

Classification of Issues

The measure we use for our dependent variables - PE_{RR} , PE_{RL} , PE_{LL} and PE_{RL-} - utilize 15 of the 56 issue categories, comprising 3 of the 7 domains, identified in the CMP dataset. Here is the list of the 15 categories together with the description of each category as provided by the CMP.

1. Right Economic Position

Domain 1: Economy

1) **per 401 Free Market Economy** It includes favorable references to: Laissez-faire economy; superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; private property rights; personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises.

2) **per 402 Incentives: Positive** Favorable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies (assistance to businesses rather than consumers). It includes: Financial and other incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks etc.; wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start enterprises.

3) **per 407 Protectionism: Negative** Support for the concept of free trade and open markets. Call for abolishing all means of market protection (in the manifesto or any other country).

4) **per 414 Economic Orthodoxy** Need for economically healthy government policy making. May include calls for: Reduction of budget deficits; retrenchment in crisis; thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship; support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system; support for strong currency.

Domain 2: Welfare and Quality of Life

5) **per 505 Welfare State Limitation** Limiting state expenditures on social services or social security. Favorable mentions of the social subsidiary principle (i.e. private care before state care).

Domain 3: Social Groups

6) **per 702 Labor Groups: Negative** Negative references to labor groups and trade unions. May focus specifically on the danger of unions 'abusing power'.

2. Left Economic Position

Domain 1: Economy

- 1) **per 403 Market Regulation** Support for policies designed to create a fair and open economic market. May include: Calls for increased consumer protection; increasing economic competition by preventing monopolies and other actions disrupting the functioning of the market; defense of small businesses against disruptive powers of big businesses; social market economy.
- 2) **per 404 Economic Planning** Favorable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government. May be: Policy plans, strategies, policy patterns etc.; of a consultative or indicative nature.
- 3) **per 406 Protectionism: Positive** Favorable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets (by the manifesto or other countries). Measures may include: Tariffs; quota restrictions; export subsidies.
- 4) **per 412 Controlled Economy** Support for direct government control of economy. May include, for instance: Control over prices; introduction of minimum wages.
- 5) **per 413 Nationalization** Favorable mentions of government ownership of industries, either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalized industries in state hand or nationalizing currently private industries. May also include favorable mentions of government ownership of land.
- 6) **per 415 Marxist Analysis** Positive references to Marxist-Leninist ideology and specific use of Marxist-Leninist terminology by the manifesto party (typically but not necessary by communist parties).

Domain 2: Welfare and Quality of Life

- 7) **per 504 Welfare State Expansion** Favorable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: Health care ; child care ; elder care and pensions; social housing.

Domain 3: Social Groups

- 9) **per 701 Labor Groups: Positive** Favorable references to all labor groups, the working class, and unemployed workers in general. Support for trade unions and calls for the good treatment of all employees, including: More jobs; good working conditions; fair wages; pension provisions etc.

3. Operationalization of Variables

3.1. Rightist Dimension of Economic Ideology (for PE_{RR} & PE_{LR}):

Per 401+per 402+ per 407+ per 414+per 505+per 702

3.2. Leftist Dimension of Economic Ideology (for PE_{LL} & PE_{RL}):

Per 403+ per 404+ per 406+per 412+ per 413+per 415+per 504+per 701

4. Likelihood Ratio Test Results for Random Effects

4.1 Hypotheses for random effect in Model 1 and 2:

Hypothesis 1: The random effects associated with the effect of GDP can be omitted from Model 1 (Model2).

Hypothesis 2: The random effects associated with the effect of Pop can be omitted from Model 1 (Model 2).

Hypothesis 3: The random effects associated with the effect of KOF can be omitted from Model 1 (Model 2).

