

ONLINE APPENDIX

Shaping public opinion about regional integration: the rhetoric of justification and party cues

Konstantin Vössing

Study 1

Appendix 1.1: Experimental treatment materials

Appendix 1.2: Measurement of variables

Appendix 1.3: Sample composition and homogeneity of treatment groups

Appendix 1.4: Supporting information for figure 2

Appendix 1.5: Analysis by sub-samples

Appendix 1.6: Debriefing note

Study 2

Appendix 2.1: Experimental treatment materials

Appendix 2.2: Measurement of variables

Appendix 2.3: Sample composition and homogeneity of treatment groups

Appendix 2.4: Supporting information for figure 3

Appendix 2.5: Analysis by sub-samples

Appendix 2.6: Debriefing note

Miscellaneous

Appendix 3: Works cited in online appendix

Appendix 1.1: Experimental treatment materials (study 1)

1.1.1 Reproduction of the treatment article

Bremer MEP Brückner (CDU): „Wichtiger Schritt für die Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität.“

Kommt jetzt die Europa-Steuer?

Brüssel/Bremen (dpa/mk). Das Europäische Parlament hat sich gestern in Brüssel für die Einführung einer sogenannten Europa-Steuer in der Europäischen Union (EU) ausgesprochen. In einer knappen Abstimmung votierten 347 Abgeordnete mit Ja, bei 12 Enthaltungen und 329 Gegenstimmen. Das Thema wurde bereits jahrelang kontrovers diskutiert, ist aber durch die Finanz- und Schuldenkrise zuletzt deutlich in den Hintergrund gerückt. Umso erstaunlicher war aus Sicht von Experten deshalb die Entscheidung einiger EU-Parlamentarier, die fast vergessene Initiative der Europäischen Kommission zur Europa-Steuer aus dem Jahre 2009 aufzugreifen und in der gestrigen Sitzung zur Abstimmung zu stellen.

Für eine Umsetzung des Beschlusses ist die Zustimmung der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten erforderlich. Dies wird in allen politischen Lagern als derzeit eher unwahrscheinlich eingeschätzt. Die Initiative des Parlaments war trotzdem erfolgreich, so war aus Expertenkreisen zu hören, weil sie das Thema wieder auf die Tagesordnung gebracht hat. Eine Europa-Steuer würde der EU eine eigene von den Mitgliedsstaaten unabhängige Finanzierungsquelle verschaffen, über die sie bisher nicht verfügt. Die Steuer wäre allerdings aufkommensneutral – für die Bürger der EU ergäbe sich keine zusätzliche Belastung, es würden lediglich Einnahmen der Mitgliedsstaaten in den unmittelbaren Zuständigkeitsbereich der EU überführt. Dennoch betonen sowohl Unterstützer als auch Gegner des Parlamentsbeschlusses, dass die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer einen erheblichen Autoritätszuwachs für die Europäische Union darstellen würde.

Herbert Brückner (CDU), Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments (MEP) aus Bremen, hat in der gestrigen Sitzung mit Ja gestimmt. Auf Anfrage des Weser Kuriers begründete Brückner seine Entscheidung so: „Die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer ist ein wichtiger Schritt für die Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität. Nur eine starke und unabhängige EU kann die richtigen Maßnahmen ergreifen, um dieses Ziel zu erreichen. Dazu braucht die EU eine eigene Einnahmequelle, die vom Einfluss der Mitgliedsstaaten abgeschirmt ist.“

1.1.2 English translation and identification of treatments

MEP Brückner from Bremen [*insert PARTY AFFILIATION*]: “Important step for achieving [*insert GOAL INVOKED IN POLICY JUSTIFICATION*]”

Euro tax coming soon?

Brussels/Bremen (dpa/mk). The European Parliament in Brussels voted in favor of introducing a so-called Euro-tax yesterday. The vote was close, with 347 legislators voting yes, 12 abstentions, and 329 votes against. The topic had been subject to a long and controversial debate, before it disappeared from the top of the political agenda as a result of the financial and debt crisis. This made the decision of several Members of the European Parliament to unearth and bring to a vote the almost forgotten Euro-tax initiative of the European Commission from 2009 all the more surprising.

The member states of the EU would have to support the measure to turn the vote of the European Parliament into political reality. Representatives from all political camps unanimously described this as rather unlikely for the time being. The initiative of the European Parliament was still successful, according to experts,

because it placed the issue back on the political agenda. A Euro-tax would provide the EU with a source of income independent of the control of its member states, which it does not currently have. Importantly, the measure would not affect overall levels of taxation. EU citizens would not have to pay any additional taxes. Instead, existing revenue of the member states would effectively be transferred under the immediate control of the EU. Both supporters and opponents emphasize that the introduction of a Euro-tax would entail a considerable increase in political authority for the European Union.

Herbert Brückner [*insert PARTY AFFILIATION*], member of the European Parliament (MEP) from Bremen, voted in favor of the Euro-tax in yesterday's session. In response to a question from the *Weser Kurier*, Brückner justified his decision as follows: "The introduction of a Euro tax is an important step toward [*insert GOAL INVOKED IN POLICY JUSTIFICATION*]. Only a strong and independent EU can take the necessary measures to achieve this goal. In order to do this, the EU needs its own source of revenue that is shielded from the influence of its member states."

1.1.3 Notes

The newspaper is identified as the "Weser-Kurier", a quality yet little known daily for the city of Bremen and its surroundings, which provides local, national, and international coverage. As the European Parliament (EP) does not have the right of initiative (that is the right to introduce new legislation), the article states that the vote in the EP is based on an "almost forgotten" initiative of the European Commission (which has the right of initiative) from 2009. The vote on the resolution to introduce a Euro-tax is described as successful yet close (347 MEPs voting yes, 329 no, and 12 abstaining) to emphasize the controversial nature of the policy. The policy is described as meaningful and important, but to ensure the believability of the treatment, the article also states that the Euro-tax is unlikely to be introduced (despite the positive vote in the EP), due to the resistance of the EU member states (which have to agree on the measure through the European Council respectively the Council of Ministers). The term "dpa" in the author by-line identifies the largest German news agency (Deutsche Presse Agentur).

Appendix 1.2: Measurement of variables (study 1)¹

1.2.1 Policy support (for the Euro-tax), dependent variable

“On a thermometer scale, numbers between 50 and 100 mean that you have a ‘warm feeling’, that is a positive opinion. The larger the number the more positive the opinion. Numbers between 0 and 50 mean that you have a ‘cold feeling’, that is a negative opinion. The smaller the number, the more negative the opinion. Using the thermometer scale from 0 to 100, what is your opinion about the Euro-tax, which was discussed in the article you just read?”

1.2.2 Justification treatment

A categorical variable, as well as an equivalent set of dummy variables, identifying the randomly assigned goal invoked in a policy-justification-by-impact (1=European identity, 2=Free market, 3=Social justice, 4=National economic benefits, 5=European economic benefits).

1.2.3 Prior policy support

Measurement is based on a semantic association test developed by Castano et al. (2003). In the following, I provide the list of words I used to conduct the semantic association test (in the study, word order is randomized, and words appear in one single list, without references to “positive”, “neutral”, and “negative”).

Positive	Neutral	Negative
Enthusiasm	Disinterest	Uneasiness
Satisfaction	Indifference	Irritation
Trust	Detachment	Distrust
Appreciation	Aloofness	Anger
Approval	Neutrality	Rejection

Participants are told, pre-treatment, to select 5 words that “best describe their thoughts about the European Union.” The positive items are coded as +1, the neutral ones as 0, and the negative ones as -1. The scale is constructed by summing the items and rescaling them to a scale from 0 (lowest level of prior policy support for the European Union) to 10 (greatest level of prior policy support).

