Online Appendix: Let's Talk, About Sexism - The Differential Effects of Gender Discrimination on Liberal and Conservative Women's Political Engagement

## Ideology versus Partisanship

Despite their significant overlap, partisanship and ideology are not interchangeable concepts. Based on data from the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES), 31\% of Republican women identify themselves as moderates on the ideological spectrum, $42 \%$ as conservatives and $21 \%$ as very conservative. Similarly, among Democratic women, $36 \%$ call themselves moderates, $34 \%$ liberal, and $22 \%$ very liberal. Thus, a significant share of Republican and Democratic women is comprised of ideological moderates. At the same time, a substantial number of women do not identify with either party but do place themselves somewhere on the ideological spectrum: While $54 \%$ of Independent women are moderates, $30 \%$ call themselves conservative, and $18 \%$ liberal. Second, ideology is more closely related to attitudes on women's role in society than partisanship. For example, the 2016 ANES data reveals that feelings towards feminists are much more powerfully predicted by women's ideology rather than their partisan affiliation. This is especially true for women on the left whereby Democratic women rate feminists on average lower than self-identified liberal women. For these reasons, I focus on women's ideology rather than partisanship.

Table A1: Political Engagement and Chance of Voting (Corresponding to Figure 3 and Figure 5)

|  | Model 1: Political Engagement | Model 2: Chance of Voting | Model 3: Political Engagement | Model 4: Chance of Voting |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Experienced Sexism | 0.62 (0.21) | 0.05 (0.04) | 1.23 (0.38) | 0.18 (0.07) |
| Ideology | (-) | (-) | 0.04 (0.30) | 0.11 (0.05) |
| Experienced Sexism $\mathbf{X}$ <br> Ideology | (-) | (-) | -1.48 (0.70) | -0.28 (0.13) |
| Partisan Strength | 0.41 (0.16) | 0.11 (0.03) | 0.38 (0.16) | 0.11 (0.02) |
| Income | -0.05 (0.34) | 0.18 (0.06) | -0.11 (0.34) | 0.18 (0.06) |
| Race | -0.11 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.02) |
| Education | 0.40 (0.21)+ | 0.08 (0.04) | 0.39 (0.21)+ | 0.07 (0.04)+ |
| Age | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.00) | 0.05 (0.00) | 0.03 (0.00) |
| Marital Status | -0.04 (0.12) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.12) | -0.03 (0.02) |
| Religion | 0.23 (0.15) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.31 (0.16)+ | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Cut 1 | 1.43 (0.29) | (-) | 1.55 (0.33) | (-) |
| Cut 2 | 2.27 (0.31) | (-) | 2.39 (0.34) | (-) |
| Constant | (-) | 0.51 (0.05) | 0.21 (0.05) | 0.45 (0.05) |
| (Pseudo) R squared | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.14 |
| N | 460 | 460 | 460 | 460 |

Note: "Political Engagement" is a 3-point ordinal variable requiring an ordered probit regression. "Chance of Voting" is a continuous variable and was therefore estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05$. + indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Figure A1: Predicted Probabilities of Political Engagement Based on Model 1


Amount of Experienced Sexism
Note: "Political Engagement" is an ordinal variable that was estimated using an ordered probit regression. Predicted probabilities were estimated for White, married, and religious women while all other variables are held at their means. Probabilities are estimated for a maximum level of political engagement (i.e. respondents who have done both campaign activities).

Table A2: Political Engagement and Chance of Voting (with Modified Ideology Measure)

|  | Model 1: Political <br> Engagement | Model 2: Chance of <br> Voting |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Experienced Sexism | $\mathbf{1 . 2 6}(\mathbf{0 . 3 8 )}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 0 6 )}$ |
| Ideology | $0.05(0.30)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 0 ( 0 . 0 5 )}$ |
| Experienced Sexism X | $\mathbf{- 1 . 4 3 ( 0 . 7 0 )}$ | $\mathbf{- 0 . 2 5 ( 0 . 1 2 )}$ |
| Ideology | $\mathbf{0 . 4 5 ( 0 . 1 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 0 ( 0 . 0 2 )}$ |
| Partisan Strength | $-0.16(0.34)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 0 5 )}$ |
| Income | $-0.06(0.14)$ | $0.04(0.02)+$ |
| Race | $0.05(0.03)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 0 )}$ |
| Age | $0.35(0.21)+$ | $0.05(0.03)$ |
| Education | $-0.03(0.13)$ | $-0.02(0.02)$ |
| Married | $0.29(0.16)+$ | $0.03(0.02)$ |
| Religion | $1.58(0.34)$ | $(-)$ |
| Cut 1 | $2.45(0.35)$ | $(-)$ |
| Cut 2 | $(-)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 4 8 ( 0 . 0 5 )}$ |
| Constant | 0.05 | 0.14 |
| (Pseudo) R squared | 436 | 436 |
| $\mathbf{N}$ |  |  |

