# Supplemental Appendix for "Leftist Insurgency in Democracies"

This appendix is primarily concerned with explaining the coding decisions made in the paper about insurgencies, regimes, and timing. The small number of cases and already substantial limits on inference make coding choices enormously important. They need to be transparently explained to justify explanations.

For instance, Polity codes Bangladesh as a clear democracy in 1972 (+8), but Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014) and Svolik (2012) both code it as an autocracy. UCDP/PRIO's dataset has neither the JSD nor PSDP in its data on civil wars, but the case-specific literature makes clear that these groups launched violent leftist rebellions against the Bangladeshi state in 1972-4. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) code the onset of the Naxalite revolt in India as 1989 (based on Sambanis 2004), while UCDP identifies 1969 and case-specific sources point to 1967. UCDP identifies 1974 as the onset year of the Communist Party of Thailand insurgency, while case-specific sources point to 1965.

The Appendix explores the implications of changes in how cases are coded (whether in terms of insurgent onset, timing, or regime-type), addresses a set of other explanatory factors, discusses regime-type data, and then provides a bibliography for scholars to explore the cases themselves.

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# 1. Coding Leftist Insurgencies and Onset-Years in Southern Asia, 1945-2015

This section focuses on identifying insurgent groups and the year in which they began their revolt. Table 1 compares the onset-year used in the paper with that coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict database.

What is a leftist insurgency?

I code leftist groups as those that explicitly articulate their goals in terms of Marxist-Leninist and/or Maoist theory, aiming to seize the state and engage in systematic transformation based on class categories. I exclude groups with some left influence that nevertheless primarily mobilized on other identity cleavages (for instance, the Tamil Tigers or the 1960s Baluch insurgency). I scope "insurgent onset" to substantial, coordinated armed mobilization under the leadership of a coherent organization. This is to distinguish insurgent onset from small, localized uprisings by peasants or students that did not turn into actual rebellions. The number of such micro-revolts is surely enormous, and we know nothing about many of them – they are of course important (Guha 1982) but would require a radically different theory and research design.

When did leftist insurgencies emerge?

Table 1 lists the 18 leftist insurgencies and onset years that I ultimately chose. I compare the onset-year I selected with that in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson and Eck 2018). 16 of the insurgencies are in the UCDP dataset, so the basic case set is highly compatible with existing sources. The two Bangladesh insurgencies are the new additions.

Of the 16 UCDP-included cases, 11 of the onset-years I chose are in agreement with UCDP. The five cases in which I judge onset to have occurred in a different year than UCDP were the CPB-Red Flag, Naxalites in India, CPI in India, second JVP revolt in Sri Lanka, and Communist Party of Thailand insurgency. These decisions are most important in two cases, since choice of year would put in a very different regime-type. I focus on the choice to mobilize for revolt, which is different than the UCDP decision rule – UCDP is interested in the year in which a particular battle death threshold is hit, but for the choice to rebel (the dependent variable of this paper), that is less informative than the initial year of substantial violent mobilization. If we accepted the UCDP coding, the CPT would have begun its war in a period of democracy in Thailand, but the case-specific literature points to 1965 as the onset year. Similarly, for the CPB-Red Flag, UCDP's coding would put this onset in a democracy-year, whereas my coding places it in the final days of British imperial rule. These are both decisions that cut against my critique of H1, so they are not being manipulated to support my arguments. The differences in the CPI, JVP, and Naxalite insurgencies onset years are not important for the regime-type codings.

**Table 1. Coding Onset and Onset-Years** 

	Communist	Paper Onset	<b>UCDP Onset</b>	Onset Year
Country	Insurgency	Year	Year	Agree?
Bangladesh	Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal	1974	N/A	N
	Purba Bangla Sarbohara			
Bangladesh	Party	1972	N/A	N
Burma	CPB-RF	1946	1948	N
Burma	PVO	1948	1948	Y
Burma	СРВ	1948	1948	Y
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	1967	1967	Y
French				
Indochina	Viet Minh	1946	1946	Y
India	Naxalites	1967	1969	N
India	CPI	1948	1947	N
Laos	Pathet Lao	1959	1959	Y
Malaya	MCP	1948	1948	Y
Nepal	CPN	1996	1996	Y
Philippines	Huks	1946	1946	Y
Philippines	CPP/NPA	1969	1969	Y
South				
Vietnam	Viet Cong	1955	1955	Y
Sri Lanka	JVP I	1971	1971	Y
Sri Lanka	JVP II	1987	1989	N
Thailand	CPT	1965	1974	N

#### Clear Cases

Most of the cases of insurgency and their years of onset are reasonably clear. They fall into two types – those in which my coding and the UCPD coding are the same, and those in which UCDP offers an onset year different than what specialist sources suggest was the first year of major revolutionary violent mobilization. Again, this is not a claim that UCDP is wrong – instead, it is a theoretically-driven choice about what activities should count as revolutionary mobilization.

