

Supplemental Materials in Support of
Mixed Judicial Selection and Constitutional Review
***Comparative Political Studies* (2019)**
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1. Data collection and production transparency

Table 1.1. Chilean Constitutional Tribunal Ministers' background and coding (2006- 2016)

Minister Name	Appointing institution coding	Political associations coding and prior careers (sources)
Juan Colombo Campbell (1993-2000; 2001-2010)	CSN	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Chosen by President Aylwin of the Concertación to serve on CT from 1993 to 2000. In an interview by Alvarado for the Colegio de abogados, Colombo emphasized that he supported Aylwin. His career prior to work on the Tribunal included work as a professor, dean, and attorney.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Entrevista, Alvarado, (3) University of Chile summary of achievements, (4) Mercurio online 2001</p>
José Luis Cea Egaña (2002-2010)	CSN	<p>No association with political parties</p> <p>Evidence: Career in academia as dean of Academia de Ciencias Policiales de Carabineros. Cea was an abogado integrante for the court of appeals of Santiago. He has no political party affiliations mentioned in news or other sources.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Interview</p>
Jorge Correa Sutil (2006-2009)	President Lagos	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Chosen by President Lagos of the Concertación to serve on the CT; Served as Subsecretary of Interior under Ricardo Lagos. Listed as member of DC (Christian Democrats), a party of the Concertación. Prior career as professor and attorney.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Cooperativa.cl</p>
Raúl Bertelsen Repetto (2006-2015) †	Senate	<p>Right</p> <p>Evidence: Bertelsen and Vodanovic were both chosen by the Senate at the same time. Their nominations were part of a “horse trading” deal in which the two main coalitions (the Concertación and center Right) were able to each choose a candidate. The right chose Bertelsen, while the center left chose Vodanovic. Bertelsen previously served as a member of the Ortúzar Commission, which helped to draft the 1980 Constitution under the military junta. He is reported as having affinity towards one of Alianza’s parties (UDI). Bertelsen served as an abogado integrante for the CT prior to becoming a judge.</p> <p>Sources: (1-2) El Mercurio (2005, 2014)</p>
Hernán Vodanovic Schnake (2006-2015) †	Senate	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Vodanovic and Bertelsen were both chosen by the Senate at the same time. Their nominations were part of a “horse trading” deal in which the two main coalitions (the right and center left) were able to</p>

Minister Name	Appointing institution coding	Political associations coding and prior careers (sources)
		<p>each choose a candidate. Vodanovic served in several government positions under Concertación presidents Allende and Frei.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2-3) El Mercurio (2005, 2014)</p>
Mario Fernández Baeza (2006—2011)	Camera/Senate	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Prior to work on the CT, served as a senator for PPD/PS, parties of the Concertación. He served as Under-secretary of Aviation and War under Concertación. presidents Aylwin and Frei. Appointed as minister of National Defense and later General Secretariat of the presidency and German Ambassador under President Lagos of the Concertación. His resume mentions prior positions as an attorney and academic. (Post bench evidence: Fernández Baeza served as Minister of the Interior and Public Security in Michele Bachelet's second term).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Vargas (2016), (3) Que Pasa (2018)</p>
Marcelo Venegas Palacios (2006-2013)	Camera/Senate	<p>Right</p> <p>Evidence: Venegas was an assessor to various RN (party of the Alianza) politicians. Beginning in 1990s, he was chief of cabinet for senator Sergio Onofre Jarpa and is known to be close with the president of the RN Carlos Larraín y Senator Sergio Romero. During the military dictatorship, he was Minister for the Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario and for the Dirección Nacional de Comunicación Social. He also controlled communications for the CT under the dictatorship.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mercurio (2009)</p>
Marisol Peña Torres (2006-2009, 2009-2018)	Supreme Court	<p>No association with political parties</p> <p>Evidence: This judge has no political party affiliations mentioned in news or other sources. She has stated in a news article that she had no affiliation with any political parties (El Mostrador 2018). Prior to serving on the bench, Peña had an extensive academic career, she was also legal counsel for the division of municipalities of the Comptroller General's office and legal advisor of the General Secretariat of the Government.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mercurio Legal, (3) Interview, (4) El Mostrador (2018)</p>
Enrique Navarro Beltrán (2006-2012)	Supreme Court	<p>No association with political parties</p> <p>Evidence: This judge has no political party affiliations mentioned in news or other sources. Prior position as director of studies of the Supreme Court (2002 to 2006), professor, and attorney.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mercurio (2006), (3) Carvajal (2012)</p>

Minister Name	Appointing institution coding	Political associations coding and prior careers (sources)
Francisco Fernández Fredes (2006-2015)		<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Member of the Socialist party committee. Member of Socialist Salvador Allende's government prior to the military coup. Positions in several Concertación governments as follows: Director of the Service of National Consumers (SERNAC) (1993-98). National Economic Prosecutor (2000 to 2001), Commission of Citizen Defense and Transparency of the Secretariat of the Government (2001 to 2005)</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mercurio (2006), (2) El Librero (2015)</p>
Carlos Carmona Santander (2009-2018)	President Bachelet	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Chosen by President Michele Bachelet, socialist and member of Concertación. Carmona held numerous positions as an academic and in Concertación governments including: Fundación Frei (1986-87); Secretary for Frei (1988-89), Asessor executive (1990 to 1991), Chief division of executive (1994-1995) Subsecretary (1999-2000).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mostrador, (3) Izquierdo Diario</p>
José Antonio Viera Gallo Quesnay (2010-2013)	President Bachelet	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Chosen by President Michele Bachelet, socialist and member of Concertación. Viera previously served as a member of Congress representing the Socialist party during the Allende government. Viera led the socialist party in exile in Italy during the dictatorship. He represented the Socialist party as a congressman (1990 to 1994) and Senator (1998 to 2006). Viera served as president of the Chamber of Deputies from 1990 to 1993. He served as minister of secretary general under President Bachelet.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Biography in Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional</p>
Iván Aróstica Maldonado (2010-2013, 2013-2022)	President Piñera	<p>Right</p> <p>Evidence: Chosen by President Sebastian Piñera of the RN, a party of the Alianza. Worked as fiscal and director of Caja de Previsión de la Defensa Nacional (from 1984 (under dictatorship) to 1995). Served as chief of juridical division of the Ministry of Interior from 2010 to 2013 under the presidency of Piñera. Prior to the bench, he also was a professor and attorney.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Izquierda diario (2017)</p>
Domingo Hernández Emparanza. (2012-2021)	Supreme Court	<p>No association with political parties</p> <p>Evidence: This judge has no political party affiliations mentioned in news or other sources. Served as attorney for Subsecretary of Health and National Fund of Health and other public administrations; Abogado integrante for Corte Apelaciones of Santiago (1998 to 2005); Abogado Integrante for Supreme Court (2006-2012); Supplemental judge of Electoral Tribunal for the region of Santiago. Prior work as professor and dean.</p>

