

Online Appendix

Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental evidence from a rebel attack

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Reader's guide to online appendix

Appendix A: Descriptive statistics: Table A shows descriptive statistics

Appendix B: Models with interaction terms between attack and Segou region indicators.

- **Table B1:** Results for Tables 2 and 3 using interaction model instead of subsample
- **Table B2:** Results for Tables 4 and 5 using interaction model instead of subsamples

Appendix C: Ethnicity

Tables C1-C10 show results for replications of Tables 2-4, where the issue of ethnicity is handled in various ways.

- **Tables C1-C4** replicate Table 2: Presidential approval and trust. These models include a full set of ethnicity fixed effects (Table B1), a dummy variable for Tuareg people (Table C2), a measure of the salience of ethnic identity (Table C3), and an interaction of the treatment variable (attack) and president co-ethnicity (Table C4).
- **Tables C5-C7** replicate Table 3: MP approval and parliamentary trust. These models include a full set of ethnicity fixed effects (Table C5), a dummy variable for Tuareg people (Table C6), and a measure of the salience of ethnic identity (Table C7).
- **Tables C8-C10** replicate Table 4: Communal councillor approval and trust. These models include a full set of ethnicity fixed effects (Table C8), a dummy variable for Tuareg people (Table C9), and a measure of the salience of ethnic identity (Table C10).

Appendix D: Partisanship

Tables D1-D6 show results for replications of Tables 2-4, where the issue of partisanship is handled.

- **Tables D1 and D2** replicate Table 2: Presidential approval and trust. These models include an interaction of the attack (treatment) variable and feeling close to the **ADEMA** party (Table D1), and an interaction of the attack (treatment) variable and feeling close to one of the parties in the **coalition** supporting the president (Table D2).
- **Tables D3 and D4** replicate Table 3: MP approval and parliamentary trust. These models include an interaction of the attack (treatment) variable and feeling close to the **ADEMA** party (Table D3), and an interaction of the attack (treatment) variable and feeling close to one of the parties in the **coalition** supporting the president (Table D4).
- **Tables D5 and D6** replicate Table 3: Communal councillor approval and trust. These models include an interaction of the attack (treatment) variable and feeling close to the **ADEMA** party (Table D5), and an interaction of the attack (treatment) variable and feeling close to one of the parties in the **coalition** supporting the president (Table D6).

Appendix E: Regional imbalances

Tables E1-E3 show results for replications of Tables 2-4, where the issue of regionally imbalanced sampling is handled.

- **Table E1** replicates Table 2: Presidential approval and trust. The models exclude respondents from the regions of Timbouctou and Kidal, where there are no respondents in the control group. Models 1-3 and 7-9 are for Mali excluding Timbouctou and Kidal. Models 4-6 and 10-12 additionally exclude the Segou region. No regressions for Segou region alone shown, as that would simply correspond to results in Table 1.
- **Table E2** replicates Table 3: MP approval and parliamentary trust. The models exclude respondents from the regions of Timbouctou and Kidal, where there are no respondents in the control group. Models 1-3 and 7-9 are for Mali excluding Timbouctou and Kidal. Models 4-6 and 10-12 additionally exclude the Segou region. No regressions for Segou region alone shown, as that would simply correspond to results in Table 1.
- **Table E3** replicates Table 4: Communal councillor approval and trust. The models exclude respondents from the regions of Timbouctou and Kidal, where there are no respondents in the control group. Models 1-3 and 7-9 are for Mali excluding Timbouctou and Kidal. Models 4-6 and 10-12 additionally exclude the Segou region. No regressions for Segou region alone shown, as that would simply correspond to results in Table 1.

Appendix F: Time-varying confounding

Tables F1-F3 show results for replications of Tables 2-4, where the issue of time-varying confounding is handled. This is done by including a full set of time fixed effects (time is indexed by day of interview in survey).

- **Table F1** replicates Table 2: Presidential approval and trust. The models include a full set of time/day fixed effects.
- **Table F2** replicates Table 3: MP approval and parliamentary trust. The models include a full set of time/day fixed effects.
- **Table F3** replicates Table 4: Communal councillor approval and trust. The models include a full set of time/day fixed effects.

Appendix G: Interviewer fixed effects and Ch^2 tests

- **Table G1** replicates Table 2: Presidential approval and trust. The models include a full set of interviewer fixed effects.
- **Table G2** replicates Table 3: MP approval and parliamentary trust. The models include a full set of interviewer fixed effects.
- **Table G3** replicates Table 4: Communal councillor approval and trust. The models include a full set of interviewer fixed effects.

- **Tables G4-G6:** Chi2 tests of association between interviewers in Segou region and a) treatment variable (Table G4), b) urban-rural location of respondents (Table G5), and districts within Segou region (Table G6).

Appendix H: Analysis of non-response

- Table H. Non-response before and after the attack – results from *t*-tests

Appendix I: Replication of Tables 2-5 using nearest neighbour matching

- **Figure I1.** Common support for Mali (whole sample)
- **Figure I2.** Common support for Segou region
- **Figure I3.** Common support for Mali without Segou region
- **Table I1** replicates Table 2 using nearest neighbour matching with observations on common support
- **Table I2** replicates Table 3 using nearest neighbour matching with observations on common support
- **Table I3** replicates Table 4 using nearest neighbour matching with observations on common support
- **Table I4** replicates Table 5 using nearest neighbour matching with observations on common support

Appendix J: Full results from Table 5.

- **Table J1:** Full results from Table 5

Appendix A: Descriptive statistics

Table A. Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Obs.
Dependent variables					
Presidential approval	2.68	0.91	1	4	1150
Presidential trust	2.93	1.05	1	4	1203
MP approval	2.45	0.89	1	4	1091
Parliamentary trust	2.85	1.02	1	4	1180
Communal councillor approval	2.54	0.91	1	4	1155
Communal councillor trust	2.81	1.09	1	4	1197
Social trust	1.69	1.01	0	3	1214
Treatment and explanatory variables					
Attack (treatment)	0.72	0.45	0	1	1232
Urban	0.27	0.45	0	1	1232
Poverty	1.02	1.20	0	4	1232
Ownership	1.09	1.00	0	3	1232
Education	0.14	0.35	0	1	1232
Age	39.1	14.2	18	80	1217
Gender	0.50	0.50	0	1	1232
Radio news	2.88	1.40	0	4	1231
President co-ethnic	0.15	0.36	0	1	1232
Region dummies (fixed effects)					
Segou	0.17	0.37	0	1	1232
Kayes	0.14	0.34	0	1	1232
Kolikouro	0.16	0.36	0	1	1232
Sikasso	0.18	0.38	0	1	1232
Mopti	0.15	0.36	0	1	1232
Timbouctou	0.05	0.21	0	1	1232
Gao	0.04	0.19	0	1	1232
Kidal	0.03	0.16	0	1	1232
Bamako	0.10	0.31	0	1	1232

Appendix B: Tables B1-B2

Table B1. Results for Tables 2 and 3 using interaction model instead of subsamples

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali
Dependent variable	Presidential approval (Table 2)	Presidential approval (Table 2)	Presidential trust (Table 2)	Presidential trust (Table 2)	MP approval (Table 3)	MP approval (Table 3)	Parliamentary trust (Table 3)	Parliamentary trust (Table 3)
Attack	-0.218 (-1.543)	-0.140 (-0.963)	-0.181 (-1.277)	-0.209 (-1.399)	-0.206 (-1.464)	-0.121 (-0.834)	-0.018 (-0.132)	-0.010 (-0.071)
Segou	0.170 (0.790)	0.238 (0.758)	0.589** (2.312)	0.763** (2.340)	1.016*** (4.745)	0.959*** (3.340)	0.747*** (3.294)	0.816*** (2.654)
Attack#Segou	-0.607** (-2.257)	-0.761*** (-2.670)	-0.469 (-1.579)	-0.440 (-1.438)	-0.669** (-2.488)	-0.793*** (-2.875)	-0.089 (-0.324)	-0.085 (-0.299)
Urban	0.029 (0.194)	-0.036 (-0.228)	-0.487*** (-3.479)	-0.399*** (-2.623)	0.087 (0.597)	0.011 (0.067)	-0.409*** (-2.903)	-0.351** (-2.305)
Ownership	-0.017 (-0.242)	0.042 (0.605)	-0.067 (-0.992)	-0.046 (-0.658)	0.014 (0.199)	0.030 (0.441)	-0.124* (-1.774)	-0.110 (-1.541)
Education	-0.375* (-1.953)	-0.440** (-2.304)	0.127 (0.727)	0.051 (0.270)	-0.259 (-1.460)	-0.309* (-1.751)	-0.058 (-0.336)	-0.135 (-0.737)
Age	0.013*** (2.719)	0.012** (2.534)	0.018*** (4.161)	0.015*** (3.361)	-0.005 (-0.976)	-0.004 (-0.746)	0.015*** (3.358)	0.012*** (2.708)
Gender	-0.028 (-0.217)	0.031 (0.237)	0.191 (1.510)	0.159 (1.251)	-0.156 (-1.184)	-0.112 (-0.837)	0.057 (0.466)	0.046 (0.366)
Radio news	0.083* (1.848)	0.064 (1.447)	0.127*** (2.911)	0.113*** (2.648)	0.043 (0.988)	0.034 (0.787)	0.084* (1.902)	0.079* (1.778)
President co-ethnic	-0.176 (-1.126)	0.086 (0.523)	0.153 (0.927)	0.121 (0.738)	-0.243 (-1.546)	-0.087 (-0.542)	-0.052 (-0.324)	-0.126 (-0.784)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.570*** (-5.304)	-1.630*** (-4.517)	-1.025*** (-3.574)	-1.104*** (-3.176)	-1.861*** (-6.165)	-1.956*** (-5.460)	-1.326*** (-4.996)	-1.461*** (-4.421)
/cut2	-0.083 (-0.282)	-0.094 (-0.263)	0.189 (0.657)	0.156 (0.448)	-0.240 (-0.808)	-0.291 (-0.826)	0.094 (0.356)	0.012 (0.036)
/cut3	1.970*** (6.514)	2.154*** (5.804)	1.417*** (4.858)	1.473*** (4.188)	1.929*** (6.311)	1.965*** (5.471)	1.440*** (5.365)	1.426*** (4.279)
Observations	1,138	1,138	1,188	1,188	1,081	1,081	1,166	1,166

Note. The coefficient for the 'Attack' variable shows effect of the attack outside of the Segou region (Segou=0). The results show that effect of attack is stronger (more negative, given by the interaction terms) in the Segou region than outside of Segou region. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B2. Results for Tables 4 and 5 using interaction model instead of subsamples

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali	Mali
Dependent variable	Local councilor approval (Table 4)	Local councilor approval (Table 4)	Local councilor trust (Table 4)	Local councilor trust (Table 4)	Social trust (Table 5)	Social trust (Table 5)
Attack	-0.187 (-1.378)	-0.056 (-0.391)	-0.060 (-0.469)	0.083 (0.620)	0.062 (0.495)	0.202 (1.596)
Segou	0.309 (1.468)	0.183 (0.643)	0.492** (2.255)	0.326 (1.194)	0.473** (2.088)	-0.088 (-0.316)
Attack#Segou	-0.379 (-1.412)	-0.525* (-1.913)	0.143 (0.529)	0.023 (0.082)	0.077 (0.280)	-0.040 (-0.145)
Urban	-0.199 (-1.379)	-0.308* (-1.805)	-0.562*** (-3.988)	-0.634*** (-3.942)	-0.088 (-0.648)	-0.293* (-1.846)
Ownership	0.024 (0.352)	0.023 (0.343)	-0.007 (-0.117)	-0.018 (-0.286)	0.078 (1.183)	0.088 (1.299)
Education	-0.335* (-1.914)	-0.350** (-2.008)	-0.381** (-2.269)	-0.462*** (-2.612)	-0.024 (-0.146)	-0.151 (-0.855)
Age	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.336)	0.004 (0.816)	0.001 (0.243)	0.014*** (3.402)	0.013*** (3.134)
Gender	0.046 (0.382)	0.080 (0.662)	0.077 (0.638)	0.055 (0.451)	-0.199* (-1.695)	-0.196 (-1.624)
Radio news	0.046 (1.062)	0.045 (1.059)	0.040 (0.976)	0.043 (1.031)	0.008 (0.171)	0.029 (0.639)
President co-ethnic	-0.178 (-1.224)	-0.100 (-0.678)	0.019 (0.117)	-0.069 (-0.433)	0.047 (0.322)	-0.094 (-0.648)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.779*** (-6.288)	-1.888*** (-5.444)	-1.587*** (-5.907)	-1.949*** (-6.172)	-1.106*** (-4.429)	-1.774*** (-5.752)
/cut2	-0.345 (-1.250)	-0.427 (-1.250)	-0.343 (-1.297)	-0.667** (-2.143)	0.323 (1.285)	-0.272 (-0.887)
/cut3	1.850*** (6.614)	1.814*** (5.273)	0.798*** (2.997)	0.529* (1.694)	1.798*** (6.951)	1.249*** (4.025)
Observations	1,141	1,141	1,182	1,182	1,198	1,198