The 11 cases in which both onset and onset-year coding align with the UCDP onset-year are the PVO, CPB, Khmer Rouge, Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, MCP, CPN, CPP/NPA, Viet Cong, and first JVP revolt. The leftist credentials of these groups are not in doubt – all were explicitly socialist and communist.

### Contested Onset-Years

There are five cases in which UCDP agrees that a group launched an insurgency, but disagrees with my coding on onset-year. The sources I used to make these judgments are listed in the case bibliography below. I code the JVP II revolt as starting in 1987 rather than 1989 because this is the year in which the JVP started intentionally using political violence in a coordinated and strategic way. The incredible opacity of the conflict makes clear casualty codings impossible – 1989 was the bloodiest year, but the culmination of the conflict rather than its beginning (Chandraprema 1991, Gunaratna 1990).

Similarly, there is no doubt that the Naxalite revolt in India began in 1967 – this is the consensus in the sources (Kohli 1990, Kennedy and Purushotham 2012). The CPB-Red Flag in Burma started its insurgency in 1946 (Lintner 1990, 10); it may have been coded as 1948 in UCDP because the dataset does not include generally observations from pre-independence British colonies in South Asia. 1974 is UCDP's chosen year for the CPT onset due to the increasing visibility of open clashes, but 1965 was the year the CPT and Thai security forces began fighting (Chutima 1990, 53; Baker and Phongpaichit, 184), the Thai government set up its Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) in 1964 (Baker and Phongpaichit, 184), and the CPT formally created its People's Liberation Army of Thailand in 1969 "to coordinate the growing military insurgency" (Wedel 1981, 328). It is possible that Thailand's partial democratization of 1973 led to freer reporting on CPT activities that allowed UCDP to confidently put the conflict above its confidence threshold for battle deaths.

The CPI onset coding is the most ambiguous, since there was insurrectionary activity at a local level in Hyderabad even prior to partition and independence (indeed, the CPI later memorialized it – Gour 1973). This is where the UCDP coding may have arisen from, and reasonably so – there was something like a very localized, poorly-studied communist insurgency ongoing at independence. However, the CPI's official turn to war was in 1948, as part of an intentional strategic shift in direction that explicitly involved a revolt against the state and intentional efforts to mobilize warfare across the country.

As with the cases above, these were all explicitly communist/ultra-leftist insurgencies.

#### Contested Onset Cases

The most difficult judgments are about what cases to include that are not in the UCDP dataset.

I include the two Bangladesh leftist insurgencies – the JSD and PSBP – because both were coordinated leftist insurrections led by a coherent central leadership. We don't know how many people died in the conflicts they were involved in, because we know remarkably little about this period of Bangladeshi history. Accounts suggest that "thousands" were killed in the complex blend of leftist revolt, state repression, and widespread crime and disorder, as well as the bloody coup of 1975 and its aftermath. Given that both groups receive substantial discussion in the existing literature, and meet the criteria for inclusion, I judged that they should be included. The sourcing is quite substantial, as the bibliography below suggests.

There are also several candidate cases that are not included in the sample of leftist insurgencies. The two most clear-cut involve Indonesia's communist movement. First, there was a small resistance waged by the remnants of the PKI in Indonesia after its destruction in 1965-66 by the Indonesian Army and local allies. Some PKI survivors tried to keep up resistance, including in West Kalimantan. However, this was not a revolt, as opposed to the final stages of a massacre in which straggling survivors simply tried to stay alive (Davidson 2008; Crouch 1978, 224). Researchers note that Sidisman tried to pursue a Maoist approach "but he made little progress before he was captured in December 1966" (Crouch 1978, 227); in East Java "the one serious attempt after 1965 to revive the PKI was crushed" (Crouch 1978, 227); and "the army conducted two significant military operations against PKI holdouts – one of them in West Kalimanatan, and a second in the environs of Purwodadi, Central Java, and Blitar, East Java" (Robinson 2018, 315, footnote 5). But the PKI was in self-defense mode, rather than launching a rebellion.