	N	Mean	SE Mean	SD	Range
Prior policy support	277	5.97	0.15	2.51	0-10

1.2.4 Prior goal support

The variable identifies the level of support for the goal invoked in the justification goal treatment received by a participant. The five constituent measures of this variable (each used for the related justification goal treatment) are based on scales that are constructed from three or four Likert-style questions asking participants to indicate their relative agreement or disagreement with a statement (5-point scale). All these questions are asked pre-treatment.

Constituent indicators of prior goal support	Items and scale reliability	References
Participants treated with European identity justification: <i>Support for European identity</i>	“Being European is part of my identity.”	Measurement based on Castano and Izerbyt (1998), and Castano et al. (2003, 738-739)
	“I don’t identify with other Europeans.” (<i>reverse coded</i>)	
	“It is important for me to be European.”	
	Scale range from 0 (lowest support) to 12 (greatest support).	

¹ The dependent variable, Policy support for the Euro-tax, is used in its original 0-100 scale in the statistical analyses. All independent variables are rescaled to a scale of 0-1 for the analyses, to facilitate more convenient comparisons of coefficients.

	Cronbach alpha = 0.61	
Participants treated with free market justification: <i>Support for free market</i>	“Letting the government get involved in the economy is often better than relying on private enterprise.” (<i>reverse coded</i>)	Measurement adapted from standard socialism-capitalism scales used in national and comparative surveys (cf. Heath et al. 1994)
	“Overall, trade unions interfere too much.”	
	“We would all be better off if the government did not get involved in the economy as much as it does.”	
	“Every man for himself and every woman for herself means that we are all going to be better off in the end.”	
	Scale range from 0 (lowest support) to 16 (greatest support). Cronbach alpha = 0.73	
Participants treated with social justice justification: <i>Support for social justice</i>	“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”	Measurement adapted from standard socialism-capitalism scales used in national and comparative surveys (cf. Heath et al. 1994)
	“Government should make sure that everyone has access to health services, unemployment benefits, and funds for retirement.”	
	“It is important to support those who are worse-off”	
	Scale range from 0 (lowest support) to 12 (greatest support). Cronbach alpha = 0.68	
Participants treated with national economic benefits justification: <i>Support for national economic benefits</i>	“The government should make sure to very carefully control the activities of foreign companies in Germany.”	Measurement based on Baughn and Yaprak (1996, 777)
	“We should only buy products from other countries that we cannot produce ourselves in Germany.”	
	“Companies that outsource their factories to countries outside of Germany should be fined.”	
	“It is important for German companies to end up victorious in competitions with foreign companies.”	
	Scale range from 0 (lowest support) to 16 (greatest support). Cronbach alpha = 0.65	
Participants treated with European economic benefits justification: <i>Support for European economic benefits</i>	“The transfer of European technologies to non-European companies should be strictly controlled.”	Measurement based on Baughn and Yaprak (1996, 777)
	“When Europeans buy products from non-European companies, they are responsible for other Europeans’ losing their job.”	
	“Companies that outsource their factories to countries outside of Europe are shirking their responsibility.”	
	“It is important for Europe to win the upper hand in trade relations with countries outside of Europe.”	
	Scale range from 0 (lowest support) to 16 (greatest support). Cronbach alpha = 0.71	

1.2.5 Party treatment

A categorical variable, as well as an equivalent set of dummy variables, identifying the randomly assigned party affiliation of the politician justifying his support for the Euro-tax, the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Herbert Brueckner (1=CDU, 2=SPD, 3=Left Party, 4=Greens).

1.2.6 Party cueing (party identification)

The following question is asked pre-treatment to measure party identification for all parties included in the study. The party cueing (party identification) variable identifies the party identification score for the party appearing in a participant’s treatment condition.

“We would like to know what you are thinking about the various political parties currently represented in the German parliament. Please evaluate each of the parties using a so-called feeling thermometer. Numbers between 50 and 100 mean that you have a ‘warm feeling’, that is a positive opinion, about the party. The larger the number the more positive the opinion. Numbers between 0 and 50 mean that you have a ‘cold feeling’, that is a negative opinion, about the party. The smaller the number, the more negative the opinion. On a feeling thermometer from 0 to 100, what is your opinion about the (*CDU, SPD, Greens, Left Party*)?”

1.2.7 Political sophistication

Political sophistication is measured by summing the correct answers to the following six political knowledge questions (a mix of multiple choice and open ended) about the EU and European integration:

1. When were the “Treaties of Rome” signed? (“1995”, “2001”, “1957”, “1944”)
2. How many member states currently constitute the European Union? (28)
3. Which of the following is NOT an institution of the European Union? (“Commission”, “European Parliament”, “Security Council”, “Council of Ministers”)
4. Which of the following statements is true? (“The members of the European Parliament are elected by the citizens of Europe”, “The members of the European Parliament are nominated by the European Commission”, “The members of the European Parliament are nominated by their national governments”, “There is no such thing as a European Parliament”)
5. The “Treaty on European Union” was signed in which city in 1992? (“Maastricht”)
6. Which one of the following statements is NOT true? (“The Treaty of Lisbon unites all national armies under the control of the EU”, “The European Central Bank determines interest rates for the countries using the Euro currency”, “The European Union decides about tariffs on American imports”, “The European Court of Justice can impose decisions of the EU against national governments”)

The cronbach alpha value for the resulting 0-6 scale is an acceptable 0.64. The original variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable by dividing participants into categories of low and high political sophistication along the mean value (3.05).

1.2.8 Need for cognition

A continuous measure of need for cognition was created on a scale from 0 (lowest need for cognition) to 16 (highest need) by summing participant’s degrees of agreement with each of the following statements (on a scale of 0, do not agree at all, to 4, agree completely): “I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally”, “I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them” (*reverse coded*), “The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me”, “I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking” (cf. Cacioppo and Petty 1982). [Variable label, 0-16 scale: *needcogA*]. The original variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable by dividing participants into categories of low and high need for cognition along the mean value (10.53).

1.2.9 Issue importance

Issue importance identifies the degree of importance participants attribute to the issue of European integration. A continuous measure of issue importance was created on a scale from 0 (issue perceived as entirely unimportant) to 12 (issue seen as extremely important) by summing participant’s degrees of agreement with each of the following statements (on a scale of 0, do not agree at all, to 4, agree completely): “European integration should play a larger role in political debates”, “When I am thinking about my views of different political parties, it is particularly important to me that a party’s opinion about European integration is close to my own”, “The topic of European integration is significant and important to me as far as politics is concerned”. The original variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable by dividing participants into categories of low and high issue importance along the mean value (6.55).

1.2.10 Age

“How old are you?”

1.2.11 Social class

"If you were asked to use one of the following labels, which social class would you say your parents belong to?" (1=working class, 2=lower middle class, 3=middle class, 4=upper middle class, 5=upper class)

1.2.12 Gender

"Are you male or female?" (0=male, 1=female)

1.2.13 Political interest

"How interested are you in politics?" (from 1=lowest to 4=highest)

1.2.14 Occupation, education, and income situations

Open ended question about participant's profession and current job.

1.2.15 Left-right position

Self-identified position on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), with 5 as an explicit middle point

1.2.16 Prior awareness of the Euro-tax policy

"How familiar were you with the proposal to introduce a Euro-tax before reading the article in the *Weser-Kurier*?" (0=not aware at all, 1=not aware, 2=not particularly aware, 3=somewhat aware, 4=aware, 5=very aware)

1.2.17 Support for government intervention in the economy

Participants are asked to indicate their relative agreement or disagreement with the following statement on a 5-point scale (1=highest level of disagreement, 2=moderate disagreement, 3= neutral point, 4=moderate agreement, 5=highest level of agreement): "Letting the government get involved in the economy is often better than relying on private enterprise."

1.2.18 Need for evaluation

Scale from 0 (lowest need for evaluation) to 16 (highest need) created from four items: "I enjoy strongly liking and disliking new things", "I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues" (*reverse coded*), "I like to decide new things are really good or really bad", "I only form strong opinions when I have to" (*reverse coded*), (cf. Jarvis and Petty 1996).