Note. The coefficient for the 'Attack' variable shows effect of the attack outside of the Segou region (Segou=0). Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix C: Tables C1-C10

Table C1. Replication of Table 2 with ethnicity fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Sogou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Sogou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.264** (-2.058)	-0.268** (-2.067)	-0.235* (-1.737)	-0.771** (-2.178)	-0.970** (-2.453)	-0.086 (-0.566)	-0.246* (-1.914)	-0.309** (-2.284)	-0.285** (-2.085)	-0.296 (-0.879)	-0.423 (-1.110)	-0.208 (-1.341)
Urban			-0.074 (-0.439)		-0.693 (-1.141)	0.092 (0.474)			-0.429*** (-2.718)		-0.643 (-0.972)	-0.335* (-1.919)
Poverty			-0.014 (-0.292)		-0.071 (-0.563)	0.008 (0.145)			0.057 (1.134)		0.024 (0.206)	0.057 (0.987)
Ownership			0.046 (0.646)		0.427** (1.987)	-0.006 (-0.082)			-0.039 (-0.542)		-0.072 (-0.370)	-0.047 (-0.589)
Education			-0.425** (-2.170)		-0.283 (-0.372)	-0.444** (-2.151)			0.094 (0.482)		0.294 (0.389)	0.043 (0.210)
Age			0.011** (2.290)		0.007 (0.551)	0.011** (2.026)			0.014*** (3.175)		0.008 (0.668)	0.015*** (2.993)
Gender			0.020 (0.151)		-0.052 (-0.142)	0.018 (0.125)			0.177 (1.367)		0.068 (0.195)	0.165 (1.149)
Radio news			0.055 (1.242)		0.043 (0.383)	0.060 (1.177)			0.114*** (2.609)		0.136 (1.341)	0.119** (2.364)
President co-ethnic			0.351 (0.464)		0.286 (0.655)	0.358 (0.465)			-0.181 (-0.222)		0.142 (0.338)	-0.325 (-0.403)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-3.086*** (-9.003)	-1.675** (-2.224)	-1.142 (-1.412)	-2.581*** (-6.931)	-2.323*** (-3.041)	-1.277 (-1.535)	-2.838*** (-6.948)	-2.620*** (-2.996)	-1.745** (-1.993)	-2.234*** (-6.120)	-1.808*** (-2.945)	-1.438 (-1.628)
/cut2	-1.590*** (-4.824)	-0.155 (-0.206)	0.395 (0.488)	-0.737** (-2.339)	-0.396 (-0.530)	0.209 (0.251)	-1.648*** (-4.108)	-1.384 (-1.597)	-0.480 (-0.551)	-1.372*** (-4.324)	-0.938 (-1.555)	-0.083 (-0.095)
/cut3	0.560* (1.708)	2.074*** (2.755)	2.644*** (3.250)	1.666*** (5.170)	2.113*** (2.723)	2.449*** (2.931)	-0.426 (-1.066)	-0.090 (-0.104)	0.848 (0.972)	0.469 (1.527)	0.936 (1.540)	1.155 (1.310)
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,138	202	202	936	1,203	1,203	1,188	207	207	981

Note. Full set of ethnicity fixed effects included (Q79 in Afrobarometer data). Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table C2. Replication of Table 2 with Tuareg dummy

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.348*** (-2.905)	-0.316*** (-2.586)	-0.298** (-2.353)	-0.891*** (-3.325)	-1.065*** (-3.648)	-0.142 (-0.980)	-0.246** (-1.989)	-0.315** (-2.451)	-0.295** (-2.266)	-0.589** (-2.087)	-0.671** (-2.163)	-0.207 (-1.383)
Urban			-0.030 (-0.186)		-0.827* (-1.685)	0.072 (0.420)			-0.376** (-2.482)		-0.721 (-1.288)	-0.324** (-2.016)
Poverty			-0.018 (-0.381)		-0.089 (-0.787)	0.006 (0.112)			0.065 (1.291)		0.044 (0.395)	0.070 (1.238)
Ownership			0.045 (0.635)		0.408** (2.209)	-0.009 (-0.110)			-0.038 (-0.542)		-0.043 (-0.241)	-0.042 (-0.536)
Education			-0.455** (-2.395)		0.027 (0.038)	-0.453** (-2.284)			0.054 (0.285)		0.377 (0.547)	0.028 (0.139)
Age			0.011** (2.408)		0.013 (1.098)	0.011** (2.145)			0.014*** (3.113)		0.013 (1.168)	0.014*** (2.944)
Gender			0.028 (0.209)		0.026 (0.081)	0.020 (0.138)			0.149 (1.168)		0.223 (0.697)	0.139 (0.983)
Radio news			0.058 (1.312)		0.036 (0.349)	0.066 (1.296)			0.113*** (2.631)		0.134 (1.394)	0.117** (2.409)
President co-ethnic			0.050 (0.304)		0.156 (0.383)	0.070 (0.391)			0.093 (0.570)		0.019 (0.048)	0.119 (0.659)
Tuareg indicator	1.115*** (4.066)	-0.084 (-0.265)	0.096 (0.285)	-0.935*** (-5.245)	-0.262 (-0.496)	0.162 (0.470)	0.280 (0.758)	-0.618 (-1.368)	-0.533 (-1.126)	-13.938*** (-13.551)	-14.318*** (-12.133)	-0.372 (-0.812)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.199*** (-17.575)	-2.069*** (-12.920)	-1.496*** (-5.063)	-2.708*** (-9.784)	-2.225*** (-3.366)	-1.576*** (-4.138)	-2.065*** (-15.857)	-2.404*** (-13.937)	-1.575*** (-5.492)	-2.479*** (-8.340)	-1.709*** (-3.072)	-1.034*** (-2.730)
/cut2	-0.731*** (-6.967)	-0.556*** (-3.774)	0.033 (0.112)	-0.945*** (-4.232)	-0.364 (-0.557)	-0.100 (-0.263)	-0.891*** (-7.806)	-1.172*** (-7.654)	-0.316 (-1.119)	-1.691*** (-6.435)	-0.908 (-1.633)	0.311 (0.822)
/cut3	1.302*** (11.758)	1.662*** (10.475)	2.273*** (7.425)	1.344*** (5.664)	2.046*** (2.958)	2.129*** (5.429)	0.291*** (2.645)	0.113 (0.758)	1.003*** (3.522)	0.034 (0.142)	0.862 (1.535)	1.538*** (4.011)
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,138	202	202	936	1,203	1,203	1,188	207	207	981

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table C3. Replication of Table 2 controlling for salience of ethnic identity

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.326*** (-2.733)	-0.317*** (-2.589)	-0.301** (-2.371)	-0.891*** (-3.317)	-1.053*** (-3.577)	-0.142 (-0.975)	-0.242** (-1.969)	-0.309** (-2.407)	-0.289** (-2.224)	-0.620** (-2.200)	-0.713** (-2.295)	-0.204 (-1.371)
Urban			-0.011 (-0.073)		-0.856* (-1.836)	0.095 (0.559)			-0.401*** (-2.626)		-0.843 (-1.511)	-0.349** (-2.150)
Poverty			-0.014 (-0.301)		-0.091 (-0.800)	0.014 (0.261)			0.055 (1.092)		0.044 (0.391)	0.058 (1.007)
Ownership			0.046 (0.657)		0.413** (2.251)	-0.005 (-0.064)			-0.037 (-0.519)		-0.027 (-0.154)	-0.043 (-0.546)
Education			-0.472** (-2.467)		0.005 (0.007)	-0.478** (-2.386)			0.049 (0.259)		0.583 (0.813)	0.034 (0.167)
Age			0.011** (2.373)		0.013 (1.075)	0.011** (2.117)			0.014*** (3.212)		0.014 (1.223)	0.015*** (3.043)
Gender			0.023 (0.173)		0.046 (0.142)	0.016 (0.109)			0.170 (1.333)		0.241 (0.762)	0.158 (1.116)
Radio news			0.064 (1.427)		0.030 (0.295)	0.074 (1.463)			0.106** (2.433)		0.131 (1.358)	0.107** (2.159)
President co-ethnic			0.058 (0.358)		0.162 (0.399)	0.089 (0.497)			0.083 (0.508)		0.024 (0.058)	0.098 (0.538)
Ethnic identify	0.008 (0.199)	-0.035 (-0.778)	-0.044 (-0.952)	0.038 (0.354)	0.047 (0.424)	-0.072 (-1.392)	0.085** (2.210)	0.066 (1.600)	0.060 (1.370)	-0.074 (-0.745)	-0.068 (-0.611)	0.085* (1.742)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.170*** (-10.664)	-2.176*** (-10.329)	-1.619*** (-5.181)	-2.586*** (-6.608)	-2.092*** (-2.964)	-1.799*** (-4.354)	-1.765*** (-9.240)	-2.201*** (-10.492)	-1.395*** (-4.590)	-2.688*** (-6.588)	-1.887*** (-3.166)	-0.774* (-1.927)
/cut2	-0.708*** (-3.782)	-0.662*** (-3.368)	-0.089 (-0.288)	-0.825** (-2.098)	-0.230 (-0.325)	-0.319 (-0.787)	-0.588*** (-3.246)	-0.968*** (-4.948)	-0.135 (-0.450)	-1.916*** (-4.916)	-1.097* (-1.835)	0.575 (1.434)
/cut3	1.314*** (6.903)	1.557*** (7.668)	2.154*** (6.759)	1.464*** (3.603)	2.182*** (2.930)	1.916*** (4.607)	0.597*** (3.311)	0.317 (1.627)	1.184*** (3.902)	-0.201 (-0.527)	0.666 (1.103)	1.804*** (4.430)
Observations	1,149	1,149	1,137	202	202	935	1,203	1,203	1,188	207	207	981

Note. Ethnic identity is measured using Q83 from the Afrobarometer survey. Low values indicate ethnic identity. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C4. Replication of Table 2 with interaction of treatment (attack) and President co-ethnicity

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample	Mali	Segou	Mali	Segou
Dependent variable	Presidential approval		Presidential trust	
Attack	-0.286** (-2.099)	-1.018*** (-3.421)	-0.213 (-1.502)	-0.662** (-2.120)
President co-ethnic	0.091 (0.328)	1.101** (2.360)	0.404 (1.329)	0.771 (0.525)
Attack# President co-ethnic	-0.064 (-0.187)	-1.070 (-1.580)	-0.456 (-1.278)	-0.819 (-0.533)
Urban	-0.026 (-0.165)	-0.899* (-1.918)	-0.382** (-2.519)	-0.886 (-1.609)
Poverty	-0.018 (-0.378)	-0.100 (-0.868)	0.062 (1.234)	0.032 (0.283)
Ownership	0.045 (0.636)	0.426** (2.312)	-0.031 (-0.441)	-0.015 (-0.084)
Education	-0.456** (-2.393)	0.067 (0.098)	0.045 (0.236)	0.521 (0.767)
Age	0.011** (2.374)	0.013 (1.105)	0.014*** (3.100)	0.014 (1.207)
Gender	0.027 (0.201)	0.049 (0.152)	0.167 (1.308)	0.277 (0.866)
Radio news	0.058 (1.305)	0.041 (0.403)	0.115*** (2.702)	0.128 (1.341)
Region fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
/cut1	-1.495*** (-5.105)	-2.177*** (-3.286)	-1.513*** (-5.312)	-1.654*** (-2.981)
/cut2	0.034 (0.118)	-0.313 (-0.477)	-0.254 (-0.908)	-0.867 (-1.560)
/cut3	2.275*** (7.489)	2.104*** (3.022)	1.064*** (3.767)	0.897 (1.595)
Observations	1,138	202	1,188	207

Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table C5. Replication of Table 3 with ethnicity fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent variable	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.175 (-1.327)	-0.223* (-1.664)	-0.224 (-1.606)	-0.769* (-1.804)	-0.754 (-1.470)	-0.081 (-0.533)	-0.020 (-0.162)	-0.064 (-0.489)	-0.030 (-0.223)	0.212 (0.600)	0.049 (0.132)	-0.028 (-0.187)
Urban			-0.030 (-0.174)		-0.374 (-0.825)	0.183 (0.927)			-0.330** (-2.089)		-1.598*** (-2.807)	-0.059 (-0.339)
Poverty			-0.046 (-0.878)		-0.016 (-0.136)	-0.048 (-0.790)			-0.011 (-0.213)		0.015 (0.123)	-0.007 (-0.122)
Ownership			0.020 (0.286)		0.233 (1.154)	-0.012 (-0.156)			-0.124* (-1.692)		0.105 (0.537)	-0.143* (-1.750)
Education			-0.362** (-1.986)		-0.750 (-1.119)	-0.358* (-1.887)			-0.127 (-0.671)		-0.052 (-0.082)	-0.093 (-0.458)
Age			-0.005 (-0.956)		-0.012 (-0.881)	-0.005 (-0.899)			0.012** (2.559)		-0.004 (-0.277)	0.012** (2.434)
Gender			-0.139 (-1.034)		-0.298 (-0.878)	-0.131 (-0.859)			0.040 (0.311)		-0.080 (-0.234)	0.023 (0.159)
Radio news			0.021 (0.477)		0.055 (0.522)	0.015 (0.288)			0.073 (1.601)		0.210* (1.899)	0.042 (0.803)
President co-ethnic			1.067 (1.133)		-0.514 (-0.926)	0.906 (1.075)			-0.509 (-0.637)		-0.088 (-0.190)	-0.517 (-0.577)
Ethnicity fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.833*** (-4.227)	-1.138 (-1.274)	-1.356 (-1.396)	-3.020*** (-6.573)	-3.494*** (-4.468)	-0.970 (-1.082)	-2.967*** (-7.015)	-2.956*** (-3.402)	-2.589*** (-3.138)	-2.730*** (-6.240)	-2.876*** (-3.871)	-1.670* (-1.805)
/cut2	-0.200 (-0.461)	0.530 (0.591)	0.323 (0.332)	-1.314*** (-3.231)	-1.769** (-2.449)	0.736 (0.817)	-1.590*** (-3.796)	-1.501* (-1.737)	-1.109 (-1.350)	-1.380*** (-4.144)	-1.455** (-2.027)	-0.152 (-0.164)
/cut3	2.016*** (4.534)	2.801*** (3.091)	2.600*** (2.645)	1.517*** (3.574)	1.134 (1.494)	2.911*** (3.195)	-0.283 (-0.675)	-0.107 (-0.124)	0.313 (0.381)	0.563* (1.751)	0.638 (0.921)	1.189 (1.287)
Observations	1,091	1,091	1,081	192	192	889	1,180	1,180	1,166	200	200	966