Minister Name	Appointing institution coding	Political associations coding and prior careers (sources)
		Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mercurio (2012)
Gonzalo Garcia Pino (2013-2022)	Camara/Senate	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Garcia Pino held several prestigious positions in successive Concertación governments including: Asesor jurídico de la División Judicial del Ministerio de Justicia (1991); División de Cultura del Ministerio de Educación (1992); Subsecretaría del Interior (2000–2001); Jefe del Comité Asesor del Ministro de Defensa Nacional (1994 – 1997); Jefe de la División de Seguridad Ciudadana del Ministerio del Interior (2000 – 2004); Asesor del Ministro del Interior (2004 – 2005); Subsecretario de Marina (2005 – 2006); Subsecretario de Guerra (2006 – 2010). Prior to the CT, García Pino also worked as a professor and an attorney.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) Carvajal (2012)</p>
Juan José Romero Guzmán (2013-2022)	Camera/Senate	<p>Right</p> <p>Evidence: Romero served as integrante en Consejo de Concesiones de Obras Publicas under Sebastian Piñera (2010-2013) and was a judge in the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (2008-2013). Prior to being chosen to the CT, he also was a professor and attorney.</p> <p>Source: (1) Resume, (2) Carvajal (2012)</p>
Maria Luisa Brahm (2013-2022)	President Piñera	<p>Right</p> <p>Evidence: Brahm was chosen by President Sebastian Piñera of the RN, a party of the Alianza. Prior to serving on the CT, she held some positions under the dictatorship such as Fiscalía Oficina de Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN) (1983-85) and other positions for ODEPLAN. She served under Piñera's government as Chief of Asesores del Presidente and Integrante del Consejo Directivo de Auditoría Interna General de Gobierno.. Prior to the CT, she worked for the Instituto Libertad.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Mostrador (2013)</p>
Cristián Letelier Aguilar (2015-) [†]	Senate	<p>Right</p> <p>Evidence: Letelier's nomination was seen as part of a "horse trade" in the Senate in which parties of the Right chose Letelier and those of the Concertación chose Pozo. Letelier served as a Congressman for the UDI (a party of the Alianza or Right (2011 to 2014). Prior to service on the CT, he also worked as a professor, attorney and asesor jurídico de la Sociedad Nacional de Minería.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Carvajal (2015), (2) Contreras (2015), (3) Salinas (2015)</p>

Minister Name	Appointing institution coding	Political associations coding and prior careers (sources)
Nelson Pozo Silva (2015-) †	Senate	<p>Concertación</p> <p>Evidence: Pozo's nomination was seen as part of a "horse trade" in the Senate in which parties of the Concertación chose Pozo and those of the Right chose Letelier. News articles at the time of the appointment characterized Pozo as a "militant" of the PS or Socialist party (party of the Concertación). Prior to the CT, he was a professor and abogado integrante of the Court of Appeals of Santiago (2004-2008) and Abogado integrante de la Corte Suprema (2009-2012). He was known as a member of the PS (party of the Concertación).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Carvajal (2015), (2) Contreras (2015), (3) Salinas (2015)</p>
José Vasquez Marquez (2015-)	Supreme Court	<p>No association with political parties</p> <p>Evidence: Vasquez is known as independent having no affiliations with the two main coalitions. Prior to service on the court he was a judge and president of the Tribunal Ambiental of Santiago. He was director of studies analyzing the Supreme Court from 2006 to 2014. Prior to the CT, he served as attorney, arbiter and professor. This judge has no political party affiliations mentioned in news or other sources.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Resume, (2) El Libero (2015)</p>

Notes: The analysis considers only judges serving on the CT after the constitutional reforms which went into effect in 2006. Prior to constitutional reforms, the *Consejo de Seguridad Nacional* (CSN) (a nonelected agency created under Chile's 1980 Constitution composed of the President of the Republic, the president of the Supreme Court, presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, heads of the armed forces and the Controller General) selected two judges. Prior to the reforms, the CSN chose Ministers Cea and Colombo who served on the Tribunal until 2010. Colombo had been a minister previously appointed by president Aylwin from 1993 to 2000.

The coded party associations were confirmed by at least two sources (listed) based on judges' party affiliation, work with a government of a particular party or staff of a legislator or service as a legislator. The party of the selecting president was also imputed to the judge in certain cases. Coding judges' political associations was not based on how judges voted on particular cases on the CT such as abortion or other highly contested issues. Pardow and Verdugo (2013) adopted similar coding based on their own research and assessment for the following judges: . Cea, Correa Sutil, Bertelsen, Vodanovic, Fernández Baeza, Venegas, Peña, Navarro, Fredes, Fernández Baeza. When an author interview was mentioned this was an interview of the judge in question or someone who discussed the judge. Interviews took place in Santiago in January 2016. Other sources for this analysis included resumes from the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal website and news analyses, articles and commentary at the time of selection, elevation, death, or change of judges' job or composition of the court. Sources for judges' careers are predominantly from their resumes.

