Supplemental Material

Teaching from Experience: Foreign Training and Rebel Success in Civil War
Online Appendix

Table 1.A: List of Successful Former Rebels and Trained Protégés

Successful Rebel Led States	Former Rebel Leadership	Sponsored Groups (First Year of Training)
Angola	• José Eduardo dos Santos	• AFDL (1996), ANC (1981)
Cuba	• Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz	• SWAPO (1975), ANC (1981), FMLN (1980), FSLN (1978)
China*	• Mao Zedong	• SWAPO (1976), Patriotic Front (1976), ZANU (1976), FNLA (1975), CPB (1975)
Liberia	• Charles Taylor	• MJP (2002), MPIGO (2002), RUF (1997)
Democratic Republic of Congo	• Laurent Kabila	• PALIR (1998)
Zimbabwe	• Robert Mugabe	• CNDD-FDD (1999)
Eritrea	• Isaias Afwerki	• OLF (1998), ONLF (1998), ARS/UIC (2006), JEM(2004), SLM-A(2004)
Ethiopia	• Meles Zenawi	• SRRC (2002)
Former Taliban Government	• Mohammed Omar	• Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa (2004)
Uganda	• Yoweri Museveni	• AFDL (1996), MLC (1998), RCD (1998), RCD-ML(1999)
Rwanda	• Paul Kagame	• CNDP (2006), RCD (1998)
Vietnam	• Ton Duc Thang	• CPT (1976)

Included only in robustness checks given uncertainty over Mao Zedong's agency during this time period.

Table 2A-Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Training by Former Rebels	0.06	0.24	0	1
Training by Former Rebels (Weighted by Logged Time)	0.07	0.42	0	3.33
Training by Major Powers	0.05	0.22	0	1
Training from Foreign Govt.	0.35	0.49	0	1
Training from Active Rebel Group	0.12	0.33	0	1
Training from Non-State Actor (non-Rebel)	0.03	0.17	0	1
External Support for Government	0.39	0.49	0	1
External Rebel Support, Training	0.17	0.38	0	1
External Rebel Support, Troops	0.02	0.15	0	1
External Rebel Support, Intelligence	0.07	0.25	0	1
External Rebel Support, Territory	0.17	0.37	0	1
Fungible Support for Rebels	.41	.49	0	1
Lootable Goods	0.52	0.50	0	1
Territory	0.46	0.50	0	1
Rebel Strength	1.71	0.68	1	4
Intensity	1.21	0.41	1	2
lnGDP	10.8	1.78	6.29	16.4
Democracy	0.45	0.50	0	1

Table 3.A: Rebel trainers with similar ideologies to rebel protégés.

This model includes the variable "Training from Similar Ideology" which measures whether the foreign trainer shared a similar economic ideology with their rebel protégé. Rebel ideology are drawn from Polo and Geditsch's (2016) ACD2GTD dataset and government ideology data are drawn from the World Bank's Database on Political Institutions. As indicated by the results, this variable does little to change the main findings of the manuscript.

Competitive Risk Model	Rebel Fav. Outcome Model 1	Govt. Fav. Outcome Model 1
Rebel Training by Former Rebels	0.82**	-1.11
	(0.39)	(0.71)
Training from Similar Ideology	0.32	-0.73
	(0.38)	(0.92)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	-0.18	0.39
	(0.42)	(0.43)
External Support for Govt.	-0.30	-0.21
	(0.26)	(0.20)
External Rebel Support, Training	-0.0036	-0.47*
	(0.34)	(0.26)
Territory Incompatibility	0.11	-0.100
	(0.24)	(0.19)
Rebel Strength	0.66***	-0.54***
	(0.16)	(0.16)
Lootable Goods	-0.14	0.10
	(0.21)	(0.17)
Intensity	0.064	-1.07***
	(0.29)	(0.37)
lnGDP	-0.13	-0.062
	(0.082)	(0.069)
Democracy	0.34	-0.27
	(0.31)	(0.23)
Observations	1,274	1,274
Log-Likelihood	-446.1646	-614.8599

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 4.A & 5.A: Rebel trainers with successful counterinsurgency experience

Tables 4.A & 5.A include the additional variable "Counterinsurgent Training" which measures whether the rebel trainer has experience defeating a rebel group within their own country. To operationalize this variable, we coded whether the foreign trainer had defeated an insurgency within the past 10 years. As illustrated by the results, this variable does significantly increase the risk that rebels will achieve a favorable outcome after receiving training from counterinsurgents. It should be noted that this variable loses statistical significance when included with Formerly Successful Rebels and has a smaller marginal effect (based on coefficient size). Similarly, this variable plays no meaningful role in reducing the risk of government favorable outcomes in civil wars (see Table 4.A below).