Note. Full set of ethnicity fixed effects included (q79 in Afrobarometer data). Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table C6. Replication of Table 3 with Tuareg dummy

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent variable	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.303** (-2.485)	-0.266** (-2.161)	-0.282** (-2.226)	-1.046*** (-3.673)	-1.033*** (-3.171)	-0.129 (-0.905)	-0.023 (-0.193)	-0.055 (-0.450)	-0.030 (-0.240)	-0.083 (-0.298)	-0.132 (-0.461)	-0.036 (-0.253)
Urban			0.021 (0.122)		-0.620* (-1.756)	0.134 (0.714)			-0.333** (-2.187)		-1.850*** (-3.882)	-0.127 (-0.772)
Poverty			-0.041 (-0.798)		-0.045 (-0.426)	-0.051 (-0.853)			-0.007 (-0.148)		0.008 (0.063)	-0.003 (-0.060)
Ownership			0.027 (0.394)		0.308 (1.593)	-0.015 (-0.201)			-0.115 (-1.609)		0.119 (0.660)	-0.139* (-1.741)
Education			-0.334* (-1.882)		-0.365 (-0.608)	-0.287 (-1.574)			-0.135 (-0.735)		0.162 (0.290)	-0.081 (-0.414)
Age			-0.004 (-0.852)		-0.004 (-0.316)	-0.004 (-0.755)			0.011** (2.563)		0.002 (0.179)	0.012** (2.440)
Gender			-0.130 (-0.978)		-0.179 (-0.560)	-0.122 (-0.812)			0.024 (0.189)		0.061 (0.205)	0.005 (0.034)
Radio news			0.026 (0.607)		0.030 (0.319)	0.034 (0.677)			0.073 (1.641)		0.181* (1.763)	0.051 (1.023)
President co-ethnic			-0.121 (-0.750)		-0.396 (-0.775)	-0.044 (-0.256)			-0.134 (-0.835)		-0.151 (-0.348)	-0.138 (-0.801)
Tuareg	0.307 (0.706)	-0.370 (-0.499)	-0.458 (-0.568)	-14.853*** (-14.379)	-14.910*** (-13.864)	-0.222 (-0.294)	-0.142 (-0.448)	-1.020** (-2.432)	-0.984** (-2.216)	-0.581*** (-3.442)	0.648 (1.239)	-1.044** (-2.251)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.825*** (-15.123)	-2.316*** (-14.037)	-2.572*** (-8.217)	-2.977*** (-9.658)	-3.205*** (-4.735)	-1.931*** (-4.964)	-1.970*** (-16.071)	-2.712*** (-16.037)	-2.299*** (-8.054)	-2.730*** (-8.697)	-2.664*** (-4.227)	-1.379*** (-3.823)
/cut2	-0.233** (-2.235)	-0.665*** (-4.513)	-0.909*** (-3.005)	-1.363*** (-5.767)	-1.559** (-2.470)	-0.249 (-0.649)	-0.606*** (-5.761)	-1.264*** (-8.413)	-0.825*** (-2.939)	-1.546*** (-6.159)	-1.380** (-2.179)	0.125 (0.347)
/cut3	1.900*** (15.345)	1.573*** (10.103)	1.333*** (4.399)	1.345*** (5.639)	1.235* (1.835)	1.890*** (4.857)	0.678*** (6.414)	0.126 (0.856)	0.595** (2.111)	0.219 (0.931)	0.599 (0.974)	1.462*** (4.011)
Observations	1,091	1,091	1,081	192	192	889	1,180	1,180	1,166	200	200	966

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table C7. Replication of Table 3 controlling for salience of ethnic identity

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.292** (-2.405)	-0.264** (-2.148)	-0.281** (-2.214)	-1.028*** (-3.605)	-0.991*** (-3.009)	-0.119 (-0.830)	-0.020 (-0.170)	-0.053 (-0.431)	-0.027 (-0.217)	-0.128 (-0.455)	-0.173 (-0.600)	-0.030 (-0.211)
Urban			0.023 (0.136)		-0.825** (-2.124)	0.141 (0.752)			-0.354** (-2.330)		-1.795*** (-4.094)	-0.149 (-0.904)
Poverty			-0.039 (-0.759)		-0.071 (-0.649)	-0.046 (-0.766)			-0.008 (-0.160)		0.020 (0.167)	-0.007 (-0.123)
Ownership			0.029 (0.428)		0.331* (1.712)	-0.010 (-0.131)			-0.113 (-1.575)		0.109 (0.594)	-0.138* (-1.728)
Education			-0.331* (-1.862)		-0.381 (-0.623)	-0.296 (-1.611)			-0.114 (-0.623)		0.278 (0.502)	-0.066 (-0.334)
Age			-0.004 (-0.822)		-0.005 (-0.365)	-0.004 (-0.750)			0.012*** (2.778)		0.003 (0.253)	0.013*** (2.683)
Gender			-0.133 (-0.998)		-0.079 (-0.248)	-0.126 (-0.844)			0.041 (0.326)		-0.005 (-0.017)	0.026 (0.187)
Radio news			0.034 (0.760)		0.003 (0.030)	0.049 (0.949)			0.080* (1.788)		0.201* (1.934)	0.057 (1.145)
President co-ethnic			-0.109 (-0.675)		-0.351 (-0.725)	-0.016 (-0.093)			-0.124 (-0.772)		-0.158 (-0.379)	-0.136 (-0.781)
Ethnic identity	-0.075* (-1.861)	-0.053 (-1.174)	-0.053 (-1.145)	0.128 (1.149)	0.170 (1.350)	-0.100* (-1.954)	-0.040 (-1.023)	-0.020 (-0.490)	-0.019 (-0.451)	-0.172 (-1.529)	-0.155 (-1.273)	0.009 (0.197)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.102*** (-10.994)	-2.478*** (-11.481)	-2.704*** (-8.107)	-2.547*** (-5.799)	-2.738*** (-3.843)	-2.241*** (-5.302)	-2.111*** (-11.495)	-2.756*** (-13.544)	-2.281*** (-7.767)	-3.305*** (-7.122)	-3.104*** (-4.610)	-1.285*** (-3.355)
/cut2	-0.506*** (-2.881)	-0.824*** (-4.118)	-1.039*** (-3.226)	-0.957** (-2.269)	-1.106 (-1.603)	-0.552 (-1.334)	-0.749*** (-4.373)	-1.313*** (-7.033)	-0.811*** (-2.809)	-2.109*** (-4.888)	-1.809*** (-2.613)	0.213 (0.560)
/cut3	1.631*** (8.937)	1.415*** (6.935)	1.205*** (3.756)	1.762*** (3.930)	1.709** (2.312)	1.594*** (3.833)	0.537*** (3.146)	0.074 (0.396)	0.606** (2.084)	-0.327 (-0.783)	0.178 (0.265)	1.546*** (4.000)
Observations	1,091	1,091	1,081	192	192	889	1,179	1,179	1,165	200	200	965

Note. Ethnic identity is measured using Q83 from the Afrobarometer survey. Low values indicate ethnic identity. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table C8. Replication of Table 4 with ethnicity fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.185 (-1.483)	-0.142 (-1.096) (-0.220)	-0.111 (-0.837) (1.294)	-0.188 (-0.531)	-0.157 (-0.406)	-0.048 (-0.325)	0.025 (0.209)	0.053 (0.419)	0.124 (0.976) (-0.828)	0.296 (0.894)	0.284 (0.824)	0.098 (0.687)
Urban			-0.327* (-1.908)		-0.772* (-1.707)	-0.193 (-0.954)			-0.659*** (-4.016)		-1.380*** (-2.848)	-0.427** (-2.330)
Poverty			-0.014 (-0.273)		-0.154 (-1.326)	0.001 (0.018)			-0.011 (-0.220)		-0.193* (-1.710)	0.029 (0.529)
Ownership			0.024 (0.343)		0.005 (0.026)	0.023 (0.312)			-0.029 (-0.446)		0.030 (0.185)	-0.038 (-0.518)
Education			-0.394** (-2.250)		-0.779 (-1.347)	-0.377** (-2.044)			-0.453** (-2.499)		-1.781** (-2.533)	-0.300 (-1.603)
Age			0.001 (0.255)		0.007 (0.595)	-0.001 (-0.153)			0.001 (0.152)		-0.013 (-1.031)	0.001 (0.267)
Gender			0.065 (0.528)		-0.033 (-0.101)	0.091 (0.664)			0.021 (0.167)		-0.104 (-0.310)	0.030 (0.213)
Radio news			0.037 (0.853)		-0.096 (-1.024)	0.063 (1.227)			0.026 (0.598)		0.131 (1.342)	-0.009 (-0.194)
President co-ethnic			0.758 (0.925)		-0.517 (-1.103)	0.934 (1.101)			-0.161 (-0.222)		-0.724 (-1.458)	-0.017 (-0.022)
Ethnicity fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.437*** (-3.791)	-0.960 (-1.164)	-0.854 (-0.984)	-1.871*** (-5.437)	-2.340*** (-3.189)	-0.843 (-0.916)	-2.280*** (-5.946)	-2.047*** (-2.677)	-2.378*** (-3.127)	-2.092*** (-5.950)	-3.271*** (-4.200)	-1.853** (-2.205)
/cut2	-1.009 (-1.568)	0.497 (0.602)	0.628 (0.724)	-0.497 (-1.567)	-0.898 (-1.297)	0.670 (0.727)	-1.082*** (-2.855)	-0.791 (-1.040)	-1.076 (-1.425)	-1.186*** (-3.882)	-2.210*** (-2.992)	-0.499 (-0.597)
/cut3	1.195* (1.845)	2.746*** (3.319)	2.906*** (3.341)	2.336*** (6.332)	2.040*** (2.770)	2.861*** (3.093)	0.023 (0.061)	0.392 (0.515)	0.141 (0.187)	0.375 (1.251)	-0.419 (-0.578)	0.649 (0.776)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,141	204	204	937	1,197	1,197	1,182	204	204	978

Note. Full set of ethnicity fixed effects included (Q79 in Afrobarometer data). Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table C9. Replication of Table 4 with Tuareg dummy

