Supplementary Appendix 1: Source Criticism and Justification

Claim: Security forces approach civilian elites for information

Observables: Soliciting of lists, forming new militia and tasking them with identifying targets, early efforts at coordination such as mass rallies

Direct Evidence: For lists, interviews with those responsible for compiling lists, as well as those close to former village heads and/or involved in an organizational capacity as a civilian during the anticommunist campaign. Also relied on secondary sources that cite journalists embedded with army, or with their own range of perpetrators in the violence (eg: Hammer 2013). For militia activity, interviews with a militia leader and civilian organizer, as well as secondary sources who interview those involved in the violence. Information is also cross-checked with witnesses in terms of how militia behaved and what type of activities they were involved in. Sources for rallies were participants, witnesses, and large numbers of secondary sources. Some of the dynamics of these rallies also briefly appear in military histories.

Source criticism/alternative explanations: Those with direct knowledge of list formation limited to a small number of elderly respondents, and could represent outliers or faulty memory. Formation of militia is common knowledge, but testimony of militia identifying targets could be attempt to inflate importance of own roles after events. Indonesian mass organizations are in part hierarchal, and rallies could be by-product of coordination at local level rather than evidence of local collaboration.

Justification: While only a small number of respondents had direct knowledge of being solicited to form lists, these testimonies were consistent across locations, suggesting a systemic practice. For example, respondents in Yogyakarta were themselves responsible for this task, while other witnesses close to *lurah* in the Surakarta area also witnessed a similar dynamic. In Solo City, another respondent who was heavily involved with and had deep knowledge of the anticommunist campaign also provided detailed knowledge of a council of civilian elites responsible for compiling and assessing information to be passed to security forces. Mathias Hammer also interviewed a number of respondents who noted similar dynamics on the Klaten regency (2013). Moreover, archival research by Wahid (2018) confirms that security forces directly approached (at least) Gadjah Mata University to form lists as well. While similar archival materials were not available for sociopolitical organizations in Central Java, it is implausible that they would empower educational leaders and ignore other local elites, especially given their coordination in other areas such as the rallies or formation of militia.

It is possible that some participants may have exaggerated their importance in the violence; however, journalists embedded with the Indonesian army at the time of the killings report that these militia were used at least in part as a means of identification and screening. This explanation is also reinforced by a number of former witnesses, who describe soldiers assembling neighbourhoods together and having locally recruited militias "inspect" their number for potential targets.

It is likely that order to coordinate with security forces were centrally directed by heads of Indonesia's mass organizations. Indeed, that there was a central civilian body in Jakarta formed for the purpose of coordinating civilian collaboration means these types of orders were almost certainly issued. However, that local organizations not only attended but provided speakers and encouraged participation in both arrests and the formation of militia within a week of security forces arriving also suggests a high willingness to collaborate locally. In this case, both national and local collaboration occurred together.

Claim: Civilian elites widen targeting criteria

Observables: sub-provincial levels of violence, how lists were compiled, identity of those imprisoned vs official criteria, militia behaviour

Direct evidence: For levels of violence, relative changes in population at district level (Chandra 2019). For list-making, interviews with those responsible for making lists in Yogyakarta, and those with knowledge of process in Solo city and surrounding areas. Also archival work of Wahid (2018) for Gadjah Mata lists. Army histories also make reference in some locations to civilian communities being especially active in reporting on the identity of communist collaborators Militia behaviour combination of interviews with a militia leader, witnesses to the violence, and former prisoners. Also used secondary sources on militia behaviour in Central Java (eg: Hasworo 2004; Jenkins and Kammen 2012). For identity of those imprisoned, I rely predominantly on testimonies of former political prisoners, as well as secondary sources using similar interviews.

Source criticism/Alternative Explanations: Changes in population levels could be due to some combination of extent of previous violence over issues like land reform, direct pressure from security forces, or perceived resistance by communist party supporters. Could also be due to unrestrained violence by civilian militia. Similar criticisms to earlier point about lists: relative few with direct knowledge, long after events. Also possible that lists were screened by security forces, and added names would have had little effect. Most militia operated under army control, and thus likely did not change pattern of violence much on their own. Possible that interviewees downplayed own role in communist movement prior to violence to further underscore the injustices they suffered from security forces.

Justification: Relative levels of violence do not support alternative explanations of higher levels of violence prior to anticommunist violence, military pressure/encouragement, or perceived resistance. By virtually all accounts, the highest levels of violence prior to the anticommunist campaign were in the regencies of Surakarta and Klaten. However, these regions experienced relatively low population losses, and in Klaten, even saw a slight population increase. Moreover, the greatest resistance to the anticommunist campaign was in Surakarta, in which communist youth erected roadblocks outside the city, union workers organized a rail strike, and members of the rebellious troops fired on the civilian mass rally. Surakarta was also the headquarters of RPKAD commander Sarwo Edhie during the anticommunist campaign.

