

Anti-Abortion Policymaking and Women's Representation

Online Appendix

Table of Contents

1. Categorizing Anti-Abortion Legislation

- Table A1: Categories of Anti-Abortion Policy, by Prominent Frame

2. Measuring Party Competition

- Table A2: Classifying State-Sessions by Level of Party Competition

3. Descriptive Statistics

- Table A3.1: Legislator-Session Unit of Analysis
- Table A3.2: Legislator-Session Unit of Analysis, 1997-2010 Only
- Table A3.3: Legislator-Party Unit of Analysis
- Table A3.4: Legislator-Party-Competitive Unit of Analysis
- Table A3.5: State Sample Characteristics

4. Sensitivity Analysis: Excluding Post-2010 Observations

- Figure A4.2: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation, 1997-2010 Only
- Figure A4.3: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame, 1997-2010 Only
- Figure A4.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Competition, 1997-2010 Only
- Figure A4.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Competition, 1997-2010 Only

5. Alternative Model Specification: Adding Two-Year Fixed Effects

- Figure A5.2: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
- Figure A5.3: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
- Figure A5.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Competition, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
- Figure A5.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Competition, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects

6. Alternative Model Specification: Converting Unit of Analysis from Legislator-Session to Legislator across Sessions Served

- Figure A6.2: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation, Legislator-Party Unit of Analysis
- Figure A6.3: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame, Legislator-Party Unit of Analysis
- Figure A6.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Competition, Legislator-Party-Competitive Unit of Analysis
- Figure A6.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Competition, Legislator-Party-Competitive Unit of Analysis

7. Gender-Specific Effects of Party Control

- Figure A7.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Control
- Figure A7.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Control

Appendix 1. Categorizing Anti-Abortion Legislation

In an ideal research design, the actual text of each individual bill would be coded according to the language and framing used to introduce and defend the bill. This approach would entail a very considerable qualitative coding effort given the number of bills in our data. An alternative approach to coding bill frames is to code the bill's substance based on a short bill synopsis, and then probabilistically generalize the framing based on common language used for the specific bill types. This is the approach taken here.

All of the bills included in this project were first coded according to their substantive topic. The list of bill topics was compiled after consulting abortion-specific interest group documents (including the Guttmacher Institute, NARAL, and Americans United for Life) and previous research on state abortion policy. Bills were then coded as pro-abortion rights or anti-abortion rights, and those bills that could not be classified with certainty were dropped from the data. We then coded the bill topics based on the most common framing used in the definition, drafting, and promotion of the bill. Bills that addressed two topics are in the dataset as separate observations. (For instance, if a bill included both new waiting periods and restrictions on abortion access for minors, it would be classified under both Protecting Women and Religious/Moral framing categories.) Below, we explain the construction of the three framing categories. We explain in some detail the origins of these categories and provide examples from model legislation commonly used to enact these laws. Table A1 below lists the policies and framing categories.

Table A1: Categories of Anti-Abortion Policy, by Prominent Frame

<i>Protecting Women</i>	<i>Fetal Centric</i>	<i>Religious / Moral</i>
Informed consent	“Partial-Birth” abortion	State funding of abortion
Waiting period	Fetal tissue disposal	Insurance coverage
Medical abortion	Bans on specific surgical abortion procedures	Conscience exemptions for healthcare providers
Provider admitting privileges	Establish fetal personhood	Schools and sex education
Abortion facilities	Ban abortion based on fetal characteristic	Contraception
Licensing, inspections and reporting	Symbolic gestures	Emergency Contraception
Clinic access and buffer zones	Constitutionality of surgical abortion	Pro-Life license plates
		Abortion access for minors
		Miscellaneous other restrictions

The organized interest groups most centrally involved in the abortion policy debate regularly issue published reports (including NARAL, the National Right to Life Committee and Americans United for Life). These publications often include state report cards, policy strategies, and model legislation. The reports provide valuable insight into the perspective, framing, and priorities of the prominent activist organizations. Because the vast majority of abortion policy is

restrictive in nature, we used the framing employed by a conservative abortion interest group to assist in the categorization of our dependent variable.

In our classification of policy proposals, we rely in particular on *Defending Life: Proven Strategies for a Pro-Life America*, published annually since 2005 by the prominent pro-life group Americans United for Life (AUL).¹ Americans United for Life is an influential anti-abortion rights interest group founded in 1971. According to their website, they provide “state lawmakers, state attorneys general, public policy groups, lobbyists, the media, and others with proven legal strategies and tools that will, step-by-step and state-by-state, lead to a more pro-life America and help set the stage of the state-by-state battle that will follow Roe’s ultimate reversal.”² AUL’s publications are a good indication of the movement’s framing and priorities, as well as the legal strategy. Their model legislation is “developed by AUL experts to assist legislators and policymakers in drafting, debating, and passing life-affirming laws” (AUL 2012, 20). A recent *Atlantic* article contends that the organization is “almost single-handedly responsible for the wave of pro-life legislation that state legislatures have passed in recent years.”³ According to the “From the President” section in the 2012 volume, 70 pro-life laws were introduced in state legislatures and AUL legal and policy experts had a “direct role” in passing 28 of those (AUL 2012, 17). Additionally, their experts testified dozens of times, and more than 1,600 copies of their model legislation were distributed across the country (AUL 2012, 17). In sum, AUL claims that it is partially responsible for the adoption of 28 restrictive abortion policies in 2011, 19 more in 2012, and 16 in 2013 - about one-third of all pro-life laws enacted in that time period (AUL Annual State Legislative Reports).⁴

Protecting Women

The annual AUL documents lend credence to the central role that the Protecting Women frame plays in the AUL’s legislative strategy. The bills in this category emphasize the damage that abortion has on the physical and psychological wellbeing of American women. Nearly all of the model legislation provided by AUL with this framing includes “women” in the suggested bill titles.