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.218*	-0.178	-0.169	-0.646**	-0.557*	-0.074	0.019	0.036	0.082	0.090	0.219	0.063
	(-1.872)	(-1.475)	(-1.371)	(-2.446)	(-1.857)	(-0.523)	(0.171)	(0.308)	(0.696)	(0.334)	(0.794)	(0.474)
Urban			-0.275		-0.724**	-0.168			-0.611***		-1.392***	-0.435**
			(-1.607)		(-2.053)	(-0.865)			(-3.832)		(-3.374)	(-2.526)
Poverty			-0.019		-0.142	-0.003			-0.007		-0.189*	0.028
			(-0.372)		(-1.344)	(-0.049)			(-0.151)		(-1.701)	(0.515)
Ownership			0.016		0.011	0.016			-0.028		0.046	-0.032
			(0.238)		(0.056)	(0.212)			(-0.427)		(0.300)	(-0.451)
Education			-0.374**		-0.425	-0.342*			-0.470***		-1.667***	-0.317*
			(-2.153)		(-0.767)	(-1.871)			(-2.629)		(-2.853)	(-1.724)
Age			0.001		0.013	-0.000			0.001		-0.009	0.001
			(0.226)		(1.044)	(-0.096)			(0.163)		(-0.770)	(0.226)
Gender			0.057		-0.030	0.084			0.030		-0.026	0.040
			(0.468)		(-0.099)	(0.621)			(0.241)		(-0.083)	(0.293)
Radio news			0.043		-0.087	0.071			0.040		0.143	0.015
			(1.000)		(-0.970)	(1.429)			(0.950)		(1.517)	(0.310)
President co-ethnic			-0.131		-0.573	-0.067			-0.073		-0.692	-0.014
			(-0.888)		(-1.369)	(-0.419)			(-0.458)		(-1.461)	(-0.084)
Tuareg	-0.291	-0.933*	-1.000*	-0.915***	-0.269	-1.018*	-0.602*	-1.117***	-1.128***	-0.578***	0.162	-1.222***
	(-0.647)	(-1.719)	(-1.772)	(-5.213)	(-0.752)	(-1.685)	(-1.949)	(-2.746)	(-2.692)	(-3.459)	(0.362)	(-2.859)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.850***	-1.897***	-1.856***	-2.218***	-2.395***	-1.753***	-1.667***	-2.282***	-2.357***	-2.106***	-3.012***	-1.797***
	(-15.697)	(-11.961)	(-6.367)	(-8.603)	(-3.797)	(-4.703)	(-15.273)	(-13.983)	(-8.298)	(-8.298)	(-4.298)	(-5.222)
/cut2	-0.436***	-0.459***	-0.395	-0.905***	-1.017*	-0.262	-0.478***	-1.039***	-1.070***	-1.233***	-1.967***	-0.468
	(-4.346)	(-3.214)	(-1.402)	(-4.187)	(-1.710)	(-0.710)	(-4.946)	(-7.052)	(-3.850)	(-5.301)	(-2.882)	(-1.376)
/cut3	1.730***	1.756***	1.851***	1.746***	1.749***	1.896***	0.607***	0.130	0.134	0.257	-0.216	0.658*
	(15.499)	(11.756)	(6.585)	(7.335)	(2.768)	(5.119)	(6.219)	(0.890)	(0.478)	(1.128)	(-0.321)	(1.927)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,141	204	204	937	1,197	1,197	1,182	204	204	978

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table C10. Replication of Table 4 controlling for salience of ethnic identity

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.213*	-0.177	-0.166	-0.699***	-0.607**	-0.066	0.011	0.038	0.086	0.021	0.182	0.072
	(-1.820)	(-1.465)	(-1.340)	(-2.633)	(-2.018)	(-0.464)	(0.094)	(0.321)	(0.733)	(0.079)	(0.646)	(0.537)
Urban			-0.307*		-0.698**	-0.202			-0.643***		-1.356***	-0.467***
			(-1.789)		(-2.013)	(-1.039)			(-4.007)		(-3.435)	(-2.672)
Poverty			-0.019		-0.138	-0.005			-0.014		-0.186*	0.017
			(-0.386)		(-1.309)	(-0.087)			(-0.293)		(-1.665)	(0.310)
Ownership			0.021		0.014	0.020			-0.023		0.044	-0.029
			(0.316)		(0.070)	(0.268)			(-0.348)		(0.286)	(-0.401)
Education			-0.345**		-0.313	-0.314*			-0.442**		-1.585***	-0.289
			(-1.985)		(-0.570)	(-1.716)			(-2.489)		(-2.647)	(-1.585)
Age			0.001		0.013	0.000			0.002		-0.008	0.002
			(0.308)		(1.108)	(0.000)			(0.342)		(-0.717)	(0.437)
Gender			0.065		-0.090	0.096			0.052		-0.059	0.065
			(0.533)		(-0.293)	(0.706)			(0.429)		(-0.191)	(0.481)
Radio news			0.043		-0.079	0.070			0.042		0.151	0.016
			(1.021)		(-0.873)	(1.417)			(0.995)		(1.577)	(0.325)
President co-ethnic			-0.118		-0.613	-0.057			-0.068		-0.709	-0.018
			(-0.802)		(-1.407)	(-0.358)			(-0.430)		(-1.482)	(-0.106)
Ethnic identity	-0.059	-0.036	-0.026	-0.179*	-0.149	-0.007	-0.058	-0.014	0.002	-0.217*	-0.098	0.030
	(-1.488)	(-0.816)	(-0.575)	(-1.750)	(-1.323)	(-0.133)	(-1.543)	(-0.344)	(0.037)	(-1.858)	(-0.768)	(0.668)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.067***	-1.997***	-1.899***	-2.804***	-2.851***	-1.764***	-1.875***	-2.308***	-2.292***	-2.843***	-3.302***	-1.648***
	(-10.564)	(-9.778)	(-6.032)	(-7.319)	(-3.996)	(-4.295)	(-10.542)	(-11.512)	(-7.660)	(-6.016)	(-4.264)	(-4.475)
/cut2	-0.649***	-0.559***	-0.440	-1.479***	-1.465**	-0.274	-0.684***	-1.068***	-1.008***	-1.952***	-2.255***	-0.322
	(-3.644)	(-2.947)	(-1.446)	(-3.887)	(-2.110)	(-0.679)	(-4.034)	(-5.658)	(-3.427)	(-4.451)	(-2.974)	(-0.881)
/cut3	1.523***	1.653***	1.800***	1.182***	1.311*	1.878***	0.401**	0.094	0.189	-0.436	-0.499	0.796**
	(8.354)	(8.516)	(5.937)	(2.989)	(1.816)	(4.646)	(2.375)	(0.499)	(0.636)	(-1.023)	(-0.666)	(2.162)
Observations	1,154	1,154	1,140	204	204	936	1,196	1,196	1,181	204	204	977

Note. Ethnic identity is measured using Q83 from the Afrobarometer survey. Low values indicate ethnic identity. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix D: Tables D1-D6

Table D1. Replication of Table 2 with partisanship variables: Interaction of attack and ADEMA party

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent variable	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.189 (-1.405)	-0.301** (-2.145)	-0.284** (-1.978)	-0.811*** (-2.806)	-1.044*** (-3.242)	-0.114 (-0.683)	-0.129 (-0.890)	-0.201 (-1.352)	-0.200 (-1.337)	-0.595** (-2.010)	-0.764** (-2.339)	-0.053 (-0.302)
ADEMA	0.568** (2.105)	0.207 (0.742)	0.166 (0.590)	-0.195 (-0.270)	-0.670 (-0.988)	0.323 (1.062)	0.580** (2.233)	0.503* (1.862)	0.402 (1.476)	-1.116 (-1.055)	-1.798* (-1.654)	0.648** (2.291)
Attack#ADEMA	-0.651** (-2.139)	-0.181 (-0.575)	-0.177 (-0.558)	-0.688 (-0.816)	-0.322 (-0.411)	-0.199 (-0.581)	-0.422 (-1.444)	-0.420 (-1.381)	-0.338 (-1.103)	0.326 (0.288)	0.926 (0.810)	-0.443 (-1.370)
Urban			-0.015 (-0.097)		-0.746* (-1.653)	0.084 (0.492)			-0.338** (-2.207)		-0.845 (-1.626)	-0.279* (-1.714)
Poverty			-0.001 (-0.014)		-0.097 (-0.830)	0.024 (0.426)			0.081 (1.593)		0.027 (0.243)	0.086 (1.497)
Ownership			0.058 (0.797)		0.433** (2.318)	-0.002 (-0.027)			-0.041 (-0.568)		-0.006 (-0.031)	-0.054 (-0.664)
Education			-0.488** (-2.548)		-0.002 (-0.002)	-0.483** (-2.415)			0.025 (0.132)		0.584 (0.909)	0.005 (0.023)
Age			0.011** (2.350)		0.017 (1.455)	0.011** (2.011)			0.014*** (3.209)		0.021* (1.691)	0.015*** (3.052)
Gender			0.052 (0.386)		0.038 (0.114)	0.059 (0.398)			0.176 (1.364)		0.343 (1.055)	0.185 (1.282)
Radio			0.054 (1.169)		0.068 (0.618)	0.060 (1.131)			0.127*** (2.932)		0.164* (1.733)	0.137*** (2.743)
President co-ethnic			0.074 (0.454)		0.069 (0.168)	0.105 (0.580)			0.078 (0.477)		-0.084 (-0.194)	0.111 (0.603)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.073*** (-15.627)	-2.030*** (-12.171)	-1.435*** (-4.785)	-2.787*** (-9.542)	-2.143*** (-3.219)	-1.530*** (-3.976)	-1.905*** (-13.210)	-2.282*** (-12.798)	-1.386*** (-4.760)	-2.597*** (-9.087)	-1.537*** (-2.789)	-0.742* (-1.885)
/cut2	-0.625*** (-5.454)	-0.529*** (-3.424)	0.085 (0.284)	-0.986*** (-4.168)	-0.224 (-0.340)	-0.066 (-0.173)	-0.734*** (-5.632)	-1.056*** (-6.607)	-0.132 (-0.461)	-1.814*** (-6.803)	-0.728 (-1.304)	0.605 (1.535)
/cut3	1.424*** (11.765)	1.716*** (10.448)	2.353*** (7.546)	1.358*** (5.463)	2.273*** (3.247)	2.191*** (5.545)	0.453*** (3.531)	0.228 (1.447)	1.188*** (4.091)	-0.065 (-0.259)	1.084* (1.894)	1.834*** (4.584)
Observations	1,122	1,122	1,112	201	201	911	1,169	1,169	1,156	206	206	950

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D2. Replication of Table 2 with partisanship variables: Interaction of attack and coalition supporting the president

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.248*	-0.358**	-0.343**	-0.820***	-1.022***	-0.166	-0.087	-0.156	-0.166	-0.484	-0.648*	-0.011
	(-1.651)	(-2.308)	(-2.155)	(-2.609)	(-2.927)	(-0.890)	(-0.550)	(-0.954)	(-1.005)	(-1.589)	(-1.950)	(-0.054)
Coalition	0.362*	0.142	0.096	0.022	-0.162	0.237	0.648***	0.573**	0.466**	-0.144	-0.629	0.674***
	(1.665)	(0.638)	(0.424)	(0.053)	(-0.325)	(0.942)	(2.848)	(2.452)	(1.965)	(-0.190)	(-0.796)	(2.634)
Attack#Coalition	-0.260	0.051	0.057	-0.439	-0.371	0.024	-0.382	-0.377	-0.291	-0.483	-0.098	-0.344
	(-1.021)	(0.193)	(0.216)	(-0.769)	(-0.596)	(0.080)	(-1.475)	(-1.410)	(-1.080)	(-0.573)	(-0.114)	(-1.167)
		(0.271)	(1.018)					(-3.283)	(-1.752)			
Urban			-0.019		-0.806*	0.089			-0.326**		-0.851	-0.260
			(-0.118)		(-1.773)	(0.519)			(-2.125)		(-1.607)	(-1.598)
Poverty			-0.000		-0.073	0.028			0.082		0.061	0.092
			(-0.010)		(-0.636)	(0.502)			(1.617)		(0.541)	(1.581)
Ownership			0.055		0.423**	-0.006			-0.048		-0.024	-0.068
			(0.762)		(2.272)	(-0.072)			(-0.665)		(-0.136)	(-0.833)
Education			-0.487**		0.084	-0.488**			0.016		0.640	-0.002
			(-2.545)		(0.122)	(-2.438)			(0.082)		(0.962)	(-0.012)
Age			0.011**		0.016	0.010*			0.014***		0.018	0.014***
			(2.298)		(1.336)	(1.925)			(3.124)		(1.484)	(2.927)
Gender			0.057		-0.012	0.061			0.177		0.251	0.182
			(0.418)		(-0.036)	(0.409)			(1.371)		(0.791)	(1.259)
Radio			0.049		0.055	0.055			0.122***		0.163*	0.132***
			(1.058)		(0.480)	(1.031)			(2.769)		(1.700)	(2.595)
President co-ethnic			0.086		0.171	0.111			0.081		0.012	0.115
			(0.525)		(0.418)	(0.617)			(0.494)		(0.030)	(0.627)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-2.071***	-2.039***	-1.470***	-2.731***	-2.151***	-1.554***	-1.814***	-2.218***	-1.359***	-2.502***	-1.570***	-0.705*
	(-14.368)	(-11.580)	(-4.817)	(-8.951)	(-3.258)	(-3.963)	(-11.769)	(-12.036)	(-4.610)	(-8.655)	(-2.858)	(-1.762)
/cut2	-0.622***	-0.535***	0.052	-0.956***	-0.262	-0.087	-0.639***	-0.987***	-0.103	-1.723***	-0.768	0.648
	(-4.869)	(-3.268)	(0.172)	(-3.688)	(-0.404)	(-0.224)	(-4.480)	(-5.899)	(-0.355)	(-6.385)	(-1.391)	(1.613)
/cut3	1.422***	1.711***	2.320***	1.373***	2.208***	2.172***	0.553***	0.300*	1.219***	0.014	1.024*	1.880***
	(10.614)	(9.912)	(7.347)	(5.005)	(3.204)	(5.405)	(3.903)	(1.808)	(4.140)	(0.054)	(1.820)	(4.612)
Observations	1,122	1,122	1,112	201	201	911	1,169	1,169	1,156	206	206	950

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D3. Replication of Table 3 with partisanship variables: Interaction of attack and ADEMA party