1.2.18 Political trust

Scale from 0 (lowest trust) to 12 (highest) created from three items: "Whatever its faults, our form of government is still the best for us", "There is not much about our form of government to be proud of" (*reverse coded*), "I would rather live in our system of government than any other I can think of" (cf. McGraw and Hubbard 1996).

1.2.19 Political efficacy

Scale from 0 (lowest efficacy) to 12 (highest) created from three items: "I am well qualified to participate in politics", "I could do as good a job in public office as most other people", "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that someone like me can't understand what's going on" (*reverse coded*).

Appendix 1.3: Sample composition and homogeneity of treatment groups (study 1)

1.3.1 Descriptive statistics for participant characteristics

	N	Range	Mean	SE Mean	SD
Age	279	18-73	28.06	0.64	10.73
Social class	278	1-5	2.78	0.06	1.00
Political sophistication	280	0-6	3.05	0.10	1.74
Political interest	281	1-4	3.31	0.04	0.65
Prior awareness of Euro-tax policy	283	0-5	1.63	0.08	1.25
Left-right position	281	0-9	3.53	0.11	1.78
Need for cognition	280	5-16	10.53	0.14	2.30
Need for evaluation	281	3-15	9.10	0.14	2.41
Political trust	280	0-12	8.13	0.14	2.38
Political efficacy	279	0-12	5.72	0.13	2.11
Gender	278	0-1	0.60	0.03	0.49

1.3.2 Differences between experimental conditions in terms of participant characteristics²

	Justification goal treatment: test of differences between five experimental conditions	Party cue treatment: test of differences between four experimental conditions
Age	0.43 (0.79)	0.88 (0.45)
Social class	0.54 (0.71)	1.48 (0.22)
Political sophistication	0.89 (0.47)	1.02 (0.38)
Political interest	1.84 (0.12)	0.85 (0.47)
Prior awareness of the Euro-tax policy	0.52 (0.72)	2.31 (0.08)
Left-right position	1.48 (0.21)	1.30 (0.27)
Need for cognition	0.90 (0.44)	0.71 (0.59)
Need for evaluation	1.14 (0.34)	1.50 (0.22)
Political trust	0.94 (0.44)	0.54 (0.66)
Political efficacy	1.14 (0.34)	1.78 (0.15)
Gender	Ten t-tests $p > 0.1$	Six t-tests $p > 0.1$

² Cells display F-values (p in parentheses) from ANOVA testing group differences between experimental conditions of the two experimental treatments (Justification goal treatment and Party cue treatment), except for the cells associated with the Gender variable, which report the results of t-tests comparing the average number of females in each treatment group for all combinations of groups created by the two experimental treatments (6 separate tests for the party cue treatment, 10 separate tests for the justification goal treatment).

Appendix 1.4: Supporting information for figure 2 (study 1)

1.4.1 Full Models

Model	Full sample	By political sophistication		By need for cognition		By issue importance	
	--- 1 ---	Low --- 2 ---	High --- 3 ---	Low --- 4 ---	High --- 5 ---	Low --- 6 ---	High --- 7 ---
Policy justification: prior policy support	25.1 (4.9) *	29.3 (6.6) *	14.4 (7.4)	30.4 (7.5) *	17.8 (6.7) *	28.1 (8.0) *	23.3 (6.8) *
Policy justification: prior goal support	17.3 (6.9) *	21.8 (10.0) *	14.5 (9.4)	22.7 (10.8) *	14.6 (9.1)	22.7 (10.1) *	16.5 (10.2)
Party cueing: party identification	12.5 (5.1) *	1.3 (7.2)	23.8 (7.5) *	13.9 (8.9)	15.2 (6.4) *	1.1 (7.9)	25.7 (7.1) *
Justification goal							
European identity	-7.3 (4.0)	-14.1 (5.6) *	0.2 (5.6)	-6.3 (5.9)	-9.2 (5.5)	-8.7 (6.0)	-8.1 (5.6)
Free market	-3.3 (4.0)	-8.9 (5.7)	-0.3 (5.8)	-1.5 (5.9)	-6.0 (5.5)	-6.6 (5.8)	1.9 (5.8)
Social justice	-10.0 (4.6) *	-15.6 (6.7) *	-4.2 (6.5)	-10.1 (7.0)	-14.9 (6.4) *	-15.0 (7.5) *	-7.9 (6.1)
National economic benefits	-5.6 (3.9)	-7.0 (5.1)	-4.5 (6.0)	-3.5 (5.9)	-9.2 (5.2)	-3.7 (5.8)	-10.3 (5.4)
European economic benefits							
Party cue							
Christian Democrats	-3.8 (3.4)	-6.5 (4.7)	-0.3 (5.0)	-4.5 (5.5)	-1.1 (4.4)	-3.6 (5.2)	-6.4 (4.7)
Social Democrats	-5.8 (3.4)	-6.0 (4.7)	-6.1 (5.1)	-4.2 (5.2)	-6.2 (4.6)	-2.3 (5.0)	-12.8 (4.9) *
Greens	-2.4 (3.6)	2.8 (4.9)	-7.5 (5.2)	-1.5 (5.6)	-2.5 (4.6)	1.5 (5.6)	-9.1 (4.9)
Left Party							
Constant	30.9 (6.1) *	34.5 (7.7) *	37.1 (8.8) *	21.2 (9.3) *	43.5 (7.5) *	34.3 (8.1) *	31.8 (9.0) *
R ²	0.18	0.23	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.17	0.22
N	274	157	115	130	142	129	145

Notes: Dependent variable is policy support for the Euro-tax (0-100 scale). Cell entries are non-standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates ($p < 0.05$) are identified using the * symbol. All independent variables are rescaled to 0-1 scales.

1.4.2 Outcomes: Classification of coefficients from models 2-7³

	Prior policy support effect		Prior goal support effect		Party identification effect	
	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size
Low sophisticates	+	>	+	>	0	<
High sophisticates	0	<	0	<	+	>
Low cognition	+	>	+	>	0	<
High cognition	+	<	0	<	+	>
Low importance	+	>	+	>	0	<
High importance	+	<	0	<	+	>

1.4.3 Expectations of hypothesis 4b compared to actual outcomes

	Prior policy support effect		Prior goal support effect		Party identification effect		Accuracy of expectations	
	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size
Low sophisticates	+	>	+	>	0	<	3/3	3/3
High sophisticates	0	<	0	<	+	>	3/3	3/3
Low cognition	+	>	+	>	0	<	2/3	3/3
High cognition	0	<	0	<	+	>	2/3	3/3
Low importance	+	>	+	>	0	<	3/3	3/3
High importance	0	<	0	<	+	>	2/3	3/3
Accuracy of expectations	5/6	6/6	5/6	6/6	6/6	6/6	16/18	18/18
							34/36	

1.4.4 Expectations of hypothesis 4a compared to actual outcomes

	Prior policy support effect		Prior goal support effect		Party identification effect		Accuracy of expectations	
	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size
Low sophisticates	0	<	0	<	+	>	0/3	0/3
High sophisticates	+	>	+	>	0	<	0/3	0/3
Low cognition	0	<	0	<	+	>	0/3	0/3
High cognition	+	>	+	>	0	<	1/3	0/3
Low importance	0	<	0	<	+	>	0/3	0/3
High importance	+	>	+	>	0	<	1/3	0/3
Accuracy of expectations	1/6	0/6	1/6	0/6	0/6	0/6	2/18	0/18
							2/36	

³ Effect direction: predicted direction of effects of independent variables (prior policy support, prior goal support, party identification) in different sub-samples (low versus high sophisticates, low versus high cognition, low versus high issue importance). Effect size: comparison of the effect sizes of independent variables in different sub-samples.