The most common type bill in this category requires that abortion providers give women informed consent of the abortion procedure. While informed consent is a staple of any surgical procedure, these *informed consent policies* require that providers give specific information. Often called *Women’s Right to Know* acts, these bills require that physicians give information about medical risks (such as the largely discredited claims that abortion leads to increased

¹ We rely most heavily on the 2011 and 2012 editions of this publication in our quotations throughout this Appendix, though we referenced earlier versions of the report in our research process.

² <http://www.aul.org/issue/abortion/>

³ <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/what-pro-life-activists-really-want/398297/>

⁴ The contribution of this group and their model legislation is also acknowledged by legislators, including the Missouri House, which adopted a resolution in 2012 honoring AUL and its president for “producing constitutionally-sound model legislation and expert advice on bills pending before this body”. See <http://www.aul.org/missouri-house-resolution-honoring-dr-charmaine-yoest/>

incidences of breast cancer or mental illness), or about the gestational development of the fetus. According to the 2011 AUL edition of *Defending Life*, abortion clinics fail to provide “adequate and accurate” information to women, and as a result, “many women are physically and psychologically harmed by the abortion process” (AUL 2011, 290). These laws “equip women with the knowledge they need before making an abortion decision and to ensure their consent is valid” (AUL 2011, 290).

In recent years, the *Women’s Right to Know* acts have evolved to include requirements that women listen to a fetal heartbeat or view an ultrasound. These additional procedures are justified, advocates argue, because they diagnose potentially dangerous ectopic pregnancies. Additionally, the report points to academic research in arguing that women feel “bonded” and not “ambivalent” after seeing an ultrasound (AUL 2011, 291). Informed consent policies are frequently accompanied with waiting periods, usually of 24 hours but occasionally as long as 72 hours (not including weekends or holidays). A “reflection period” allows a woman “time to consider her treatment and protective options” if she is a victim of abuse (AUL 2011, 296).

The Protecting Women frame is also prominent in policies designed to protect women from an allegedly unregulated abortion industry. Policies implementing increased regulation, inspections, licensing and reporting promote women’s safety by imposing higher standards on the physicians that can provide abortions, on the facilities themselves, and require more data collection about the safety and incidence of abortion. Many of the policies regarding medical abortion are about collecting information about the safety of RU-486 or regulating the distribution of it. The 2011 AUL publication contends that side effects are “confusingly similar to an ectopic pregnancy” and that “unlike surgical abortions, abortifacients can be prescribed by anyone with a ‘medical license,’ such as untrained psychiatrists, podiatrists and dentists” (AUL 2011, 320). The AUL further explains there is a lack of evidence about the risks and complications associated with non-surgical abortion (AUL 2011, 320). Other restrictions on medical abortion deal with the potential dangers of the Mifeprex drug or restrict the off-label use of Mifeprex. For instance, the *Abortion-Inducing Drugs Safety Act* would “Protect women from the dangerous and potentially deadly off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs” (AUL 2012, 346).⁵ The AUL also opposes the use of telemedicine abortion, which allows physicians to prescribe abortion inducing drugs to women via telecommunication technology.

The AUL publication had few mentions to clinic access laws. Freedom of Clinic Access (FOCA) policies are one of the most common pro-abortion Rights policies. These policies include increased penalties for protestors blocking the physical access to medical facilities and enact a “buffer zone” between the public sidewalk (where protestors may stand) and the entrances to abortion clinic entrances. The AUL opposes these policies, as they impede the ability of “sidewalk counselors” from making contact with women entering an abortion clinic (see AUL 2013, 571).

⁵ According to recent research (<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10759273>), the FDA required dose of Mifeprex is 2-3 times larger than necessary. Many doctors prescribe lower doses to keep costs for women low, and to avoid giving women more medication than necessary given the possible complications and side effects of the drug.

Fetal Centric

Fetal centric policies use language that focuses on “unborn” or “preborn” children. The most ideological fetal centric policies establish the separate personhood or citizenship of the fetus. Some of these bills are proposed statutory declarations, joint resolutions, or days of remembrance that mimic the language of the well-known Missouri Preamble, “The life of each human being begins at conception. Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing.”

Other bills are proposed constitutional amendments. For example, the AUL suggests the language of, “The policy of [State] is to protect the life of every unborn child from conception to birth, to the extent permitted by the federal constitution” (AUL 2012, 228). There are many variations of constitutional amendments and joint resolutions that reference the personhood of fetuses.

Many fetal centric bills focus on visceral details of surgical abortion. These bills emphasize the “violent destruction” of human embryos. Among the most well-known of these policies are those that prohibit a specific late term abortion procedure. Policies that ban intact Dilation and Extraction, more commonly known by the political name “partial birth abortion,” describe the procedure as “a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary” (AUL 2012, 243). Other gestational bans on surgical abortion are based on beliefs about the fetus’ development. For example, the *Fetal Pain and Awareness Act* ensures women receive information about fetal pain and a requirement that abortion providers offer to administer anesthesia to the fetus (AUL 2011, 291).

