**How Mediator Leadership Transitions Influence Mediation Effectiveness**

In this appendix, we provide descriptive statistics and a series of additional analyses that complement and further support the main article’s findings. These include the following sections:

1. **Descriptive statistics** of all variables used in the analysis.
2. Cox Proportional-Hazards model with **time-varying covariates** andStratified Cox Proportional-Hazards models with **conflict-varying baseline hazards.**
3. Duration-Selection models with **Weibull and log-normal models in second stage.**
4. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with a **sample limited to short conflicts.**
5. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models **interacting *Mediator Leader Change* with time since change.**
6. Cox Proportional-Hazards models with **varying *Mediator Leader Change* carryover periods and decay function.**
7. Models with an **alternative measure of mediation effectiveness as dependent variable.**
8. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with **alternative measures of conflict intensity.**
9. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with **squared democracy variable.**
10. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with a **Cold War dummy.**
11. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with an additional variable for the **number of mediators.**
12. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with an variable for **leader changes in the government fighting an intrastate conflict.**
13. Duration-Selection model with **conflict type in the selection equation.**
14. Duration-Selection model with **mediator regime types.**
15. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with the **number of mediator leader changes.**

**A.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables used in the analysis**

*Table A.1*. Descriptive Statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Observations | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| Conflict Duration | 2,330 | 19.598 | 16.859 | 1 | 72 |
| Mediation | 2,330 | 0.211 | 0.408 | 0 | 1 |
| Mediator Leader Change | 2,330 | 0.094 | 0.292 | 0 | 1 |
| Conflict Intensity | 2,330 | 0.707 | 0.455 | 0 | 1 |
| Population (ln) | 1,994 | 10.252 | 1.560 | 4.563 | 14.082 |
| GDP per capita (ln) | 1,994 | 3,754.215 | 5,328.977 | 203.270 | 48,852.99 |
| Rebel Groups | 1,914 | 1.312 | 0.726 | 1 | 8 |
| Rebel Political Wing | 1,914 | 0.882 | 0.939 | 0 | 2 |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | 1,914 | 7.415 | 3.471 | 0 | 13.816 |
| Democracy | 2,189 | 0.338 | 6.801 | -10 | 10 |
| Years since Change | 2,330 | 14.473 | 15.477 | 0 | 71 |
| Mediation Success | 150 | 0.353 | 0.480 | 0 | 1 |
| Battle-related Deaths (ln) | 1,155 | 6.664 | 2.031 | 2.565 | 13.117 |
| Cold War | 2,330 | 0.517 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of Mediators | 2,330 | 0.273 | 1.048 | 0 | 11 |
| Conflict Government Leader Change | 1,941 | 0.595 | 0.491 | 0 | 1 |
| Mediator polity2 | 393 | 3.348 | 5.961 | -9 | 10 |
| Mediator *W* | 305 | 0.675 | 0.302 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of Mediator Leader Changes | 2,330 | 0.251 | 0.938 | 0 | 9 |

**A.2. Cox Proportional-Hazards model with time-varying covariates and Stratified Cox Proportional-Hazards models with conflict-varying baseline hazards**

In the main text, we begin by presenting Cox proportional hazards models, which assume that the “relative hazards over different covariate values are proportional” and independent of time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001: 972). However, tests using Schoenfeld residuals imply that this assumption is violated for some variables in Model 3 in the main text, namely *Mediation* and *GDP per capita (ln)*. Model A1 addresses this by allowing the effect of these variables to vary over time (see Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). In addition, Models A2 and A3 estimate stratified Cox models, which allow the underlying baseline hazards to vary over conflict types as, e.g., coups may generally prove less enduring than other types of conflict (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012) or duration may be significantly affected by whether a conflict ends in a peace agreement, a victory by one of the sides, or low activity. In Table A.2, Model A2, we use a binary coup variable and the type of incompatibility as strata for this purpose. In Model A3, we let the baseline hazards vary over outcome types from the UCDP Termination data (Kreutz 2010), thus accounting for differences between conflicts that end in different ways.

However, the results in Models A1, A2, and A3 are in line with those in the main text as *Mediator Leader Change* is negatively signed and statistically distinguishable from 0.