Appendix 1.5: Analysis by sub-samples (study 1)

	Student sub-sample	General population Sub-sample
Policy justification: prior policy support	25.0 (7.1) *	24.3 (8.6) *
Policy justification: prior goal support	22.0 (9.3) *	16.4 (9.9) +
Party cueing: party identification	14.3 (6.7) *	10.0 (7.8)
Justification goal		
European identity	-7.4 (5.2)	-8.2 (5.8)
Free market	5.4 (5.2)	-9.9 (6.0) +
Social justice	-12.9 (6.1) *	-10.1 (6.6)
National economic benefits	-6.4 (5.0)	-5.4 (5.6)
European economic benefits		
Party cue		
Christian Democrats	-0.6 (4.4)	-7.5 (5.1)
Social Democrats	-0.1 (4.8)	-7.9 (4.8)
Greens	-4.0 (4.6)	-1.7 (5.5)
Left Party		
Constant	28.9 (7.5) *	37.4 (8.6) *
R ²	0.25	0.20
N	109	165

Notes: Dependent variable is policy support for the Euro-tax (0-100 scale). Cell entries are non-standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates ($p < 0.05$) are identified using the * symbol. Coefficient estimates with $p < 0.1$ are identified using +. All independent variables are rescaled to 0-1 scales.

Appendix 1.6: Debriefing note (study 1)

1.6.1 Reproduction of the debriefing note handed to participants after the experiment

Informationen zur Studie und zum Probanden-Pool

Die Studie an der Sie gerade teilgenommen haben, ist ein sozialwissenschaftliches Experiment. Bei experimentellen Studien werden durch die Forschenden systematisch Informationen manipuliert und zwischen den Teilnehmenden variiert. Diese Vorgehensweise erlaubt es uns, verlässliche Aussagen darüber zu treffen, ob eine bestimmte Variable, die uns theoretisch interessiert, einen kausalen Effekt auf andere Variablen hat.

Bei der experimentellen Studie, an der Sie gerade teilgenommen haben, geht es darum, wie zufrieden Menschen mit politischen Aussagen sind, und wie dies ihre politischen Einstellungen beeinflusst. Dazu haben wir auch in dieser Studie gewisse Informationen „fabriziert“ und systematisch zwischen den Teilnehmenden variiert. So gibt es tatsächlich eine politische Auseinandersetzung über die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer, aber die in den von uns verfassten Texten beschriebene Abstimmung im Europäischen Parlament hat es in dieser Form nicht gegeben. Wir haben darüber hinaus einem fiktiven Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments verschiedene Aussagen über die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer zugeordnet. Welche/r Teilnehmer/in der Studie welche Aussage gelesen hat, wurde per Zufall entschieden.

Diese ganze Vorgehensweise ist notwendig zur Durchführung von Experimenten und extrem wichtig für unsere Forschung: nur so können wir herausfinden, ob es überhaupt einen Unterschied macht, welche Argumente Politiker/innen verwenden, um ihre Entscheidungen zu begründen.

Damit wir diese Frage zuverlässig erforschen können, möchten wir Sie sehr bitten, den Inhalt der Studie nicht mit anderen zu besprechen, die noch an der Studie teilnehmen wollen.

Genauere Informationen über die Manipulation, die wir vorgenommen haben, die wissenschaftlichen Ziele der Studie sowie die Möglichkeiten der praktischen Anwendung von Studien mit kleinen Stichproben (u.a. Experimente) erhalten Sie im Rahmen einer kurzen Informationsveranstaltung. Über den Termin informieren wir Sie noch per email. Falls Sie dann verhindert sind, gibt es zu Anfang des kommenden Semesters einen zweiten Termin, zu dem die Informationsveranstaltung erneut angeboten wird. Dieser zweite Termin wird auch rechtzeitig durch die email-Liste des Probanden-Pools und auf der Webseite des Probanden-Pools << sowi.hu-berlin.de/lehrbereiche/comppol/prob >> bekannt gegeben.

Für Studierende am Institut für Sozialwissenschaften der HU Berlin: Durch die Teilnahme an der Veranstaltung erwerben Sie einen weiteren 1/3 BZQ Punkt. Bitte bringen Sie zu allen BZQ Aktivitäten des Probanden-Pools die Teilnehmerliste mit, die auch auf der o.g. Webseite verfügbar ist, um sich Ihre Teilnahme bestätigen zu lassen. Wir würden uns natürlich sehr freuen, wenn Sie anderen Studierenden hier am Institut über die Möglichkeit berichten würden, durch die Teilnahme an Aktivitäten des Probanden-Pools BZQ-Punkte zu erwerben. Die Registrierung erfolgt über die o.g. Webseite.

Falls Sie Fragen zu dieser Studie oder zum Probanden-Pool haben, können Sie sich gerne an einen der folgenden Ansprechpartner wenden:

[Name and email address of contact person #1]

[Name and email address of contact person #2]

1.6.3 English translation of the debriefing note

Information about the study and the participant pool

The study in which you just participated is a social science experiment. In experimental studies, researchers systematically manipulate information and vary the content of information between participants. This allows us to reach valid conclusions about whether some variable we are interested in has a causal effect on other variables.

The purpose of the present study is to figure out whether the opinions of people about political statements they read influence their political views. To investigate this topic, we also “fabricated” and systematically varied some information in this study. There really is a political debate about the introduction of a Euro-tax described in the article you just received, but the vote mentioned in the article, which we wrote for this study, has not taken place. We also assigned certain political statements about the introduction of a Euro-tax to a fictitious member of the European Parliament. It was randomly decided, which participant received which statement.

This entire procedure is necessary to successfully carry out the experiment and extremely important for our research. This is the best way to determine whether the arguments that politicians use to justify their decisions make any difference at all. It would help us a great deal in reliably answering this question if you could not discuss the content of this study with other participants.

We are organizing a brief event to provide additional information about the manipulation used in this study, the goals of our scholarship and the ways in which experimental research methods can be applied. We will notify you about the time and location of the event via email. If you cannot make it to the first event, you can also participate in a second event, which will be organized during the beginning of the next academic year. The second event will also be announced through the email list of the participant pool and our website at << sowi.hu-berlin.de/lehrbereiche/comppol/prob >>.

For students at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at HU Berlin: You will acquire additional course credit by participating in the events mentioned above. Please make sure to bring along your participant pool activities list to receive the credit. And do let other students know about the possibility of acquiring course credit through participant pool activities. Everyone can register through the above mentioned website.

For any questions you might have about this study or the participant pool, please do not hesitate to contact us:

[Name and email address of contact person #1]

[Name and email address of contact person #2]

Appendix 2.1: Experimental treatment materials (study 2)

2.1.1 Reproduction of the treatment article

Bremer MEPs vertreten unterschiedliche Positionen. Brückner (CDU) ist dafür: „Wichtiger Schritt für die Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität.“ Wilmers (SPD) spricht sich dagegen aus: „Trägt nicht zur Verwirklichung einer europäischen Identität bei.“

Kommt jetzt die Europa-Steuer?

Brüssel/Bremen (dpa/mk). Das Europäische Parlament hat sich gestern in Brüssel für die Einführung einer sogenannten Europa-Steuer in der Europäischen Union (EU) ausgesprochen. In einer knappen Abstimmung votierten 347 Abgeordnete mit Ja, bei 12 Enthaltungen und 329 Gegenstimmen. Das Thema wurde bereits jahrelang kontrovers diskutiert, ist aber durch die Finanz- und Schuldenkrise zuletzt deutlich in den Hintergrund gerückt. Umso erstaunlicher war aus Sicht von Experten deshalb die Entscheidung einiger EU-Parlamentarier, die fast vergessene Initiative der Europäischen Kommission zur Europa-Steuer aus dem Jahre 2009 aufzugreifen und in der gestrigen Sitzung zur Abstimmung zu stellen.