A relatively new type of fetal centric bill prohibits abortion on the basis of the fetus’ sex, race, genetic abnormalities, and (rarely) perceived sexual orientation. According to the AUL, “so far few states prohibit these inherently discriminatory procedures. It is, however, an area where “pro-abortion advocates have little ammunition to challenge such bills from a public policy standpoint” (AUL 2011, 280). The justification for these policies also makes a gendered appeal: “A sex-selection abortion is used to prevent the birth of a child of an undesired sex. The victims of sex-selection abortion are overwhelmingly female” (AUL 2011, 281).

A final type of fetal-centric bills concerns fetal tissue. These bills variously require that aborted fetal tissue be disposed of in a specific manner, prohibit the use of fetal tissue in medical research, or oppose infertility treatments such as IVF. The AUL references the destruction of the human embryo. The AUL finds embryonic cell research deeply problematic and focuses on the personhood of an embryo. “The future of human cures is not in destroying some humans to treat others” (AUL 2012, 442). “Every human being ... deserves the protections accorded to all other human beings. If we decide that some members of the human race should not receive those protections, then we are all at risk if the rich, powerful, or simple majority decides some of us are no longer worth of life” (AUL 2012, 449).

Moral or Religious

The final category of abortion restriction articulates opposition in terms of religious or moral beliefs. Oftentimes these bills do not attempt to restrict legal abortion; instead, they

protect against unwilful support of abortion-related activities by taxpayers that may be opposed to abortion on moral or religious grounds.

The most well-known bill in this category prohibits the use of public funds to pay for abortions for low-income women, except under specific circumstances. These bills are often based on the Hyde Amendment. State funding restrictions are a “proven weapon in reducing abortions” (AUL 2011, 341) that “avoid making taxpayers indirectly complicit in abortion” (AUL 2011, 340). Bills in this category restrict funds going to organizations like Planned Parenthood through the Title X program, or prohibit teachers, counselors or nurses at public schools from discussing or providing support for abortions.

The same justification of moral or religious opposition to the funding of abortions is used to prohibit coverage of abortion in public and private insurance policies. The justification of opposition to abortion funding in public insurance plans is framed in terms of taxpayers and public funds. The AUL also provides model legislation that would prohibit abortion coverage in private insurance plans on the grounds that people do not know abortion is covered: “the vast majority of private health insurance plans, often unbeknownst to employers and consumers, covered abortion-on-demand” (AUL 2012, 355). Policies that restrict access to contraception and emergency contraception use similar language. For example, the AUL refers to the “danger of ‘contraceptive equity’” (AUL 2011, 353) and warns that contraceptive equity laws harm religious-affiliated organizations that are not exempt (such as churches), strains a healthcare system already burdened, and opens the door to mandating insurance coverage of abortion (AUL 2011, 355).

Conscience exemptions are policies that allow health professionals (such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists or insurance companies) to refuse to provide certain services based on personal beliefs. While almost all states already exempt certain health professionals from participating in abortion, the AUL argues that there is “urgent need” for laws that recognize the right for “all healthcare providers, including individuals (who may work for a private or public healthcare facility), institutions (whether those institutions are public or private); and payers (such as insurance companies) to refuse to participate in any healthcare service to which they conscientiously object” (AUL 2011, 662).

Many bills relate to honoring or funding Crisis Pregnancy Centers or Pregnancy Resource Centers. These centers seek to persuade women with unintended pregnancies to choose an alternative to abortion. In many states, the sale of special Choose Life License Plates is a way to raise funds for CPCs and other organizations that emphasize abortion alternatives.

Finally, religious or moral framing is also used in the drafting and defense of parental involvement policies, including parental consent and parental notification. While pro-abortion Rights organizations like NARAL refer to “minor women,” AUL and NRLC refer to “immature minors” and “girls.” The AUL argues for more parental involvement by reiterating the claim that abortion causes long-term physical and psychological injury, and that minor women need the support of their parents. A mandated waiting period “provides parents with an opportunity to consult with the minor and ‘discuss the

consequences of her decision in the context of the values and moral religious principles of their family’” (AUL 2011, 120). These policies also incorporate women protective framing, such as by stating that “Immature minors often lack the ability to make fully formed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range consequences. The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion are sometimes serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature” (AUL 212, 307). Because these policies employ both moral/religious and women protective frames, we ran analyses with both framing classifications. The results did not differ significantly.

Appendix 2. Measuring Party Competition

The “folded” Ranney (1976) index of party competition measures the partisan balance in state government, or “the degree of competition between Democrats and Republicans for control of the state legislature and the governor’s office” (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012, 338). Its components include: the percentage of Democrats in the upper and lower chambers of the state legislature; the Democratic vote share in the gubernatorial election; and Democratic control of the legislature and governor’s office. The folded index ranges from 0.5, indicating unified one-party government, to 1.0, indicating a perfect competition or balance between Democrats and Republicans. It is computed as a rolling average over 4-, 8-, or 10-year intervals and is available for every state-year through 2010 (Jordan and Grossman 2016). We chose the most sensitive 4-year interval to maximize variation over our 16-year time frame. However, given the limited availability, we rely on the 2010 figures for our 2011 and 2010 (or 2011-12) sessions.