The Madiun uprising in 1948 Indonesia pitted parts of the PKI against the Republic of Indonesia, including the seizure of Madiun by PKI forces and several months of ensuing combat. This case is not included for two reasons. First, it was a clash within an insurgent movement, closer to a factional power struggle than an insurgent revolt. Second, it does not appear to have been a premeditated or intended event by the PKI leadership; instead, local tensions and suspicions from political clashes in Solo have sparked a local PKI military effort to take over Madiun, where there were fears of a similar set of clashes. Though the conflict then escalated once Sukarno decreed that it was a treasonous act that needed to be crushed, leading the PKI leadership to throw in with their local military commanders, this was not a choice by the PKI for rebellion. Robinson (2018, 36) summarizes it as a "local affair that caught the national PKI leadership by surprise." Swift (1989) provides a valuable overview of this case.

There were two tiny attempted revolts in autocratic Nepal. First, the Jhapa revolt in early 1970s Nepal involved very few small-scale clashes between a tiny group of ultra-leftists and landlords and police in a particular region of Nepal (Khadka 1995, Thapa 2004). Second, there were attacks on nine police stations by Mashal activists in the Kathmandu Valley (Adhikari 2014, 7) in 1986. Neither seems to be meet the criteria of a coordinated insurgency, and both were rapidly crushed without any form of escalation or broadening. Of the two, however, the Jhapa Naxalite Movement is a more plausible inclusion case since its activities did stretch over several years.

Finally, there is some evidence of some form of localized peasant/leftist insurgency in parts of East Pakistan, linked to East Pakistan's communists and radical leftist peasants (Franda 1970). Umar (2004) identifies "nine guerrilla camps" and "three small arms factories" (134) as of February 1949, while noting that these "clashes between guierrillas and the government forces continued till the end of February 1950" (137). He highlights Sylhet, Mymensingh, Rajshahi, and Khulna as the core of organized peasant mobilization (144). This is a difficult case, since its sourcing is extremely restricted; it appears to have been primarily a set of localized peasant uprising, but one that was fused with the Communist Party in those local areas. Given how little we know about it, even compared to the 1972-74 Bangladesh revolts, I chose not to include this violence. As I note below, if it was included it's not clear what the regime coding would be – Pakistan in 1949-50 was neither a democracy nor an autocracy of any particular form.

# Implications of ambiguous cases

The main case in which identifying the onset of violent revolutionary mobilization is challenging is the CPI, in 1947 or 1948, but in that case focusing on when the CPI as a whole chose war allows a clear answer. The choice to change the onset-year in the CPT and CPB-Red Flag are both decisions that cut against the paper's critique of H1, so these are not efforts to manipulate coding decisions to help the paper.

The bigger challenge comes in the unincluded cases. Much hinges on how we view localized revolts, as in Nepal and Bangladesh. If we include the Jhapa revolt in the 1970s, that would be a case of leftist insurgency under autocracy, and if we removed the two 1970s Bangladesh revolts, two of democracy-year onsets would disappear. It's not clear what to do with Pakistan's regime-type in 1948-50 (Polity IV codes it as a 2, 4, 4; Boix et al. 2013 code 1950 as a democracy-year, but not 1948-9; GWF 2014 code the period as an "oligarchy"). This would rebalance the distribution of cases. But it would not change the fact that the Burma, India, and 1971 JVP revolts all occurred under democracy. I believe the judgments made here are defensible given the available sources; even if one disagrees, there would not be a radical shift in the nature of the findings regarding H1 – the proportion of onsets under autocracy would rise, but there would remain a substantial number of onsets under democracy.

# 2. Coding Regime Type in Onset-Years in Southern Asia, 1945-2015

Identifying whether a country is a democracy or not in a given year can be quite complicated. Different measures and datasets can sometimes lead to distinctly different results. Combined with ambiguities over onset-year, disagreements over regime type within a year can also challenge inferences in this project. See Table 2 for a summary of the regime-type data. Much hinges on how I judged these codings.