Für eine Umsetzung des Beschlusses ist die Zustimmung der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten erforderlich. Dies wird in allen politischen Lagern als derzeit eher unwahrscheinlich eingeschätzt. Die Initiative des Parlaments war trotzdem erfolgreich, so war aus Expertenkreisen zu hören, weil sie das Thema wieder auf die Tagesordnung gebracht hat. Eine Europa-Steuer würde der EU eine eigene von den Mitgliedsstaaten unabhängige Finanzierungsquelle verschaffen, über die sie bisher nicht verfügt. Die Steuer wäre allerdings aufkommensneutral – für die Bürger der EU ergäbe sich keine zusätzliche Belastung, es würden lediglich Einnahmen der Mitgliedsstaaten in den unmittelbaren Zuständigkeitsbereich der EU überführt. Dennoch betonen sowohl Unterstützer als auch Gegner des Parlamentsbeschlusses, dass die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer einen erheblichen Autoritätszuwachs für die Europäische Union darstellen würde.

In der politischen Auseinandersetzung verwenden Befürworter und Gegner der Europa-Steuer teilweise sehr unterschiedliche Begründungen für Ihre jeweiligen Positionen. Herbert Brückner (CDU), Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments (MEP) aus Bremen, unterstützt die Europa-Steuer und hat in der gestrigen Sitzung mit Ja gestimmt. Auf Anfrage des Weser Kuriers begründete Brückner seine Entscheidung so: „Die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer ist ein wichtiger Schritt für die Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität. Nur eine starke und eigenständige EU kann die richtigen Maßnahmen ergreifen, um dieses Ziel zu erreichen. Dazu braucht die EU eine eigene Einnahmequelle, die vom Einfluss der Mitgliedsstaaten abgeschnitten ist.“ Der andere Bremer

MEP, Frank Wilmers (SPD), lehnt die Europa-Steuer ab und hat in der Sitzung des Europa-Parlaments mit Nein gestimmt. Er sagte dem Weser Kurier zur Begründung: „Eine Europa-Steuer würde die EU viel zu einflussreich und zu unabhängig von den Mitgliedsländern machen. Eine gestärkte EU trägt aber nicht zur Verwirklichung einer europäischen Identität bei. Das kann man nicht von oben verordnen, das muss sich innerhalb der einzelnen Staaten entwickeln.“

2.1.2 English translation and identification of treatments

MEP Brückner *[insert PARTY AFFILIATION]* is in favor of the policy: “Important step for achieving *[insert GOAL INVOKED IN POLICY JUSTIFICATION or finish after “policy” for control condition]*”. MEP Wilmers is against the policy: “Does not help to accomplish *[insert GOAL INVOKED IN POLICY JUSTIFICATION or finish after “policy” for control condition]*”.

Euro tax coming soon?

Brussels/Bremen (dpa/mk). The European Parliament in Brussels voted in favor of introducing a so-called Euro-tax yesterday. The vote was close, with 347 legislators voting yes, 12 abstentions, and 329 votes against. The topic had been subject to a long and controversial debate, before it disappeared from the top of the political agenda as a result of the financial and debt crisis. This made the decision of several Members of the European Parliament to unearth and bring to a vote the almost forgotten Euro-tax initiative of the European Commission from 2009 all the more surprising.

The member states of the EU would have to support the measure to turn the vote of the European Parliament into political reality. Representatives from all political camps unanimously described this as rather unlikely for the time being. The initiative of the European Parliament was still successful, according to experts, because it placed the issue back on the political agenda. A Euro-tax would provide the EU with a source of income independent of the control of its member states, which it does not currently have. Importantly, the measure would not affect overall levels of taxation. EU citizens would not have to pay any additional taxes. Instead, existing revenue of the member states would effectively be transferred under the immediate control of the EU. Both supporters and opponents emphasize that the introduction of a Euro-tax would entail a considerable increase in political authority for the European Union.

Supporters and opponents of the Euro-tax employ varying justifications for their positions. Herbert Brückner [*insert PARTY AFFILIATION*], member of the European Parliament (MEP) from Bremen, voted in favor of the Euro-tax in yesterday's session. In response to a question from the Weser Kurier, Brückner justified his decision as follows: "The introduction of a Euro tax is an important step toward [*insert GOAL INVOKED IN POLICY JUSTIFICATION or replace text after "session" with ", but did not provide a justification for his decision in response to a request from the Weser Kurier" for control condition*] Only a strong and independent EU can take the necessary measures to achieve this goal. In order to do this, the EU needs its own source of revenue that is shielded from the influence of its member states." The other MEP from Bremen, Frank Wilmers [*insert PARTY AFFILIATION*] voted against the Euro-tax in the session of the European Parliament. This is what he told the Weser-Kurier to justify his decision: "A Euro-tax would make the EU too influential and too independent from the member states, and a strengthened EU does not contribute to achieve [*insert GOAL INVOKED IN POLICY JUSTIFICATION and "which is better accomplished in each of the member states" or replace text after "Parliament" with ", but did not provide a justification for his decision in response to a request from the Weser Kurier" for control condition*].

2.1.3 Notes

The newspaper is identified as the "Weser-Kurier", a quality yet little known daily for the city of Bremen and its surroundings, which provides local, national, and international coverage. As the European Parliament (EP) does not have the right of initiative (that is the right to introduce new legislation), the article states that the vote in the EP is based on an "almost forgotten" initiative of the European Commission (which has the right of initiative) from 2009. The vote on the resolution to introduce a Euro-tax is described as successful yet close (347 MEPs voting yes, 329 no, and 12 abstaining) to emphasize the controversial nature of the policy. The policy is described as meaningful and important, but to ensure the believability of the treatment, the article also states that the Euro-tax is unlikely to be introduced (despite the positive vote in the EP), due to the resistance of the EU member states (which have to agree on the measure through the European Council respectively the Council of Ministers). The term "dpa" in the author by-line identifies the largest German news agency (Deutsche Presse Agentur).

Appendix 2.2: Measurement of variables (study 2)⁴

2.2.1 Justification treatment 1a (by Herbert Brueckner, pro Euro-tax)

A categorical variable, as well as an equivalent set of dummy variables, identifying the randomly assigned goal invoked in the policy-justification-by-impact communicated by Herbert Brueckner to explain his support for the Euro-tax (1=European identity, 2=free market, 3= economic benefits, 4=no goal invoked, control).

2.2.2 Justification treatment 1b (by Frank Wilmers, against Euro-tax)

A categorical variable, as well as an equivalent set of dummy variables, identifying the randomly assigned goal invoked in the policy-justification-by-impact communicated by Frank Wilmers to explain his vote against the Euro-tax (1=European identity, 2=free market, 3= economic benefits, 4=no goal invoked, control).

2.2.3 Prior policy support

To create this variable, participants are first asked the following question: “There are different opinions about which decisions should be made by the countries in Europe independently from one another, and which decisions should be made jointly through the European Union. What do you think? Which of the following policy areas should be decided by your home country alone? And in which areas should decisions be made jointly within the European Union? And in which areas would you say that it does not matter?”

Participants then indicate whether they prefer national authority (coded as -1), European Union authority (coded as 1), or whether they are neutral (coded as 0), for the following 12 policy areas: immigration, employment, money and finance, environmental affairs, defense, press and media, health and social affairs, science, education, employment law, foreign affairs, domestic security and judicial affairs.

Eventually, the 12 variables thus constructed are summed, and then transformed into a 0-1 scale, on which lower values represent less and higher values more prior policy support.

2.2.4 Prior goal support

The same Likert scale questions asked in study 1 were used in study 2 to create indices measuring support for the various goals included in the justification goal treatments. Instead of using three or four of these questions, as in study 1, study 2 included the two items that had proven most reliable in study 1 (see appendix 1.2 for details). For the European identity goal, I included the items “Being European is part of my identity” and “It is important for me to be European.” For the free market goal, I included the items “Letting the government get involved in the economy is often better than relying on private enterprise” (*reverse coded*) and “Every man for himself and every woman for herself means that we are all going to be better off in the end.” For the economic benefits goal, I included two items that were included in study 1, but not used in the analysis, namely “There are many important topics in politics, but nothing is more important than a good economy” and “Economic well-being for our people is an exceptionally important political goal.”