To distinguish competitive from non-competitive state-years, we first calculated the average index score for all states from 1991 to 2010 (.8789). Next, we coded all state-years with an above-average score as “competitive” and all others as “non-competitive.” As a result, the state-sessions in our sample are coded as follows:

Table A2: Classifying State-Sessions by Level of Party Competition

State	Non-Competitive Sessions	Competitive Sessions
Arizona	1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, ... 2010, 2011, 2012	2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009
Arkansas	1997, 1999, ... 2007, 2009, 2011	2001, 2003, 2005
California	1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04	1997-98, ... 2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12
Colorado	2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007
Florida	2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	1997-98, 1999
Illinois	2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12	1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04
Louisiana	1997, ... 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007	1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, ... 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
Maryland	1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, ... 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	2005
Mississippi	2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004	1997, 1998, 1999, ... 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012

New Jersey	1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, ... 2006-07, 2008-09, ... 2012-13	2002-03, 2004-05, ... 2010-11
New Mexico	2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003
Nevada		1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011
North Dakota	1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011	
Ohio	1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06	2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12
Pennsylvania	1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02	2003-04, 2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12
South Carolina	2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12	1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04
Tennessee		1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12
Texas	2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011	1997, 1999, 2001
Utah	1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	
Washington	2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12	1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06
Wisconsin		1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12

By this measure, party competition varies considerably within states, over time and across states. Almost half (46%) of our legislator-session observations occur in a competitive state-session.

References

- Jordan, Marty P., and Matt Grossmann. 2016. *The Correlates of State Policy Project v1.14*. East Lansing, MI: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR).
- Ranney, Austin. 1976. "Parties in State Politics." In *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*, eds. Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth N. Vines. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Shufeldt, Gregory, and Patrick Flavin. 2012. "Two Distinct Concepts: Party Competition in Government and Electoral Competition in the American States." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 12(3): 330-42.

Appendix 3. Descriptive Statistics

Table A3.1: Legislator-Session Unit of Analysis (See main text.)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	No. of Obs.
<u>Dependent Variables: Sponsored at least one...</u>					
Pro-Abortion Rights Bill (any)	0.0037261	0.060929	0	1	23349
Anti-Abortion (any)	0.0353334	0.1846251	0	1	23349
Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bill	0.021971	0.1465918	0	1	23349
Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bill	0.0116493	0.1073038	0	1	23349
Anti-Abortion/Religious Bill	0.0153754	0.1230432	0	1	23349
<u>Independent Variables</u>					
Conservative Republican Woman (CRW)	0.0288235	0.1673138	0	1	23349
Conservative Republican Man (CRM)	0.1325539	0.3390992	0	1	23349
Moderate or Liberal Republican Woman (MRW)	0.0626579	0.2423519	0	1	23349
Moderate or Liberal Republican Man (MRM)	0.25954	0.4383916	0	1	23349
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Man (MDM)	0.2718746	0.4449351	0	1	23349
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Woman (MDW)	0.07238	0.2591216	0	1	23349
Liberal Democratic Man (LDM)	0.0996617	0.2995548	0	1	23349
Liberal Democratic Man (LDW)	0.0725085	0.2593335	0	1	23349
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Total Bills Sponsored	17.43899	35.68243	0	1490	23349
Republican Control of House	0.45745	0.4981969	0	1	23349
Competitive State-Session	0.4596342	0.4983786	0	1	23349
AR	0.0339629	0.1811376	0	1	23349
AZ	0.0412009	0.1987589	0	1	23349
CA	0.0276243	0.1638974	0	1	23349
CO	0.0447985	0.2068657	0	1	23349
FL	0.0773052	0.2670809	0	1	23349
IL	0.042186	0.2010175	0	1	23349
LA	0.0711808	0.2571321	0	1	23349
MD	0.0967922	0.2956809	0	1	23349
MS	0.0827444	0.2755015	0	1	23349
ND	0.0327209	0.1779089	0	1	23349
NJ	0.0322069	0.1765531	0	1	23349
NM	0.047925	0.2136121	0	1	23349
NV	0.0143903	0.119096	0	1	23349
OH	0.0353762	0.1847329	0	1	23349
PA	0.0705384	0.2560576	0	1	23349
SC	0.043428	0.2038229	0	1	23349
TN	0.0339629	0.1811376	0	1	23349
TX	0.0514369	0.2208919	0	1	23349
UT	0.0511371	0.220282	0	1	23349
WA	0.034691	0.1829999	0	1	23349
WI	0.0343912	0.1822357	0	1	23349