Model 1					
Hypothesis Label	Models Compared (Nested vs. References)	LRT (1)	LRT (As)	Test Statistic Value (Calculation)	p-Value
1	Model A1 vs. Model 1	-1029.697	-1067.397	$X^2(1:2)=75.4$ (2134.7-2059.3)	0.0000
2	Model A2 vs. Model 1	-1029.697	-1073.12	$X^2(1:2)=86.94$ (2146.4-2059.3)	0.0000
3	Model A3 vs. Model 1	-1029.697	-1048.509	$X^2(1:2)=37.718$ (2097.0-2059.3)	0.0000
Model 2		LRT(2)	LRT(Bs)		
1	Model B1 vs. Model 2	-1024.242	-1037.098	$X^2(1:2)=25.79$ (2074.1-2048.4)	0.0000
2	Model B2 vs. Model 2	-1024.242	-1036.976	$X^2(1:2)=25.52$ (2073.9-2048.4)	0.0000
3	Model B3 vs. Model 2	-1024.242	-1028.157	$X^2(1:2)=7.91$ (2056.3-2048.4)	0.0120

4.2 Hypotheses for random effect in Model 3 and 4:

Hypothesis 1: The random effects associated with the effect of GDP can be omitted from Model 3 (Model4).

Hypothesis 2: The random effects associated with the effect of Pop can be omitted from Model 3 (Model 4).

Hypothesis 3: The random effects associated with the effect of KOF can be omitted from Model 3 (Model 4).

Model 3					
Hypothesis Label	Models Compared (Nested vs. References)	LRT (3)	LRT (Cs)	Test Statistic Value (Calculation)	p-Value
1	Model C1 vs. Model 3	-1283.96	-1299.316	$X^2(1:2)=30.7$ (2598.6-2567.9)	0.0000
2	Model C2 vs. Model 3	-1283.96	-1302.635	$X^2(1:2)=37.3$ (2605.2-2567.9)	0.0000
3	Model C3 vs. Model 3	-1283.96	-1292.517	$X^2(1:2)=17.1$ (2585.0-2567.9)	0.0001
Model 4		LRT (4)	LRT (Ds)		
1	Model D1 vs. Model 4	-950.5809	-985.3992	$X^2(1:2)=69.6$ (1970.7-1901.1)	0.0000
2	Model D2 vs. Model 4	-950.5809	-987.6612	$X^2(1:2)=74.2$ (1975.3-1901.1)	0.0000
3	Model D3 vs. Model 4	-950.5809	-966.767	$X^2(1:2)=32.4$ (1933.5-1901.1)	0.0000

5. Robustness Tests-Model Specifications

Model 2.1

$$PE_{ti(RL)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 trade + \beta_2 FDI + \beta_3 capital + \beta_4 pop + u_{0i} + u_{1i} trade + u_{2i} FDI + u_{3i} capital + u_{4i} pop + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.1

$$PE_{ti(LR)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 trade + \beta_2 FDI + \beta_3 capital + \beta_4 pop + u_{0i} + u_{1i} trade + u_{2i} FDI + u_{3i} capital + u_{4i} pop + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 2.2

$$PE_{ti(RL)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 CSGR + u_{0i} + u_{1i} GDP + u_{2i} pop + u_{3i} CSGR + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.2

$$PE_{ti(LR)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 CSGR + u_{0i} + u_{1i} GDP + u_{2i} pop + u_{3i} CSGR + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 2.3

$$PE_{ti(RL)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.3

$$PE_{ti(LR)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 2.4

$$PE_{ti(RL)} = \gamma_i + \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.4

$$PE_{ti(LR)} = \gamma_i + \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 2.5

$$PE_{ti(RL)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PE_{(t-1)i(RL)} + \beta_2 GDP + \beta_3 pop + \beta_4 KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.5

$$PE_{ti(LR)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PE_{(t-1)i(LR)} + \beta_2 GDP + \beta_3 pop + \beta_4 KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 2.6