Based on these items, prior goal support is then measured as follows. First, in conditions with only one justification, the score for prior goal support is determined based on participants’ support for the one goal invoked in that justification. This includes goals that are invoked to justify support and rejection of the policy, because participants in both these scenarios are led to consider the possibility that the policy will have a positive effect on the goal in question. Second, in conditions with two (or no) justifications, the level of support for the goal invoked by the politician to justify policy rejection is subtracted from the level of support for the goal that is invoked to justify policy approval. In this scenario, the pro-Euro-tax justification claims that a certain goal benefits from the policy, while the against-Euro-tax justification claims that this or

⁴ This appendix details info about the measurement of variables that are specific to study 2. For all other variables that are used in study 2 as well as study 1, see appendix 1.2.

some other goal fails to benefit the policy. The goal used to justify policy rejection is thus explicitly contrasted to the goal that is used to justify policy support. This is why overall levels of prior goal support are calculated here by subtracting the former from the latter.

The resulting scores for both scenarios are then rescaled to 0-1, so that higher values, as in study 1, stand for a greater push exerted by prior goal support on participants to support the justified policy.

2.2.5 Party treatment 1a (by Herbert Brückner, pro Euro-tax)

A categorical variable, as well as an equivalent set of dummy variables, identifying the randomly assigned party affiliation of the politician justifying his support for the Euro-tax, the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Herbert Brueckner (1=CDU, 2=SPD, 3=Left Party, 4=Greens).

2.2.6 Party treatment 1b (by Frank Wilmers, against Euro-tax)

A categorical variable, as well as an equivalent set of dummy variables, identifying the randomly assigned party affiliation of the politician justifying his rejection of the Euro-tax, the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Frank Wilmers (1=CDU, 2=SPD, 3=Left Party, 4=Greens).

2.2.7 Party cueing (party identification)

The following question is asked pre-treatment to measure party identification for all parties included in the experiment: “We would like to know what you are thinking about the various political parties currently represented in the German parliament. Please evaluate each of the parties using a so-called feeling thermometer. Numbers between 50 and 100 mean that you have a ‘warm feeling’, that is a positive opinion, about the party. The larger the number the more positive the opinion. Numbers between 0 and 50 mean that you have a ‘cold feeling’, that is a negative opinion, about the party. The smaller the number, the more negative the opinion. On a feeling thermometer from 0 to 100, what is your opinion about the (*CDU, SPD, Greens, Left Party*)?”

The party cueing (party identification) variable for study 2 is calculated as follows. First, I identify party identification scores for the two parties assigned in party cue treatments 1a and 1b, and then rescale the values to scales from 0 to 1. Second, I subtract the identification score for the party positioned against the Euro-tax from the identification score for the party that is in favor of the Euro-tax, and then rescale the resulting values to a scale from 0 to 1.

The party cueing (party identification) variable thus identifies the overall push exerted on participants by party cueing, based on party identification differentials, to support the Euro-tax. Values above 0.5 identify stronger feelings for the party supporting the Euro-tax and values below 0.5 identify stronger feelings for the party positioned against the Euro-tax. The lower the value, the weaker party cueing toward supporting the Euro-tax, and the higher the value, the stronger party cueing toward supporting the Euro-tax.

2.2.8 Political sophistication

The continuous measure for political sophistication (details on items and construction of the variable see appendix 1.2) was used to create a dichotomous measure by splitting the population into two sub-groups of low and high political sophistication along the mean value (3.10).

2.2.9 Need for cognition

A continuous measure of need for cognition was created on a scale from 0 (lowest need for cognition) to 8 (highest need) by summing participant’s degrees of agreement with each of the following statements (on a scale from 0, do not agree at all, to 4, agree completely): “I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them” (*reverse coded*), “The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me” (see appendix 1.2 for further details). The continuous variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable by dividing participants into categories of low and high need for cognition along the mean value (4.86).

2.2.10 Issue importance

Issue importance identifies the degree of importance participants attribute to the issue of European integration. A continuous measure of issue importance was created on a scale from 0 (issue perceived as entirely unimportant) to 8 (issue seen as extremely important) by summing participant's degrees of agreement with each of the following statements (on a scale of 0, do not agree at all, to 4, agree completely): "European integration should play a larger role in political debates" and "The topic of European integration is significant and important to me as far as politics is concerned" (see appendix 1.2 for further details). The original variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable by dividing participants into categories of low and high issue importance along the mean value (5.48).

2.2.11 Political trust

The measure of political trust was created on a scale from 0 (lowest trust) to 8 (highest) based on the following two items: "There is not much about our form of government to be proud of" (*reverse coded*), "I would rather live in our system of government than any other I can think of" (for details see appendix 1.2).

2.2.12 Need for evaluation

The measure of need for evaluation was created on a scale from 0 (lowest need for evaluation) to 8 (highest need) based on the following two items: "I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues" (*reverse coded*), "I only form strong opinions when I have to" (*reverse coded*) (for details see appendix 1.2).

2.2.13 Political efficacy

The measure of political efficacy was created on a scale from 0 (lowest efficacy) to 8 (highest) based on the following two items: "I am well qualified to participate in politics", and "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that someone like me can't understand what's going on" (*reverse coded*) (for details see appendix 1.2).

Appendix 2.3: Sample composition and homogeneity of treatment groups (study 2)

2.3.1 Descriptive statistics for participant characteristics

	N	Range	Mean	SE Mean	SD
Age	300	18-70	30.32	0.66	11.45
Social class	300	1-5	2.61	0.06	1.00
Political sophistication	300	0-6	3.10	0.10	1.66
Political interest	300	1-4	3.10	0.45	0.78
Prior awareness of Euro-tax policy	300	0-5	1.31	0.06	1.11
Left-right position	300	0-10	3.77	0.12	2.03
Need for cognition	300	0-8	4.86	0.08	1.41
Need for evaluation	300	0-8	5.02	0.10	1.72
Political trust	300	0-8	5.12	0.11	1.81
Political efficacy	300	0-8	3.88	0.10	1.73
Gender	300	0-1	0.54	0.03	0.50

2.3.2 Differences between experimental conditions in terms of participant characteristics⁵

	Justification goal treatment 1a (pro Euro-tax)	Justification goal treatment 1b (against Euro-tax)	Party cue treatment 1a (pro Euro-tax)	Party cue treatment 1b (against Euro-tax)
Age	2.04 (0.11)	0.90 (0.44)	0.48 (0.69)	0.65 (0.59)
Social class	1.26 (0.29)	1.08 (0.36)	0.62 (0.61)	0.08 (0.97)
Political sophistication	0.69 (0.56)	0.31 (0.82)	0.64 (0.59)	1.41 (0.24)
Political interest	0.11 (0.95)	1.32 (0.27)	1.12 (0.34)	1.11 (0.35)
Prior awareness of the Euro-tax policy	0.10 (0.96)	0.63 (0.60)	1.63 (0.18)	0.82 (0.48)
Left-right position	1.14 (0.33)	1.80 (0.15)	0.13 (0.94)	0.27 (0.85)
Need for cognition	0.88 (0.45)	0.08 (0.97)	1.02 (0.38)	0.36 (0.79)
Need for evaluation	0.77 (0.51)	0.89 (0.45)	0.61 (0.61)	1.47 (0.22)
Political trust	1.14 (0.34)	1.20 (0.31)	0.22 (0.89)	1.03 (0.38)
Political efficacy	0.63 (0.60)	0.57 (0.64)	1.07 (0.36)	0.73 (0.53)
Gender	Six t-tests p>0.1	Six t-tests p>0.1	Six t-tests p>0.1	Six t-tests p>0.1

⁵ Cells display F-values (p in parentheses) from ANOVA testing group differences between conditions of the experimental treatments (Justification goal treatments and Party cue treatments), except for the cells associated with the Gender variable, which report the results of t-tests comparing the average number of females in each treatment group for all combinations of groups created by the two experimental treatments (6 separate tests for the party cue treatment, as well as 6 separate tests for the justification goal treatment).