Country	Group	Onset	Polity IV	Svolik (2012)	GWF (2014)	Boix et al. (2013)	Paper Coding
Bangladesh	JSD	1974	+2	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Democracy
Bangladesh	PBSP	1972	+8	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Democracy
Burma	CPB-RF	1946	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Autocracy

Burma	PVO	1948	8	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Burma	СРВ	1948	8	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	1967	-9	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy
French Indochina	Viet Minh	1946	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Autocracy
India	Naxalites	1967	9	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
India	CPI	1948	N/A	Democracy	Democracy	N/A	Democracy
Laos	Pathet Lao	1959	8	No Authority	Democracy	Autocracy	Democracy
Malaya	MCP	1948	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Autocracy
Nepal	CPN	1996	5	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Philippines	Huks	1946	2	No Authority	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Philippines	CPP/NPA	1969	2	Democracy	Democracy	Autocracy	Democracy
South Vietnam	Viet Cong	1955	-3	No Authority	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy
Sri Lanka	JVP I	1971	8	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Sri Lanka	JVP II	1987	5	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Democracy
Thailand	CPT	1965	-7	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy

### Clear Cases

Of the 18 onset cases, 13 seem fairly consistent across datasets and specialist sources. Burma 1946, Malaya 1948, and French Indochina 1946 were all authoritarian-colonial political regimes, while South Vietnam 1955, Thailand 1965, and Cambodia 1967 were clearly authoritarian regimes.

In turn, Burma 1948, India 1948, India 1967, Sri Lanka 1971, Philippines 1946, and Nepal 1996 are consistently democracies. There are a few cases in which one of the existing datasets does not code one of these; Svolik (2012) for instance, uses "No Authority" when there is a civil war ongoing on in a country; Boix et al. (2013) start their India coding in 1950.

### Contested Cases

There are five country-years in which there is meaningful disagreement: Sri Lanka 1987, Laos 1959, Philippines 1969, Bangladesh 1972, Bangladesh 1974. This, unsurprisingly, includes three of the four cases that clearly support H2 as well as the 1969 Philippines case that offers partial support – Sri Lanka 1987, Bangladesh 1974, Laos 1959, and Philippines 1969 were all either experiencing autocratization.

I will start with the easiest case – while Polity codes 1972 Bangladesh as a +8, Svolik (2012), Geddes et al. (2014), and Boix et al (2013) all code it as an autocracy. In part this has to do with coding rules about regime-spells, since Mujib ended up becoming a dictator. But 1972-3 was a period of plausible democracy: "In 1973 the regime continued on its course of establishing a secular parliamentary political system in Bangladesh. Parliamentary elections were held early and on schedule to legitimize the system" (Jahan 1974, 127) and "From the very beginning, the

Awami League regime allowed all political parties to function except the rightist Muslim League, the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), and other pro-Islamic parties whose leaders had collaborated with the Pakistan army in 1971" (Amin 1986, 765). In 1972 Mujib had explicitly embraced democracy and late 1972 saw the creation of the secular, democratic, parliamentary Constitution. That said, Riaz (2016) notes allegations of vote-rigging and intimidation. The chaos of transition from Pakistani rule was complex and murky, and this was not a clean election, but it appears to have been significantly closer to a democratic election than to an autocratic sham or heavily-rigged contest.

Laos 1958 is coded as a democracy in Boix but a dictatorship in 1959; Polity IV codes it as +8 in both 1958 and 1959, Svolik codes it as "No authority," and GWF identifies 1959 as a year in which we see a switch from democracy to personalistic dictatorship. This is not a widely-studied case, so I rely on Stuart-Fox (1997). His argument is that 1958 was clearly a democracy-year, while over the course of 1959 we see increasing strains on the political system before the collapse of democracy in 1960. Importantly, the government crackdown on the Pathet Lao, and the Second Battalion's escape to North Vietnam, in 1959 occurred under a democratic government (Stuart-Fox 104-8) that emerged following the collapse of the First Coalition. The army was gaining influence in this period of escalating civil war, but an abortive military coup did not occur until December 24, 1959 (Stuart-Fox 110), which failed in favor of a caretaker government and a plan for new elections, which were held in April 1960 but badly rigged. 1959 seems like a reasonable year to continue to include as a democracy, since power was held by a parliamentary government. By contrast, 1960 is the year of a rigged election, the August 9 1960 neutralist coup, and then a counter-coup from the right (Smith 1963).