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.154 (-1.140)	-0.193 (-1.396)	-0.210 (-1.491)	-1.140*** (-3.893)	-1.127*** (-3.473)	0.018 (0.110)	0.049 (0.358)	0.029 (0.201)	0.051 (0.352)	-0.102 (-0.334)	-0.191 (-0.583)	0.084 (0.501)
ADEMA	0.638** (2.360)	0.509* (1.852)	0.512* (1.838)	0.068 (0.059)	-0.020 (-0.015)	0.671** (2.336)	0.335 (1.432)	0.368 (1.501)	0.328 (1.318)	0.017 (0.032)	-0.452 (-0.660)	0.418 (1.563)
Attack#ADEMA	-0.597* (-1.931)	-0.310 (-0.985)	-0.311 (-0.969)	0.190 (0.152)	0.190 (0.134)	-0.486 (-1.447)	-0.309 (-1.128)	-0.366 (-1.281)	-0.346 (-1.193)	-0.011 (-0.016)	0.379 (0.447)	-0.425 (-1.363)
Urban			0.031 (0.184)		-0.756** (-2.027)	0.154 (0.813)			-0.321** (-2.089)		-1.828*** (-4.044)	-0.105 (-0.632)
Poverty			-0.046 (-0.893)		-0.040 (-0.371)	-0.066 (-1.090)			-0.002 (-0.041)		0.011 (0.092)	-0.002 (-0.034)
Ownership			0.016 (0.231)		0.332* (1.673)	-0.036 (-0.465)			-0.118 (-1.619)		0.120 (0.672)	-0.147* (-1.797)
Education			-0.304* (-1.718)		-0.165 (-0.283)	-0.245 (-1.339)			-0.131 (-0.703)		0.208 (0.361)	-0.074 (-0.375)
Age			-0.005 (-0.974)		-0.002 (-0.167)	-0.005 (-0.930)			0.012*** (2.706)		0.004 (0.320)	0.013*** (2.631)
Gender			-0.131 (-0.957)		-0.163 (-0.514)	-0.116 (-0.752)			0.054 (0.426)		0.071 (0.234)	0.047 (0.328)
Radio news			0.019 (0.435)		0.009 (0.092)	0.034 (0.663)			0.087* (1.913)		0.193* (1.831)	0.072 (1.415)
President co-ethnic			-0.101 (-0.620)		-0.330 (-0.629)	-0.026 (-0.149)			-0.155 (-0.953)		-0.158 (-0.358)	-0.164 (-0.938)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.659*** (-13.128)	-2.205*** (-13.097)	-2.514*** (-7.882)	-2.968*** (-9.622)	-3.157*** (-4.658)	-1.800*** (-4.561)	-1.871*** (-13.663)	-2.603*** (-14.671)	-2.116*** (-7.335)	-2.733*** (-8.298)	-2.604*** (-4.122)	-1.111*** (-3.023)
/cut2	-0.079 (-0.698)	-0.566*** (-3.723)	-0.860*** (-2.793)	-1.380*** (-5.960)	-1.534** (-2.417)	-0.124 (-0.319)	-0.523*** (-4.315)	-1.176*** (-7.374)	-0.662** (-2.327)	-1.548*** (-5.620)	-1.321** (-2.070)	0.371 (1.011)
/cut3	2.078*** (15.777)	1.688*** (10.609)	1.397*** (4.568)	1.374*** (5.908)	1.311* (1.931)	2.026*** (5.160)	0.771*** (6.300)	0.215 (1.363)	0.761*** (2.655)	0.223 (0.866)	0.662 (1.061)	1.709*** (4.577)
Observations	1,062	1,062	1,053	191	191	862	1,147	1,147	1,135	199	199	936

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D4. Replication of Table 3 with partisanship variables: Interaction of attack and coalition supporting the president

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.150 (-1.026)	-0.199 (-1.320)	-0.215 (-1.407)	-1.196*** (-3.764)	-1.174*** (-3.265)	0.045 (0.253)	0.125 (0.815)	0.123 (0.772)	0.150 (0.938)	-0.012 (-0.038)	-0.119 (-0.345)	0.203 (1.083)
Coalition	0.526** (2.379)	0.482** (2.122)	0.496** (2.134)	0.029 (0.051)	0.023 (0.035)	0.684*** (2.692)	0.491** (2.378)	0.540** (2.510)	0.525** (2.385)	0.418 (0.847)	-0.007 (-0.013)	0.619** (2.544)
Attack#Coalition	-0.395 (-1.504)	-0.162 (-0.600)	-0.157 (-0.571)	0.341 (0.488)	0.293 (0.372)	-0.357 (-1.180)	-0.388 (-1.587)	-0.470* (-1.834)	-0.468* (-1.801)	-0.424 (-0.685)	-0.082 (-0.122)	-0.535* (-1.859)
Urban			0.045 (0.260)		-0.751** (-1.993)	0.172 (0.906)			-0.303** (-1.977)		-1.795*** (-3.950)	-0.087 (-0.527)
Nofood			-0.043 (-0.822)		-0.047 (-0.437)	-0.056 (-0.929)			0.000 (0.006)		0.018 (0.150)	0.002 (0.033)
Ownership			0.008 (0.114)		0.334* (1.673)	-0.051 (-0.660)			-0.128* (-1.751)		0.117 (0.656)	-0.163** (-1.993)
Education			-0.321* (-1.806)		-0.199 (-0.336)	-0.261 (-1.429)			-0.140 (-0.763)		0.146 (0.264)	-0.078 (-0.399)
Age			-0.005 (-1.118)		-0.003 (-0.199)	-0.006 (-1.108)			0.012*** (2.650)		0.003 (0.252)	0.013*** (2.577)
Gender			-0.132 (-0.966)		-0.150 (-0.467)	-0.122 (-0.790)			0.052 (0.408)		0.038 (0.124)	0.044 (0.309)
Radio			0.013 (0.283)		0.002 (0.023)	0.030 (0.583)			0.083* (1.814)		0.185* (1.693)	0.071 (1.383)
President co-ethnic			-0.093 (-0.567)		-0.322 (-0.634)	-0.023 (-0.131)			-0.159 (-0.980)		-0.142 (-0.330)	-0.170 (-0.963)
Region fixed effects												
/cut1	-1.619*** (-11.930)	-2.165*** (-12.315)	-2.514*** (-7.824)	-2.975*** (-9.155)	-3.189*** (-4.612)	-1.794*** (-4.504)	-1.770*** (-12.014)	-2.511*** (-13.734)	-2.042*** (-6.989)	-2.651*** (-7.885)	-2.613*** (-4.142)	-1.018*** (-2.733)
/cut2	-0.038 (-0.304)	-0.520*** (-3.254)	-0.855*** (-2.763)	-1.383*** (-5.446)	-1.563** (-2.409)	-0.111 (-0.283)	-0.419*** (-3.123)	-1.079*** (-6.477)	-0.584** (-2.024)	-1.463*** (-5.095)	-1.330** (-2.092)	0.470 (1.259)
/cut3	2.119*** (14.929)	1.740*** (10.440)	1.408*** (4.590)	1.376*** (5.397)	1.287* (1.860)	2.046*** (5.194)	0.878*** (6.436)	0.316* (1.898)	0.843*** (2.892)	0.311 (1.142)	0.652 (1.053)	1.812*** (4.771)
Observations	1,062	1,062	1,053	191	191	862	1,147	1,147	1,135	199	199	936

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D5. Replication of Table 4 with partisanship variables: Interaction of attack and ADEMA party

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.168 (-1.227)	-0.167 (-1.182)	-0.166 (-1.167)	-0.754*** (-2.703)	-0.696** (-2.262)	-0.008 (-0.050)	-0.006 (-0.048)	0.079 (0.562)	0.098 (0.703)	-0.022 (-0.074)	0.117 (0.384)	0.120 (0.743)
ADEMA	0.444** (1.997)	0.365 (1.536)	0.345 (1.413)	-0.465 (-0.617)	-0.564 (-0.626)	0.508** (1.985)	0.257 (1.217)	0.368* (1.663)	0.282 (1.271)	-0.365 (-0.554)	-0.303 (-0.454)	0.370 (1.553)
Attack#ADEMA	-0.212 (-0.792)	-0.068 (-0.240)	-0.025 (-0.085)	0.570 (0.645)	0.742 (0.713)	-0.176 (-0.571)	0.032 (0.124)	-0.148 (-0.532)	-0.017 (-0.059)	0.654 (0.848)	0.627 (0.723)	-0.121 (-0.396)
Urban			-0.285 (-1.632)		-0.778** (-2.092)	-0.161 (-0.815)			-0.633*** (-3.878)		-1.439*** (-3.582)	-0.444** (-2.501)
Poverty			-0.023 (-0.448)		-0.138 (-1.289)	-0.012 (-0.201)			-0.000 (-0.009)		-0.184 (-1.638)	0.034 (0.606)
Ownership			0.007 (0.102)		0.018 (0.090)	-0.002 (-0.020)			-0.021 (-0.325)		0.053 (0.343)	-0.026 (-0.358)
Education			-0.345** (-1.989)		-0.296 (-0.564)	-0.311* (-1.710)			-0.455*** (-2.583)		-1.557** (-2.536)	-0.308* (-1.706)
Age			0.002 (0.344)		0.015 (1.228)	0.000 (0.001)			0.001 (0.259)		-0.008 (-0.673)	0.002 (0.355)
Gender			0.089 (0.726)		-0.022 (-0.074)	0.132 (0.954)			0.066 (0.531)		-0.017 (-0.053)	0.088 (0.637)
Radio news			0.028 (0.664)		-0.084 (-0.886)	0.061 (1.233)			0.040 (0.920)		0.143 (1.495)	0.019 (0.393)
President co-ethnic			-0.100 (-0.674)		-0.533 (-1.232)	-0.039 (-0.245)			-0.069 (-0.432)		-0.660 (-1.389)	-0.018 (-0.105)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.718*** (-13.224)	-1.819*** (-11.070)	-1.788*** (-6.061)	-2.286*** (-8.353)	-2.376*** (-3.663)	-1.573*** (-4.137)	-1.586*** (-12.349)	-2.166*** (-12.728)	-2.217*** (-7.724)	-2.156*** (-7.914)	-3.012*** (-4.227)	-1.639*** (-4.613)
/cut2	-0.310*** (-2.672)	-0.387** (-2.575)	-0.331 (-1.156)	-0.970*** (-4.329)	-0.991 (-1.622)	-0.083 (-0.219)	-0.413*** (-3.560)	-0.942*** (-6.085)	-0.947*** (-3.371)	-1.279*** (-5.218)	-1.963*** (-2.824)	-0.330 (-0.938)
/cut3	1.867*** (14.467)	1.832*** (11.689)	1.919*** (6.719)	1.730*** (7.277)	1.834*** (2.843)	2.075*** (5.437)	0.664*** (5.694)	0.210 (1.359)	0.242 (0.852)	0.220 (0.917)	-0.206 (-0.300)	0.776** (2.198)
Observations	1,123	1,123	1,111	203	203	908	1,164	1,164	1,151	203	203	948

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D6. Replication of Table 4 with partisanship variables: Interaction of attack and coalition supporting the president

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.114 (-0.771)	-0.121 (-0.791)	-0.127 (-0.821)	-0.825*** (-2.854)	-0.779** (-2.463)	0.090 (0.482)	0.063 (0.434)	0.151 (0.988)	0.163 (1.089)	0.071 (0.236)	0.172 (0.558)	0.186 (1.055)
Coalition	0.404** (2.010)	0.361* (1.680)	0.337 (1.515)	-0.420 (-0.753)	-0.478 (-0.714)	0.551** (2.258)	0.320* (1.655)	0.401** (1.975)	0.341* (1.657)	0.385 (0.583)	0.359 (0.536)	0.373* (1.662)
Attack#Coalition	-0.277 (-1.134)	-0.147 (-0.558)	-0.097 (-0.363)	0.646 (0.937)	0.817 (1.032)	-0.327 (-1.115)	-0.158 (-0.667)	-0.287 (-1.141)	-0.187 (-0.725)	-0.145 (-0.195)	0.063 (0.082)	-0.240 (-0.848)
Urban			-0.273 (-1.568)		-0.790** (-2.219)	-0.147 (-0.748)			-0.614*** (-3.769)		-1.388*** (-3.535)	-0.431** (-2.425)
Poverty			-0.019 (-0.372)		-0.142 (-1.323)	-0.002 (-0.041)			0.004 (0.072)		-0.192* (-1.722)	0.040 (0.721)
Ownership			0.004 (0.054)		0.017 (0.084)	-0.011 (-0.145)			-0.024 (-0.367)		0.065 (0.415)	-0.031 (-0.424)
Education			-0.352** (-2.026)		-0.324 (-0.611)	-0.316* (-1.733)			-0.470*** (-2.649)		-1.719*** (-2.889)	-0.319* (-1.756)
Age			0.001 (0.287)		0.014 (1.192)	-0.000 (-0.075)			0.001 (0.202)		-0.010 (-0.842)	0.001 (0.288)
Gender			0.085 (0.693)		-0.006 (-0.019)	0.119 (0.864)			0.060 (0.479)		-0.039 (-0.124)	0.077 (0.556)
Radio news			0.027 (0.631)		-0.088 (-0.903)	0.062 (1.248)			0.039 (0.908)		0.111 (1.136)	0.021 (0.425)
President co-ethnic			-0.107 (-0.731)		-0.541 (-1.293)	-0.046 (-0.291)			-0.088 (-0.546)		-0.682 (-1.394)	-0.034 (-0.193)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.677*** (-12.045)	-1.773*** (-10.429)	-1.758*** (-5.943)	-2.319*** (-8.516)	-2.433*** (-3.709)	-1.509*** (-3.917)	-1.528*** (-10.971)	-2.112*** (-12.143)	-2.175*** (-7.595)	-2.045*** (-7.564)	-3.074*** (-4.307)	-1.599*** (-4.493)
/cut2	-0.270** (-2.146)	-0.341** (-2.190)	-0.302 (-1.054)	-1.001*** (-4.338)	-1.047* (-1.689)	-0.019 (-0.050)	-0.356*** (-2.791)	-0.887*** (-5.609)	-0.905*** (-3.236)	-1.169*** (-4.882)	-2.021*** (-2.911)	-0.289 (-0.823)
/cut3	1.906*** (13.873)	1.877*** (11.632)	1.947*** (6.836)	1.701*** (6.913)	1.785*** (2.730)	2.139*** (5.566)	0.721*** (5.633)	0.264* (1.674)	0.282 (1.000)	0.327 (1.374)	-0.261 (-0.382)	0.815** (2.310)
Observations	1,123	1,123	1,111	203	203	908	1,164	1,164	1,151	203	203	948