*Table A.2*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: time-varying covariates and conflict-varying baseline hazards

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A1 | Model A2 | Model A3 |
|  | Cox Model | Stratified Cox Model | Stratified Cox Model |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.602\* | -0.730\*\*\* | -0.900\*\* |
|  | (0.361) | (0.272) | (0.441) |
| Mediation | 0.046\*\*\* | 1.151\*\*\* | 0.809\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.175) | (0.179) |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.555\*\*\* | -0.546\*\*\* | -0.373\*\* |
|  | (0.150) | (0.157) | (0.188) |
| Population (ln) | -0.110\*\*\* | -0.084\* | -0.024 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.049) | (0.042) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000\*\* | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.295\* | -0.323\*\* | 0.357\*\* |
|  | (0.171) | (0.163) | (0.155) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.059 | -0.017 | -0.061 |
|  | (0.063) | (0.065) | (0.074) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.090\*\*\* | -0.093\*\*\* | -0.067\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.021) |
| Democracy | 0.003 | -0.002 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.015) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1587.388 | -1279.303 | -895.523 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties. Mediation and GDP per capita (ln) are time-varying covariates in Model 1. Strata in Models A2 are a coup dummy and the type of incompatibility. Strata in Models A3 are conflict outcomes.\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.3. Duration-Selection models with Weibull and log-normal models in second stage**

When estimating the Duration-Selection model in the main text, we opt for an exponential duration model in the outcome stage and, hence, for a flat baseline hazard. However, this is not guided by theoretical reasoning: Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), in fact, argue both that a flat baseline hazard may be unrealistic and that the specified form of the baseline hazard does affect the results one obtains. Models A4 and A5 thus re-estimate Model 4 from the main text using the other available duration models when using the Duration-Selection estimator by Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon (2006). The baseline hazard in Model A4 follows a Weibull distribution while that in A5 follows a lognormal distribution. These estimations present accelerated failure time coefficients, meaning that *positive coefficients indicate a longer conflict duration*.

*Mediator Leader Change* is statistically significant and positively signed in both models, implying that it has a conflict-prolonging effect. Our substantive finding thus does not depend on the specified baseline hazard.

*Table A.3*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Duration-Selection models with Weibull and log-normal models

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A4 | Model A4 | Model A5 | Model A5 |
|  | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | 0.355\* |  | 0.647\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.206) |  | (0.243) |  |
| Conflict Intensity | 1.924\*\*\* | 1.144\*\*\* | 2.327\*\*\* | 1.203\*\*\* |
|  | (0.248) | (0.144) | (0.340) | (0.149) |
| Population (ln) | 0.216\*\* | -0.165\*\*\* | 0.186\* | -0.160\*\*\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.044) | (0.104) | (0.049) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | 0.000\*\* | 0.000 | 0.000\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | 0.450\*\* | 0.121 | 0.405\*\* | 0.215\*\* |
|  | (0.213) | (0.096) | (0.191) | (0.106) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.028 | -0.314\*\*\* | -0.122 | -0.364\*\*\* |
|  | (0.117) | (0.080) | (0.160) | (0.096) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | 0.059\*\* | 0.057\*\*\* | 0.089\*\* | 0.067\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.020) | (0.037) | (0.024) |
| Democracy | -0.000 | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.037\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.013) |
| Constant | -0.925 | 0.995\*\* | -1.658\* | 0.384 |
|  | (1.009) | (0.504) | (0.981) | (0.549) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -929.284 | -929.284 | -725.491 | -725.491 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  | 0.093 |  | 0. 365\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are accelerated failure time coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Model A4 uses a Weibull duration model on the Outcome stage while Model A5 uses a lognormal duration model on the on the Outcome stage. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.4. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with a sample limited to short conflicts**

In the main analysis, we “carry-over” mediator leader changes, i.e., if the third-party mediating a conflict experiences a leadership change during the mediation effort, *Mediator Leader Change* is coded as 1 for this conflict-year and all subsequent years. However, the theoretical mechanisms imply that such changes should be especially detrimental to mediation effectiveness in the short-term, whereas long-term consequences may be somewhat less dire. We thus run a number of additional specifications to examine to what extent the negative effect of mediator leadership changes depends on time. First, we simply restrict the sample to conflicts that have, at maximum, endured for six years, i.e., less than 30% of our initial sample and re-estimate Models 3 and 4 from the main analysis. However, the effect of *Mediator Leader Change* is in line with thatobtained in the main specifications. It is statistically significant and negatively signed, implying that it decreases mediation effectiveness.

*Table A.4*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Short conflicts only

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A6 | Model A7 | Model A7 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.766\*\* | -0.788\*\* |  |
|  | (0.361) | (0.395) |  |
| Mediation | 0.607\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.199) |  |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.420\*\* | -0.584 | 0.510\*\* |
|  | (0.188) | (0.422) | (0.205) |
| Population (ln) | -0.071 | -0.209 | -0.098\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.150) | (0.058) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.855\*\*\* | -0.491 | 0.119 |
|  | (0.266) | (0.571) | (0.198) |
| Rebel Political Wing | 0.013 | -0.117 | -0.246\*\* |
|  | (0.076) | (0.310) | (0.105) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.083 | 0.086\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.065) | (0.022) |
| Democracy | -0.007 | 0.009 | 0.029\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.046) | (0.014) |
| Constant |  | 1.937\* | 0.153 |
|  |  | (1.121) | (0.644) |
| Observations | 454 | 454 | 454 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -646.118 | -223.343 | -223.343 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A6). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.5. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models interacting *Mediator Leader Change* with time since that change**