Appendix 2.4: Supporting information for figure 3 (study 2)

2.4.1 Full Models

Model	Full sample	By political sophistication		By need for cognition		By issue importance	
	--- 1 ---	Low --- 2 ---	High --- 3 ---	Low --- 4 ---	High --- 5 ---	Low --- 6 ---	High --- 7 ---
Policy justification: prior policy support	20.0 (5.9) *	12.4 (7.7)	29.1 (10.0) *	23.6 (9.6) *	18.2 (8.3) *	12.2 (9.2)	9.3 (6.7)
Policy justification: prior goal support	18.1 (8.7) *	9.6 (11.1)	34.4 (15.1) *	8.9 (13.8)	23.4 (11.7) *	-0.1 (13.7)	20.4 (9.7) *
Party cueing: party identification	20.0 (8.0) *	19.5 (9.9)	25.0 (14.0)	4.1 (12.8)	31.7 (10.9) *	-6.7 (11.5)	20.5 (9.5) *
Pro Euro-tax justification goal							
European identity	1.1 (3.8)	-1.6 (4.9)	3.3 (6.3)	3.4 (5.8)	-0.6 (5.3)	2.4 (5.8)	8.5 (4.2) *
Free market	2.1 (3.8)	2.3 (5.0)	4.9 (6.3)	5.8 (6.6)	0.2 (4.9)	-6.7 (5.8)	8.1 (4.3)
Collective economic benefits	1.1 (3.7)	-0.1 (4.8)	3.5 (6.2)	0.9 (5.9)	-1.2 (5.2)	2.5 (6.3)	3.6 (4.3)
No justification							
Against Euro-tax justification goal							
European identity	2.7 (3.9)	-2.2 (4.9)	13.9 (6.7) *	5.0 (6.2)	2.0 (5.2)	1.3 (6.0)	-1.7 (4.4)
Free market	1.6 (3.8)	-2.1 (4.8)	6.0 (6.1)	-0.5 (6.2)	2.5 (4.9)	2.2 (6.1)	-0.8 (4.5)
Collective economic benefits	1.6 (3.7)	-3.1 (4.8)	9.4 (6.4)	1.7 (6.0)	2.4 (5.3)	-5.4 (5.9)	-2.8 (4.3)
No counter-justification							
Pro Euro-tax party cue							
Christian Democrats	7.8 (3.9) *	8.5 (5.0)	7.8 (6.4)	3.9 (6.8)	10.0 (5.1)	12.1 (6.4)	0.0 (4.3)
Left Party	0.7 (4.0)	-0.6 (5.1)	4.0 (6.8)	-5.4 (6.7)	2.2 (5.3)	-1.7 (6.8)	4.3 (4.2)
Greens	-0.6 (3.9)	2.0 (5.1)	-4.2 (6.4)	-4.6 (6.5)	0.1 (5.3)	1.2 (6.6)	-0.6 (4.0)
Social Democrats							
Against Euro-tax party cue							
Christian Democrats	-2.6 (4.0)	-5.2 (5.1)	2.0 (6.7)	-1.7 (6.1)	-3.3 (5.6)	5.3 (6.3)	2.2 (4.2)
Left Party	-4.1 (4.0)	-3.6 (5.0)	-6.9 (6.6)	-10.9 (6.3)	-0.2 (5.3)	1.0 (6.2)	-2.0 (4.0)
Greens	-8.8 (3.8) *	-8.9 (4.9) +	-6.1 (6.5)	-16.1 (6.4) *	-3.7 (5.1)	-7.9 (6.2)	3.2 (4.1)
Social Democrats							
Constant	20.3 (8.7) *	31.5 (10.7) *	-3.1 (15.5)	38.4 (13.1) *	9.9 (12.5)	32.5 (14.2) *	27.1 (9.6) *
R ²	0.12	0.09	0.26	0.17	0.13	0.16	0.11
N	298	187	111	124	174	109	189

Notes: Dependent variable is policy support for the Euro-tax (0-100 scale). Cell entries are non-standardized OLS regression coefficients and standard errors. Statistically significant coefficient estimates ($p < 0.05$) are identified using *. Independent variables are rescaled to 0-1 scales.

2.4.2 Outcomes: Classification of coefficients from models 2-7⁶

	Prior policy support effect		Prior goal support effect		Party identification effect	
	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size
Low sophisticates	0	<	0	<	0	<
High sophisticates	+	>	+	>	0	>
Low cognition	+	>	0	<	0	<
High cognition	+	<	+	>	+	>
Low importance	0	>	0	<	0	<
High importance	0	<	+	>	+	>

2.4.3 Expectations of Hypothesis 4b compared to actual outcomes

	Prior policy support effect		Prior goal support effect		Party identification effect		Accuracy of expectations	
	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size
Low sophisticates	+	>	+	>	0	<	1/3	1/3
High sophisticates	0	<	0	<	+	>	0/3	1/3
Low cognition	+	>	+	>	0	<	2/3	2/3
High cognition	0	<	0	<	+	>	1/3	2/3
Low importance	+	>	+	>	0	<	1/3	2/3
High importance	0	<	0	<	+	>	2/3	2/3
Accuracy of expectations	2/6	4/6	0/6	0/6	5/6	6/6	7/18	10/18
							17/36	

2.4.4 Expectations of Hypothesis 4a compared to actual outcomes

	Prior policy support effect		Prior goal support effect		Party identification effect		Accuracy of expectations	
	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size	Direction	Size
Low sophisticates	0	<	0	<	+	>	2/3	2/3
High sophisticates	+	>	+	>	0	<	3/3	2/3
Low cognition	0	<	0	<	+	>	1/3	1/3
High cognition	+	>	+	>	0	<	2/3	1/3
Low importance	0	<	0	<	+	>	2/3	1/3
High importance	+	>	+	>	0	<	1/3	1/3
Accuracy of expectations	4/6	2/6	6/6	6/6	1/6	0/6	11/18	8/18
							19/36	

⁶ Effect direction: predicted direction of effects of independent variables (prior policy support, prior goal support, party identification) in different sub-samples (low versus high sophisticates, low versus high cognition, low versus high issue importance). Effect size: comparison of the effect sizes of independent variables in different sub-samples.

Appendix 2.5: Analysis by sub-samples

	Student sub-sample	General population sub-sample
Policy justification: prior policy support	30.5 (8.5) *	8.5 (8.9)
Policy justification: prior goal support	20.2 (11.8) +	13.2 (14.1)
Party cueing: party identification	25.4 (11.4) *	24.7 (12.6) *
Pro Euro-tax justification goal		
European identity	2.8 (5.0)	0.1 (6.2)
Free market	2.3 (5.0)	1.2 (6.3)
Collective economic benefits	2.3 (5.3)	2.5 (5.7)
No justification		
Against Euro-tax justification goal		
European identity	1.8 (4.9)	3.7 (6.5)
Free market	1.2 (5.0)	2.5 (5.8)
Collective economic benefits	5.8 (5.0)	-5.1 (5.9)
No counter-justification		
Pro Euro-tax party cue		
Christian Democrats	11.4 (5.3) *	4.2 (6.2)
Left Party	2.9 (5.1)	-4.1 (6.7)
Greens	-0.8 (5.0)	-2.9 (6.7)
Social Democrats		
Against Euro-tax party cue		
Christian Democrats	-3.6 (5.2)	-4.9 (6.5)
Left Party	1.2 (5.1)	-13.9 (6.8) *
Greens	-9.7 (5.3) +	-10.2 (6.1) +
Social Democrats		
Constant	7.4 (12.6)	33.1 (13.8) *
R ²	0.17	0.13
N	169	129

Notes: Dependent variable is policy support for the Euro-tax (0-100 scale). Cell entries are non-standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates ($p < 0.05$) are identified using the * symbol. Coefficient estimates with $p < 0.1$ are identified using +. All independent variables are rescaled to 0-1 scales.