Sources:

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- Carvajal, Cinthya. Cristian Letelier y Nelson Pozo, Nuevos Ministros del Tribunal Constitucional, *El Mercurio*, January 8, 2015, p. A1.
- _____. El derecho tiene que avanzar a la realidad y buscar soluciones razonables *El Mercurio* (May 5, 2012) [Navarro]
- _____. Gonzalo García y Juan José Romero ratificados para el Tribunal Constitucional (July 3, 2013)
- Contreras, Pablo. 2015. “Designación de dos nuevos ministros del TC: la cocina constitucional. Colegio de abogado
https://archivo.colegioabogados.cl/cgi-bin/procesa.pl?plantilla=/v2/cont_actividades_listado.html&idcat=668&titulo_categoria_listado=&nseccion=actividades%2520y%2520noticias%2520%253A%2520%2520%253A%2520Entrevista%2520a%2520Juan%2520Colombo%2520Campbell%2520C%2520ex%2520presidente%2520del%2520Tribunal%2520Constitucional%253A%2520Apuntes%2520de%2520un%2520c%2520Eclope
- Cooperative.cl. Aborto: Correa Sutil defendió al ministro Santelices ante diputados (Martes, 12 de Junio de 2018). [Colombo]
- El Libroero. El perfil de los seis candidatos que se disputan el cupo de ministro del Tribunal Constitucional (August 27, 2015) [Fredes, Vasquez Marquez]
- La Izquierda Diario. Iván Aróstica, el nuevo presidente del Tribunal Constitucional. El ex funcionario de Sebastián Piñera será ratificado como presidente el próximo 28 de agosto. (August 13, 2017)[Aróstica; Carmona]
- El Mercurio. Senado aprueba a abogados Bertelsen y Vodanovic para Tribunal Constitucional en votación única, los parlamentarios votaron en forma electrónica por la dupla que logró 34 votos a favor y cuatro en contra de la bancada PRSD (November 8, 2005).
- _____. Nominación de Corte Suprema: Ex defensor ciudadano va al TC. (August 17, 2006)[Fredes]
- _____. Senadores ya barajan nombres para suceder a Bertelsen y Vodanovic en el TC (November 23, 2014)
- _____. Pleno eligió a dos miembros del Tribunal Constitucional (April 29, 2006)[Navarro].
- _____. Corte Suprema eligió a Domingo Hernández como nuevo ministro del Tribunal Constitucional El abogado, quien obtuvo 15 de 21 votos a su favor, reemplazará en el cargo a Enrique Navarro. Lo siguió en la elección Emilio Pfeffer, quien es actualmente abogado integrante de la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago. (May 25, 2012).[Hernández]
- El Mercurio.online. Marcelo Venegas fue designado como nuevo presidente del Tribunal Constitucional Su nombre fue respaldado por todos los miembros de la entidad. Asumirá el cargo el 28 de agosto, en reemplazo de Juan Colombo (August 5, 2009)
- El Mercurio Legal. Marisol Peña es elegida como presidenta del Tribunal Constitucional.
- El Mercurio online. Juan Colombo nuevo miembro del Tribunal Constitucional. Juan Colombo reemplazará al ministro Mario Verdugo luego que el 28 de noviembre se concretara su alejamiento por haber cumplido 75 años de edad. (March 27, 2001).
- El Mostrador. María Luisa Brahm acusa "intromisión" y "presión indebida" de El Mercurio en decisiones del TC (September 13, 2013) [Carmona, Brahm]
- _____. Marisol Peña: aunque en el TC "la política no debiera reinar, en la práctica sí reina" (June 8, 2018)
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https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Antonio_Viera_Gallo_Quesney
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- Pardow, Diego and Sergio Verdugo. 2015. “El Tribunal Constitucional chileno y la reforma de 2005. Un Enroque entre Jueces de Carrera y Académicos.” *Revista de Derecho* XXVIII (1): 123-144. A 2013 version of the paper in English provides background for these authors coding choices.
- Qué Pasa. Mario Fernández vuelve a clases. El también conocido como “Peta” Fernández volvió a clases. Esto, porque retomó sus actividades académicas como profesor de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Chile, específicamente en el departamento de Derecho Público. (April 13, 2018)
- University of Chile announcement. Juan Colombo Campbell Nuevo Profesor Emerito U. de Chile.
- Vargas, Felipe. Presidenta Bachelet designa a Mario Fernández como nuevo ministro del Interior y El embajador en Uruguay ocupará el cargo del saliente ministro Jorge Burgos. El mercurio online (June 8, 2016)

Table 1.2. Colombian Constitutional Court judges' backgrounds and coding (1997-2014)