It is also extremely unlikely that higher levels of violence were due to civilians acting purely outside the army chain of command. In virtually all areas of Central Java, violence only started with the arrival of the RPKAD. Even though there are reports of militia acting unilaterally, violence in Central Java stopped at relatively the same time, suggesting that it was largely under military control. Even if militia did act outside of army control at times, there relative strength would also be dictated by the strength of anticommunist groups, who were responsible for providing recruits to these bodies. Finally, the vast majority of victims were detained prior to execution, making it highly unlikely that militias using violence wholly outside the security umbrella was a significant factor in Central Java.

One might also argue that because militia operated under the auspices of the army, they had little opportunity to increase violence. While this might be true in the sense of directly wielding lethal

violence in the course of anticommunist sweeps, their ability to identify individuals during these operations would still drastically increase the number of individuals arrested. Dynamics of violence in West Java best illustrate this point: in areas in which militia were not active, there were very few arrests at all. However, in those areas, all reports converge on higher levels of arrests and killings, suggesting a direct link between the two. If militia could not use direct violence freely, these dynamics can only be understood by providing information on the ground.

It is possible that my respondents to the lists represent outliers, in terms of how lists were compiled. However, given the patterns of violence across the province, this seems unlikely. Per above, the soliciting of lists was a fairly ubiquitous occurrence. An organization with greater resources (ie: more local support) would have the infrastructure to more easily create more expansive lists, leading to higher levels of targeting.

Finally, it is possible that my, and others, respondents downplayed their role in the communist party and its affiliated organizations, suggesting that their targeting fit into those parameters specified by the army. While possible, I find this explanation unlikely. Higher ranking members of the communist party, including those acting as assistants to politburo members freely discussed their affiliation with the party at high levels – the only exception being members of the "Special Bureau" responsible for infiltrating the armed forces. Moreover, former soldiers and civilian organizers frequently discussed that mistakes were made in targeting, and that many were arrested or killed that otherwise should have been unharmed. The convergence on this point, from mine and others interviews, as well as from US diplomatic archives strongly support the huge number of false positives. On this note, however, virtually all interviewed political prisoners were interrogated, had their role assessed – even if incorrectly – and knew of some who had been freed. The violence was never wholly indiscriminate.

Claim: Torture leads to additional targeting + greater rates of killing

Observables: Ubiquity of torture + forced naming of conspirators. Multiple waves of arrests for sustained period.

Direct source: Interviews with former political prisoners, secondary sources interviewing political prisoners

Source criticism: Torture seemingly ubiquitous, but many imprisoned rather than executed (albeit non-majority)

Justification: The continuous wave of arrests from late October to March 1966 suggests an increasing flow of information on potential targets. All respondents interviewed by myself or others point to the ubiquity of torture and the search for additional names. That new lists of targets were continually created suggests this type of flow from the torture chamber to those responsible for conducting arrests. Indeed, some respondents were explicitly told that they were in prison due to the confessions of others.

That torture led to greater rates of killing is fairly easy to observe. First, people did die under the effects of torture – something that most respondents were aware of happening at the time. Second, interrogators regularly sought confessions for activities that would have placed on in Category A, for which the penalty was execution. For example, victims were tortured into confessing prior knowledge of

the September 30th Movement. This line of questioning was frequently cited by respondents, all who claim they denied knowledge of this (but often confessed to lesser "crimes"). That many of them spoke at length about the extent of the torture inflicted upon them suggests that many would have been compelled to knowledge that would have warranted their execution.

Claim: Additional killings due to logistical problem

Observables: Orders to kill for cost-of-care reasons, massive overcrowding in prisons/food shortages

Direct Evidence: Diplomatic cables (for orders), interviews (for prison conditions)

Source criticism/Alternative explanations: Possible that contact by American embassy lacked detailed knowledge about orders of army high command. Also possible that provincial variations was not due to orders themselves but variations in either interpretation or willingness to follow them (eg: lower rates of killing in West Java due to commander preferences – see Robinson 2018).

Justification: At the time of the killings the US embassy in Jakarta was in regular contact with aides that were in close contact with both Generals Suharto and Nasution. The former led the entirety of the anticommunist campaign, while the latter would almost certainly have been informed of all major events during this period. Most cables further suggest a level of closeness with especially Nasution, indicating numerous well-placed sources. Moreover, other high-ranking sources cited by others suggest this logistical element was in play in Central Java (see Jenkins and Kammen 2012).

It is also possible that the decision to use mass executions was more due to the preference of local commanders rather than a response to specific conditions (eg: Robinson 2018). However, this claim seems less plausible for two reasons. First, rates of state violence were consistently high in Indonesia in all provinces except West Java – the only one in which security forces were entrenched and took prisoners at all (Kammen and Zakaria 2012). As it is unlikely that only a single regional commander would have opted for less bloodshed, an external factor – the logistical problem – likely conditioned behaviour in most instances. Second, the military command structure would have made disobedience unlikely. The commander of the West Java Division, Brigadier-General Adjie, was also an experienced soldier unlikely to outright defy in order to use executions. Underscoring this, divisional commanders that were seen as hesitant – such as East Java commander Brigadier-General Basuki Rachmat – were relieved of their commands. That Adjie was not suggests that variations in rates of killings are not due to such individual preferences.