Second, we allow the effect of *Mediator Leader Change* to vary over time by interacting it with a variable counting the years since the last transition in any of the mediating parties (if any). The results are in line with those of the main analysis as the coefficient of *Mediator Leader Change* is again statistically significant and negative. Finally, the coefficients indicate that the negative effect of such a transition on mediation effectiveness may attenuate with time as the interaction term is positive in both models. However, it is only statistically significant in the selection model.

*Table A.5*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Interacting *Mediator Leader Change* with time since that change

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A8 | Model A9 | Model A9 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -1.204\*\*\* | -1.596\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.398) | (0.413) |  |
| Mediation | 1.030\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.163) |  |  |
| Years since Change | -0.049\*\*\* | -0.064\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.009) | (0.019) |  |
| Mediator Change \* Years Change | 0.017 | 0.066\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.018) | (0.022) |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.521\*\*\* | -1.392\*\*\* | 1.135\*\*\* |
|  | (0.153) | (0.327) | (0.144) |
| Population (ln) | -0.032 | -0.250\*\* | -0.161\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) | (0.100) | (0.044) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.476\*\*\* | -0.448\* | 0.125 |
|  | (0.179) | (0.270) | (0.096) |
| Rebel Political Wing | 0.014 | -0.037 | -0.310\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.123) | (0.079) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.094\*\*\* | -0.091\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.032) | (0.020) |
| Democracy | -0.013 | 0.012 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.012) |
| Constant |  | 2.151\*\* | 0.952\* |
|  |  | (0.880) | (0.500) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1528.669 | -920.590 | -920.590 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A8). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.6. Cox Proportional-Hazards models with varying Mediator Leader carryover periods and decay function**

Third, to further examine how the effect of mediator leader change differs over time, we re-estimate Model 3 from the main text with limited-duration variables and a decay function. First, we vary the number of years a mediator leadership transition is carried over to and while using a decay function. That is, we start by coding such transitions only for the year in which they take place and then gradually add post-transition years for which *Mediator Leader Change* is also coded as 1, one year at a time. Second, we include a decay function of the time since the preceding mediator leader change to capture that its effects may decrease with time. This variable takes the form where we set the decay parameter to 2 (see also Buhaug 2006).

*Table A.6*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Varying mediator leader change carryover periods

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A10 | Model A11 | Model A12 | Model A13 | Model A14 | Model A15 |
| Carry-over until | Cox Model  *t* | Cox Model  *t+1* | Cox Model  *t+2* | Cox Model  *t+3* | Cox Model  *t+4* | Cox Model  *t+5* |
| Mediator Leader Change | -1.064\*\*\* | -0.952\*\*\* | -0.904\*\*\* | -0.735\*\* | -0.782\*\*\* | -0.776\*\*\* |
|  | (0.371) | (0.311) | (0.330) | (0.305) | (0.300) | (0.293) |
| Mediation | 1.129\*\*\* | 1.142\*\*\* | 1.154\*\*\* | 1.136\*\*\* | 1.152\*\*\* | 1.160\*\*\* |
|  | (0.148) | (0.155) | (0.160) | (0.159) | (0.159) | (0.159) |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.573\*\*\* | -0.571\*\*\* | -0.569\*\*\* | -0.573\*\*\* | -0.571\*\*\* | -0.570\*\*\* |
|  | (0.155) | (0.155) | (0.155) | (0.156) | (0.156) | (0.156) |
| Population (ln) | -0.083\* | -0.084\* | -0.085\* | -0.082\* | -0.082\* | -0.082\* |
|  | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.045) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.331\*\* | -0.338\*\* | -0.343\*\* | -0.349\*\* | -0.346\*\* | -0.343\*\* |
|  | (0.162) | (0.164) | (0.165) | (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.167) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.033 | -0.033 | -0.034 | -0.032 | -0.033 | -0.033 |
|  | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.065) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.101\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Democracy | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1578.686 | -1579.093 | -1579.261 | -1580.777 | -1580.243 | -1580.221 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The results of these models provide further evidence that the effect of mediator leader change on mediation effectiveness somewhat attenuates with time. Its effect becomes smaller as a longer carry-over period is added to the binary item and the coefficient of the decay function is positive and statistically significant, indicating that mediation effectiveness increases the more time elapsed since a mediator leader change happened.

