited in the broader experimental analyses.

What's more, the results presented in Tables B.5 and B.6 also lend credibility to the presumption that differences across gender can be traced back to intrinsic rather than political motivations for descriptive representatives. The experimental results show clear differences between men and women in office. However, the results cannot speak specifically to the mechanisms driving these differences. I have assumed that such gender gaps stem from intrinsic benefits offered by a women's issue group to a female legislator based on shared group identity. But scholars have also often suggested that linkages between descriptive and substantive representation arise from how legislators perceive the strength of electoral support offered by in-group constituencies. In his groundbreaking research on Congressional behavior, Fenno (1979) observes that members of Congress consider their districts in terms of a conglomeration of constituency groups. If a legislator perceives a great deal of electoral potential for a given constituency group, they are likely to allocate more time to address policy issues specific to that particular constituency, and vice versa; they are likely allies to that constituency group and their policy preferences.

Consensus that women do objectively constitute a "constituency group" as defined by Fenno (1978) is also fairly clear in the literature. The politics of gender guide how voters consider issues, parties, and candidates (Brians 2005; Dolan 1998; Schaffner 2005; Herrnson,

Lay and Stokes 2003; Paolino 1995; Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Despite being descriptively underrepresented in politics (CAWP 2015), women make up over half the voting electorate and are considered significant for understanding campaign dynamics (Schaffner 2005). Furthermore, studies show that women use their identity in deciding how to vote (Brains 2005; Dolan 1998; Paolino 1995; Plutzer and Zipp 1996).

Evidence also suggests that legislators themselves see women as a potential “constituency group,” estimating their electoral support and taking action in part based on their beliefs about what women as a voting group can offer electorally. Democratic and Republican candidates alike take significant steps in campaign outreach to women voters specifically by utilizing identity-based appeals (Abdullah 2012; Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011; Casserly 2012; Schaffner 2005). Reingold (2000), in her study of Women as a Constituency Group, considers which legislators in particular view female constituents this way. By exploring how individual legislators perceive the electoral potential of their female constituents as a distinct constituency group, Reingold reveals who is more or less predisposed to taking action on women-specific policy concerns. She clarifies, “one does not necessarily have to perceive women as a particularly supportive constituency group to take action on their behalf, but such support certainly would provide an incentive for doing so” (2000, 114). Using interview-based evidence collected in the California and Arizona state legislatures, Reingold (2000) finds that female legislators rated women as their most supportive constituency group, whereas male legislators did not. In fact, among male California legislators, women were rated as one of the least supportive constituency groups. Notably, districts represented by male versus female legislators were similar with respect to constituent ideology and partisanship; “the relatively

strong support these female lawmakers felt they received from women cannot be ‘explained away’ as a coincidental reflection of district peculiarities” (2000, 119).

There thus exists a puzzling question as to what drives differences between the observed legislative activity of men and women. Identifying if a legislator’s motivation is intrinsic or political is an important question because a legislator is often presented with opportunities to take action on behalf of groups which must remain unobserved; if politically rather than intrinsically motivated, a legislator is unlikely to work for positive change for a group where there is no potential for electoral gains. Intrinsic motivations give hope that politicians will do the right thing even when nobody is watching. Furthermore, women as a marginalized group are far from homogeneous, and some subgroups within the female population- especially those facing intersectional marginalization- might not constitute large constituencies for female legislators in power. Again, if politically rather than intrinsically motivated, a female legislator is unlikely to take strong legislative action on a women’s policy primarily targeting marginalized female populations outside their direct constituencies. On the other hand, intrinsic motivations for women’s substantive representation would more optimistically predict pro-women’s legislative activism in the same scenario. Nevertheless, this central question is as difficult to answer as it is important to answer; as Broockman (2013, 533) states well, “the role of such intrinsic motivation is challenging to empirically explore because politicians have incentives to appear intrinsically motivated even if they are not.”

Ultimately, there are two potential stories at play, both of which would shed light on the gender gaps as well the ceiling effect emerging in my central findings:

1. Men and women are motivated to respond to a women’s advocacy organization based on a gender group affinity (intrinsic benefits). Women are likely to feel that affinity, leading to a

higher likelihood they will respond to the women's group in their simple meeting request and also leading to the ceiling effect of added lobbying tactics. In contrast, men do not feel that affinity, and thus the additional political motivation of added lobbying tactics leads them to be more responsive.