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix E: Tables E1-E3

Table E1. Replication of Table 2 excluding regions (Timbouctou and Kidal) with no respondents in control group

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	No Segou	No Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	No Segou	No Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.447*** (-3.639)	-0.317*** (-2.590)	-0.309** (-2.442)	-0.354** (-2.565)	-0.185 (-1.347)	-0.159 (-1.089)	-0.310** (-2.461)	-0.314** (-2.428)	-0.301** (-2.287)	-0.252* (-1.796)	-0.246* (-1.681)	-0.211 (-1.396)
Urban			-0.005 (-0.031)			0.112 (0.637)			-0.363** (-2.321)			-0.298* (-1.782)
Poverty			-0.044 (-0.881)			-0.024 (-0.422)			0.054 (1.045)			0.057 (0.978)
Ownership			0.054 (0.763)			-0.001 (-0.008)			-0.039 (-0.535)			-0.045 (-0.558)
Education			-0.442** (-2.260)			-0.432** (-2.111)			0.088 (0.451)			0.070 (0.337)
Age			0.011** (2.213)			0.011* (1.937)			0.015*** (3.204)			0.015*** (3.035)
Gender			0.011 (0.084)			0.001 (0.009)			0.159 (1.217)			0.146 (0.996)
Radio			0.054 (1.198)			0.062 (1.198)			0.124*** (2.827)			0.133*** (2.632)
President co-ethnic			0.037 (0.227)			0.056 (0.312)			0.084 (0.507)			0.108 (0.587)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-2.269*** (-17.467)	-2.103*** (-13.055)	-1.595*** (-5.211)	-2.183*** (-15.025)	-2.059*** (-8.599)	-1.621*** (-4.070)	-2.108*** (-15.761)	-2.440*** (-13.895)	-1.560*** (-5.293)	-2.041*** (-13.719)	-1.668*** (-7.434)	-0.954** (-2.413)
/cut2	-0.744*** (-6.905)	-0.542*** (-3.671)	-0.018 (-0.058)	-0.707*** (-5.803)	-0.539** (-2.397)	-0.087 (-0.220)	-0.903*** (-7.790)	-1.178*** (-7.608)	-0.268 (-0.927)	-0.750*** (-5.836)	-0.313 (-1.484)	0.437 (1.107)
/cut3	1.310*** (11.463)	1.649*** (10.392)	2.197*** (6.965)	1.307*** (10.092)	1.639*** (6.906)	2.109*** (5.167)	0.300*** (2.703)	0.123 (0.816)	1.067*** (3.657)	0.355*** (2.850)	0.894*** (4.230)	1.678*** (4.192)
Observations	1,077	1,077	1,066	875	875	864	1,120	1,120	1,106	913	913	899

Note. Models 1-3 and 7-9 are for entire Mali excluding Timbouctou and Kidal. Models 4-6 and 10-12 additionally exclude the Segou region. No regressions for Segou region alone shown, as that would simply correspond to results in Table 1. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table E2. Replication of Table 3 excluding regions (Timbouctou and Kidal) with no respondents in control group

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	No Segou	No Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	No Segou	No Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.341*** (-2.716)	-0.276** (-2.157)	-0.285** (-2.161)	-0.214 (-1.540)	-0.111 (-0.769)	-0.122 (-0.819)	-0.079 (-0.659)	-0.054 (-0.434)	-0.031 (-0.248)	-0.080 (-0.599)	-0.044 (-0.317)	-0.036 (-0.255)
Urban			-0.109 (-0.610)			-0.008 (-0.037)			-0.359** (-2.294)			-0.130 (-0.757)
Poverty			-0.091* (-1.730)			-0.114* (-1.859)			-0.027 (-0.522)			-0.027 (-0.458)
Ownership			0.020 (0.282)			-0.029 (-0.368)			-0.118 (-1.601)			-0.144* (-1.751)
Education			-0.328* (-1.739)			-0.279 (-1.420)			-0.089 (-0.475)			-0.029 (-0.143)
Age			-0.004 (-0.719)			-0.003 (-0.618)			0.012*** (2.652)			0.013** (2.547)
Gender			-0.134 (-0.974)			-0.126 (-0.810)			0.032 (0.247)			0.011 (0.073)
Radio			0.029 (0.642)			0.040 (0.778)			0.076* (1.668)			0.057 (1.101)
President co-ethnic			-0.139 (-0.839)			-0.057 (-0.318)			-0.145 (-0.896)			-0.151 (-0.866)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-1.898*** (-15.010)	-2.411*** (-13.918)	-2.738*** (-8.354)	-1.718*** (-12.570)	-1.847*** (-8.767)	-2.177*** (-5.281)	-1.989*** (-15.918)	-2.726*** (-15.919)	-2.302*** (-7.846)	-1.871*** (-13.649)	-1.543*** (-7.052)	-1.343*** (-3.610)
/cut2	-0.245** (-2.268)	-0.690*** (-4.494)	-1.003*** (-3.185)	-0.027 (-0.227)	-0.097 (-0.495)	-0.410 (-1.012)	-0.614*** (-5.766)	-1.268*** (-8.379)	-0.817*** (-2.833)	-0.446*** (-3.765)	-0.051 (-0.241)	0.175 (0.472)
/cut3	1.981*** (15.053)	1.648*** (10.029)	1.349*** (4.282)	2.119*** (13.951)	2.161*** (10.166)	1.857*** (4.525)	0.693*** (6.468)	0.142 (0.953)	0.622** (2.150)	0.805*** (6.654)	1.284*** (5.909)	1.528*** (4.058)
Observations	1,031	1,031	1,022	839	839	830	1,099	1,099	1,086	899	899	886

Note. Models 1-3 and 7-9 are for entire Mali excluding Timbouctou and Kidal. Models 4-6 and 10-12 additionally exclude the Segou region. No regressions for Segou region alone shown, as that would simply correspond to results in Table 2. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table E3. Replication of Table 4 excluding regions (Timbouctou and Kidal) with no respondents in control groups

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	No Segou	No Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	No Segou	No Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.240** (-1.981)	-0.185 (-1.477)	-0.179 (-1.393)	-0.149 (-1.092)	-0.075 (-0.528)	-0.077 (-0.518)	0.010 (0.090)	0.039 (0.329)	0.086 (0.725)	-0.009 (-0.068)	0.033 (0.247)	0.071 (0.530)
Urban			-0.340* (-1.897)			-0.220 (-1.068)			-0.675*** (-4.090)			-0.488*** (-2.697)
Poverty			-0.074 (-1.463)			-0.071 (-1.219)			-0.041 (-0.810)			-0.010 (-0.183)
Ownership			0.007 (0.098)			-0.002 (-0.028)			-0.033 (-0.489)			-0.040 (-0.532)
Education			-0.347* (-1.893)			-0.307 (-1.579)			-0.463** (-2.524)			-0.301 (-1.596)
Age			0.002 (0.412)			0.001 (0.127)			0.002 (0.426)			0.003 (0.531)
Gender			0.023 (0.184)			0.040 (0.282)			0.060 (0.474)			0.075 (0.534)
Radio news			0.050 (1.136)			0.087* (1.701)			0.052 (1.205)			0.032 (0.646)
President co-ethnic			-0.149 (-0.984)			-0.082 (-0.501)			-0.084 (-0.532)			-0.025 (-0.144)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-1.920*** (-15.451)	-1.954*** (-11.793)	-1.971*** (-6.473)	-1.859*** (-13.247)	-1.710*** (-8.592)	-1.865*** (-4.748)	-1.669*** (-15.030)	-2.279*** (-13.846)	-2.320*** (-7.981)	-1.593*** (-12.902)	-1.263*** (-7.805)	-1.758*** (-4.977)
/cut2	-0.451*** (-4.343)	-0.472*** (-3.191)	-0.463 (-1.581)	-0.351*** (-2.983)	-0.185 (-1.003)	-0.313 (-0.808)	-0.473*** (-4.841)	-1.032*** (-6.994)	-1.026*** (-3.610)	-0.331*** (-3.040)	0.038 (0.253)	-0.420 (-1.203)
/cut3	1.813*** (15.336)	1.837*** (11.756)	1.888*** (6.435)	1.834*** (13.583)	2.054*** (10.518)	1.964*** (5.036)	0.618*** (6.261)	0.142 (0.972)	0.184 (0.642)	0.704*** (6.364)	1.144*** (7.405)	0.705** (2.012)
Observations	1,084	1,084	1,071	880	880	867	1,117	1,117	1,103	913	913	899

Note. Models 1-3 and 7-9 are for entire Mali excluding Timbouctou and Kidal. Models 4-6 and 10-12 additionally exclude the Segou region. No regressions for Segou region alone shown, as that would simply correspond to results in Table 1. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix F: Tables F1-F3

Table F1. Replication of Table 2 including time fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.971*	-0.574	-0.848	-2.298**	-2.516***	0.513	-0.396	-0.149	-0.515	-0.679	-1.130	-0.120
	(-1.742)	(-0.932)	(-1.351)	(-2.549)	(-2.698)	(0.504)	(-0.982)	(-0.338)	(-1.175)	(-0.983)	(-1.518)	(-0.206)
Urban			-0.064		-0.403	0.043			-0.416***		-0.190	-0.423**
			(-0.388)		(-0.647)	(0.238)			(-2.588)		(-0.261)	(-2.473)
Poverty			-0.022		-0.069	-0.010			0.061		0.024	0.062
			(-0.442)		(-0.538)	(-0.185)			(1.198)		(0.208)	(1.065)
Ownership			0.046		0.326*	-0.009			-0.031		-0.146	-0.032
			(0.656)		(1.672)	(-0.112)			(-0.429)		(-0.721)	(-0.400)
Education			-0.454**		-0.051	-0.467**			0.100		0.831	0.060
			(-2.346)		(-0.068)	(-2.314)			(0.527)		(1.140)	(0.299)
Age			0.012**		0.015	0.010*			0.014***		0.018	0.014***
			(2.396)		(1.249)	(1.853)			(3.057)		(1.455)	(2.700)
Gender			0.038		0.050	0.008			0.172		0.255	0.155
			(0.282)		(0.150)	(0.057)			(1.349)		(0.774)	(1.082)
Radio news			0.066		0.085	0.057			0.119***		0.187*	0.115**
			(1.454)		(0.752)	(1.102)			(2.715)		(1.772)	(2.329)
President co-ethnic			0.089		0.534	0.093			0.114		0.292	0.142
			(0.531)		(1.291)	(0.504)			(0.657)		(0.591)	(0.728)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-2.348***	-2.230***	-1.697***	-3.219***	-2.411***	-1.833***	-2.150***	-2.380***	-1.547***	-2.433***	-1.399**	-1.222***
	(-10.581)	(-8.946)	(-4.905)	(-8.078)	(-3.479)	(-3.844)	(-9.750)	(-9.677)	(-4.674)	(-5.762)	(-2.159)	(-2.753)
/cut2	-0.876***	-0.707***	-0.156	-1.294***	-0.417	-0.345	-0.968***	-1.143***	-0.282	-1.619***	-0.560	0.133
	(-4.102)	(-2.909)	(-0.451)	(-3.807)	(-0.605)	(-0.725)	(-4.560)	(-4.874)	(-0.860)	(-4.253)	(-0.897)	(0.299)
/cut3	1.157***	1.528***	2.106***	1.262***	2.252***	1.904***	0.225	0.148	1.041***	0.250	1.365**	1.370***
	(5.357)	(6.052)	(5.860)	(3.680)	(3.074)	(3.880)	(1.069)	(0.636)	(3.145)	(0.662)	(2.136)	(3.052)
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,138	202	202	936	1,203	1,203	1,188	207	207	981