*Table A.7*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Mediator leader change decay function

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Model A16 |
|  | Cox Model |
| Mediator Leader Change: Decay Function | 1.058\*\*\* |
|  | (0.209) |
| Mediation | 0.854\*\*\* |
|  | (0.153) |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.511\*\*\* |
|  | (0.161) |
| Population (ln) | -0.049 |
|  | (0.044) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.390\*\* |
|  | (0.176) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.009 |
|  | (0.063) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.101\*\*\* |
|  | (0.018) |
| Democracy | -0.014 |
|  | (0.011) |
| Observations | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1563.423 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.7. Heckman Probit model with an alternative measure of mediation effectiveness as dependent variable**

In the main analysis, we use conflict duration to measure the effectiveness of a mediation effort. The main goal of most mediation attempts in ongoing disputes should be to terminate them, which suggests that the time it takes to achieve this goal is a useful measure of mediation effectiveness. However, duration is not the only variable one could think of to capture mediation effectiveness. One alternative is using an item coded based on the outcomes of mediation efforts as reported in the original Civil War Mediations data (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). In line with Clayton (2013), this is a binary item taking the value of 1 if a mediation effort results in a partial or full settlement (0 otherwise). Using this measure lowers our sample as it is only available until 2004 and not coded for a substantial number of conflicts in the data set. More importantly, however, it may code some mediation attempts as unsuccessful even if they ended the conflict to a large extent. For instance, if a mediation effort results in the majority of a rebel group laying down arms, but a small spoiler faction continued to fight the government, this will result in a conflict ultimately ending due to government victory or because of low activity. Hence, such a mediation attempt would be coded as unsuccessful with this measure.

We nonetheless consider this binary item as an alternative dependent variable in a Heckman-style probit model with sample selection where the first stage accounts for mediation occurrence. We include cubic polynomials of time since the outcome event in each stage to account for time dependence and otherwise consider the same explanatory variables as in the main analysis. In line with our results there, *Mediator Leader Change* has a negative and statistically significant effect on this alternative measure of mediation effectiveness.

We also use this setup to test whether our results are driven by not distinguishing between different mediation rounds. Mediation may occur in several rounds and these may differ in their types and participants. To address this potential issue, we define the mediation round as the unit of analysis in the outcome stage and examine whether *Mediator Leader Change* affects a round’s probability of culminating in a partial or full settlement in Model A18. Aggregating mediation years into mediation rounds results in a substantial loss of degrees of freedom, however, and we thus omit some controls whose effect on obtaining a settlement once mediation occurs should be limited. The results of the Heckman probit model using mediation rounds as unit of observation mirror those of the one with mediation-years and, hence, provide further evidence in line with the claim that mediator leader changes decrease mediation effectiveness.

*Table A.8*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Mediation success as an alternative dependent variable

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A17 | Model A17 | Model A18 | Model A18 |
|  | Probit-  Selection (Outcome) | Probit-Selection (Selection) | Probit-  Selection (Outcome) | Probit-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.394\* |  | -0.447\* |  |
|  | (0.235) |  | (0.264) |  |
| Conflict Intensity | 0.059 | 0.921\*\*\* |  | 0.782\*\*\* |
|  | (0.320) | (0.168) |  | (0.166) |
| Population (ln) | -0.095 | -0.208\*\*\* |  | -0.189\*\*\* |
|  | (0.134) | (0.054) |  | (0.053) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | 0.194 | 0.257\*\* | -0.023 | 0.201 |
|  | (0.142) | (0.127) | (0.245) | (0.154) |
| Rebel Political Wing | 0.129 | -0.378\*\*\* | 0.252 | -0.317\*\*\* |
|  | (0.187) | (0.107) | (0.228) | (0.099) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | 0.031 | 0.066\*\* | 0.043 | 0.037 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.027) | (0.048) | (0.025) |
| Democracy | -0.005 | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.038\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.014) | (0.031) | (0.015) |
| Constant | 0.878 | 0.231 | 0.177 | 0.128 |
|  | (1.253) | (0.587) | (0.896) | (0.588) |
| Observations | 1,498 | 1,498 | 1,423 | 1,423 |
| Time Period | 1950-2004 | 1950-2004 | 1950-2004 | 1950-2004 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -385.713 | -385.713 | -232.983 | -232.983 |
| P > 2 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.272 | 0.272 |
|  |  | -0.472\*\* |  | -0.507 |

Note: Table entries are coefficients from a probit regression, dependent variable: *Mediation Success*. Conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.8. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with an alternative measure of conflict intensity**

In our main specifications, we use a binary item indicating whether a conflict crossed the 1,000 battle deaths threshold to measure conflict intensity. However, more detailed information on the exact battle-related deaths of conflicts is available from Lacina & Gleditsch (2002) for most of our sample period, but also leads to a substantial reduction of observations. Here, we re-estimate Models 3 and 4 from the main text using the logged battle-related deaths in a conflict as a continuous indicator of conflict intensity.