Note: "Political Engagement" is a 3-point ordinal variable requiring an ordered probit regression. "Chance of Voting" is a continuous variable and was therefore estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. In this analysis, the ideology measure does not include respondents who chose "Don't know" when asked about their ideological self-placement. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05 .+$ indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Figure A2: Predicted Levels of Chance of Voting across Ideology and Experienced Sexism Based on Model 4


Note: "Vote Chance" is a continuous variable that was estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. Predicted levels were estimated for White, married, and religious women while all other variables are held at their means.

Table A3: Political Engagement and Chance of Voting (Controlling for Perceptions of Sexism)

|  | Model 1: <br> Political <br> Engagement | Model 2: <br> Chance of Voting | Model 3: Political Engagement | Model 4: Chance of Voting |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Experienced Sexism | 0.67 (0.22) | 0.03 (0.04) | 1.29 (0.39) | 0.17 (0.07) |
| Ideology | (-) | (-) | -0.00 (0.30) | 0.12 (0.05) |
| Experienced Sexism X Ideology | (-) | (-) | -1.45 (0.71) | -0.30 (0.13) |
| Perception of Sexism | -0.14 (0.25) | 0.03 (0.04) | -0.24 (0.26) | 0.05 (0.05) |
| Partisan <br> Strength | 0.42 (0.16) | 0.10 (0.02) | 0.39 (0.16) | 0.11 (0.02) |
| Income | -0.06 (0.34) | 0.18 (0.06) | -0.13 (0.34) | 0.19 (0.06) |
| Race | -0.11 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.02) | -0.11 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.02) |
| Education | 0.40 (0.20)+ | 0.07 (0.03) | 0.40 (0.21)+ | 0.07 (0.04)+ |
| Age | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.00) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.00) |
| Marital Status | -0.03 (0.12) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.12) | -0.03 (0.02) |
| Religion | 0.23 (0.15) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.31 (0.16) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Cut 1 | 1.37 (0.31) | (-) | 1.42 (0.36) | (-) |
| Cut 2 | 2.21 (0.32) | (-) | 2.27 (0.36) | (-) |
| Constant | (-) | 0.49 (0.05) | (-) | 0.42 (0.06) |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { (Pseudo) R } \\ & \text { squared } \end{aligned}$ | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.14 |
| N | 460 | 460 | 460 | 460 |

Note: "Political Engagement" is a 3-point ordinal variable requiring an ordered probit regression. "Chance of Voting" is a continuous variable and was therefore estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05 .+$ indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table A4: Future Political Engagement

|  | Model: Likelihood of Future Political Activity |
| :--- | :---: |
| Experienced Sexism | $\mathbf{0 . 3 4 ( 0 . 0 9 )}$ |
| Ideology | $0.05(0.07)$ |
| Experienced Sexism X | $\mathbf{- 0 . 3 6 ( 0 . 1 7 )}$ |
| Ideology | $0.02(0.03)$ |
| Partisan Strength | $0.02(0.08)$ |
| Income | $-0.04(0.03)$ |
| Race | $-0.00(0.00)$ |
| Age | $0.03(0.05)$ |
| Education | $-0.01(0.03)$ |
| Married | $0.05(0.03)$ |
| Religion | $\mathbf{0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 0 7 )}$ |
| Constant | 0.06 |
| R squared | 460 |
| $\mathbf{N}$ |  |

Note: "Likelihood of Future Political Activity" is measuring respondents' likelihood of distributing information or advertisements supporting a political or social interestgroup. Response options ranged from not at all likely (1) to extremely likely (5). All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05 .+$ indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table A5: Political Engagement and Chance of Voting Among Men

|  | Model 1: Political Engagement | Model 2: Chance of Voting | Model 3: Political Engagement | Model 4: Chance of Voting |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Experienced Sexism | 0.96 (0.24) | -0.02 (0.04) | 1.15 (0.41) | -0.08 (0.07) |
| Ideology | (-) | (-) | 0.06 (0.25) | -0.02 (0.04) |
| Experienced Sexism X <br> Ideology | (-) | (-) | -0.39 (0.68) | 0.12 (0.12) |
| Partisan Strength | 0.48 (0.14) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.48 (0.14) | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Income | 1.12 (0.34) | 0.21 (0.05) | 1.13 (0.34) | 0.21 (0.06) |
| Race | 0.23 (0.15) | 0.05 (0.02) | 0.24 (0.15) | 0.05 (0.02) |
| Education | 0.33 (0.21) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.34 (0.21) | 0.05 (0.03) |
| Age | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.00) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.00) |
| Marital Status | -0.30 (0.13) | -0.07 (0.02) | -0.30 (0.13) | -0.07 (0.02) |
| Religion | 0.16 (0.16) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.16 (0.16) | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Cut 1 | 1.73 (0.30) | (-) | 1.77 (0.32) | (-) |
| Cut 2 | 2.38 (0.31) | (-) | 2.42 (0.32) | (-) |
| Constant | (-) | 0.63 (0.05) | 0.38 (0.04) | (-) |
| (Pseudo) R squared | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.13 |
| N | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 |