Note. Full set of time (date-of-survey-fieldwork) fixed effects included. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table F2. Replication of Table 3 including time fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.625 (-1.436)	-0.621 (-1.359)	-0.650 (-1.375)	-1.857** (-2.009)	-1.787* (-1.748)	-0.543 (-1.011)	0.082 (0.200)	-0.063 (-0.151)	-0.398 (-1.017)	-0.203 (-0.314)	-0.561 (-0.801)	-0.690 (-1.507)
Urban			0.048 (0.267)		-0.078 (-0.165)	0.181 (1.102)			-0.407** (-2.571)		-1.395** (-2.308)	-0.298* (-1.901)
Poverty			-0.045 (-0.872)		-0.100 (-0.826)	-0.006 (-0.103)			-0.004 (-0.074)		-0.017 (-0.142)	0.081 (1.512)
Ownership			0.024 (0.339)		0.237 (1.178)	-0.046 (-0.592)			-0.108 (-1.457)		0.028 (0.134)	-0.148* (-1.857)
Education			-0.334* (-1.828)		-0.099 (-0.170)	-0.235 (-1.239)			-0.059 (-0.314)		0.275 (0.432)	0.069 (0.353)
Age			-0.003 (-0.627)		-0.004 (-0.274)	-0.005 (-0.946)			0.012*** (2.703)		0.006 (0.413)	0.015*** (2.994)
Gender			-0.104 (-0.771)		-0.224 (-0.644)	-0.175 (-1.173)			0.060 (0.464)		0.078 (0.252)	0.022 (0.153)
Radio news			0.042 (0.960)		-0.031 (-0.295)	0.054 (1.068)			0.084* (1.862)		0.236** (2.158)	0.061 (1.219)
President co-ethnic			-0.097 (-0.559)		-0.002 (-0.005)	-0.251 (-1.363)			-0.068 (-0.397)		0.075 (0.162)	0.014 (0.076)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-1.801*** (-9.190)	-2.354*** (-10.415)	-2.528*** (-7.097)	-3.350*** (-5.476)	-3.658*** (-4.408)	-1.815*** (-4.741)	-2.051*** (-9.443)	-2.698*** (-11.119)	-2.224*** (-6.716)	-3.063*** (-7.355)	-2.465*** (-3.661)	-1.339*** (-3.635)
/cut2	-0.188 (-0.971)	-0.672*** (-3.064)	-0.836** (-2.384)	-1.592*** (-2.741)	-1.899** (-2.383)	-0.150 (-0.392)	-0.675*** (-3.267)	-1.242*** (-5.437)	-0.743** (-2.271)	-1.804*** (-5.503)	-1.163* (-1.727)	0.114 (0.310)
/cut3	1.975*** (9.390)	1.604*** (6.921)	1.446*** (4.065)	1.532*** (2.621)	1.273 (1.529)	1.930*** (4.936)	0.625*** (3.027)	0.153 (0.675)	0.682** (2.068)	0.147 (0.440)	0.894 (1.317)	1.391*** (3.733)
Observations	1,091	1,091	1,081	192	192	889	1,180	1,180	1,166	200	200	966

Note. Full set of time fixed effects included. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table F3. Replication of Table 4 including time fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.349 (-0.678)	-0.563 (-1.098)	-0.780 (-1.423)	-1.840*** (-2.773)	-2.109*** (-2.627)	0.555 (0.626)	0.718* (1.866)	0.392 (0.977)	0.166 (0.417)	0.087 (0.161)	-0.447 (-0.678)	0.499 (0.760)
Urban			-0.242 (-1.312)		-0.878 (-1.630)	-0.143 (-0.908)			-0.528*** (-3.134)		-1.255** (-2.536)	-0.479*** (-3.182)
Poverty			-0.031 (-0.624)		-0.217* (-1.749)	-0.019 (-0.339)			-0.035 (-0.715)		-0.229** (-2.046)	0.031 (0.580)
Ownership			0.007 (0.093)		-0.100 (-0.467)	0.016 (0.215)			-0.015 (-0.226)		-0.009 (-0.052)	-0.004 (-0.062)
Education			-0.343* (-1.909)		-0.752 (-1.160)	-0.338* (-1.771)			-0.452** (-2.481)		-1.794*** (-2.644)	-0.243 (-1.346)
Age			0.002 (0.403)		0.011 (0.889)	-0.002 (-0.463)			0.000 (0.077)		-0.011 (-0.945)	0.003 (0.591)
Gender			0.097 (0.790)		-0.080 (-0.246)	0.084 (0.611)			0.076 (0.608)		-0.032 (-0.100)	0.102 (0.744)
Radio			0.058 (1.354)		0.031 (0.316)	0.081 (1.600)			0.059 (1.334)		0.262** (2.278)	0.026 (0.539)
President co-ethnic			-0.104 (-0.672)		-0.060 (-0.138)	-0.091 (-0.551)			-0.037 (-0.223)		-0.491 (-1.062)	0.207 (1.153)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-1.843*** (-9.404)	-1.928*** (-8.423)	-1.844*** (-5.535)	-2.626*** (-6.030)	-2.688*** (-3.371)	-1.751*** (-4.800)	-1.734*** (-9.104)	-2.241*** (-10.463)	-2.269*** (-7.191)	-2.550*** (-6.826)	-3.207*** (-4.306)	-1.540*** (-4.269)
/cut2	-0.400** (-2.105)	-0.465** (-2.093)	-0.357 (-1.087)	-1.026** (-2.492)	-1.020 (-1.333)	-0.265 (-0.734)	-0.510*** (-2.783)	-0.972*** (-4.801)	-0.963*** (-3.101)	-1.522*** (-4.486)	-2.041*** (-2.839)	-0.230 (-0.640)
/cut3	1.812*** (9.067)	1.790*** (7.770)	1.930*** (5.847)	2.172*** (4.764)	2.286*** (2.872)	1.883*** (5.137)	0.614*** (3.339)	0.225 (1.111)	0.261 (0.830)	0.170 (0.495)	-0.159 (-0.220)	0.863** (2.390)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,141	204	204	937	1,197	1,197	1,182	204	204	978

Note. Full set of time fixed effects included. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix G: Tables G1-G6

Table G1. Replication of Table 2 with interviewer fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Presidential approval						Presidential trust					
Attack	-0.342*** (-2.708)	-0.313** (-2.454)	-0.288** (-2.196)	-0.922*** (-3.446)	-1.020*** (-3.518)	-0.123 (-0.817)	-0.312** (-2.427)	-0.314** (-2.426)	-0.300** (-2.306)	-0.621** (-2.217)	-0.738** (-2.379)	-0.215 (-1.433)
Urban			-0.052 (-0.319)		-0.740 (-1.552)	0.028 (0.161)			-0.402*** (-2.600)		-0.947 (-1.614)	-0.349** (-2.129)
Poverty			0.032 (0.628)		-0.018 (-0.163)	0.046 (0.770)			0.076 (1.445)		0.074 (0.654)	0.082 (1.348)
Ownership			0.098 (1.326)		0.410** (2.023)	0.046 (0.563)			0.014 (0.196)		0.030 (0.164)	0.015 (0.179)
Education			-0.573*** (-2.837)		-0.035 (-0.051)	-0.578*** (-2.701)			-0.038 (-0.192)		0.574 (0.790)	-0.083 (-0.397)
Age			0.008* (1.718)		0.012 (0.985)	0.008 (1.490)			0.012*** (2.790)		0.014 (1.246)	0.012** (2.530)
Gender			0.035 (0.260)		-0.052 (-0.171)	0.043 (0.289)			0.172 (1.304)		0.328 (1.007)	0.155 (1.062)
Radio news			0.061 (1.305)		-0.064 (-0.650)	0.098* (1.818)			0.079* (1.717)		0.157 (1.611)	0.065 (1.224)
President co-ethnic			0.088 (0.569)		0.057 (0.151)	0.128 (0.754)			0.116 (0.709)		0.095 (0.229)	0.143 (0.790)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interviewer fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-2.913 (-1.230)	-2.896*** (-5.765)	-2.356*** (-4.321)	-1.981*** (-6.185)	-1.682*** (-2.697)	-1.215*** (-2.752)	-1.082 (-1.127)	-2.502*** (-7.111)	-1.819*** (-4.387)	-2.418*** (-6.835)	-1.548*** (-2.664)	-0.974* (-1.931)
/cut2	-1.232 (-0.522)	-1.216** (-2.510)	-0.650 (-1.222)	-0.062 (-0.204)	0.344 (0.552)	0.440 (0.996)	0.195 (0.203)	-1.226*** (-3.617)	-0.515 (-1.261)	-1.646*** (-5.006)	-0.757 (-1.279)	0.425 (0.842)
/cut3	1.234 (0.523) (0.385)	1.251*** (2.580)	1.847*** (3.445)	2.478*** (6.990)	2.979*** (4.404)	2.932*** (6.373)	1.550 (1.607) (2.593)	0.130 (0.388)	0.873** (2.146)	0.108 (0.339)	1.058* (1.743)	1.725*** (3.387)
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,138	202	202	936	1,203	1,203	1,188	207	207	981

Note. Full set of interviewer fixed effects included, derived from Q110 “Interviewer number” in Afrobarometer data. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table G2. Replication of Table 3 with interviewer fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	MP approval						Parliamentary trust					
Attack	-0.298**	-0.268**	-0.272**	-1.096***	-0.994***	-0.159	-0.024	-0.030	0.005	-0.106	-0.125	0.005
	(-2.330)	(-2.123)	(-2.102)	(-3.999)	(-3.139)	(-1.062)	(-0.190)	(-0.244)	(0.041)	(-0.388)	(-0.425)	(0.035)
Urban			-0.017		-0.799*	0.089			-0.393**		-2.003***	-0.170
			(-0.098)		(-1.833)	(0.459)			(-2.559)		(-4.008)	(-1.032)
Poverty			0.010		0.052	-0.008			0.008		0.159	-0.015
			(0.198)		(0.502)	(-0.133)			(0.153)		(1.309)	(-0.259)
Ownership			0.073		0.185	0.058			-0.094		0.128	-0.123
			(1.003)		(0.953)	(0.715)			(-1.279)		(0.616)	(-1.526)
Education			-0.429**		-0.088	-0.387*			-0.159		0.255	-0.094
			(-2.234)		(-0.140)	(-1.953)			(-0.847)		(0.413)	(-0.476)
Age			-0.006		-0.002	-0.006			0.011**		0.007	0.011**
			(-1.252)		(-0.152)	(-1.171)			(2.469)		(0.542)	(2.255)
Gender			-0.098		-0.284	-0.049			0.049		0.077	0.034
			(-0.713)		(-0.895)	(-0.316)			(0.379)		(0.243)	(0.236)
Radio news			0.017		-0.091	0.048			0.066		0.144	0.054
			(0.362)		(-0.986)	(0.903)			(1.418)		(1.316)	(1.032)
President co-ethnic			-0.089		-0.388	-0.015			-0.141		-0.023	-0.157
			(-0.557)		(-0.760)	(-0.090)			(-0.855)		(-0.058)	(-0.870)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Interviewer fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-3.240**	-3.146***	-3.370***	-2.657***	-3.044***	-3.147**	-1.898**	-3.585***	-3.209***	-2.622***	-2.390***	-1.465*
	(-2.146)	(-6.125)	(-5.882)	(-7.925)	(-4.187)	(-2.195)	(-2.499)	(-9.800)	(-7.376)	(-6.535)	(-3.562)	(-1.751)
/cut2	-1.462	-1.366***	-1.580***	-1.028***	-1.374**	-1.326	-0.384	-2.072***	-1.670***	-1.429***	-1.075	0.111
	(-0.969)	(-2.743)	(-2.824)	(-3.602)	(-1.994)	(-0.926)	(-0.505)	(-5.860)	(-3.906)	(-4.177)	(-1.574)	(0.132)
/cut3	0.899	0.997**	0.792	1.894***	1.644**	0.926	1.106	-0.582*	-0.153	0.474	1.090	1.533*
	(0.596)	(2.030)	(1.437)	(6.138)	(2.250)	(0.647)	(1.449)	(-1.690)	(-0.364)	(1.416)	(1.627)	(1.819)
Observations	1,091	1,091	1,081	192	192	889	1,180	1,180	1,166	200	200	966

Note. Full set of interviewer fixed effects included, derived from Q110 “Interviewer number” in Afrobarometer data. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix: Gates and Justesen (2020): Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack, JCR