However, the effect of *Mediator Leader Change* in both models mirrors that obtained in the main specifications as it remains statistically significant and negatively signed, indicating that it decreases mediation effectiveness. The effect of *Battle-related Deaths (ln)* is also similar to that of *Conflict Intensity* in the main models as more intense conflicts are more likely to see mediation, but also tend to be longer.

*Table A.9* The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Battle-related deaths as measure of conflict intensity

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A19 | Model A20 | Model A20 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.679\*\* | -0.747\* |  |
|  | (0.331) | (0.395) |  |
| Mediation | 1.008\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.205) |  |  |
| Battle-related Deaths (ln) | -0.007 | -0.315\*\* | 0.123\*\* |
|  | (0.047) | (0.137) | (0.053) |
| Population (ln) | -0.048 | -0.348 | -0.154\*\*\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.217) | (0.051) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.664\*\*\* | -0.422 | 0.135 |
|  | (0.223) | (0.419) | (0.122) |
| Rebel Political Wing | 0.062 | 0.031 | -0.246\*\* |
|  | (0.079) | (0.261) | (0.108) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.138\*\*\* | -0.166\*\* | 0.089\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.081) | (0.029) |
| Democracy | -0.010 | 0.057 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.043) | (0.017) |
| Constant |  | 2.989 | 0.474 |
|  |  | (2.117) | (0.565) |
| Observations | 992 | 992 | 992 |
| Time Period | 1950-2008 | 1950-2008 | 1950-2008 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -815.177 | -609.105 | -609.105 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | 0.004 |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A17). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.9. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with squared democracy variable**

Our main specifications include the *polity2* score to account for the effect of regime type on mediation onset and effectiveness. However, this effect must not be linear as autocracies and democracies may both be less likely to accept mediation and fight shorter armed conflicts than anocracies. We thus re-estimate Models 3 and 4 from the main text while also including the squared *polity2* score to account for such a nonlinear effect.

The effect of *Mediator Leader Change* in Table A.10 is again substantively identical to that obtained in the main specifications as it remains statistically significant and negatively signed, implying that it decreases mediation effectiveness. However, Model A22 also provides some evidence that the effect of regime type on mediation onset is not linear.

*Table A.10*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Curvilinear specification of *Polity2*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A21 | Model A22 | Model A22 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.759\*\*\* | -0.476\*\* |  |
|  | (0.285) | (0.232) |  |
| Mediation | 1.182\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.166) |  |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.566\*\*\* | -2.233\*\*\* | 1.113\*\*\* |
|  | (0.156) | (0.287) | (0.143) |
| Population (ln) | -0.081\* | -0.186 | -0.126\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) | (0.147) | (0.046) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.336\*\* | -0.576\*\* | 0.113 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.280) | (0.095) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.032 | 0.090 | -0.310\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.133) | (0.082) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.101\*\*\* | -0.079\*\* | 0.053\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.034) | (0.020) |
| Democracy | -0.004 | -0.000 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.024) | (0.012) |
| Democracy2 | 0.000 | -0.002 | -0.005\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.006) | (0.003) |
| Constant |  | 1.236 | 0.835\* |
|  |  | (1.202) | (0.495) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1580.146 | -925.716 | -925.716 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A19). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.10. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with Cold War dummy**

Some studies argue that the end of the Cold War served as a crucial change point in third-party involvement in armed intrastate conflicts. More specifically, there is evidence that outside mediation in such conflicts has become more likely after 1989 (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna 2011), thus also decreasing these conflicts’ duration (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004). To account for this, we re-estimate Models 3 and 4 from the main text and include a *Cold War* dummy as an additional control.

However, results in Table A.11 indicate – again – that *Mediator Leader Change* has a negative effect on mediation effectiveness as its coefficient is negatively signed and statistically distinguishable from 0. The results of *Cold War* are as expected as conflicts are generally longer before 1990, while being less likely to experience third-party mediation. In addition, the *Cold War* has no additional effect on conflict duration once a dispute was selected into mediation.