Table 4.A

Risk Rebel Favorable Outcomes Competitive Risk Models	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rebel Training by Former Rebels	0.87**		0.78**
	(0.38)		(0.38)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	-0.12	-0.045	-0.14
	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.37)
External Rebel Support, Training	-0.0072	0.079	-0.11
	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.35)
External Support for Govt.	-0.30	-0.40	-0.32
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Territory Incompatibility	0.093	0.082	0.11
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Rebel Strength	0.65***	0.68***	0.66***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Lootable Goods	-0.15	-0.12	-0.12
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Intensity	0.083	0.036	0.058
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
lnGDP	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.082)
Democracy	0.35	0.29	0.36
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.30)
Counterinsurgent		0.66**	0.54
		(0.33)	(0.34)
Observations	1,274	1,274	1,274
Log-Likelihood	-446.3056	-447.3541	-445.4417

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.A

Risk of Government Favorable Outcomes Competitive Risk Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rebel Training by Former Rebels	-1.15		-1.15
	(0.71)		(0.71)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	0.30	0.27	0.30
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.43)
External Rebel Support, Training	-0.48*	-0.70**	-0.49*
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.28)
External Support for Govt.	-0.22	-0.16	-0.22
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Territory Incompatibility	-0.087	-0.063	-0.086
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Rebel Strength	-0.54***	-0.56***	-0.54***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Lootable Goods	0.100	0.099	0.10
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Intensity	-1.07***	-1.02***	-1.07***
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
lnGDP	-0.065	-0.066	-0.066
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Democracy	-0.27	-0.20	-0.26
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)
Counterinsurgent		0.078	0.053
		(0.43)	(0.42)
Observations	1,274	1,274	1,274
Log-Likelihood	-615.1667	-617.5255	-615.1591

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.A: Additional Controls (Ethnic Fractionalization, Territorial Control, Logged Population, and Foreign Intervention into the Conflict)

Competitive Risk Models	Rebel Fav. Outcome	Govt. Fav. Outcome
Rebel Training by Former Rebels	0.97**	-0.98
	(0.40)	(0.75)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	0.47	0.30
	(0.39)	(0.42)
External Support for Govt.	-0.12	-0.25
	(0.26)	(0.21)
External Rebel Support, Training	0.030	-0.55*
	(0.35)	(0.30)
Territory Incompatibility	0.30	-0.11
	(0.24)	(0.21)
Rebel Strength	0.50***	-0.63***
	(0.18)	(0.17)
Lootable Goods	0.30	-0.070
	(0.27)	(0.20)
Intensity	0.070	-0.97**
	(0.33)	(0.40)
lnGDP	-0.22*	-0.085
	(0.13)	(0.12)
Democracy	0.49	-0.62**
	(0.31)	(0.26)
Foreign Intervention	-0.37	0.29
	(0.36)	(0.34)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.11	0.23
	(0.51)	(0.52)
lnPopulation	0.0064	0.10
	(0.15)	(0.14)
coldwar	-1.23***	-0.29
	(0.34)	(0.24)
Territorial Control	0.19	-0.029
	(0.23)	(0.20)
Observations	1,184	1,184
Log-Likelihood	-418.1317	-539.0768

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7.A: Trainer Relative Capacity (logged CINC scores)
This table includes a control for the relative capabilities of rebel trainers as measured through the
logged CINC scores of training states. Though major powers and CINC scores are significant in
Model 1, it is difficult to interpret this result given a strong correlation between the variables.
CINC scores appear to play no noticeable role when including them with the more nuanced
coding of rebel trainers (foreign governments, etc.).

Competitive Risk Models	Rebel Fav. Outcome Model 1	Govt. Fav. Outcome Model 1	Rebel Fav. Outcome Model 2	Govt. Fav. Outcome Model 2
Rebel Training by Former Rebels	0.91**	-1.12*	0.73**	-1.14
	(0.38)	(0.68)	(0.35)	(0.75)
Training from Foreign Govt.			0.35	-0.014
			(0.30)	(0.28)
Training from Active Rebel Group			0.24	0.16
			(0.34)	(0.34)
Training from Foreign Non-State Actor (non-Rebel)			0.58	-0.61
			(0.45)	(0.92)
External Support for Govt.	-0.31	-0.19	-0.26	-0.20
	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.20)
lntraincinc	-10.7**	13.2	-3.13	4.17
	(5.14)	(8.81)	(3.05)	(3.70)
External Rebel Support, Training	0.028	-0.59**	-0.19	-0.58**
	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.29)
Territory Incompatibility	0.11	-0.15	-0.00014	-0.10
	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.19)
Rebel Strength	0.65***	-0.55***	0.60***	-0.54***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Lootable Goods	-0.17	0.14	-0.13	0.13
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.17)
Intensity	0.12	-1.08***	0.039	-1.06***
	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.37)
lnGDP	-0.12	-0.078	-0.13	-0.070
	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.071)
Democracy	0.38	-0.24	0.25	-0.25
	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.23)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	1.19*	-1.38		
	(0.61)	(1.12)		
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270
Log-Likelihood	-444.9727	-603.3619	-444.1167	-603.6723