$$\Delta PE_{ti(RL)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta GDP + \beta_2 \Delta pop + \beta_3 \Delta KOF + u_{0i} + u_{1i} \Delta GDP + u_{2i} \Delta pop + u_{3i} \Delta KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.6

$$\Delta PE_{ti(LR)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta GDP + \beta_2 \Delta pop + \beta_3 \Delta KOF + u_{0i} + u_{1i} \Delta GDP + u_{2i} \Delta pop + u_{3i} \Delta KOF + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 2.7

$$AWPE_{ti(RL)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 trade + \beta_2 FDI + \beta_3 capital + \beta_4 pop + u_{0i} + u_{1i} trade + u_{2i} FDI + u_{3i} capital + u_{4i} pop + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Model 4.7

$$AWPE_{ti(LR)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 trade + \beta_2 FDI + \beta_3 capital + \beta_4 pop + u_{0i} + u_{1i} trade + u_{2i} FDI + u_{3i} capital + u_{4i} pop + \varepsilon_{ti}$$

Robustness Check Results

Table 3: Models 2.1&Model 4.1

Models	Model 2.1 (DV: PE _{RL})	Model 4.1 (DV: PE _{LR})
Fixed Effect Parameter		
Intercept	7.341966 (0.0000) ^{***}	4.323266 (0.0000) ^{***}
Trade	0.054028 (0.0079) ^{***}	0.003643 (0.6507)
FDI	0.103814 (0.0602)	0.004635 (0.8175)
Capital	-0.00065 (0.9518)	-0.009066 (0.0859)
Pop	0.000000 (0.0613)	0.000000 (0.6939)
Covariance Parameter		
σ^2_{int}	7.72	3.37
σ^2_{Trade}	0.003	0.0004
σ^2_{FDI}	0.012	0.0003
$\sigma^2_{Capital}$	0.000	0.0007
σ^2_{Pop}	0.000	0.000
ICCs		
$\sigma_{Trade,int}$	-0.628	-0.417
$\sigma_{FDI,int}$	-0.211	-0.004
$\sigma_{Capital,int}$	-0.015	-0.100
$\sigma_{Pop,int}$	-0.132	-0.399
Correlation Coefficient		
$\sigma_{Trade,FDI}$	-0.048	-0.017
$\sigma_{Trade,Capital}$	0.033	-0.077
$\sigma_{Trade,Pop}$	0.032	0.134
$\sigma_{FDI,Capital}$	-0.002	-0.050
$\sigma_{FDI,Pop}$	0.007	-0.008
$\sigma_{Capital,Pop}$	-0.006	0.073
σ^2	23.81	7.41

Table 4: Models 2.2 & 4.2

Models	Model 2.2 (DV: PE_{RL})	Model 4.2 (DV: PE_{LR})
Fixed Effect Parameter		
Intercept	1.24557 (0.5996)	4.248926 (0.0003)***
GDP	0.04563 (0.6390)	-0.058335 (0.4262)
Pop	0.00000 (0.0522)	0.000000 (0.9454)
CSGR	61.88617 (0.0012)***	-2.350647 (0.7198)
Covariance Parameter		
σ^2_{int}	14.36	12.45
σ^2_{GDP}	0.013	0.017
σ^2_{Pop}	0.012	0.000
σ^2_{CSGR}	2.787	209.11
ICCs		
$\sigma_{GDP,int}$	0.812	-0.855
$\sigma_{Pop,int}$	0.393	-0.130
$\sigma_{CSGR,int}$	-0.965	-0.980
Correlation Coefficient		
$\sigma_{GDP,Pop}$	0.513	0.124
$\sigma_{GDP,CSGR}$	-0.876	0.813
$\sigma_{CSGR,Pop}$	-0.536	0.090
σ^2	19.78	6.30