*Table A.11*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Cold War

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A23 | Model A24 | Model A24 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.784\*\*\* | -0.490\*\* |  |
|  | (0.274) | (0.234) |  |
| Mediation | 1.309\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.172) |  |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.657\*\*\* | -2.178\*\*\* | 1.146\*\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.294) | (0.145) |
| Population (ln) | -0.055 | -0.210 | -0.170\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) | (0.128) | (0.044) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.383\*\* | -0.570\*\* | 0.113 |
|  | (0.166) | (0.282) | (0.096) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.045 | 0.100 | -0.295\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.136) | (0.081) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.088\*\*\* | -0.084\*\* | 0.048\*\* |
|  | (0.018) | (0.036) | (0.021) |
| Democracy | -0.000 | -0.003 | 0.031\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.024) | (0.012) |
| Cold War | 0.486\*\*\* | -0.200 | -0.273\*\* |
|  | (0.146) | (0.302) | (0.136) |
| Constant |  | 1.454 | 1.226\*\* |
|  |  | (1.179) | (0.514) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1573.099 | -925.955 | -925.955 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A21). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.11. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with number of mediators**

*Table A.12*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Number of Mediators

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A25 | Model A26 | Model A27 | Model A27 | Model A28 | Model A28 |
|  | Cox Model | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.677\*\*\* | -0.653\*\* | -0.426\*\* |  | -0.500\*\* |  |
|  | (0.257) | (0.272) | (0.210) |  | (0.220) |  |
| Mediator LC x Number |  | 0.012 |  |  | -0.163 |  |
|  |  | (0.264) |  |  | (0.225) |  |
| Mediator LC x Number2 |  | -0.018 |  |  | 0.080 |  |
|  |  | (0.088) |  |  | (0.078) |  |
| Number (of Mediators) | -0.103 | -0.125 | 0.572\*\*\* |  | 0.495\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.189) | (0.185) | (0.178) |  | (0.181) |  |
| Number (of Mediators)2 | -0.003 | 0.014 | -0.087\*\* |  | -0.145\*\* |  |
|  | (0.037) | (0.066) | (0.037) |  | (0.070) |  |
| Mediation | 1.337\*\*\* | 1.355\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.225) | (0.271) |  |  |  |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.578\*\*\* | -0.579\*\*\* | -2.113\*\*\* | 1.138\*\*\* | -2.107\*\*\* | 1.139\*\*\* |
|  | (0.157) | (0.158) | (0.271) | (0.143) | (0.284) | (0.143) |
| Population (ln) | -0.086\* | -0.087\* | -0.124 | -0.162\*\*\* | -0.122 | -0.162\*\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.113) | (0.044) | (0.111) | (0.044) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000\*\* | 0.000 | -0.000\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.323\*\* | -0.323\*\* | -0.566\*\* | 0.132 | -0.552\* | 0.131 |
|  | (0.159) | (0.162) | (0.287) | (0.096) | (0.284) | (0.096) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.030 | -0.030 | 0.063 | -0.309\*\*\* | 0.055 | -0.309\*\*\* |
|  | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.132) | (0.079) | (0.134) | (0.079) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.100\*\*\* | -0.100\*\*\* | -0.073\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* | -0.072\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.031) | (0.020) |
| Democracy | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.007 | 0.034\*\*\* | -0.007 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.012) |
| Constant |  |  | 0.020 | 0.959\* | 0.511 | 0.959\* |
|  |  |  | (1.093) | (0.500) | (1.054) | (0.500) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1579.140 | -1579.113 | -926.461 | -926.461 | -925.977 | -925.977 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A23). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

There is also evidence that the number of distinct third-party mediators affects mediation effectiveness (Böhmelt 2011). For our purposes, this is particularly relevant as one may expect that the probability of a *Mediator Leader Change* occurring increases as the number of mediators is raised, whereas its negative effect on mediation effectiveness may actually decrease because not all mediators should be affected by it at the same time. However, a leadership transition in one of the participants in larger mediation coalitions may also result in coordination issues inside the coalition. That is, mediators would not only need to re-establish trust and information channels with the conflict parties, but also with the other parties to the coalition effort. We would thus expect that *Mediator Leader Change* decreases mediation effectiveness even when accounting for the number of mediators. To test this, we follow Böhmelt (2011) by including the number of mediators and its squared term as additional controls in Models 3 and 4 from the main text. Additionally, we also test whether the effect of *Mediator Leader Change* is conditional on the number of mediators by interacting these measures. For the models with interaction terms, we subtract one from the number of mediators before interacting it with mediator leader change. This way, the constituent term can directly be interpreted as the effect of mediator leader change if there is one mediating party.

The results for *Mediator Leader Change* aresubstantively identical to those from the main specifications, indicating that it has a conflict-prolonging effect. The main constituent term is negatively signed and statistically significant in all models while its interactions terms with the mediator number are insignificant, emphasizing that its impact is not moderated by how many separate countries participate in a mediation effort. In line with earlier findings, our results demonstrate that the number of mediators has a nonlinear effect on mediation effectiveness at least once we account for the non-random assignment of mediation. This result is substantively interesting as previous work on this is on interstate disputes, not intrastate wars.

