Text 1 Supplement

Two pieces of information are provided in this online appendix. The first is a sample of coding for the initiatives in the 2004 general election (Table A1). The second piece is results from the models testing the pivotal politics model.

Table 1 Supplement. Sample of Coding for Initiatives, 2004 General Election

Proposition		
#	Title	Coding
61	Children's Hospital Projects. Grant Program. Bond Act. Initiative	Earmark
	Statute.	
62	Elections. Primaries. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and	NI
	Statute.	
63	Mental Health Services Expansion, Funding. Tax on Personal	Earmark
	Incomes Above \$1 Million. Initiative Statute.	
64	Limits on Private Enforcement of Unfair Business Competition	NI
	Laws. Initiative Statute.	
65	Local Government Funds, Revenues. State Mandates. Initiative	Earmark
	Constitutional Amendment.	
66	Limitations on "Three Strikes" Law. Sex Crimes. Punishment.	NI
	Initiative Statute.	
67	Emergency Medical Services. Funding. Telephone Surcharge.	Earmark
	Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.	
68	Non-Tribal Commercial Gambling Expansion. Tribal Gaming	NI
	Compact Amendments. Revenues, Tax Exemptions. Initiative	
	Constitutional Amendment and Statutes.	
69	DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding. Initiative Statute.	Earmark
70	Tribal Gaming Compacts. Exclusive Gaming Rights.	NI
	Contributions to State. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and	
	Statute.	
71	Stem Cell Research. Funding. Bonds. Initiative Constitutional	Earmark
	Amendment and Statute.	

Note: This list is taken from the Table of Contents for the 2004 General Election Voter Information Guide. It can be found at the UC Hastings Ballot Measure Database, https://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_pamphlets/. NI = Not included.

To test the pivotal politics model of initiative use, separate models were estimated and are presented in Table A2 (Columns 1-4) with the additional interval variables from Boehmke, Osborn, and Schilling (2015). The results provide additional support for the pivotal politics model.

In Column 1, both the Filibuster and Veto Intervals are significant and positive. For the Filibuster Interval, moving from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean results in 2 more initiative earmarks on the ballot.¹ For the Veto Interval, across the same range of values, the number of initiatives increases by 1.6. In Column 2, the Gridlock Interval is also significant and positive. A change from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean produces 1.6 more initiatives.

The interval variables are also significant and positive in the tax cut models in Columns 3 and 4. A one standard deviation change above the mean of the Filibuster Interval leads to 8 more tax cut initiatives on the ballot. Across the same range of values, the Veto Interval yields 2.6 more initiatives. The substantive effects for the Gridlock Interval (Column 4) appear extremely large. A change from the mean to one standard deviation above it results in 135 more initiatives. There is not a good explanation for this unusually large effect. Alternative models were tested to determine if the Poisson was not the correct model, but a Vuong test revealed that it is.

Notes

One standard deviation below the mean for this variable is not used to calculate substantive
effects because the value would be negative and there are no negative values for this variable.
To maintain consistency in the interpretation of the interval variables, a change from the
mean to one standard deviation above the mean is used for all interval variables.