Appendix 1: sample and response rate

	Energy	Telecom	Rail	Post	Airlines	TOTAL
Number of sampled firms	140	128	96	30	64	458
Company responses	91	67	35	21	29	243
Company response rate	65.0%	52.3%	36.5%	70.0%	45.3%	53.1%
Individual responses	128	100	47	31	50	356
Median number of answered questions	21	22	17	9	15	20
Mean number of answered questions	16	16	13	11	13	15

Table A1: Sample and response rate of the survey

Note: The reported response rate is based only on the responses in which at least three questions were completed.

Appendix 2: Additional descriptive statistics

As Table A2 shows, only 26 percent of firms report regularly addressing only one regulator at whatever level, while 43 percent of firms regularly address two or three regulators. The number of firms regularly addressing just one regulator at the national level stands at 36 percent, while those addressing two or three regulators at this level account for 43 percent. In terms of European regulators, the percentage of firms regularly addressing one such regulator is 47 percent, while 24 percent of respondents report addressing two or three European regulators on a frequent basis. Finally, the percentage of firms which indicate they regularly address one international regulator stands at 18 percent, while 14 percent of firms report addressing two or three international regulators. These figures indicate a sizeable percentage of companies are regularly turning to multiple regulators, especially at the national but also at the European level.

	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4 or more**
All	1.3 (3)	26.0 (58)	25.6 (57)	17.0 (38)	30.1 (67)
National	0.9 (2)	35.6 (78)	27.4 (60)	15.5 (34)	20.6 (45)
European	21.6 (37)	46.8 (80)	17.5 (30)	6.4 (11)	7.7 (13)
International	60.5 (75)	17.7 (22)	12.1 (15)	1.6 (2)	8.1 (10)

Table A2: Percentage of firms reporting that they regularly address 0, 1, 2, 3 or more regulators.

Note: The numbers represent the percentage of respondents that indicated their firms contacted regularly the respective number and type of regulators. In brackets are displayed the corresponding frequencies.

Appendix 3: Most frequently addressed regulator depending on type of problem in question

As an alternative ways to explore H1-H3, in this appendix we consider the types of regulator firm most frequently address depending on the stakes, salience and technical complexity a problem entails. Defining a regulator as 'likely to be addressed' if more than 50% of the respondents of the sample in a given sector indicate that they would approach it regarding a given problem, we rank the frequency with which firms in different sectors approach sectoral or cross-sectoral regulators at the national, European and international level. Thus, Table A3 displays *in descending order* the types of regulators that most firms in a given sector indicated as likely to address when concerned with problems in which it has a lot to gain or lose and problems in which there is not much at stake for it. We find that firms approach frequently European and international-level regulators only on issues where the stakes are high and they stand to lose or gain significantly. Notably, European sectoral regulators are addressed more frequently than national cross-sectoral regulators on issues where firms have a lot to lose, except in the case of railway firms (for the exact breakdown of the results by sector, see Figure A1).

2

	Problems in which a firm has a lot to gain or lose	Problems in which there is not much at stake for a firm
Airlines	1. NAT sectoral & EUR sectoral (.95) 2. INTL sectoral (.63) 4. EUR cross-sectoral (.53)	1. NAT sectoral (.63)
Energy	1. NAT sectoral (.93) 2. EUR sectoral (.75) 3. NAT cross-sectoral (.68) 4.EUR cross-sectoral (.55)	1. NAT sectoral (.68)
Post	1. NAT sectoral (1.00) 2. EUR sectoral (.64)	1. NAT sectoral (.55)
Rail	1. NAT sectoral (.95) 2. NAT cross-sectoral (.62) 3. EUR sectoral (.52)	1. NAT sectoral (.71)
Telecom	1. NAT sectoral (.92) 2. EUR sectoral (.88) 3. NAT cross-sectoral (.71) 4. EUR cross-sectoral (.63)	1. NAT sectoral (.67)

Table A3: Most frequently reported choice of regulator when a firm is concerned with problems in which it has a lot to gain or lose versus problems in which there is not much at stake for it (in descending order)

Note: Reported are only the types of regulator which more than 50% of the respondents of the sample in a given sector indicated as likely to address. The exact fraction of such firms is displayed in brackets.

	Publicly contested problems	**Problems of little public interest**
Airlines	1. NAT sectoral (.89) 2. EUR sectoral (.78) 3. EUR cross-sectoral (.56)	1. NAT sectoral (.67)
Energy	1. NAT sectoral (.93) 2. NAT cross-sectoral (.68) 3. EUR sectoral (.57)	1. NAT sectoral (.75)
Post	1. NAT sectoral (.91)	1. NAT sectoral (.73)
Rail	1. NAT sectoral (.89) 2. NAT cross-sectoral (.68)	1. NAT sectoral (.74)
Telecom	1. NAT sectoral (.92) 2. NAT cross-sectoral (.71) 3. EUR sectoral (.63)	1. NAT sectoral (.83)

Table A4: Most frequently reported choice of regulator when a firm is concerned with publicly contested problems versus problems of little interest to the public, per sector (in descending order)

Note: Reported are only the types of regulator, which more than 50% of the respondents of the sample in a given sector indicated as likely to address. The exact fraction of such firms is displayed in brackets.