**A.12. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with leader changes in the government fighting an intrastate conflict**

We also include leader changes in the government fighting an intrastate conflict in addition to *Mediator Leader Change* in our models. While the focus of our study lies on changes in the executive of mediating parties, we add *Conflict Gov. Leader Change* to Models 3 and 4 from the main text as existing literature argues that such changes can increase the probability of negotiation and mediation onset as well as their success (e.g., Ghosn 2010; Lutmar & Terris 2019; Ryckman & Braithwaite 2018). Also, the two types of leader change may be linked due to diffusion processes of resistance movement onset (e.g., Gleditsch & Rivera 2017) or the incidence of external shocks such as the end of the Cold War. We again use data from the CHISOLS data set for this (Mattes, Leeds & Matsumura 2016).

The models in Table A.13 indicate that *Mediator Leader Change* has a negative effect on mediation effectiveness as its coefficient is negatively signed and statistically significant. If anything, this effect actually becomes marginally stronger when accounting for leader change in the conflict government. In line with existing studies, results also show that *Conflict Gov. Leader Change* makes the onset of mediations more likely. In contrast, it only has a conflict-shortening effect if the non-random assignment of mediation is left unaccounted. This effect disappears, though, when the duration-selection estimator is used.

*Table A.13*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Conflict government leader changes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A29 | Model A30 | Model A30 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.791\*\*\* | -0.568\*\* |  |
|  | (0.270) | (0.226) |  |
| Mediation | 1.202\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.162) |  |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.616\*\*\* | -2.239\*\*\* | 1.066\*\*\* |
|  | (0.157) | (0.283) | (0.143) |
| Population (ln) | -0.044 | -0.249\*\* | -0.142\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) | (0.112) | (0.044) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000 | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.575\*\*\* | -0.697\*\* | 0.104 |
|  | (0.167) | (0.291) | (0.102) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.086 | -0.042 | -0.316\*\*\* |
|  | (0.073) | (0.126) | (0.081) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.083\*\*\* | -0.050 | 0.050\*\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.034) | (0.020) |
| Polity2 | -0.016 | 0.017 | 0.022\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.022) | (0.012) |
| Conflict Gov. Leader Change | 0.756\*\*\* | -0.309 | 0.327\*\*\* |
|  | (0.127) | (0.288) | (0.116) |
| Constant |  | 2.131\*\* | 0.684 |
|  |  | (0.989) | (0.506) |
| Observations | 1,668 | 1,668 | 1,668 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1449.241 | -839.911 | -839.911 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A24). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.13. Duration-Selection model with conflict type in the selection equation**

In our main Duration-Selection model as well as all the robustness checks, we use the time since the last mediation attempt and the peace duration splines as exclusion restrictions in the selection equation. To ensure that this choice of exclusion restrictions does not affect our results, we follow existing mediation research that uses the issue type of the conflict to identify the selection part of two-stage models (Gartner 2011; see also Beardsley 2008). Following this approach, the selection equation model in A31 thus includes a dummy item indicating whether a given conflict is fought over government control; conflicts over territory form the baseline category. The result for *Mediator Leader Change* remainssubstantively unchanged from the main specifications. Importantly, the findings also indicate that conflicts over government are less likely to receive mediation than territorial ones, lending support to the use of issue type as an exclusion restriction.

*Table A.14*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Additional identifying variable in the selection equation

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A31 | Model A31 |
|  | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change | -0.484\*\* |  |
|  | (0.230) |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -2.215\*\*\* | 1.178\*\*\* |
|  | (0.272) | (0.143) |
| Population (ln) | -0.210\* | -0.188\*\*\* |
|  | (0.123) | (0.046) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.567\*\* | 0.157 |
|  | (0.278) | (0.098) |
| Rebel Political Wing | 0.079 | -0.308\*\*\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.076) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.076\*\* | 0.053\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.020) |
| Polity2 | -0.002 | 0.035\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.012) |
| Conflict over Government |  | -0.234\* |
|  |  | (0.140) |
| Constant | 1.398 | 1.303\*\* |
|  | (1.124) | (0.555) |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -928.251 | -928.251 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**A.14. Duration-Selection model with mediator regime types**

We now examine whether mediator characteristics, namely their regime type and winning coalition size, moderate the effect of mediator leader change on mediation effectiveness. One may expect that the theoretical mechanisms outlined in the article mostly affect countries that are more democratic and have larger winning coalitions as leader changes should induce more substantive policy shifts there. We test this interaction by interacting the binary item on mediator leader change with two variables, namely the average mediator *polity2* score (Model A32) and the average mediator winning coalition size as measured by Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors’ (2003) *W* statistic (Model A33), respectively. Both variables are averaged over all countries participating in a mediation effort. We present only Duration-Selection models here as both variables only exist for conflicts, which experienced mediation.