Table G3. Replication of Table 4 with interviewer fixed effects

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Communal councilor approval						Communal councilor trust					
Attack	-0.222*	-0.150	-0.138	-0.681**	-0.519*	-0.130	-0.037	0.022	0.076	0.096	0.274	-0.039
	(-1.780)	(-1.215)	(-1.097)	(-2.532)	(-1.706)	(-0.893)	(-0.307)	(0.185)	(0.635)	(0.359)	(0.987)	(-0.291)
Urban			-0.304*		-0.593	-0.200			-0.713***		-1.435***	-0.514***
			(-1.700)		(-1.536)	(-0.986)			(-4.378)		(-3.367)	(-2.886)
Poverty			-0.017		-0.082	-0.005			-0.025		-0.077	-0.020
			(-0.325)		(-0.784)	(-0.080)			(-0.484)		(-0.621)	(-0.331)
Ownership			0.071		-0.009	0.094			-0.001		0.045	0.004
			(1.024)		(-0.043)	(1.219)			(-0.016)		(0.291)	(0.057)
Education			-0.445**		-0.505	-0.395**			-0.453**		-1.613***	-0.304
			(-2.460)		(-0.930)	(-2.020)			(-2.460)		(-2.613)	(-1.616)
Age			0.000		0.011	-0.002			0.000		-0.007	0.000
			(0.072)		(0.969)	(-0.368)			(0.105)		(-0.583)	(0.088)
Gender			0.098		-0.075	0.147			0.051		-0.051	0.081
			(0.797)		(-0.259)	(1.055)			(0.411)		(-0.157)	(0.595)
Radio news			0.009		-0.153*	0.048			0.024		0.083	0.016
			(0.201)		(-1.720)	(0.923)			(0.518)		(0.857)	(0.310)
President co-ethnic			-0.093		-0.693*	-0.009			-0.086		-0.618	-0.048
			(-0.611)		(-1.653)	(-0.056)			(-0.540)		(-1.264)	(-0.282)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Interviewer fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
/cut1	-2.860***	-2.110***	-2.151***	-1.535***	-1.843***	-2.592***	-1.809	-2.979***	-3.147***	-1.754***	-2.654***	-1.785
	(-19.676)	(-4.408)	(-3.907)	(-5.213)	(-2.777)	(-8.366)	(-1.233)	(-8.312)	(-7.359)	(-5.283)	(-3.431)	(-1.185)
/cut2	-1.356***	-0.597	-0.616	-0.132	-0.372	-1.044***	-0.536	-1.703***	-1.825***	-0.877***	-1.609**	-0.424
	(-11.433)	(-1.275)	(-1.140)	(-0.477)	(-0.582)	(-3.516)	(-0.365)	(-4.910)	(-4.365)	(-2.636)	(-2.089)	(-0.282)
/cut3	1.024***	1.796***	1.812***	2.691***	2.578***	1.279***	0.671	-0.490	-0.577	0.673**	0.191	0.732
	(9.079)	(3.768)	(3.332)	(8.228)	(3.760)	(4.359)	(0.457)	(-1.444)	(-1.397)	(1.966)	(0.247)	(0.486)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,141	204	204	937	1,197	1,197	1,182	204	204	978

Note. Full set of interviewer fixed effects included, derived from Q110 “Interviewer number” in Afrobarometer data. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. In models with regional dummies, the Segou region is the reference group. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table G4. Association between interviewer number and treatment variable, Segou region

	Control group	Treatment group	Total
MLI41	14 26.92	38 73.08	52 100.00
MLI42	14 29.17	34 70.83	48 100.00
MLI43	14 26.92	38 73.08	52 100.00
MLI44	14 25.00	42 75.00	56 100.00
Total	56 26.92	152 73.08	208 100.00

$$Chi^2 = 0.23, p=0.97$$

Note: MLI41-MLI44 are interviewer numbers. Cell entries are number of observation and row percentages.

Table G5. Association between interviewer number and urban-rural location of respondents, Segou region

	Rural area	Urban area	Total
MLI41	38 73.08	14 26.92	52 100.00
MLI42	42 87.50	6 12.50	48 100.00
MLI43	46 88.46	6 11.54	52 100.00
MLI44	42 75.00	14 25.00	56 100.00
Total	168 80.77	40 19.23	208 100.00

$$Chi^2 = 6.56, p=0.09$$

Note: MLI41-MLI44 are interviewer numbers. Cell entries are number of observation and row percentages.

Table G6. Chi^2 test of association between interviewer number and districts within Segou region

$$Chi^2 = 46.33, p=0.98$$

Note: There are 24 districts within the Segou region. As the corresponding frequency table is very large, only results from the Chi^2 test is shown.

Appendix H.



Table H. Non-response before and after the attack – results from *t*-tests


Sample	Mali			Segou region		
	Mean non-response, control group	Mean non-response, treatment group	<i>t</i> -test, test-stat	Mean non-response, control group	Mean non-response, treatment group	<i>t</i> -test, test-stat
<i>Non-response for approval</i>						
Presidential approval	0.044	0.075	2.01**	0.018	0.033	0.57
MP approval	0.099	0.121	1.07	0.071	0.079	0.18
Communal councillor approval	0.067	0.061	0.39	0.000	0.026	1.22
Combined approval	0.209	0.257	1.09	0.089	0.138	0.69
<i>Non-response Institutional trust</i>						
Presidential trust	0.0145	0.027	1.30	0.0179	0.000	1.65*
Parliamentary trust	0.044	0.042	0.15	0.0179	0.046	0.94
Communal councillor trust	0.108	0.080	1.54	0.071	0.092	0.47
Combined trust	0.166	0.149	0.53	0.107	0.138	0.49

Note. Dependent variable is non-response. Non-responses are defined as answers coded as ‘don’t know’, ‘haven’t heard enough to say’, ‘refuse to answer’, or ‘missing value’. Non-responses are coded as 1; responses are coded as 0. Combined approval/trust are sum indices of the three respective variables; the sum indices vary from 0 (minimum) to three (maximum). Reported numbers for the *t*-tests are absolute values of *t*-statistics for differences in means between respondents surveyed before and after the attack. In the Mali sample, *n*=1232; in the Segou sample, *n*=208. *** *p*<0.01, ** *p*<0.05, * *p*<0.1.

Appendix I.

Figures I1-I3 show area of common support for Mali (I1), Segou (I2), and Mali without Segou (I3)





Appendix I.

Table I1. Replication of Table 2 using nearest-neighbor matching

Model Sample	(1) Mali	(2) Mali	(3) Segou	(4) Segou	(5) Without Segou	(6) Without Segou	(7) Mali	(8) Mali	(9) Segou	(10) Segou	(11) Without Segou	(12) Without Segou
Outcome	Presidential approval (1-6)						Presidential trust					
<i>ATT</i>	-0.18** (2.38)	-0.17** (2.49)	-0.50*** (4.12)	0.51*** (4.43)	-0.05 (0.57)	-0.04 (0.55)	-0.13 (1.53)	-0.12 (1.49)	-0.52*** (3.70)	-0.43*** (3.29)	0.06 (0.63)	-0.01 (0.11)
Matches per observation	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2
Common support	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1045	1045	199	199	936	936	1084	1084	198	198	981	981
# Obs. off common support	22	22	9	9	1	1	22	22	9	9	1	1

Note. All estimates are obtained from nearest neighbour matching, using the ‘teffects nnmatch’ estimator in Stata 15 (based on Abadie et al. 2004). The propensity score is obtained separately for each model using logit regressions where the attack (treatment) is the outcome and the covariates shown in Table 2 are the regressors. The outcome variable for the matching estimates is presidential approval (models 1-6) and presidential trust (model 7-12), respectively, as indicated in the table. Matching is done based on the Mahalanobis distance metric. Observations on common support are defined those in the interval between the minimum propensity score for the group interviewed after the attack (treatment group) and the maximum value of the propensity score for observations interviewed before the attack (control group). Estimates show average treatment effect on the treated (ATE). Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 use one nearest matched control per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 use two nearest matched controls per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Absolute values of z-statistics are shown in parentheses and based on robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table I2. Replication of Table 3 using nearest-neighbor matching

Model Sample	(1) Mali	(2) Mali	(3) Segou	(4) Segou	(5) Without Segou	(6) Without Segou	(7) Mali	(8) Mali	(9) Segou	(10) Segou	(11) Without Segou	(12) Without Segou
Outcome	MP approval (1-6)						Parliamentary trust (7-12)					
<i>ATT</i>	-0.13* (1.75)	-0.09 (1.43)	-0.55*** (4.41)	-0.47*** (4.25)	-0.003 (0.04)	0.009 (0.13)	0.02 (0.26)	<0.00 (0.01)	-0.10 (0.83)	-0.11 (0.92)	0.12 (1.15)	0.05 (0.59)
Matches per observation	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2
Common support	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1002	1002	183	183	889	889	1064	1064	191	191	966	966
# Obs. off common support	22	22	9	9	1	1	22	22	9	9	1	1

Note. All estimates are obtained from nearest neighbour matching, using the ‘teffects nnmatch’ estimator in Stata 15 (based on Abadie et al. 2004). The propensity score is obtained separately for each model using logit regressions where the attack (treatment) is the outcome and the covariates shown in Table 2 are the regressors. The outcome variable for the matching estimates is MP approval (models 1-6) and parliamentary trust (model 7-12), respectively, as indicated in the table. Matching is done based on the Mahalanobis distance metric. Observations on common support are defined those in the interval between the minimum propensity score for the group interviewed after the attack (treatment group) and the maximum value of the propensity score for observations interviewed before the attack (control group). Estimates show average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 use one nearest matched control per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 use two nearest matched controls per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Absolute values of z-statistics are shown in parentheses and based on robust standard errors. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table I3. Replication of Table 4 using nearest-neighbor matching

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	Without Segou	Without Segou	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	Without Segou	Without Segou
Outcome	Communal councillor approval (1-6)						Communal councillor trust (7-12)					
<i>ATT</i>	-0.08 (1.06)	-0.04 (0.62)	-0.39*** (2.73)	-0.30** (2.10)	0.02 (0.21)	0.01 (0.17)	0.004 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.29)
Matches per observation	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2
Common support	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1049	1049	195	195	937	937	1082	1082	195	195	978	978
# Obs. off common support	22	22	9	9	1	1	22	22	9	9	1	1

Note. All estimates are obtained from nearest neighbour matching, using the ‘teffects nnmatch’ estimator in Stata 15 (based on Abadie et al. 2004). The propensity score is obtained separately for each model using logit regressions where the attack (treatment) is the outcome and the covariates shown in Table 2 are the regressors. The outcome variable for the matching estimates is communal councillor approval (models 1-6) and communal councillors trust (model 7-12), respectively, as indicated in the table. Matching is done based on the Mahalanobis distance metric. Observations on common support are defined those in the interval between the minimum propensity score for the group interviewed after the attack (treatment group) and the maximum value of the propensity score for observations interviewed before the attack (control group). Estimates show average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 use one nearest matched control per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 use two nearest matched controls per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Absolute values of z-statistics are shown in parentheses and based on robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table I4. Replication of Table 5 using nearest-neighbor matching

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	Without Segou	Without Segou
Outcome	Social trust					
<i>ATT</i>	0.01 (0.15)	0.06 (0.74)	0.03 (0.17)	0.10 (0.69)	0.02 (0.26)	0.01 (0.14)
Matches per observation	1	2	1	2	1	2
Common support	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations						
# Obs. off common support ⁴¹	22	22	9	9	1	1

Note. All estimates are obtained from nearest neighbour matching, using the ‘teffects nnmatch’ estimator in Stata 15 (based on Abadie et al. 2004). The propensity score is obtained separately for each model using logit regressions where the attack (treatment) is the outcome and the covariates shown in Table 2 are the regressors. The outcome variable for the matching estimates is social trust (models 1-6). Matching is done based on the Mahalanobis distance metric. Observations on common support are defined those in the interval between the minimum propensity score for the group interviewed after the attack (treatment group) and the maximum value of the propensity score for observations interviewed before the attack (control group). Estimates show average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Models 1, 3, and use one nearest matched control per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Models 2, 4, and 6 use two nearest matched controls per treated observation (as indicated in the table). Absolute values of z-statistics are shown in parentheses and based on robust standard errors. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix J.

Table J5. Full results for Table 5: (Non)Effects of Rebel Attack on Social Trust

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample	Mali	Mali	Mali	Segou	Segou	No Segou
Dependent var.	Social trust					
Attack	0.127	0.217**	0.189*	0.204	0.166	0.194
	(1.156)	(1.978)	(1.677)	(0.768)	(0.602)	(1.548)
Urban			-0.292*		-0.568	-0.246
			(-1.845)		(-1.212)	(-1.422)
Poverty			-0.054		0.000	-0.066
			(-1.083)		(0.003)	(-1.159)
Ownership			0.080		0.220	0.056
			(1.173)		(1.303)	(0.739)
Education			-0.167		-0.321	-0.131
			(-0.940)		(-0.505)	(-0.702)
Age			0.014***		0.011	0.014***
			(3.205)		(0.986)	(2.995)
Gender			-0.202*		-0.114	-0.219*
			(-1.671)		(-0.367)	(-1.663)
Radio news			0.027		0.079	0.020
			(0.597)		(0.811)	(0.391)
President co-ethnic			-0.092		-0.167	-0.078
			(-0.628)		(-0.357)	(-0.509)
Region fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
/cut1	-1.652***	-2.074***	-1.729***	-2.201***	-1.710***	-1.803***
	(-15.491)	(-13.381)	(-6.632)	(-7.245)	(-2.850)	(-5.401)
/cut2	-0.257***	-0.602***	-0.224	-0.722***	-0.177	-0.299
	(-2.735)	(-4.251)	(-0.872)	(-3.150)	(-0.302)	(-0.899)
/cut3	1.157***	0.862***	1.297***	0.967***	1.590***	1.170***
	(11.669)	(6.062)	(4.993)	(4.176)	(2.643)	(3.472)
Observations	1,214	1,214	1,198	206	206	992

Note. Coefficients are log(odds) from ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors; z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.