Table A3.2: Legislator-Session Unit of Analysis, 1997-2010 Only (See Appendix 4.)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	No. of Obs.
<u>Dependent Variables: Sponsored at least one...</u>					
Pro-Abortion Rights Bill (any)	0.0037383	0.0610289	0	1	20330
Anti-Abortion (any)	0.0326119	0.177623	0	1	20330
Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bill	0.020364	0.1412455	0	1	20330
Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bill	0.0106247	0.1025296	0	1	20330
Anti-Abortion/Religious Bill	0.0138711	0.1169589	0	1	20330
<u>Independent Variables</u>					
Conservative Republican Woman (CRW)	0.0276931	0.164096	0	1	20330
Conservative Republican Man (CRM)	0.1259223	0.3317699	0	1	20330
Moderate or Liberal Republican Woman (MRW)	0.0635022	0.2438701	0	1	20330
Moderate or Liberal Republican Man (MRM)	0.2588293	0.4380024	0	1	20330
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Man (MDM)	0.2810133	0.449505	0	1	20330
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Woman (MDW)	0.073635	0.2611824	0	1	20330
Liberal Democratic Man (LDM)	0.0977373	0.2969665	0	1	20330
Liberal Democratic Man (LDW)	0.0716675	0.2579429	0	1	20330
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Total Bills Sponsored	17.1214	34.59745	0	1490	20330
Republican Control of House	0.4341367	0.4956552	0	1	20330
Competitive State-Session	0.4701918	0.499123	0	1	20330
AR	0.0341367	0.1815848	0	1	20330
AZ	0.0414166	0.1992567	0	1	20330
CA	0.0277914	0.1643788	0	1	20330
CO	0.0450566	0.2074333	0	1	20330
FL	0.0769798	0.266566	0	1	20330
IL	0.0419577	0.2004974	0	1	20330
LA	0.0717167	0.2580245	0	1	20330
MD	0.0972946	0.2963658	0	1	20330
MS	0.08303	0.2759344	0	1	20330
ND	0.0329562	0.1785264	0	1	20330
NJ	0.0286768	0.1669007	0	1	20330
NM	0.048303	0.214411	0	1	20330
NV	0.0144614	0.1193857	0	1	20330
OH	0.0353173	0.184585	0	1	20330
PA	0.0707821	0.2564668	0	1	20330
SC	0.0435809	0.2041658	0	1	20330
TN	0.0341859	0.181711	0	1	20330
TX	0.051697	0.22142	0	1	20330
UT	0.0513527	0.2207215	0	1	20330
WA	0.0348746	0.1834666	0	1	20330
WI	0.0344319	0.1823402	0	1	20330

Table A3.3: Legislator-Party Unit of Analysis (See Appendix 6.)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	No. of Obs.
<u>Dependent Variables: Sponsored at least one...</u>					
Pro-Abortion Rights Bill (any)	0.012699	0.111982	0	1	5591
Anti-Abortion (any)	0.0876409	0.2827972	0	1	5591
Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bill	0.0561617	0.2302543	0	1	5591
Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bill	0.0334466	0.1798158	0	1	5591
Anti-Abortion/Religious Bill	0.0441781	0.2055091	0	1	5591
<u>Independent Variables</u>					
Conservative Republican Woman (CRW)	0.0321946	0.1765324	0	1	5591
Conservative Republican Man (CRM)	0.1493472	0.3564622	0	1	5591
Moderate or Liberal Republican Woman (MRW)	0.0647469	0.2461008	0	1	5591
Moderate or Liberal Republican Man (MRM)	0.2659632	0.4418842	0	1	5591
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Man (MDM)	0.2527276	0.4346149	0	1	5591
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Woman (MDW)	0.0704704	0.255961	0	1	5591
Liberal Democratic Man (LDM)	0.0960472	0.2946823	0	1	5591
Liberal Democratic Man (LDW)	0.068503	0.2526296	0	1	5591
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Total Bills Sponsored	17.64349	27.44856	0	1097.5	5591
Republican Control of House	0.4952731	0.4624227	0	1	5591
Competitive State-Session	0.4879513	0.4253012	0	1	5591
AR	0.0668932	0.2498593	0	1	5591
AZ	0.0397067	0.1952866	0	1	5591
CA	0.0520479	0.2221436	0	1	5591
CO	0.0416741	0.1998613	0	1	5591
FL	0.0726167	0.2595295	0	1	5591
IL	0.0472187	0.2121254	0	1	5591
LA	0.0516902	0.2214207	0	1	5591
MD	0.0554463	0.2288697	0	1	5591
MS	0.0463245	0.2102056	0	1	5591
ND	0.0363084	0.187073	0	1	5591
NJ	0.0388124	0.1931648	0	1	5591
NM	0.0298694	0.1702423	0	1	5591
NV	0.0207476	0.142551	0	1	5591
OH	0.0592023	0.236024	0	1	5591
PA	0.0720801	0.2586437	0	1	5591
SC	0.0490073	0.2159026	0	1	5591
TN	0.0379181	0.1910153	0	1	5591
TX	0.0592023	0.236024	0	1	5591
UT	0.0359506	0.1861837	0	1	5591
WA	0.0439993	0.2051119	0	1	5591
WI	0.0432838	0.2035136	0	1	5591