*Table A.15*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Mediator Regime Types

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A32 | Model A32 | Model A33 | Model A33 |
|  | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) | Duration-Selection (Outcome) | Duration-Selection (Selection) |
| Mediator Leader Change (LC) | -0.382 |  | 0.255 |  |
|  | (0.269) |  | (0.395) |  |
| Mediator LC x Polity2 | -0.069\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.035) |  |  |  |
| Mediator LC x *W* |  |  | -1.610\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.573) |  |
| Mediator Polity2 | 0.055\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.026) |  |  |  |
| Mediator *W* |  |  | 0.869\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.471) |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -2.171\*\*\* | 1.111\*\*\* | -2.198\*\*\* | 1.070\*\*\* |
|  | (0.243) | (0.160) | (0.221) | (0.163) |
| Population (ln) | -0.365\*\* | -0.174\*\*\* | -0.386\*\* | -0.175\*\*\* |
|  | (0.155) | (0.049) | (0.170) | (0.050) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.731\*\* | 0.195\* | -0.835\*\*\* | 0.197\* |
|  | (0.285) | (0.104) | (0.297) | (0.102) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.115 | -0.261\*\*\* | -0.016 | -0.265\*\*\* |
|  | (0.159) | (0.088) | (0.156) | (0.094) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.060 | 0.060\*\*\* | -0.031 | 0.059\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.023) | (0.045) | (0.023) |
| Polity2 | -0.016 | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.024 | 0.027\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.013) | (0.028) | (0.013) |
| Constant | 3.068\*\* | 0.785 | 3.038\*\* | 0.720 |
|  | (1.340) | (0.529) | (1.520) | (0.530) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,696 | 1,696 | 1,647 | 1,647 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -770.303 | -770.303 | -671.391 | -671.391 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  | 0.25\*\*\* |  | 0.25\*\*\* |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The constituent term *Mediator Leader Change* is insignificant in A32 and A33, while the interaction terms are negatively signed and statistically significant. The effect of mediator leader change thus becomes more negative as mediators’ *polity2* score and winning coalition size increase. For the sake of comparison, this estimated negative effect is approximately as strong as in the Duration-Selection model presented in the main analysis when mediators’ average *polity2* score is 1 or their average winning coalition size 0.456. This is the case for at least 70% of mediation cases in our sample.

**A.15. Cox Proportional-Hazards and Duration-Selection models with the number of mediator leader changes**

*Table A.16*. The Effectiveness of International Mediation in Civil Conflicts: Number of mediator leader changes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model A34 | Model A35 | Model A35 |
|  | Cox Model | Duration-  Selection (Outcome) | Duration-  Selection (Selection) |
| Number of Mediator Leader Changes | -0.313\*\*\* | -0.228\*\* |  |
|  | (0.073) | (0.099) |  |
| Mediation | 1.097\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.155) |  |  |
| Conflict Intensity | -0.558\*\*\* | -2.234\*\*\* | 1.137\*\*\* |
|  | (0.153) | (0.262) | (0.143) |
| Population (ln) | -0.074 | -0.195 | -0.162\*\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.121) | (0.044) |
| GDP per capita (ln) | 0.000 | -0.000\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Rebel Groups | -0.307\* | -0.528\* | 0.131 |
|  | (0.159) | (0.288) | (0.097) |
| Rebel Political Wing | -0.026 | 0.114 | -0.311\*\*\* |
|  | (0.064) | (0.127) | (0.079) |
| Rebel Fighters (ln) | -0.101\*\*\* | -0.080\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.032) | (0.020) |
| Polity2 | -0.007 | -0.007 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.012) |
| Constant |  | 1.166 | 0.955\* |
|  |  | (1.106) | (0.500) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,765 | 1,765 | 1,765 |
| Time Period | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 | 1950-2011 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1578.024 | -931.789 | -931.789 |
| P > 2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  |

Note: Table entries are (non-exponentiated) coefficients; conflict-clustered standard errors in parentheses; Efron method for ties (Model A32). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In the main analysis, we code mediator leader changes as a binary item, which takes the value 1 for the conflict-years in which mediation took place and any mediator experienced a leadership change as well as subsequent years until the termination of conflict. One potential issue with this coding is that it may conflate different mediation experiences. To alleviate this concern, we now use the number of mediator leadership changes a conflict has experienced up to and including the conflict-year under observation as an alternative independent variable. While most observations have experienced no change, but about 40% of conflict-years that have did so more than once. The original binary item does not capture this variation and we thus re-run Models 3 and 4 of the main text using the count item as main independent variable to disentangle the potentially divergent effects of the *Number of Mediator Leader Changes*. However, the results presented in table A15 suggest that this does not alter our substantive findings.

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