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate ^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
Ciro Angarita Baron (1993)	President Gaviria (S1)	Not in analysis. Service prior to 1997.
Eduardo Cifuentes Munoz (1993-2000)	President Gaviria (S1)	Liberal Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Liberal party. Prior to serving on the CC, he worked as an academic and director of investigations for the Bank of Colombia. Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) El Tiempo (1992), (3) La Silla Vacía (2016), (4) Semana (2015)
Jose Gregorio Hernandez (1993-2001)	Supreme Court (S1)	Conservative. Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as a member of the conservative party. Prior to serving on the CC, he was an academic and in the 1980s had government posts as an auxiliary magistrate for the Supreme Court's sala constitucional (the predecessor of the CC). Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) El Tiempo (1992), (3) La Silla Vacía (2016), (4) Elección Visible
Simon Rodriguez (1993)	Consejo de Estado (S1)	Not in analysis. Service prior to 1997.
Alejandro Martinez Caballero (1993-2001)	President Gaviria (S1)	Liberal Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Liberal party. Prior to serving on the CC, he was an attorney and professor. He worked for the Contraloría and had been a Deputy for Congress for Anapo in 1966. He has worked as an asesor for la Alianza Democrática M-19 in the Constituent Assembly. Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Semana (2015), (3) La Silla Vacía 2016
Fabio Moron Diaz (1993-2001)	President Gaviria/ SC (S1)	Not in analysis. Service prior to 1997.
Jaime Sanin Greiffenstein (1991-1993)	Supreme Court (S1)	Not in analysis. Service prior to 1997.
Carlos Gaviria Díaz (1993-2001)	Consejo de Estado (S1)	Liberal Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Liberal party. Prior to serving on the CC, he was an attorney and professor and served as municipal judge in Rionegro. Gaviria served as senator for the Frente Social y Político a

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate ^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
		<p>party of the left. (Post bench evidence: Gaviria ran as a presidential candidate against Uribe for the Liberal party).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) El Tiempo (1992), (3) La SillaVacía (2016)</p>
Jorge Arango Mejía (1993-1998)	Supreme Court (S1)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Liberal party. Prior to serving on the CC, he was a civil judge in la Dorado, a mayor and an ambassador to the Czech republic.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009), (2) El Tiempo (1992), (3) La SillaVacía (2016)</p>
Antonio Barrera Carbonell (1993-2001)	Consejo de Estado (S1)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Liberal party. Prior to serving on the CC, was an attorney and asesor of the Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria and a conjuez for the Tribunal Administrativo de Cundiamerca and a conjuez for the Consejo de Estado.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) Resume, (3) El Tiempo, (4) La SillaVacía (2016)</p>
Hernando Herrera Vergara (1993-1999)	President Gaviria (S1)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Liberal party. Prior to serving on the CC, he was a magistrate in the Consejo Superior de la Judicatura and a vice minister of communications.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) Resume, (3) El Tiempo (1992), (4) Semana (2015), (5) La SillaVacía (2016)</p>
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa (1993-2001)	Consejo de Estado (S1)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary during appointments and afterwards on the ideology of the court, placed this judge as associated with the Conservative party. Prior to serving on the CC, he was an academic for various institutions. Assisted in talks with the FARC for the Pastrana government.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) El Tiempo (1992), (3) La SillaVacía (2016)</p>
Alfredo Beltrán Sierra (1998-2006)	Supreme Court (S2)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Considered to have an orientation towards the Liberal party from various sources. Prior to service on the CC, he was a professor and auxiliary magistrate for the Tribunal Superior de Bogotá.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Resume</p>

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
Jaime Araujo Renteria (2001-2009)	Consejo de Estado (S3)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary noted that he was a member of the Liberal party. In 1995, he was the choice for Consejo for the Liberal party. Prior to service on the CC, he was ambassador for Colombia for the Holy See and magistrate of the Consejo Nacional Electoral. In 1998, he ran as candidate for the Liberal party. (Additional post bench evidence: In 2009, he ran for candidate from the liberal party. In 2018, Araujo was a Vice presidential candidate for the Liberal party).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) La SillaVacía (2016), (3) Lamprea (2009)</p>
Manuel Jose Cepeda (2001-2009)	President Pastrana (S3)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary lists him as a moderate conservative with expertise in constitutional matters. Prior to the CC, he was an asesor for both the Gaviria and Barco administrations (both from the Liberal party) and Ambassador to UNESCO. He was chosen by President Pastrana of the Conservative party.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Resume</p>
Jaime Cordoba Trivino (2001-2009)	Supreme Court (S3)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary places him a moderate liberal. Prior to service on the CC, he was a professor and attorney. He also was a criminal judge for Bogotá, delegated procurador before the Supreme Court and Defensor del pueblo as well as vice fiscal general of the Nation and worked as asesor on some international organizations.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis, (2) Resume</p>
Rodrigo Escobar Gil (2001-2009)	Consejo de Estado (S3)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary places him as associated with the Conservative party. Prior to the CC, he was a professor and attorney.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) La SillaVacía (2012)</p>
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra (2001-2009)	President Pastrana (S3)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary places him as associated with the conservative party. He was chosen by President Pastrana of the Conservative party. Prior to the CC, worked in academics and was a civil judge, magistrate of the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá and of the Supreme Court. (Post bench, he was a candidate for position on the International Criminal Court).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) La SillaVacía (2009) (3) Semana (2015)</p>

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
Eduardo Montealegre (2001-2004)	Consejo de Estado (S3)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary suggests he was a member of the Liberal party. He was criminal judge of Bogotá and Vice procurador general of the Nation. He was asesor for various governments. (Post bench, he was named Fiscal General and a profile of him at that appointment associates him historically with the Liberal Party (See El Espectador (2012)).</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009) (2) El Espectador (2012).</p>
Alvaro Tafur Galvis (1999-2007)	President Pastrana (S3)	<p>Conservative.</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary associates Tafur with the Conservative party. He was nominated by President Pastrana of the Conservative party. Prior to service on the court, he was a conuez and magistrate for the Supreme Court, the Consejo de Estado and the Consejo Superior de la Judicature. He also worked as an academic.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Semana (2015), (3) Elección Visible</p>
Clara Inés Vargas (2001-2009)	Supreme Court (S3)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary places her as associated with the Liberal party. Her nomination was supported by the Liberal party as well. Prior to serving on the CC, she was a civil judge and magistrate of the Superior Tribunal of Bogota and also served as a Procuradora delegated by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Lamprea (2009)</p>
Humberto Sierra Porto (2004-2012)	Consejo de Estado (S4)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary associates him with the Liberal party and his nomination was supported by the Liberal Party and a dissident group from Uribe's coalition. Prior to working on the CC, he was an academic and litigant, asesor of the chamber of deputies and procurador delegado for the Public Function.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) La Silla Vacía (2013) (3) Lewin (2013)</p>
Nilson Pinilla Pinilla (2006-2014)	Supreme Court (S4)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary suggests he is associated with the Conservative party and was supported by parties of Uribe's government coalition. Prior to the CC, he was a professor and served as a municipal criminal judge and as a magistrate of the Supreme Court. He also was an asesor of the Bank of the Republic.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Silla Vacía (2009), (3) La Semana (2015)</p>