2. Men and women are both politically motivated in the decision to respond to a women's advocacy organization. However, female legislators see women as a key electoral constituency more so than men and are thus more likely to respond to the basic meeting request. This leads to the ceiling effect for women, where added lobbying efforts and political mobilization are unlikely to see substantial visible effect on women in office.

Partisanship offers an interesting opportunity to disentangle these stories. If electoral rather than intrinsic motivations do better to explain the gender gaps in my findings, we would expect Democratic women to be more likely to respond to the women's organization than Republican women. Based on the analysis presented in Table B.6, this is not the case. While I cannot make any firm conclusions based on these limited findings, it is noteworthy that the reported trends align well with my underlying theoretic framework, pointing towards intrinsic rather than political mechanisms for the links between descriptive and substantive representation.

Notes

¹ This outreach also provided strong qualitative background evidence, and prompted the subsequent follow-up study exploring how gender identity and legislative alliances shape the strategic choices of women's issue lobbyists.

² In order to ensure that the fictitious organization's email request appeared credible and that the organization itself appeared legitimate, a link was provided in the close of each email to an organizational website. Each website was identical aside from state-level facts and statistics about sex trafficking to ensure consistency across the experimental design.

³ Originally, I had opted against using a debrief for participants in the study, estimating potential costs to future researchers of state politics as well as to organizations lobbying at the state level that could arise from negative legislator reactions. That said, the IRB contended that these costs were overestimated, and strongly argued that the failure to debrief legislators about the substantial measures of deception could not be ethically supported. In the end, I conceded this point. Additionally, it is worth noting once more that legislator responses to the debriefing were not negative, and were in fact positive overall.

B Tables

Table B.1: OLS Model Presented in Figure 1

	<i>DV: Legislator Response</i>	
	(baseline model)	(interacting treatment by gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.159*** (0.057)	0.295*** (0.080)
Expertise Treatment	-0.015	0.062 (0.077)
Combined Treatment	0.079 (0.056)	0.191** (0.077)
Female	0.111*** (0.040)	0.288*** (0.080)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		-0.282** (0.113)
Female * Expertise Treatment		-0.177 (0.113)
Female * Combined Treatment		-0.248** (0.113)
Constant	0.312*** (0.043)	0.235*** (0.053)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.488 (df = 595)	0.486 (df = 592)
F Statistic	5.313*** (df = 4; 595)	4.120*** (df = 7; 592)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.2: Response Rates by State

	% Response	% Female Response	% Male Response	Gender Gap	N
California	37.7%	44.4%	30.7%	13.7%	53
Massachusetts	36.0%	38.0%	34.0%	4.0%	100
Michigan	55.4%	64.8%	45.9%	18.9%	74
Missouri	33.3%	46.7%	20.0%	26.7%	90
Pennsylvania	36.5%	41.7%	31.2%	10.4%	96
Rhode Island	36.8%	37.1%	40.0%	-2.9%	70
South Carolina	34.6%	38.5%	30.7%	7.7%	52
Wisconsin	72.3%	81.3%	63.6%	17.6	65

Table B.3: OLS (State Fixed Effects) Model

	<i>DV: Legislator Response</i>	
	(baseline model)	(interacting treatment by gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.137** (0.055)	0.271*** (0.078)
Expertise Treatment	-0.050 (0.055)	0.008 (0.076)
Combined Treatment	0.061 (0.055)	0.151** (0.076)
Female	0.113*** (0.039)	0.265*** (0.078)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		-0.274** (0.110)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		-0.135 (0.111)
Female * Combined Treatment		-0.198* (0.111)
Constant	0.302*** (0.076)	0.236*** (0.081)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.474 (df = 588)	0.473 (df = 585)
F Statistic	5.717*** (df = 11; 588)	4.995*** (df = 14; 585)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.4: OLS (State Fixed Effects) Model with Legislator Controls