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8.A: Alternative Measurements for Successful Rebels

This model includes more specific measurements of successful rebel trainers. The "Strict" definition only includes former rebels that won their civil war through a rebel victory. The "Loose" definition measures whether rebels fought the government to a negotiated settlement. As you can see, strict models (though still significant) are far less effective than rebels that were able to fight for a negotiated settlement. This distinction, though, may be somewhat arbitrary, as rebels may have the capacity to force the government to negotiate and therefore allow them to take control of the state through a negotiated settlement (such as in Burundi).

Competitive Risk Models	Rebel Fav. Outcome	Govt. Fav. Outcome
Training by Successful Rebels, Strict	0.72**	-1.05*
	(0.34)	(0.54)
Training by Successful Rebels, Loose	1.68**	-14.5***
	(0.70)	(0.70)
Training from Foreign Govt.	0.12	-0.085
	(0.25)	(0.22)
Training from Active Rebel Group	0.11	-0.046
	(0.35)	(0.33)
Training from Foreign Non-State Actor (non-Rebel)	0.56	-0.69
	(0.45)	(0.95)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	-0.17	0.29
	(0.39)	(0.41)
External Support for Govt.	-0.28	-0.23
	(0.26)	(0.20)
Territory Incompatibility	0.054	-0.084
	(0.25)	(0.18)
Rebel Strength	0.67***	-0.54***
	(0.15)	(0.16)
Lootable Goods	-0.12	0.10
	(0.21)	(0.17)
Intensity	0.031	-1.12***
	(0.30)	(0.36)
lnGDP	-0.12	-0.056
	(0.085)	(0.069)
Democracy	0.32	-0.28
	(0.33)	(0.23)
Observations	1,274	1,274
Log-Likelihood	-443.5787	-615.3247

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9.A- Inclusion of Chinese Training from 1975-1976
This model includes rebels that received Chinese training from 1975-1976. As Chairman Mao Zedong suffered Parkinson's disease in the last years of his life,[1] it is unclear the degree to which he had agency in how foreign policy was executed. We therefore removed these instances from the models presented in the manuscript. This specifically adds five new rebel groups, three of which achieved rebel favorable outcomes in their insurgencies with the state. As demonstrated by the results, our findings remain unchanged with the inclusion of these groups.

Competitive Risk Model	Rebel Fav. Outcome	Govt. Fav. Outcome
Rebel Training by Former Rebels	0.99**	-1.10**
	(0.40)	(0.53)
Rebel Training by Major Powers	-0.20	0.62*
	(0.43)	(0.38)
External Support for Govt.	-0.25	-0.21
	(0.28)	(0.20)
External Rebel Support, Training	0.19	-0.12
	(0.45)	(0.31)
External Rebel Support, Troops	0.78	-1.20
	(0.49)	(1.14)
Fungible Support for Rebels	-0.51	-0.52**
	(0.36)	(0.24)
External Rebel Support, Territory	-0.023	0.039
	(0.28)	(0.23)
External Rebel Support, Intelligence	-0.20	-0.43
	(0.35)	(0.36)
Territory Incompatibility	0.15	-0.078
	(0.25)	(0.19)
Rebel Strength	0.63***	-0.52***
	(0.17)	(0.16)
Lootable Goods	-0.16	0.13
	(0.21)	(0.17)
Intensity	0.11	-0.98***
	(0.31)	(0.37)
lnGDP	-0.15*	-0.084
	(0.085)	(0.069)
Democracy	0.43	-0.19
	(0.33)	(0.23)
Observations	1,274	1,274
Log-Likelihood	-443.2813	-610.9880

Robust standard errors in parentheses

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[1] Glass, Andrew. Sept. 16th, 2016. "Mao Zedong dies in Beijing at age 82, Sept. 9, 1976." *Politico* Last Accessed: https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/mao-zedong-dies-in-beijing-at-age-82-sept-9-1976-227742

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1