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
Mauricio González Cuervo (2007-2015)	President Uribe (S5)	Conservative Evidence: This judge was considered to be associated with the Conservative party. Prior to the CC, he had been a professor, viceminister of the interior and viceminster of justice and juridical secretary of the President. Evidence: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) La SillaVacía (2009), (3) Semana (2015)
Maria Victoria Calle Correa (2009-2017)	President Uribe (S5)	Conservative Evidence: This judge is considered associated with the Conservative party and close to the government at the time of her selection. Prior to work on the CC, she worked as an attorney and was vice counsel of an insurance company and consultant for some municipalities. Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) La SillaVacía (2009)
Juan Carlos Henao Pérez (2009-2012)	Consejo de Estado (S5)	Liberal Evidence: Commentary suggests that this judges is considered associated with the Liberal party supported his selection to the CC. Prior to work on the CC had been an administrative law expert and had been a conjuez and auxiliary magistrate for the Consejo de Estado. Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) La SillaVacía (2009)
Gabriel E. Mendoza Martelo (2009-2017)	Consejo de Estado (S5)	Conservative Evidence. Commentary suggests that he is considered associated or affiliated with the Conservative party. His election to the Court was supported by senator Efraín Cepeda who was the president of the Conservative party. Prior to the CC, he served as a municipal criminal and labor judge and was magistrate for the Administrative Court of the Atlántico and a magistrate for the Consejo de Estado. Evidence: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2-3) La SillaVacía (2009, 2012)
Jorge Ivan Palacio Palacio (2009-2017)	Supreme Court (S5)	Conservative Evidence: Commentary suggests that he is associated with the Conservative party. His appointment to the CC was supported by the government coalition. Prior to the CC he was a municipal criminal judge and a magistrate for the Supreme Court as well as a juridic asesor for the Bank of the Republic. Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009)

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub (2009-2017)	President Uribe (S5)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary suggests that he is aligned with the conservative party, especially Uribe. His nomination was supported by the president's governing coalition. Prior to the CC, he was a magistrate for the Consejo Nacional Electoral and a conjuez of the Cosejo Superior de la Judicatura. He also was a professor. He resigned after a corruption scandal.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis (2009), (2) Semana (2015), (3-6) La Silla Vacía (2009, 2012, 2017), (7) Lewin (2016), (8) Lewin & Duque (2017)</p>
Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva (2009-2017)	Supreme Court (S5)	<p>Liberal</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary places him aligned more with the Liberal party than the Conservative party. Prior to the CC, he was a civil judge and magistrate of the Tribunal Superior de Cundinamarca.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Rubiano Galvis 2009, (2) La Silla Vacía 2009</p>
Luis Guillermo Guerrero (2012-	Consejo de Estado (S6)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary places him as a conservative and his selection was supported by the Conservative party. He defeated another candidate, Carolos Medellín, supported by the Liberal party. He stated in a news source that he has an affinity towards the ideas of the Conservative Party, but as a constitutional judge he would not represent a political ideology (Silla Vacía 2012). Prior to the CC, he was an asesor jurídico for a university, was secretary general for the Corporación Autónoma para Desarrollo de Nariño. Magistrate for the Sala Administrativa for the Consejo Superior de la Judicatura, attorney and asesor de la Federación nacional de Cafeteros.</p> <p>Sources: (1) Semana (2015), (2) La Silla Vacía (2012, 2017) (3) Lewin (2017).</p>
Alberto Rojas Ríos (2012-	Consejo de Estado (S6)	<p>Conservative</p> <p>Evidence: Commentary stated although, it was first assumed he was a liberal, as he worked with some judges and other political figures that were aligned with the Liberal party, he was associated more with the Conservative party and they supported his selection to the CC. Prior to the CC, he served as a procurator and vice procurator general, academic and attorney. He also worked as a conjuez for the CC prior to his elevation.</p> <p>Sources (1) Semana (2013), (2-3) La Silla Vacía (2013, 2016)</p>

Magistrado	Nominating Institution (Confirming Senate ^a)	Political association coding and prior careers (information and source)
Gloria Stella Ortiz Delgado (2014-	Supreme Court (S6)	Conservative Evidence: Commentary suggests, she was selected with assistance from the Conservative Party. Prior to the CC she was an attorney for a university and had many years experience in the judicial branch including as an auxiliary judge, attorney and auxiliary magistrate for the CC. Sources: (1) Lewin (2017), (2) Acosta and Gómez (2014), (3) Unidos por la vida (2015)

Notes: The coded party association was confirmed by at least two sources (listed) based on judges' party associations, work with a government of a particular party or legislator or staff for a legislator. The party of the selecting president was also imputed to the judge in certain cases, such as in the cases of Pastrana's three presidential appointees. The party association was not based on how judges voted on particular cases on the CC such as abortion or other highly contested issues. Other sources for this analysis included resumes from the Colombian Constitutional Court, news analyses, articles and commentary during confirmation, elevation, or death. Sources for judges careers' are predominantly from Rubiano Galvis (2009) and Elección Visible.