The Philippines in 1969 are coded as +2 in Polity IV, democracy under both Svolik and GWF, but Autocracy under Boix et al. There is no doubt that the Philippines in 1969 was under the increasing strain of the Marcos presidency, as well as the general corruption and violence of politics in the country at the time, but he had not yet declared martial law and was still operating in his first term as elected president. The 1969 elections were violent and problematic, but they occurred in November, well after the December 1968 formation of the CPP as a revolutionary party and March 1969 official founding of the NPA. It seems eminently reasonable to code the Philippines as a full-suffrage democracy, no matter how flawed.

The two cases in which the datasets are most unified in their codings of autocracy are Bangladesh 1974 and Sri Lanka 1987.

Bangladesh 1974 is +2 in Polity IV and coded as autocracy in Svolik (2012, GWF (2014), and Boix et al. (2013). By the end of year, Awami League members were pushing for a "Second Revolution" under the control of Mujib, and in late December, Mujib declared a state of emergency. During the year, the JRB stepped up its repression of the opposition, and the JSD began to mobilize for warfare. This is a case of a democracy rapidly backsliding. But this is what we would expect from H2 as part of blocking of democratic participation. The clearest moves to autocracy occurred in 1975, with the creation of a new political system, the formation of BAKSAL as the ruling party, and then the bloody series of coups and counter-coups from the middle of the year onwards. Polity's +2 seems about right for 1974, and given that there were not suffrage restrictions, the state was ruled by its democratically elected leader, and the move

toward emergency rule occurred in the last few days of the year, this is another defensible democracy coding. It may be that coders are reading the Mujib regime backward from its clear authoritarianism of 1975.

The GWF codebook argues that "Although the Awami League had been an electoral party in Pakistan before its breakup, the Mujib government never allowed opposition or held fair elections (Blood 1988; Political Handbook of the World 2012d, 107-08)." This does not appear to be accurate. Both Moten (1981) and Jahan (1974) discuss the elections and neither suggests there was rigging or major irregularities in the March 7, 1973 election. Rashiduzzaman (1977, 803), notes that rightist parties were banned, which was because they had collaborated with Pakistani security forces in 1971 (this is an ongoing issue in Bangladeshi politics), and that "most of the opposition parties were divided amongst themselves and could not seriously challenge Mujib's popularity in the 1973 elections." Khan (1976, 113) writes that "The election was essentially free" despite some violence in the run-up to the election. The Blood (1988) source cited by GWF does not, to the best of my knowledge, support the claim that Mujib allowed no free elections – the most direct discussion of the 1973 election indicates that "Most Bangadeshis still revered the Bangabandhu at the time of the first national elections held in 1973. Mujib was assured of victory, and the Awami League won 282 out of 289 directly contested seats" (Blood 1988).

1973 Bangladesh seems to be a tough sell as an autocracy, and the justification for 1974 hinges largely on the incremental increase in state repression over the course of the year and, especially, on the state of emergency declared with 3 days left in the year in late December 1974. 1975 was the clear year of change. These are murky and ambiguous years, however, so iron-clad confidence is impossible.

Finally, Sri Lanka in 1987 is coded as +5 by Polity (IV) and Autocracy by the datasets. The most defensible shift in the regime coding is to change my coding to Autocracy; below I do just this. It is important to be clear that by including this case as a democracy-year, I am actually helping H2, the primary competitor to my own theory. As the analysis below shows, changing it to an autocracy makes only a marginal difference to conclusions about H1.

The main reasons for coding Sri Lanka as an autocracy include the more centralized executive presidency introduced in 1978, the dubious referendum of 1982, and the growing political repression by the state (as I note, GWF 2014 go further to code 1988-1993 as autocratic, which I believe is a substantial mis-coding). The key source is DeVotta (2002, 91-92). He notes that the 1978 Constitution provided "near-dictatorial powers" (91) and that JR Jayewardene used "autocratic, extrajudicial, and fraudulent means" (92) to manage foes. But at the same time, JR faced serious internal pressures and by 1987, it was becoming clear that elections would be needed to stabilize the country in the face of the Indo-Lanka Accord:

"riots broke out immediately after the terms of the Accords were announced, and Sinhalese of every political party have protested the agreement. President Jayewardene had to use all of the personal power of his office and call up a great many political debts to get his provincial council scheme passed in Parliament" (Singer 1990, 423) (also, "After narrowly winning a Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the Provincial

Councils bill, a key element of the accord, the UNP government got the bill through Parliament" (Pfaffenberger 1988, 145)).