Table A3.4: Legislator-Party-Competitive Unit of Analysis (See Appendix 6.)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	No. of Obs.
<u>Dependent Variables: Sponsored at least one...</u>					
Pro-Abortion Rights Bill (any)	0.0096424	0.0977278	0	1	7467
Anti-Abortion (any)	0.0745949	0.2627541	0	1	7467
Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bill	0.0478104	0.2133791	0	1	7467
Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bill	0.0279898	0.1649546	0	1	7467
Anti-Abortion/Religious Bill	0.0358913	0.1860315	0	1	7467
<u>Independent Variables</u>					
Conservative Republican Woman (CRW)	0.029329	0.1687385	0	1	7467
Conservative Republican Man (CRM)	0.1431633	0.3502627	0	1	7467
Moderate or Liberal Republican Woman (MRW)	0.0624079	0.2419112	0	1	7467
Moderate or Liberal Republican Man (MRM)	0.2614169	0.439436	0	1	7467
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Man (MDM)	0.2626222	0.4400883	0	1	7467
Moderate or Conservative Democratic Woman (MDW)	0.0705772	0.2561344	0	1	7467
Liberal Democratic Man (LDM)	0.0988349	0.2984602	0	1	7467
Liberal Democratic Man (LDW)	0.0716486	0.2579224	0	1	7467
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Total Bills Sponsored	18.99229	32.80437	0	1377	7467
Republican Control of House	0.4595844	0.4729029	0	1	7467
Competitive State-Session	0.496585	0.5000218	0	1	7467
AR	0.0677648	0.2513587	0	1	7467
AZ	0.0459354	0.2093592	0	1	7467
CA	0.053569	0.2251803	0	1	7467
CO	0.0393732	0.1944944	0	1	7467
FL	0.0695058	0.2543294	0	1	7467
IL	0.050087	0.2181392	0	1	7467
LA	0.0601312	0.2377458	0	1	7467
MD	0.0603991	0.2382407	0	1	7467
MS	0.0539708	0.2259752	0	1	7467
ND	0.0271863	0.1626368	0	1	7467
NJ	0.0476764	0.213095	0	1	7467
NM	0.0317397	0.1753179	0	1	7467
NV	0.015535	0.1236759	0	1	7467
OH	0.0551761	0.228339	0	1	7467
PA	0.0780769	0.2683105	0	1	7467
SC	0.0516941	0.2214236	0	1	7467
TN	0.0283916	0.1661	0	1	7467
TX	0.0597295	0.2370008	0	1	7467
UT	0.0269184	0.1618559	0	1	7467
WA	0.0447301	0.2067247	0	1	7467
WI	0.0324093	0.1770963	0	1	7467

Table A3.5: State Sample Characteristics, 1997-2012

State	Professionalism ⁶	Control of Legislature ⁷	Percent Women ⁸	Polarization Lower Chamber ⁹	Polarization Upper Chamber
AR	2	Dem	19.18%	0.557	0.547
AZ	2	Rep	33.60%	2.179	1.911
CA	3	Dem	28.35%	2.874	2.783
CO	2	Lean Rep	36.72%	2.458	2.295
FL	2	Rep	24.14%	1.563	1.426
IL	3	Dem	30.14%	1.263	1.157
LA	2	Lean Dem	15.71%	0.704	0.593
MD	2	Dem	33.69%	1.809	1.719
MS	1	Lean Dem	15.09%	1.015	1.222
ND	1	Rep	18.70%	1.072	1.112
NJ	2	Lean Dem	23.15%	1.018	0.943
NM	1	Rep	30.80%	2.064	1.754
NV	2	Rep	34.23%	1.254	1.153
OH	3	Lean Rep	20.83%	1.574	1.823
PA	3	Lean Rep	13.61%	1.193	1.327
SC	2	Rep	12.91%	1.269	1.028
TN	2	Lean Dem	16.77%	1.316	1.283
TX	2	Lean Rep	21.21%	2.03	1.908
UT	1	Rep	21.79%	1.542	1.526
WA	2	Lean Dem	32.44%	2.143	2.196
WI	3	Lean Rep	23.45%	1.878	2.196

⁶ Source: National Council of State Legislatures, “Full and Part-Time Legislatures”: <http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx> .

1=part-time; 2=hybrid; 3=full-time professional

⁷ Dem/Rep = Democratic/Republican control in all sessions; Lean Dem/Rep = Dem/Rep in most sessions

⁸ Source: Center for American Women in Politics, 2012 figures (Figures for entire 1997-2012 time period are very similar, especially in terms of the rank order of states.)


⁹ Source (Lower and Upper Chamber): Shor and McCarty 2011

Appendix 4. Sensitivity Analysis: Excluding Post-2010 Observations

Excluding the post-2010 observations from our dataset changes very few of our results. Below we note any significant difference between the 1997-2010 results and the main results reported in the manuscript.


Figure A4.2: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation, 1997-2010 Only

Compare to Figure 2 in main text.




No differences.

Figure A4.3: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame, 1997-2010 Only
Compare to Figure 3 in main text.



No differences.

Figure A4.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Competition, 1997-2010 Only
Compare to Figure 4 in main text.




All Pro-Abortion Rights Bills:

Competition (1997-2010) still has no significant effects. However, it now slightly decreases the likelihood of sponsorship by LDM and LDW, thus reducing ideological differences among Democrats, especially among women (LDW vs. MDW), in competitive environments.

All Anti-Abortion Bills:

No differences.

Figure A4.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Competition, 1997-2010 Only
Compare to Figure 5 in main text.



Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bills:
No differences.


Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bills:
Competition (1997-2010) has a stronger, more significant effect on CRW; thus, the gender gap in sponsorship rates among conservative Republicans in competitive environments is larger and more significant ($p=.038$).

Anti-Abortion/Religious Bills:
Competition (1997-2010) has stronger, more significant positive effects on CRW and CRM, but only because their sponsorship rates in non-competitive environments are lower.