^a The confirming senates are referred to as S1 to S6 as follows: S1 (1991 to July, 1994), S2 (july 20, 1994 to July, 1998), S3 (July 20, 1998 to July, 2002), S4 (July 20, 2002 to July, 2006), S5 (July 20, 2006 to July, 2010) and S6 (July 20, 2010 to July, 2014)

Sources:

Acosta, Ricardo Cáceres and Marlene Gómez. Senado Elige a Gloria Stella Ortiz como magistrada de la Corte Constitucional (Notice of the Senate, May 7, 2014)

El Espectador. Así es Eduardo Montealegre, el nuevo fiscal (March 22, 2012)

El Tiempo. Seis Liberales para la Corte Constitucional (1992)

La Silla Vacía. Partido Liberal se distancia del magistrado Alberto Rojas (August 29, 2013)[Rojas, Sierra Porto, Montealegre, Gaviria]

____. Carlos Gaviria Díaz: Ex candidato presidencial (July 13, 2016)

____. Jaime Araújo Rentería. (July 13, 2016).

____. Alberto Rojas Ríos, Magistrado de la Corte Constitucional (July 13, 2016)

____. Carlos Gaviria Díaz. Ex candidato presidencial (July 13, 2016)[Gaviria, Martínez, Hernández, Naranjo, Morón, Cifuentes, Arango, Herrera, Barrera]

____. La Nueva Corte es más conservadora que la anterior y de menor perfil, pero no es de bolsillo de Uribe (March 25, 2009) [Pinilla, Mendoza, Pretelt, Calle, González, Monroy, Escobar Gil, Henao]

____. Luis Guillermo Guerrero, nuevo magistrado de la Corte Constitucional (August 14, 2012).

____. Jorge Pretelt Chalub, Ex magistrado de la Corte Constucional (May 2, 2017).

Lewin, Juan Esteban. Terna para la Corte constitucional sin constitutionalista: un favorito, una sorpresa y una penalista (March 6, 2013)[Sierra Porto, Guerrero]

____. Pretelt, un conservador suspendido con votos conservadores (August 24, 2016)

____. Pretelt, la encarnación de un proyecto político conservador (March 9, 2015)

____. El Senado define hoy si la Corte se vuelve más conservadora (May 3, 2017)[Pretelt, Ortiz]

Montoya, Ana María. "" Si no vas al Senado, No te Eligen Magistrado: Instituciones Informales y Criterios de Selección de los Magistrados de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana en el Senado (1992-2009)." *Colombia Internacional* 79 (2013).

Rubiano Galvis, Sebastian. 2009. "La Corte Constitucional: Entre la Independencia Judicial y la Captura Política. In *Mayorías sin Democracia: Desequilibrio de Poderes y Estado Derecho en Colombia 2002-2009*.

Semana. 2013. El polémico nuevo magistrado Alberto Rojas fue elegido tras dos semanas de 'propaganda negra'. (April 10, 2013)
_____. El magistrado que puede cambiar todo la corte (October 14, 2015)[Cifuentes, Herrera, Martínez, Cepeda, Tafur, Monroy, Pretel, Guillermo, Pinilla, Gonzalez, Mendoza]
Unidos de la Vida. Magistrada Gloria Stella Ortiz impone el aborto e ideología de género (December 14, 2015)(article was not used for this judge's position on abortion, but rather commentary of the conservative party supporting her selection).

Table 1.3 Orientation of political parties in Chile's legislature

Table 15 Orientation of political parties in Chile's Legislature				
	Concertación or center left Seats (%)	Alianza or center right Seats (%)	Coalition with most seats in Legislature	President's party
Bachelet 06-2010 ^{a b c}				
H/120	Coalition for Democracy, 65 seats ^b (54.20%)	Alianza 54 seats (45.8%)	Concertación	Socialist Party (part of Concertación)
S/38	Coalition for Democracy, 20 seats (52.63%)	Alianza 17 seats (44.73%)		
Piñera 10-14 ^{a c}				
H/120	Coalition for Democracy, 57 seats (47.5%)	Coalition for Change, 58 seats (48.33%)	Concertación	RN (part of Alianza)
S/38	Concertación and Juntos Podemos, 19 seats (50%) CPD ^c	Coalition for Change, 16 seats (44.75%) ^c		
Bachelet 2014-2018 ^{a c}				
H/120	New Majority, 67 seats (55.83%)	Alianza 49 seats (40.83%)	Concertación	Socialist Party (part of Concertación)
S/38	New Majority, 21 seats (55.26%)	Alianza 16 seats (42%)		

^a Parline. Siavelis (2013)

^b Alemán and Navia (2016) note that although Bachelet's coalition originally resulted in unified government, subsequent defections from the House and Senate resulted in her coalition losing the majority.

^c Fuentes (2014: 92).

Note: Percent of seats needed to pass in both houses of congress is as follows: Ordinary laws: 51%; Organic laws: 4/7ths or 57.14%; and Precepts or treaties: 3/5 or 60%.