Appendix 2.6: Debriefing note

2.6.1 Reproduction of the debriefing note handed to participants after the experiment

Informationen zur Studie und zum Probanden-Pool

Die Studie, an der Sie gerade teilgenommen haben, ist ein sozialwissenschaftliches Experiment. Bei experimentellen Studien werden durch die Forscher/innen systematisch Informationen manipuliert und zwischen den Teilnehmer/innen der Studie variiert. Diese Vorgehensweise erlaubt es uns, verlässliche Aussagen darüber zu treffen, ob eine bestimmte Variable, die uns theoretisch interessiert, einen kausalen Effekt auf andere Variablen hat.

Bei der experimentellen Studie, an der Sie gerade teilgenommen haben, geht es darum, wie zufrieden Menschen mit der Qualität politischer Informationen sind, und wie dies ihre Einstellungen beeinflusst. Dazu haben wir auch in dieser Studie gewisse Informationen „fabriziert“ und systematisch zwischen den Teilnehmer/innen variiert. So gibt es tatsächlich eine politische Auseinandersetzung über die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer, aber die in den von uns verfassten Texten beschriebene Abstimmung im Europäischen Parlament hat es in dieser Form nicht gegeben. Wir haben darüber hinaus zwei fiktiven Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments verschiedene Aussagen über die Einführung einer Europa-Steuer zugeordnet. Welche/r Teilnehmer/in der Studie welche Aussage gelesen hat, wurde per Zufall entschieden.

Diese ganze Vorgehensweise ist notwendig zur Durchführung von Experimenten und extrem wichtig für unsere Forschung: nur so können wir herausfinden, ob es überhaupt einen Unterschied macht, welche Argumente Politiker/innen verwenden, um ihre Entscheidungen zu begründen.

Damit wir diese Frage zuverlässig erforschen können, möchten wir Sie sehr bitten, den Inhalt der Studie nicht mit anderen zu besprechen, die noch an der Studie teilnehmen wollen.

Weitere Informationen über die Inhalte und wissenschaftlichen Ziele dieser und ähnlicher Studien bieten wir Ihnen im Laufe einer kurzen Veranstaltung am *Institut für Sozialwissenschaften*. Der genaue Termin wird auf unserer Website << sowi.hu-berlin.de/lehrbereiche/comppol/prob >> sowie per email an die registrierten Teilnehmer/innen des Probanden-Pools angekündigt. Sie sind dazu herzlich eingeladen. Eine Anmeldung ist nicht notwendig. Sie können sich auch auf unserer Webseite als Teilnehmer/in im Probanden-Pool registrieren, um Einladungen zur Teilnahme an weiteren Studien zu erhalten.

Für Studierende am Institut für Sozialwissenschaften der HU Berlin: Sie erwerben durch die Teilnahme an der o.g. Informationsveranstaltung einen 1/3 BZQ Punkt. Bitte bringen Sie zu allen BZQ Aktivitäten des Probanden-Pools die Teilnehmerliste mit, die auch auf der o.g. Webseite verfügbar ist, um sich Ihre Teilnahme bestätigen zu lassen. Wir würden uns natürlich sehr freuen, wenn Sie anderen Studierenden hier am Institut über die Möglichkeit berichten würden, durch die Teilnahme an Aktivitäten des Probanden-Pools BZQ-Punkte zu erwerben. Die Registrierung erfolgt über die o.g. Webseite.

Falls Sie Fragen zu dieser Studie oder zum Probanden-Pool haben, können Sie sich gerne an die folgenden Ansprechpartner am *Institut für Sozialwissenschaften* wenden:

[Name and email address of contact person # 1]

[Name and email address of contact person # 2]

[Name and email address of contact person # 3]

2.6.2 English translation of the debriefing note

Information about the study and the participant pool

The study in which you just participated is a social science experiment. In experimental studies, researchers systematically manipulate information and vary the content of information between participants. This allows us to reach valid conclusions about whether some variable we are interested in has a causal effect on other variables.

The purpose of the present study is to figure out whether the opinions of people about political statements they read influence their political views. To investigate this topic, we also “fabricated” and systematically varied some information in this study. There really is a political debate about the introduction of a Euro-tax described in the article you just received, but the vote mentioned in the article, which we wrote for this study, has not taken place. We also assigned certain political statements about the introduction of a Euro-tax to two fictitious members of the European Parliament. It was randomly decided, which participant received which statement.

This entire procedure is necessary to successfully carry out the experiment and extremely important for our research. This is the best way to determine whether the arguments that politicians use to justify their decisions make any difference at all. It would help us a great deal in reliably answering this question if you could not discuss the content of this study with other participants.

We are organizing a brief event at *the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at HU Berlin* to provide additional information about the content and goals of this and similar studies. We will notify you about the time and location of the event on our website << sowi.hu-berlin.de/lehrbereiche/comppol/prob >> and in an email to all registered participants of the participant pool. We are looking forward to welcoming you! No prior registration for the event is required. To receive invitations for future studies, you can register for the participant pool at our website.

For students at *the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at HU Berlin*: You will acquire additional course credit by participating in the events mentioned above. Please make sure to bring along your participant pool activities list to receive the credit. A copy of the list can be downloaded on our website. And do let other students know about the possibility of acquiring course credit through participant pool activities. Everyone can register through the above mentioned website.

For any questions you might have about this study or the participant pool, please do not hesitate to contact us:

[Name and email address of contact person # 1]

[Name and email address of contact person # 2]

[Name and email address of contact person # 3]

Appendix 3: Works cited in online appendix

- Baughn, Christopher and Attila Yaprak (1996) Economic Nationalism: Conceptual and Empirical Development. *Political Psychology* 17 (4): 759-778
- Bennett, W. Lance (1980) The Paradox of Public Discourse: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Accounts. *Journal of Politics* 42 (3): 792-817
- Cacioppo, John and Richard Petty (1982) The need for cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 42, 116–131
- Castano, Emanuele and Vincent Yzerbyt (1998) The highs and lows of group homogeneity. *Behavioral Processes* 42: 219-238
- Castano, Emanuele; Vincent Yzerbyt, and David Bourguignon (2003) We are one and I like it: The impact of ingroup entitativity on ingroup identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 33: 735–754
- Edelman, Murray (1977) Political Language: Words that succeed and policies that fail. New York: Academic Press
- Gonzales, Marti Hope; Julie Pederson, Debra Manning, and David Wetter (1990) Pardon my gaffe: Effects of sex, status, and consequence severity on accounts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58 (4): 610-621
- Hareli, Shlomo (2005) Accounting for one's behavior - what really determines its effectiveness? Its type or content? *Journal for the theory of social behavior* 35 (4): 359-372
- Heath, Anthony; Geoffrey Evans, and Jean Martin (1994) The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values: The Development of Balanced Socialist/Laissez Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales. *British Journal of Political Science* 24: 115-132
- Jarvis, W. Blair and Richard Petty (1996) The need to evaluate. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70 (1): 172-194
- McGraw, Kathleen (1991) Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts. *American Political Science Review* 85 (4): 1133-1157

- McGraw, Kathleen and Clark Hubbard (1996) Some of the people some of the time: individual differences in the acceptance of political accounts. In Mutz et al (eds.) *Political persuasion and attitude change*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
- Shapiro, Debra; E. Holly Buttner, and Bruce Barry (1994) Explanations: what factors enhance their perceived adequacy? *Organizational behavior and human decision processes* 58: 346-368