Table 5: Models 2.3 & 4.3

Models	Model 2.3 (DV: PE_{RL})	Model 4.3 (DV: PE_{LR})
Intercept	5.8415 (0.000)***	5.9991 (0.000)
GDP	0.0679 (0.199)	0.0167 (0.620)
Pop	0.0000 (0.032)**	0.0000 (0.433)
KOF	0.0846 (0.000)***	-0.0270 (0.014)**

Table 6: Models 2.4 & 4.4

Models (Country Level)	Model 2.4 (DV: PE_{RL})	Model 4.4 (DV: PE_{LR})
Intercept	4.241 (0.009)***	4.966 (0.000)***
GDP	0.062 (0.281)	0.018 (0.5139)
Pop	0.000 (0.192)	0.000 (0.5981)
KOF	0.115 (0.000)***	-0.012 (0.2533)
$\hat{\sigma}_y$	4.92	2.571
$\hat{\sigma}_{country}$	2.717	1.486

Table 7: Models 2.5 & 4.5

Models	Model 2.5 (DV: PE_{RL})	Model 4.5 (DV: PE_{LR})
Intercept	0.467 (0.000) ^{***}	4.185 (0.000) ^{***}
GDP	0.953 (0.112)	0.021 (0.513)
$PE_{RL(lag)}$	0.467(0.000) ^{***}	
$PE_{LR(lag)}$		0.393(0.000) ^{***}
Pop	0.000 (0.132)	-0.0000 (0.193)
KOF	0.059 (0.002) ^{***}	-0.0240 (0.009) ^{***}

Table 8: Models 2.6 & 4.6

Models	Model 2.6 (DV: ΔPE_{RL})	Model 4.6 (DV: ΔPE_{LR})
Fixed Effect Parameter		
Intercept	0.1966 (0.6359)	0.1773 (0.4016)
ΔGDP	0.0494 (0.3749)	0.0345 (0.3974)
ΔPop	0.0000 (0.4793)	0.0000 (0.9256)
ΔKOF	0.1743 (0.0289) ^{***}	-0.06093 (0.1254)
Covariance Parameter		
σ_{int}^2	0.099	0.000
σ_{GDP}^2	0.0003	0.013
σ_{Pop}^2	0.0000	0.000
σ_{KOF}^2	0.0276	0.000
ICCs		
$\sigma_{GDP,int}$	0.082	-0.093
$\sigma_{Pop,int}$	0.067	0.000
$\sigma_{KOF,int}$	-0.605	-0.002
Correlation Coefficient		
$\sigma_{GDP,Pop}$	-0.022	0.066
$\sigma_{GDP,KOF}$	-0.090	-0.120
$\sigma_{KOF,Pop}$	-0.146	-0.013
σ^2	30.90	9.55

Table 9: Models 2.7 & 4.7

Models	Model 2.7 (DV: $\Delta AWPE_{RL}$)	Model 4.7 (DV: $\Delta AWPE_{LR}$)
Fixed Effect Parameter		
Intercept	103.29631(0.0588)*	117.501 (0.0002)***
ΔGDP	0.37105(0.84899)	0.04637 (0.9599)
ΔPop	0.00000(0.4234)	0.00000 (0.4174)
ΔKOF	2.01314(0.0296)**	-0.50338(0.1999)
Covariance Parameter		
σ_{int}^2	33.68	18.95
σ_{GDP}^2	17.09	1.147
σ_{Pop}^2	0.000	0.000
σ_{KOF}^2	17.21	1.682
ICCs		
$\sigma_{GDP,int}$	-0.436	-0.289
$\sigma_{Pop,int}$	0.384	-0.833
$\sigma_{KOF,int}$	-0.843	-0.960
Correlation Coefficient		
$\sigma_{GDP,Pop}$	-0.222	0.344
$\sigma_{GDP,KOF}$	0.425	0.180
$\sigma_{KOF,Pop}$	-0.718	0.728
σ^2	19.05	6.16

Note: DV calculated as the party-family mean, weighted by party relevance (i.e. percentage of the vote won by the given party).