Table 1.4 Orientation of political parties in Colombia's legislature

Table 17: Orientation of political parties in Colombia's legislature					
	Liberal Party and associates Seats (%)	Conservative Party associates Seats (%)	Party with most seats in legislature	Party with most seats in confirming Senate	President's party
Gaviria (1991-1994)					
H	87(LP) + 13 (M-19)(62%)	15 (CP)(9%)	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal
S	58(LP)+ 9 (M-19) (66%)	14 (CP)(14%)			
Samper (1994-1998)					
H	88(LP) (55%)	50 (CP) + 1(MNC)(32%)	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal
S	56 (LP) (55%)	20 (CP)(20%)			
Pastrana (1998-2002) ^a					
H	54 (LP) (34%)	15(CP) + 7 (MNC) + 3 (NFD)(16%)	Liberal	Liberal	Conservative party supported by a multi-party coalition
S	48(LP) (47%)	25 (CP) + 7 (MNC) (31%)			
Uribe I (2002-2006)					
H	54(LP) + 7 (CR) (36%)	21(CP) (13%)	Liberal	Liberal	Independent, with liberal militancy past.
S	29(LP) (28%)	13(CP) (13%)			
Uribe II (2006-2010)					
H	35(LP in the opposition) + 30 (P de U) + 20 (CR) (51%)	29 (CP) (17%)	Liberal	Liberal	P de U, with the Liberal party in the opposition.
S	18(LP in the opposition) +20 (P de U)+ 15(CR) (52%)	18 (CP) (18%)			
Santos (2010-2014)					
H	37(LP) + 47 (P de U) (50%)	38 (CP) (23%)	Liberal	Liberal	P de U
S	17(LP) + 28 (P de U) (44%)	22 (CP) (22%)			

Note: The party abbreviations are as follows: Liberal Party (LP), Conservative Party (CP), Alianza Democratica M-19 (M-19), Cambio Radical (CR), Movimiento Nacional Conservador (MNC), Nueva Fuerza Democratica (NFD)

A brief description of these parties and their relation to Colombia's traditional liberal and conservative parties is listed below.

Political Party	Origin	Liberal/Conservative
Alianza Democrática M-19	This political movement was created as result of the demobilization of the guerrilla group "Movimiento 19 de Abril", which upon entering politics modified its extreme left position, and assumed became closer to the center-left. "During the National Constituent Assembly elected in 1990, the AD-M19 was allied with the Liberal Party to confront the conservatives (Febres-Cordero, 1997: 40-41). On the other hand, Antonio Navarro Wolf (leader of the AD-M19) entered the government of the liberal President Gaviria from the beginning, occupying a ministerial position. This prevented a parliamentary opposition from developing. In short, between 1991 and 1994 AD-M19 found itself sharing power in the government rather than in the opposition." (López 2005, 48)	Liberal
Movimiento Nacional Conservador	In 2002, this party was one of nine movements that supported the candidacy of Álvaro Uribe Vélez. (Duque Daza 2006, 2011)	Conservative
Movimiento Fuerza Progresista		Conservative
Nueva Fuerza Democrática	Party affiliated with the Conservative party in Congress (Duque 2014)	Conservative
Cambio Radical	In 1998, a group of members of the Colombian Liberal Party, ex-Galanists, founded a political organization. This movement was a reaction to the election of the presidential candidate Horacio Serpa without having carried out an internal consultation, part of agreements under which the New Liberalism had agreed to reunify with the Liberal party. As a consequence of this breach, a movement of liberal origin was created, with a liberal ideology, but different from the liberal party. See http://www.partidocambioradical.org/nuestra-historia/ visited: June 9, 2019	Liberal
Partido de la U	In 2005 President Alvaro Uribe created the Partido de la U, which brought together retired members of the Liberal Party and some small regional parties, such as Nuevo Partido, Colombia Democrática, Colombia Viva y Colombia Siempre, as well as some conservative leaders.	Liberal
Partido Centro Democrático	In 2012, Alvaro Uribe proposes a "Front against terrorism" driven by a movement called "Pure Democratic Center" (PCD), which was interpreted by some as a new party but by others as a great "coalition". (Lozada and Liendo 2016). The creation of this new party was a response to the distance between Uribe and Santos, who was elected with the support and by the Partido de la U.	Conservative

Sources

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Table 1.5. Coding of case subject areas based on constitutional provisions referenced

	Articles of relevant constitutions		Coding of variables for case types
	Chile 2006-	Colombia	
Bases for unconstitutionality	1-9		
Nationality & citizenship	10-18	96-102	
Political parties		103-112	
Rights and Duties	19-23	11-95	Rights
Government	24-45	188-227	
President and ministers	24-37	188-227	Separation of powers
State administration	38	113-131	
States of exception	39-45	212-215	
Congress	46-75	132-187	Separation of powers
Judicial power	76-82	228-245	Separation of powers
Public ministry	83-91	275-284	
Constitutional Court	92-94	239-245	
Electoral justice	95-97		
Comptroller general	98-100	267-274	
Armed forces & security	101-105	216-223	
Consejo Nacional de Estado	106-107		
Economic		332-370	
Central Bank	108-109	371-373	
Subnational government	110-126	285-331	Subnational
Constitutional reform	127-129	374-380	

Table 1.6. Summary statistics of judge-level data for the Chilean CT

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Judges' unconstitutional vote	0.23	0.42	0	1
Presidential appointee	0.24	0.43	0	1
Legislative appointee	0.39	0.49	0	1
Concertación associated judge	0.44	0.50	0	1
Right associated judge	0.31	0.46	0	1
Tenure	3.61	2.55	0	11
Requerimiento	0.09	0.29	0	1
Separation of powers	0.24	0.43	0	1
Rights	0.30	0.46	0	1
Subnational	0.23	0.42	0	1
Avg. other presidential appointees	0.24	0.12	0	0.43
Avg. other legislative appointees	0.39	0.09	0.14	0.57
Avg. other Concertación assoc. jud.	0.44	0.11	0.13	0.71
Avg. other Right assoc. judges	0.31	0.11	0	0.57
Composition change 1	0.12	0.32	0	1
Composition change 2	0.08	0.28	0	1

Table 1.7. Summary statistics of judge-level data for the Colombia CC

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Judges' unconstitutional vote	0.30	0.46	0	1
Presidential nominees	0.39	0.49	0	1
Supreme Court nominees	0.28	0.45	0	1
Liberal party associated judge	0.50	0.50	0	1
Tenure	3.80	2.50	0	9
Statutory law	0.08	0.27	0	1
International treaty	0.15	0.36	0	1
Separation of powers	0.67	0.47	0	1
Rights	0.73	0.44	0	1
Subnational	0.16	0.36	0	1
Separation of powers	0.67	0.47	0	1
Avg. other presidential nominees	0.38	0.12	0	0.63
Avg. other Supreme Court nominees	0.28	0.12	0	0.50
Avg. other Liberal party associated j.	0.49	0.21	0	0.88
Composition change 1	0.12	0.32	0	1
Composition change 2	0.02	0.15	0	1

2. Robustness checks

Explanation of robustness checks:

In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the regressions are run with only one judge level variable for tenure to ascertain whether the model fits (ie. AIC/BIC) with the institutional selector were better than those with only tenure. The results indicate that the main models with institutional selectors had a better fit than those with only tenure.