Pfaffenberger argues that by 1987 the UNP government was "already in deep trouble with the Sinhalese masses for failing to defeat the Tamil insurgent" (1988, 137). *Asian Survey*'s 1988 assessment of Sri Lanka in 1987 is of a flawed and trouble regime, but not an authoritarian regime: "unless Sri Lanka's aging political leadership can prove more effective in persuading youths that democracy is a better way of solving problems than violence, it is by no means impossible that the years to come will see a radical youth regime in Sri Lanka-or, to prevent it, a military coup" (Pfaffenberger 1988, 147). GWF 2014 (Codebook, p. 6) outline criteria for authoritarianism. Much hinges here on what one makes of the 1978 Constitution – though ultimately a disaster, it was passed through standard electoral practices. The banning of the TULF was as a result of the Sixth Amendment – illiberal, but not illegal. The 1982 referendum is the best case for coding autocracy-onset, since there is credible evidence of rigging and manipulation, as well as recurring states of emergency. I view Sri Lanka as a deeply flawed but democratic regime until the 1988 elections were announced, but this is a clearly contestable claim, and it is reasonable to suggest that 1987 was an autocracy-year.

GWF also code 1988-1993 as autocracy-years; this matters if we accept the UCDP coding of 1989 as the onset-year of that revolt. They write that it was "Coded autocratic because Premadasa, elected in a violent rigged election in 1988." This is a much less credible claim than for the 1978-1987 (but especially 1982-1987) period. I have found no evidence that the 1988 presidential election was rigged. The violence was largely driven by the JVP rebellion, rather than "classical" electoral violence aimed at incumbents holding power. The closest I can find to a scholarly claim of rigging is Amerasinghe (1989), which deploys circumstantial evidence and whose assessment of the JVP's goals and methods is not borne out by the JVP's escalating violence in the summer of 1989.

There was rigging in 1988 – but it was, allegedly, by the Indian Peacekeeping Force and their Tamil armed allies in the North and East as part of the Northeast Provincial Council elections in October (not the December 1988 presidential election in which Premadasa was elected). Singer writes: "The Indians apparently "rigged" the nomination process for the provincial council elections in the North in October 1988 so that only the EPRLF candidates were nominated. That way the Indians could declare the EPRLF the winner without having an election, which they were certain the LTTE would try to disrupt" (Singer 1990, 423). This was a different election, de facto out of Sri Lankan government control.

# 3. Findings with Conservative Case Selection

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The JVP seems to have shocked the authorities and virtually everyone else by its ability to disrupt the country just prior to the presidential election of 1988. It is true that the election was held despite the JVP and that much of the violence and disruption subsided immediately afterwards, but its members were so effective in frightening people into not voting-particularly in districts where the JVP was strongest-that they were able to reduce voter participation to as low as 4.5% in one election district." Singer 1990, 415.

To be highly conservative, we could restrict the sample to only conflicts that are included in UCDP (thus dropping both Bangladesh cases) and change Sri Lanka 1987 to being an autocracy, in line with existing datasets. There is no compelling reason to change the onset-years, since these are confirmed, objective facts than coding judgments. Table 3 presents this alternative case selection.

Adopting this conservative case selection would not substantially change the findings presented in the paper. We would have 16 leftist insurgency onset cases, of which 7 were Autocracy-years (Burma 1946, French Indochina 1946, Malaya 1948, South Vietnam 1955, Thailand 1965, Cambodia 1967, Sri Lanka 1987) and 9 as Democracy-years. We would lose two clear cases supporting H2 (Bangladesh 1974 and Sri Lanka 1987) and one case supporting H3 (Bangladesh 1972), while adding one case supporting H1 (Sri Lanka 1987). The hypothesis most damaged by this change would be the primary *competitor* to the paper's own argument. Continuing to include two H2-supporting cases in the case selection is not a choice made to manipulate the evidence to support my own claims.