Appendix 5. Alternative Model Specification: Adding Two-Year Fixed Effects


Adding two-year fixed effects to our models changes very few of our results. Below we note any significant differences between these alternative-model results and the main results reported in the manuscript.

Figure A5.2: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
Compare to Figure 2 in main text.




No differences.

Figure A5.3: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
 Compare to Figure 3 in main text.



No differences.


Figure A5.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Competition, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
Compare to Figure 4 in main text.



All Pro-Abortion Rights Bills:
No differences.

All Anti-Abortion Bills:
Effects of competition on GOP women (conservative and moderate) are slightly stronger (both p-values <.100), and gender differences in the effects of competition among Republicans (conservative and moderate) are slightly larger (both p-values <.100).

Figure A5.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Competition, Controlling for Two-Year Fixed Effects
Compare to Figure 5 in main text.



Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bills:
No differences.

Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bills:
The effect of competition on MRW is a bit stronger (from 1.1% to 2.4% chance of sponsoring) and more significant ($p=.045$). The gender gap in sponsorship among moderate Republicans in competitive environments is still insignificant ($p=.160$).

Anti-Abortion/Religious Bills:
No differences.


Appendix 6. Alternative Model Specification: Converting Unit of Analysis from Legislator-Session to Legislator across Sessions Served

To further account for path-dependent legislator effects over time (above and beyond clustering the standard errors by legislator), we decided to convert our unit of analysis from legislator-session to legislator across sessions served and model the probability of having ever sponsored an abortion bill (of various types). To account for instances of individual legislators switching parties during the time period observed, however, we defined our unit of analysis as legislator-party. Thus, party-switchers appear in the converted/aggregated dataset twice, once for all sessions served as a Democrat and again for all sessions served as a Republican.

Replicating Table 1 (Models 1-5) and Figures 2-3 with the legislator-party as the unit of analysis, we model the probability of having ever sponsored a particular type of abortion bill (across all sessions served in the same party) as a function of legislator ideology-party-gender (which is time invariant), controlling for: the proportion of sessions served in a competitive environment; the proportion of sessions served under Republican Party control; the average number of total bills sponsored per session across all sessions served; and state fixed effects.

This changes some estimates of the effects of our control variables but has very little effect on our main results regarding legislator IPG. Below we note any significant differences between these alternative-model results and the main results reported in the manuscript.

Figure A6.2: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation, Legislator-Party Unit of Analysis
Compare to Figure 2 in main text



All Pro-Abortion Rights Bills:

Republican control (or the proportion of sessions served under GOP control) no longer has a significant effect.


All Anti-Abortion Bills:

Republican control (or the proportion of sessions served under GOP control) no longer has a significant effect.

The gender gap among conservative Republicans is not quite as significant: as predicted, 28% of CRW and 22% of CRM sponsored at least one Pro-Abortion Rights Bill over all sessions served ($p=.060$).

Figure A6.3: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame, Legislator-Party Unit of Analysis

Compare to Figure 3 in main text.



Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bills:

Republican control no longer has a significant effect.

Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bills:

Republican control now has a significant negative effect ($p=.040$).

The positive effect of party competition (or the proportion of sessions served in a competitive environment) is stronger and more significant ($p=.016$).

Anti-Abortion/Religious Bills:

Republican control no longer has a significant effect.


The positive effect of party competition (or the proportion of sessions served in a competitive environment) is weaker and now statistically insignificant ($p>.100$).

To test the conditional or interactive effects of party competition, we converted our unit of analysis from legislator-party to legislator-party-competitive. This allows us to directly compare the likelihood of abortion bill sponsorship across all competitive sessions served to the likelihood of abortion bill sponsorship across all non-competitive sessions served. Individual legislators thus can appear in this alternative dataset multiple times if they switched parties or served in both competitive and non-competitive state-sessions.

Replicating Table 2 (Models 6-10) and Figures 4-5 with legislator-party-competitive as the unit of analysis, we model the probability of having ever sponsored a particular type of abortion bill (across all competitive and non-competitive sessions served in the same party) as a function of legislator ideology-party-gender (which is time invariant) and partisan competition, controlling for: the proportion of competitive and non-competitive sessions served under Republican Party control; the average number of total bills sponsored per session across all competitive and non-competitive sessions served; and state fixed effects.

This alternative specification changes some estimates of the interactive effects of legislator IPG and party competition, in many cases enhancing the gender-specific effects of competition. Below we note any significant differences between these alternative-model results and the main results reported in the manuscript.


Figure A6.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Competition, Legislator-Party-Competitive Unit of Analysis
Compare to Figure 4 in main text.



All Pro-Abortion Rights Bills:
No differences.

All Anti-Abortion Bills:
The positive effect of competition on CRW is stronger (a 67% increase from .20 to .33) and more significant ($p=.030$); thus, the gender difference in competition's effect among conservative Republicans is larger and more significant ($p=.029$).

Figure A6.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Competition, Legislator-Party-Competitive Unit of Analysis
Compare to Figure 5 in main text.