Note: "Political Engagement" is a 3-point ordinal variable requiring an ordered probit regression. "Chance of Voting" is a continuous variable and was therefore estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05$. + indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table A6: Political Engagement and Chance of Voting Among Men (Three-Way-Interaction)

|  | Model 1: Political Engagement | Model 2: Chance of Voting |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Experienced Sexism | 0.92 (0.40) | -0.09 (0.07) |
| Ideology | 0.01 (0.24) | -0.02 (0.04) |
| Experienced Sexism X Ideology | -0.25 (0.67) | 0.12 (0.12) |
| Gender (Woman) | -0.30 (0.23) | -0.09 (0.04) |
| Gender X Experienced Sexism | 0.22 (0.55) | 0.27 (0.10) |
| Gender X Ideology | 0.04 (0.38) | 0.13 (0.07)+ |
| Gender X Experienced Sexism X Ideology | -1.10 (0.98) | -0.40 (0.18) |
| Partisan Strength | 0.43 (0.10) | 0.05 (0.01) |
| Income | 0.49 (0.23) | 0.20 (0.04) |
| Race | 0.04 (0.10) | 0.05 (0.01) |
| Age | 0.04 (0.02)+ | 0.03 (0.00) |
| Education | 0.37 (0.14) | 0.06 (0.02) |
| Married | -0.16 (0.09)+ | -0.05 (0.01) |
| Religion | 0.26 (0.11) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Cut 1 | 1.42 (0.24) | (-) |
| Cut 2 | 2.16 (0.24) | (-) |
| Constant | (-) | 0.60 (0.04) |
| R squared | 0.05 | 0.12 |
| N | 874 | 874 |

Note: "Political Engagement" is a 3-point ordinal variable requiring an ordered probit regression. "Chance of Voting" is a continuous variable and was therefore estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05 .+$ indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table A7: Political Engagement and Chance of Voting (Perceived Sexism)

|  | Model 1: <br> Political <br> Engagement | Model 2: <br> Chance of <br> Voting | Model 1: <br> Political <br> Engagement | Model 2: <br> Chance of <br> Voting |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Perceived Sexism | $-0.14(0.25)$ | $0.03(0.04)$ | $0.30(0.43)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 2 0 ( 0 . 0 8 )}$ |
| Ideology | $(-)$ | $(-)$ | $0.20(0.45)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 2 0 ( 0 . 0 8 )}$ |
| Perceived Sexism X | $(-)$ | $(-)$ | $-1.31(0.78)+$ | $\mathbf{- 0 . 3 3 ( 0 . 1 5 )}$ |
| Ideology | $\mathbf{0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 2 2 )}$ | $0.03(0.04)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 2 3 )}$ | $0.04(0.04)$ |
| Experienced Sexism | $\mathbf{0 . 4 2 ( 0 . 1 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 0}(\mathbf{0 . 0 2 )}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 3 8 ( 0 . 1 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 0 ( 0 . 0 2 )}$ |
| Partisan Strength | $-0.06(0.34)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 0 6 )}$ | $-0.16(0.34)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 8 ( 0 . 0 6 )}$ |
| Income | $-0.11(0.13)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 2 )}$ | $-0.11(0.13)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 2 )}$ |
| Race | $0.04(0.03)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 0 )}$ | $0.05(0.03)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 0 )}$ |
| Age | $0.40(0.20)+$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 8 ( 0 . 0 3 )}$ | $0.40(0.20)+$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 8 ( 0 . 0 3 )}$ |
| Education | $-0.03(0.12)$ | $-0.03(0.02)$ | $-0.01(0.12)$ | $-0.03(0.02)$ |
| Married | $0.23(0.15)$ | $0.01(0.02)$ | $0.30(0.16)+$ | $0.01(0.02)$ |
| Religion | $1.37(0.31)$ | $(-)$ | $1.48(0.39)$ | $(-)$ |
| Cut 1 | $2.21(0.32)$ | $(-)$ | $2.33(0.39)$ | $(-)$ |
| Cut 2 | $(-)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 0 5 )}$ | $(-)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 3 9 ( 0 . 0 7 )}$ |
| Constant | 0.04 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.14 |
| (Pseudo) R squared | 460 | 460 | 460 | 460 |
| N |  |  |  |  |

Note: "Political Engagement" is a 3-point ordinal variable requiring an ordered probit regression. "Chance of Voting" is a continuous variable and was therefore estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05 .+$ indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Figure A3: Distribution of Perceived Sexism Against Women in the U.S. by Personal Experience with Sexism

## Belief in Discrimination Among Women with...



Amount of Discrimination against Women in the U.S.
Note: Graph is based on the 2016 ANES Pilot Study data. Sample includes women only.