**Table 3. Alternative Coding: Conservative Case Selection** 

Country	Group	Onset	Polity IV	Svolik (2012)	GWF (2014)	Boix et al. (2013)	Paper Coding	Alternative
Burma	CPB-RF	1946	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Autocracy	Autocracy
Burma	PVO	1948	8	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Burma	CPB	1948	8	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	1967	-9	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy
French Indochina	Viet Minh	1946	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Autocracy	Autocracy
India	Naxalites	1967	9	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
India	CPI	1948	N/A	Democracy	Democracy	N/A	Democracy	Democracy
Laos	Pathet Lao	1959	8	No Authority	Democracy	Autocracy	Democracy	Democracy
Malaya	MCP	1948	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Autocracy	Autocracy
Nepal	CPN	1996	5	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Philippines	Huks	1946	2	No Authority	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Philippines	CPP/NPA	1969	2	Democracy	Democracy	Autocracy	Democracy	Democracy
South Vietnam	Viet Cong	1955	-3	No Authority	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy
Sri Lanka	JVP I	1971	8	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Sri Lanka	JVP II	1987	5	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Democracy	Autocracy
Thailand	CPT	1965	-7	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocracy

# 4. Alternative and Complementary Explanations

In this section I explore several variables that may also provide insight into the outcomes in the cases.

Consolidated vs. Unconsolidated Democracies

Of the cases of insurgent onset under democracy, most clearly occurred in unconsolidated democratic systems: India in 1948, Burma in 1948, 1946 Philippines, Bangladesh in 1972 and 1974, and 1996 Nepal are plausibly coded as unconsolidated given the recentness of either independence from colonial rule and/or democratic transition. Other cases involve more plausibly consolidated democracies, including India in 1967 and Sri Lanka in 1971 and 1987. The Philippines in the late 1960s is hard to clearly categorize either way: it had existed as a nominally full-suffrage democracy for two decades but was on its way to Marcos' authoritarianism. This suggests that the pressures the paper identifies are likely to be most intense in early periods of democracy, as the contours of the new political arena are still being formed and solidified, but that this is not a necessary condition for the hypothesized dynamic to occur.

# Cold War Dynamics

International politics can have a number of effects, as I outlined in the theory section and pointed to in several cases. Here I explore two relationships that emerge from the case evidence.

The first relates to the emergence of incorporation windows in the first place. This requires both democracy and openness to leftist incorporation into mainstream politics. Tentatively, the evidence from southern Asia points to the importance of relatively loose Cold War alignment in order to see incorporation windows under democracy. India, Burma, and Sri Lanka all managed to avoid tight involvement in the proxy wars of the period, and all had periods (in Burma's case, only until 1962) of democracy with space for the left in electoral politics. This generated fairly intense pressures on left movements that both created co-optation and violence: being somewhat insulated from left-right international competition seems to have facilitated the process outlined in H3. Nepal also falls into this context, with its democratization occurring after the end of the Cold War.

By contrast, in Thailand, Pakistan, Indonesia, and other stalwarts of American Cold War containment policy, both democracy and openness to the mainstream left were much harder to come by, while allied regimes of the Soviets and Chinese pursued authoritarianism (i.e., Laos, North Vietnam). We see Laos on both sides of this divide: its democratic breakdown in the late 1950s was deeply connected with the Cold War, and following the overthrow of the pro-US regime, it became a communist party-state.

An important exception to this pattern was the Philippines prior to Marcos; while violent and unequal, the Philippines was a full-suffrage democracy as well as a close US ally.

Second, "moments" of transnational diffusion seem to have affected the timing of ideological splintering in southern Asia. There were two moments of greatest transnational polarization and revolutionary mobilization: the first in the late 1940s alongside decolonization, the emergence of the USSR as a superpower, and the CCP's victory in China. Both spurred by formal Soviet statements and by their own reading of the domestic conditions they faced, radical leftist movements (McAdam 2018) moved ambitiously toward revolt. This heightened the range of ideological positions within broad lefts and heightened internal tensions. The second movement occurred in the late 1960s, as the "Global 1968" interacted with the Cultural Revolution in China

to spur a new wave of revolutionary expectation, both in Europe (Della Porta 1995) and Asia (Westad 2007, Lovell 2019). This helps us understand the clustering of revolts in the late 1940s and late 1960s/early 1970s, though outliers remain, including the JVP in 1987 and CPN-M in 1990s Nepal.

# Electoral Systems

It is worth exploring whether there is a relationship between electoral system and revolt. We see FPTP parliamentary systems in India, Nepal (in the 1990s, though with changes since), Burma in the 1940s/50s, 1971 Sri Lanka (but not 1987 Sri Lanka), and Bangladesh during its 1973 election.

By contrast, the Philippines during the period of leftist insurgent onsets operated under the 1935 constitution, which was presidential. 1987 Sri Lanka was a mixed system with separately elected president and prime minister, though presidential dominance.