Anti-Abortion/Pro-Woman Bills:

Competition's positive effect on CRW is now significant ($p=.053$), as is the difference in competition's effect on CRW and CRM ($p=.083$). As a result, the gender gap in sponsorship activity among conservative Republicans is now significant only in competitive environments ($p=.158$ in non-competitive environments). Thus, the distinctive pro-woman leadership of conservative GOP women emerges only when and where competition between the parties is relatively intense. These results come closer to our initial expectation that all three conditions are necessary (and sufficient) for women's distinctive leadership on anti-abortion policy to emerge: strong conservatism, women-centered issue framing, and party competition.

Anti-Abortion/Fetal Rights Bills:

Competition's effect on CRW is weaker (106% increase, from .068 to .140) and not quite significant ($p=.106$). But its effect on MRW is stronger (186% increase, from .022 to .063) and now statistically significant ($p=.035$). As a result, the gender difference in competition's effect among conservative Republicans is no longer significant ($p=.189$), while that among moderate Republicans is now marginally significant ($p=.098$). Thus, competition's effects on GOP women are reversed. It is now *moderate* Republican women's distinctive fetal-rights leadership that emerges in competitive environments only; gender gaps in sponsorship activity among conservatives are insignificant in both competitive and non-competitive environments.

Anti-Abortion/Religious Bills:

Competition now has no effect whatsoever on moderate Republicans (male or female).

Appendix 7. Gender-Specific Effects of Party Control

In this supplemental analysis, we explore various possibilities for party control of the legislative chamber to have gender-specific effects on anti-abortion or pro-abortion rights sponsorship activity. Atkinson (2017), for example, suggests that majority party status provides a particularly strong incentive for female leadership on women's issues. Swers's research, on the other hand, suggests that women in the minority can become mobilized when the majority party's agenda threatens to move policy away from the status quo in opposition to their preferences on women's rights. When their party lost control of the Senate in 2003, Democratic women *intensified* their efforts to champion feminist legislation, particularly on reproductive rights, in order "to protect feminist causes from the Republican Party's more socially conservative agenda" (Swers 2013, 55-56). Given the fact that the vast majority of post-*Webster/Casey* abortion policy initiative and energy in the states has been on the side of limiting abortion rights and access (Kreitzer 2015), we might see similarly defensive behavior among Democratic women in Republican-controlled state legislatures.

To test these hypotheses, we model sponsorship activity as a function of the interacting effects of party control and legislator ideology-party-gender (IPG), much like we model the interacting effects of party competition and legislator IPG in the main text (Table 2, Models 6-10, and Figures 4-5). Here, we control for party competition (at the state-session level) in addition to total number of bills sponsored (by legislator-session) and state fixed effects. State-sessions in which neither party held a majority of the house seats (split control) were excluded from the analysis. Resulting predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) are presented in the Figures A7.4 and A7.5 below.

Figure A7.4: Sponsorship of Any Abortion Rights or Anti-Abortion Legislation by Party Control





Figure A7.5: Sponsorship of Anti-Abortion Legislation by Issue Frame and Party Control



As seen in Figures A7.4 and A7.5, the effects of party control are not clearly gender-specific – even when and where *anti*-abortion policy leadership is concerned. The positive or mobilizing effects of GOP control on pro-life/pro-woman and moral/religious bill sponsorship rates observed in Table 1 (Models 3 and 5) are by no means exclusive to Republican women.¹⁰ Rather, GOP men and women, conservatives and moderates alike, are more likely to sponsor such measures when they enjoy majority party status – though the effects are modest and not always statistically significant. And, while the estimated effects of majority party status are larger among CRW than they are for CRM, the gender differences in those effects are nowhere close to being statistically significant. Thus, the overall patterns of conservative Republican women’s policy leadership observed in Figures 2-3 (main text) do not differ much between Democratic-controlled and Republican-controlled state houses. Although the gender gaps are larger under GOP-control, CRW are more likely than CRM to sponsor pro-life pro-woman legislation, but no more (or less) likely to sponsor other types of anti-abortion measures regardless of which party controls the chamber and the legislative agenda.¹¹

¹⁰ Nor are GOP women, conservative or moderate, the exception to the null effect of party control on fetal rights sponsorship in Model 4.

¹¹ When post-2010 observations are excluded and when the legislator-party-GOP control is the unit of analysis, there are even fewer differences between Democratic- and Republican-controlled chambers.

Party control of the chamber appears more consequential for patterns of pro-abortion rights policy leadership in Figure A7.4, but again, the effects are not gender-specific. GOP control stimulates abortion rights policy activity among liberal Democratic men and women alike (effects are significant at $p=.010$ and $p=.071$, respectively). Thus, it is the threat of an attack on abortion rights in Republican-controlled chambers that leads Democrats to sponsor more pro-abortion rights bills, not majority party status. Moreover, contrary to our expectations that only Democratic women would respond to this heightened threat, Democratic men also respond quite dramatically. Indeed, it is only in Republican-controlled chambers that LDM have any significant, non-zero probability of sponsoring any abortion rights legislation. Nonetheless, regardless of party control, LDW are more likely to assume abortion rights leadership than are their male counterparts (though the gender gap in GOP-controlled chambers is not quite significant at $p=.101$).

References

- Atkinson, Mary Layton. 2017. "Gender and Policy Agendas in the Post-War House." *Policy Studies Journal* (in press: doi: 10.1111/psj.12237).
- Kreitzer, Rebecca J. 2015. "Politics and Morality in State Abortion Policy." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 15(1): 41-66.
- Swers, Michele L. 2013. *Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.