In Table 2.3, the Chilean CT results were rerun with the removal of judges not associated with any parties. Column 1 of this table represents the results when judges affiliated with the Right are included in the regression and those affiliated with the Concertación constitute the base group. Column 2 represents the results when judges affiliated with the Concertación are included in the regression and those affiliated with the Right constitute the base group. The results in these columns are consistent with the main results.

In Table 2.4, a further regression using the Chilean CT data was analyzed as the Chilean data does not contain the counterfactual of judges selected by the Supreme Court or CSN, who are affiliated with parties of the Right. Therefore, creating variables which represent the appointer and the judges' party provides a robustness check to the main results. If judges selected by the president or the legislature (regardless of party affiliation) are more likely to strike down laws than those appointed by the Supreme Court or CSN, then this is additional evidence that appointing institution, and not party is a viable determinant of judges' decisions to strike down laws. This regression includes the following variables.

Presidential appointee associated with the Concertación

Presidential appointees associated with the Right

Legislative appointees associated with the Concertación

Legislative appointees associated with the Right

Supreme Court or CSN appointees associated with the Concertación

The base group is judges appointed by the Supreme Court or CSN who are not associated with parties.

The results in Table 2.5 show that judges associated with both parties selected by the President or the legislature are more likely to strike down laws than those selected by the Supreme Court and the CSN, all consistent with the main results

Table 2.1. Chile CT with tenure as only judge level variable

Variables	(1)
Tenure	0.00 (0.01)
Requerimiento	0.97*** (0.23)
Sepration of powers	0.45** (0.19)
Subnational	0.46*** (0.16)
Rights	0.60*** (0.17)
Avg. other presidential appointees	-1.20** (0.52)
Avg. other legislative appointees	-1.16*** (0.45)
Composition change 1	-0.18 (0.30)
Composition change 2	0.64*** (0.23)
Level 2 variance	-0.14 (0.19)
Constant	-0.98*** (0.26)
Observations	3,860
Number of cases	247
AIC	3549
BIC	3617

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.2. Colombia CC with tenure as only judge level variable

Variables	(1)
Tenure	0.03*** (0.01)
Statutory law	1.13*** (0.38)
International treaty	-1.52*** (0.16)
Separation of powers	0.32** (0.13)
Rights	-0.06 (0.11)
Subnational government	0.08 (0.16)
Avg. other presidential nominee	1.57*** (0.34)
Avg. other Supreme Court nominee	0.44 (0.28)
Composition change 1	0.03 (0.24)
Composition change 2	-0.53 (0.37)
Level 2 variance	1.87*** (0.16)
Constant	-2.68*** (0.31)
Judge level observations	16,493
Number of cases	1,332
AIC	13425
BIC	13517

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.3. Chile CT main results with nonpartisan judges removed

Variables	(1)	(2)
Presidential appointee	0.58*** (0.16)	0.52*** (0.12)
Legislative appointee	0.60*** (0.17)	0.56*** (0.15)
Right associated judge	-0.14 (0.18)	
Concertación associated judge		0.08 (0.15)
Tenure	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Requerimiento	0.82*** (0.20)	0.81*** (0.20)
Separation of powers	0.50*** (0.15)	0.50*** (0.15)
Rights	0.45*** (0.15)	0.46*** (0.15)
Subnational	0.43*** (0.15)	0.43*** (0.15)
Avg. other presidential appointees	2.19* (1.17)	1.67** (0.78)
Avg. other legislative appointees	2.82** (1.23)	2.45** (1.03)
Avg. other Right associated judges	-0.61 (1.00)	
Avg. other Concertación associated judges		0.06 (0.77)
Composition change 1	0.17 (0.28)	0.17 (0.29)
Composition change 2	0.44* (0.25)	0.48* (0.25)
Level 2 variance	-0.55*** (0.20)	-0.54*** (0.20)
Constant	-3.34*** (0.59)	-3.35*** (0.77)
Judge level observations	2,887	2,887
Number of cases	247	247

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.4. Chile CT with variables for appointer and political association combined

Variables	(1)
Presidential appointees associated with Concertación	0.40* (0.22)
Presidential appointess associated with the Right	0.43** (0.18)
Legislative appointees associated with Concertación	0.61*** (0.20)
Legislative appointees associated with the Right	0.40** (0.17)
Supreme Court or CSN associated with the Concertación	-0.16 (0.19)
Tenure	0.01 (0.01)
Requerimiento	0.96*** (0.23)
Separation of powers	0.44** (0.18)
Rights	0.42** (0.16)
Subnational	0.48*** (0.16)
Avg. other Concertación associated judges	-1.48 (1.33)
Avg. other Right associated judges	-1.88 (1.78)
Avg. other presidential appointees	2.35 (1.53)
Avg. other legislative appointees	3.62** (1.60)
Composition change 1	0.11 (0.31)
Composition change 2	0.51* (0.27)
Level 2 variance	-0.29 (0.19)
Constant	-2.71*** (0.88)
Judge level observations	3,860
Number of cases	247

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1