There is not an obvious relationship here: most of the countries in the sample were parliamentary first-past-the-post systems, and that is also true of the most of the countries that experienced leftist revolt under democracy. The mechanisms identified seem to potentially occur under multiple forms of democracy, though it may be that parliamentary systems with numerous parties are most amenable to leftist splits and divisions, in contrast to (in this sample, very rare) presidential systems.

# Development

It is impossible to hold development and economic structure constant across cases and especially over time, and there are surely important differences across cases, whether in the specifics of class structure, urban-rural cleavages, or industralization. Yet it is clear that all of the countries examined here, under both autocracy and democracy, were primarily rural and poor.

To provide an extremely rough sense of how the cases vary, I use World Bank historical data on per capita GDP (in current USD) for each country in each year of onset. Colonial cases are not included, and a number of other cases are not in the World Bank data, plus measurement issues are extremely challenging, so many caveats are necessary here. Among the cases for which we have some data, Sri Lanka is unusually wealthy, along with the Philippines and Thailand, in comparison to Burma, India, and Nepal in particular. Among the non-onset cases, Pakistan and Indonesia are not unusually wealthy or impoverished in comparative perspective. Much closer research would be needed to carefully assess how economic structures and development impact the emergence of leftist movements and their splintering, as well as the reaction of regimes, but on an initial cut, there are not obvious patterns confounding the claims I make in the manuscript.

Table 4. Per Capita GDP

Armed Group	Country	Onset Year	Regime Type	Per capita GDP
Communist Party of	Thailand	1965	Authoritarian	\$137

Thailand				
(CPT)				
Naxalites	India	1967	Democracy	\$96
Communist	India	1948	Democracy	Not in World Bank
Party of India				data
(CPI)				
Janatha	Sri Lanka	1971	Democracy	\$186
Vimukthi				
Peramuna				
(JVP)				
JVP	Sri Lanka	1987	Democracy	\$402
Communist	Nepal	1996	Democracy	\$205
Party of				
Nepal-Maoist				
(CPN-M)				
Communist	Burma	1948	Democracy	Not in World Bank
Party of				Data
Burma (CPB)				
CPB-Red Flag	Burma	1946	Authoritarian/Colonial	N/A Colonial
Peoples'	Burma	1948	Democracy	Not in World Bank
Volunteer				Data
Organisation				
(PVO)	D1 111 1	1016		N
Hukbalahap	Philippines	1946	Democracy	Not in World Bank
N. D. 1.1	D1 '11'	1060		Data
New People's	Philippines	1968	Democracy	\$224
Army (NPA)	т	1050	D.	N. ( ' W. 11D 1
Pathet Lao	Laos	1959	Democracy	Not in World Bank
X7: - 4 X 4:1-	English.	1046	A 41 114- 11- 11 / C - 1 - 11- 1	Data N/A Colonial
Viet Minh	French	1946	Authoritarian/Colonial	N/A Colonial
Viet Cong	Indochina South	1955	Authoritarian	Not in World Bank
Viet Cong	Vietnam	1933	Aumoritarian	data
Khmer Rouge	Cambodia	1967	Authoritarian	\$144
Malayan	Malaya	1948	Authoritarian/Colonial	N/A Colonial
Communist	iviaiaya	1740	Authornarian/Colollial	IN/A COMMA
Party (MCP)				
Jatiya	Bangladesh	1974	Democracy	\$182
Samajtantrik	Dungladesh	17/7	Democracy	Ψ102
Dal (JSD)				
Purba Bangla	Bangladesh	1972	Democracy	\$92
Sarbohara	241151440011	17,12		¥2 <b>=</b>
Party (PBSP)				
- with (1 DD1)	1			l .

# **4. Distribution of Regime-Type Country-Years**

In the manuscript I provide a rough sense of the distribution of regime types across southern Asia, using Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013; BMR), Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, GWF), and Svolik (2012). The countries I examine as falling into scope are Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and (North) Vietnam.

In BMR, using the DEMOCRACY variable, 67.63% of country-years in the southern Asia sample are non-democratic. In GWF, using the GWF-NONAUTOCRACY variable in the All Political Regimes yearly data gives us 66.79% not democratic, 31.42% democratic, .48% provisional, and 1.31% warlord. In Svolik, using the Regime and No Authority Spells data for the countries in questions and the REGIME variable, 27.6% of country-years are democracy, 60.9% are dictatorship, and 11.3% are no authority.

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