Table A8: Coding Scheme for MTurk Writing Assignment

| Code | Incident |
| :---: | :--- |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | Concerns about equal performance/competence <br> on the job |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | Concerns about gender-conforming interests <br> and hobbies |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | Concern about safety <br> $\mathbf{4}$Sexual harassment (on the job or in personal life) <br> Concerns about the objectification of women in <br> general |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | Description of discrimination that was NOT <br> related to respondent's gender or sex |
| $\mathbf{6}$ | Description only entails feelings but not an actual <br> event |
| $\mathbf{7}$ | Description is nonsensical |
| $\mathbf{8}$ |  |

Table A9: Perceptions of Sexual Harassment among Liberal and Conservative Women

|  | Among Liberal <br> Women | Among Conservative <br> Women |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Asking about sexual fantasies, preferences, or <br> history | $68.4 \%$ | $58.6 \%$ |
| Catcalling | $73.0 \%$ | $45.5 \%$ |
| Facial expressions, winking, throwing kisses, <br> or licking lips | $64.0 \%$ | $44.1 \%$ |
| Looking a person up and down | $36.7 \%$ | $22.1 \%$ |
| Making sexual gestures with hands or <br> through body movements | $87.0 \%$ | $76.1 \%$ |
| Personal questions about social or sexual life | $54.8 \%$ | $47.3 \%$ |
| Pressure for sexual favors | $94.6 \%$ | $89.2 \%$ |
| Referring to an adult as a girl, hunk, doll, <br> babe, or honey | $34.4 \%$ | $16.2 \%$ |
| Sexual comments | $82.9 \%$ | $67.6 \%$ |
| Sexual comments about a person's clothing, <br> anatomy, or looks | $84.7 \%$ | $65.3 \%$ |
| Sexual innuendos or stories | $62.2 \%$ | $49.1 \%$ |
| Standing close or brushing up against a <br> person | $48.2 \%$ | $33.3 \%$ |
| Unwanted sexual looks or gestures | $82.9 \%$ | $66.2 \%$ |
| Unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or <br> questions | $93.4 \%$ | $79.7 \%$ |
| Unwanted touching, leaning over, cornering, <br> or pinching | $95.9 \%$ | $94.1 \%$ |
| Whistling at someone | $51.3 \%$ | $25.7 \%$ |

Note: Entries are percentages among liberal and conservative women. Data come from an undergraduate student survey ( $\mathrm{N}=1,084$ ). The survey was conducted between March and April in 2018. Students received extra-credit for their participation. $65 \%$ of the sample was comprised of women. $47 \%$ of them were self-identified liberals, $19 \%$ moderates, and $34 \%$ conservatives.

Table A10: Political Participation Among Women on Mechanical Turk

|  | Model 1: Political <br> Participation | Model 2: Political <br> Participation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Treatment | $\mathbf{0 . 1 0}(\mathbf{0 . 0 5 )}$ | $(-)$ |
| Restricted Treatment | $(-)$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1 4 ( 0 . 0 5 )}$ |
| Ideology (Self-Placement) | $0.01(0.07)$ | $0.01(0.07)$ |
| Treatment X Ideology | $\mathbf{0 . 1 9}(\mathbf{0 . 0 9 )}$ | $(-)$ |
| Restricted Treatment X | $(-)$ | $\mathbf{- 0 . 2 5 ( 0 . 1 1 )}$ |
| Ideology | $\mathbf{0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 3 )}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 3 )}$ |
| Constant | 196 | 168 |
| $\mathbf{N}$ | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| R-squared |  |  |

Note: "Political Participation" is a continuous variable requiring an ordinary least square regression. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 . The two models differ in their operationalization of the treatment. Model 1 includes all women in the treatment group whereas Model 2 only includes women in the treatment group who report on a real incident of sexism rather than a hypothetical one. Ideology ranges from 0 - very liberal to 1 - very conservative. Sample includes women only. Bolded coefficients are significant at $\mathrm{p}<0.05$. + indicates marginal significance at $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