	<i>DV: Legislator Response</i>	
	(baseline model)	(interacting treatment by gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.163*** (0.057)	0.299*** (0.080)
Expertise Treatment	-0.016 (0.057)	0.062 (0.078)
Combined Treatment	0.080 (0.056)	0.198** (0.077)
Female	0.110*** (0.040)	0.292*** (0.080)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		-0.284** (0.113)
Female * Expertise Treatment		-0.179 (0.113)
Female * Combined Treatment		-0.260** (0.113)
Democrat	-0.085**	-0.089** (0.042)
Relevant Committee Membership	0.028 (0.047)	0.023 (0.047)
Lower Chamber	-0.035	-0.034 (0.048)
Constant	0.385*** (0.066)	0.310*** (0.073)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.487 (df = 591)	0.485 (df = 588)
F Statistic	3.325*** (df = 7; 591)	3.142*** (df = 10; 588)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.5: OLS Model with State and Legislator Controls

	<i>DV: Legislator Response</i>	
	(baseline model)	(interacting treatment by gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.163*** (0.056)	0.297*** (0.080)
Expertise Treatment	-0.015 (0.056)	0.060 (0.077)
Combined Treatment	0.079 (0.056)	0.191** (0.077)
Female	0.110*** (0.040)	0.286*** (0.080)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		-0.280** (0.113)
Female * Expertise Treatment		-0.174 (0.113)
Female * Combined Treatment		-0.248** (0.113)
Democrat	-0.099** (0.043)	-0.102** (0.043)
Relevant Committee Membership	0.035 (0.047)	0.029 (0.047)
Lower Chamber	-0.027	-0.027 (0.049)
Legislature Professionalism	0.015 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)
Percent Women in Legislature	0.008 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
Constant	0.210 (0.135)	0.154 (0.137)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.486 (df = 590)	0.485 (df = 587)
F Statistic	3.208*** (df = 9; 590)	3.035*** (df = 12; 587)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Triple Interactions: Gender * Democrat * Treatment

<i>DV: Response to Women's Advocacy Organization</i>	
	Legislator Response
Mobilization Treatment	0.381*** (0.134)
Expertise Treatment	- 0.046 (0.127)
Combined Treatment	0.233* (0.124)
Female	0.260** (0.132)
Democrat	- 0.086 (0.107)
Female * Mobilization Treatment	- 0.391** (0.192)
Female * Expertise Treatment	0.056 (0.188)
Female * Combined Treatment	- 0.245 (0.184)
Female * Democrat	0.052 (0.166)
Democrat * Mobilization Treatment	- 0.114 (0.167)
Democrat * Expertise Treatment	0.172 (0.160)
Democrat * Combined Treatment	- 0.058 (0.158)
Female * Democrat * Mobilization Treatment	0.148 (0.238)
Female * Democrat * Expertise Treatment	- 0.367 (0.235)
Female * Democrat * Combined Treatment	- 0.019 (0.233)
Observations	600
Residual Std. Error	0.485 (df = 584)
F Statistic	2.597*** (df = 15; 584)
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table B.7: Triple Interactions: Gender * Republican * Treatment

<i>DV: Response to Women's Advocacy Organization</i>	
	Legislator Response
Mobilization Treatment	0.252*** (0.097)
Expertise Treatment	0.068 (0.096)
Combined Treatment	0.136 (0.097)
Female	0.291*** (0.099)
Republican	0.069 (0.107)
Female * Mobilization Treatment	– 0.242* (0.136)
Female * Expertise Treatment	– 0.283** (0.137)
Female * Combined Treatment	– 0.220 (0.141)
Female * Republican	– 0.061 (0.162)
Republican * Mobilization Treatment	0.079 (0.163)
Republican * Expertise Treatment	– 0.162 (0.158)
Republican * Combined Treatment	0.052 (0.156)
Female * Republican * Mobilization Treatment	– 0.117 (0.232)
Female * Republican * Expertise Treatment	0.406* (0.230)
Female * Republican * Combined Treatment	0.045 (0.230)
Observations	600
Residual Std. Error	0.472 (df = 577)
F Statistic	3.600*** (df = 22; 577)
<i>Note:</i>	
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