Table A4 displays *in descending order* the types of regulators that most firms in a given sector indicated as likely to address when concerned with publicly contested problems and problems of little interest to the public (for more details, see Figure A2). In all sectors, firms are likely to address only national sectoral regulators regarding issues of limited public interest. When concerned with publicly contested problems, bar some sectoral differences, firms are generally most likely to address national sectoral regulators, then national cross-sectoral regulators, followed by European sectoral regulators, but not international regulators. Postal services and railway firms are alone in approaching solely national regulators, likely due to the limited availability of alternative competent regulatory venues at the supranational level. Thus, firms appear to 'go abroad' only when concerned with publicly contested issues where they are not confident of getting a favourable decision by the regulator at home. They seem to be responding to public pressure at home when they choose to 'go abroad' and seek out alternative regulatory venues. This appears to hold for all sectors.

	Highly technical problems	Technically simple problems
Airlines	1. NAT sectoral (.90) 2. EUR sectoral (.74) 3. INTL sectoral (.63)	1. NAT sectoral (.63)
Energy	1. NAT sectoral (.92) 2. EUR sectoral (.51)	1. NAT sectoral (.72) 2. NAT cross-sectoral (.52)
Post	1. NAT sectoral (1.00)	1. NAT sectoral (.64)
Rail	1. NAT sectoral (.85)	1. NAT sectoral (.80)
Telecom	1. NAT sectoral (.94) 3. EUR sectoral (.52)	1. NAT sectoral (.77)

Table A5: Most frequently reported choice of regulator when a firm is concerned with highly technical problems versus technically simply problems (in descending order)

Note: Reported are only the types of regulator, which more than 50% of the respondents of the sample in a given sector indicated as likely to address. The exact fraction of such firms is displayed in brackets.

Turning to H3, what emerges from our findings, summarized in Table A5 (for more details see Figure A3) is that when confronted with highly technical issues, firms tend to contact national and European *sectoral* regulators. In the airlines, energy and telecom sectors, firms may not limit themselves to addressing national sectoral agencies only, but would also seek to acquire information from European sectoral regulators. In other words, the European sectoral regulator helps firms "cross-check" the information obtained at the national level. In contrast, when technically simple problems are concerned, firms prefer to remain at the national level, which is obviously easier to address. Thus we could argue that the lower the complexity of an issue, the weaker the incentive is to "go to Brussels".

Figure A1: Firms' choice of sectoral or cross-sectoral regulator at national, European or international level when facing 'problems in which they have a lot to gain or lose' versus 'problems in which there is not much at stake for them'

Figure A2: Firms' choice of sectoral or cross-sectoral regulator at national, European or international level when facing 'publicly contested problems' versus 'problems of little interest to the public'

Figure A3: Firms' choice of sectoral or cross-sectoral regulator at national, European or international level when facing 'technically difficult' and 'technically simple' problems

Appendix 4: Robustness checks for H4 and H5 (negative binomial regressions)

	Dependent variable: Number of regularly addressed regulators		
	(7)	(8)	(9)
(Intercept)	-0.667	-0.182	-0.417
	(0.431)	(0.382)	(0.431)
Sector competitiveness (within country)	-0.043	-0.029	-0.024
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.074)
Sector competitiveness (cross-country)	**0.316*****	**0.289*****	**0.297*****
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.11)
Perceived EU competence	**0.044****	**0.046****	**0.042****
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Market share	0.46	0.429	
	(0.234)	(0.237)	
Operating revenue (billion €)	**0.012*****	**0.012*****	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Number of employees (thousands)	-0.001	-0.002	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Regulatory quality	**0.287****		**0.287****
	(0.126)		(0.134)
Self-regulation (% of regulatory activity)	0.004		0.002
	(0.004)		(0.004)
N	356	356	356
AIC	1535.55	1539.45	1551.57

Table A6: Multilevel negative binomial regressions of the number of regularly addressed regulators (without weights).

	Dependent variable: Number of regularly addressed regulators		
	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	-0.643	-0.179	-0.408
	(0.498)	(0.381)	(0.424)
Sector competitiveness (within country)	-0.044	-0.022	-0.02
	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.071)
Sector competitiveness (cross-country)	**0.311****	**0.285****	**0.293*****
	(0.128)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Perceived EU competence	**0.04***	**0.046****	**0.043****
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Market share	0.368	0.418	
	(0.281)	(0.233)	
Operating revenue (billion €)	0.01	**0.012*****	
	(0.006)	(0.004)	
Number of employees (thousands)	-0.001	-0.002	
	(0.002)	(0.001)	
Regulatory quality	**0.258***		**0.287****
	(0.148)		(0.128)
Self-regulation (% of regulatory activity)	0.007		0.002
	(0.005)		(0.004)
N	356	356	356
AIC	1028.66	1538.16	1549.9

Table A7: Negative binomial regressions of the number of regularly addressed regulators (with weights).