Online Appendix for "Preferences for the Scope of Protests"[*]

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A   Appendix Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Comparison of Survey and 2011 Census Demographics

	Gugulethu		Mitchells Plain	
	census	survey	census	survey
secondary schooling completed	37.5	36.8	32.9	31.6
employed	39.1	32.2	38.2	29.5
female	51.0	60.1	51.4	60.6

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Grievances:					
– grievance level	1482	3.24	0.55	0	4
Protest Efficacy:					
– protests make politicians listen	1482	2.42	1.23	0	4
– protests waste of time	1482	1.75	1.26	0	4
– protests make politicians respond	1482	2.38	1.18	0	4
– protest efficacy index	1482	-0.00	1.00	-2	2
Political Efficacy:					
– can punish politicians	1482	2.45	1.30	0	4
– dishonest politicians can be shamed	1482	2.88	1.07	0	4
– community can pressure politicians	1482	2.97	1.04	0	4
– political efficacy index	1482	-0.00	1.00	-3	1
Social Efficacy:					
– fair society achievable	1482	4.20	0.87	1	5
– community stands up f. fair society	1481	0.61	0.49	0	1
– inequality inevitable	1444	0.38	0.49	0	1
– social efficacy index	1443	0.00	1.00	-3	2
Other Efficacy Variables:					
– protest type effectiven.	1466	0.55	0.50	0	1
– combined efficacy index	1482	0.00	1.00	-4	2
Personal Power:					
– people listen to me	1482	3.14	0.84	0	4
– my opinions are ignored	1482	1.48	1.10	0	4
– my wishes not valued	1482	1.57	1.10	0	4
– power index	1482	0.00	1.00	-3	2
Crime Blame:					

– blame people	1463	0.19	0.39	0	1
– blame police	1463	0.14	0.34	0	1
– blame government	1463	0.33	0.47	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	1463	0.34	0.48	0	1
Service Blame:					
– blame people	1482	0.25	0.43	0	1
– blame agency	1482	0.11	0.31	0	1
– blame government	1482	0.32	0.47	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	1482	0.33	0.47	0	1
– broad blame attrib.	1463	5.56	1.71	2	8
Protest Scope:					
– choice docs & nurses march	1469	0.44	0.50	0	1
– choice corruption march	1469	0.31	0.46	0	1
– choice redistribution march	1469	0.25	0.43	0	1
– net support redistribution march	1482	-0.43	1.19	-3	3
– net support corruption march	1482	-0.29	1.05	-3	3
Petition:					
– petition personnell	1362	0.42	0.49	0	1
– petition corruption	1362	0.33	0.47	0	1
– petition redistribution	1362	0.25	0.43	0	1
Demographics:					
– female	1482	0.60	0.49	0	1
– age	1478	43.37	16.33	18	96
– secondary school degree	1482	0.34	0.47	0	1

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Grievances:					
– grievance level	703	3.23	0.55	0	4
Protest Efficacy:					
– protests make politicians listen	703	2.34	1.25	0	4
– protests waste of time	703	1.81	1.29	0	4
– protests make politicians respond	703	2.34	1.16	0	4
– protest efficacy index	703	-0.06	1.01	-2	2
Political Efficacy:					
– can punish politicians	703	2.40	1.29	0	4
– dishonest politicians can be shamed	703	2.86	1.12	0	4
– community can pressure politicians	703	2.93	1.09	0	4
– political efficacy index	703	-0.04	1.02	-3	1
Social Efficacy:					
– fair society achievable	703	4.19	0.87	1	5
– community stands up f. fair society	703	0.60	0.49	0	1
– inequality inevitable	689	0.38	0.48	0	1
– social efficacy index	689	-0.01	0.99	-3	2
Other Efficacy Variables:					
– protest type effectiven.	698	0.53	0.50	0	1
– combined efficacy index	703	-0.05	1.00	-4	2
Personal Power:					
– people listen to me	703	3.13	0.86	0	4
– my opinions are ignored	703	1.50	1.09	0	4
– my wishes not valued	703	1.66	1.11	0	4
– power index	703	-0.04	1.01	-3	2
Crime Blame:					

– blame people	692	0.22	0.42	0	1
– blame police	692	0.14	0.34	0	1
– blame government	692	0.31	0.46	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	692	0.33	0.47	0	1
Service Blame:					
– blame people	703	0.29	0.45	0	1
– blame agency	703	0.11	0.31	0	1
– blame government	703	0.30	0.46	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	703	0.30	0.46	0	1
– broad blame attrib.	692	5.36	1.74	2	8
Protest Scope:					
– choice docs & nurses march	694	0.46	0.50	0	1
– choice corruption march	694	0.30	0.46	0	1
– choice redistribution march	694	0.24	0.43	0	1
– net support redistribution march	703	-0.48	1.25	-3	3
– net support corruption march	703	-0.29	1.11	-3	3
Petition:					
– petition personnell	648	0.44	0.50	0	1
– petition corruption	648	0.32	0.47	0	1
– petition redistribution	648	0.24	0.43	0	1
Demographics:					
– female	703	0.61	0.49	0	1
– age	702	42.12	16.11	18	96
– secondary school degree	703	0.34	0.47	0	1

Table A.4: Summary Statistics: Low Efficacy Treatment Group

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Grievances:					
– grievance level	396	3.23	0.53	1	4
Protest Efficacy:					
– protests make politicians listen	396	2.34	1.24	0	4
– protests waste of time	396	1.79	1.28	0	4
– protests make politicians respond	396	2.24	1.23	0	4
– protest efficacy index	396	-0.09	1.03	-2	2
Political Efficacy:					
– can punish politicians	396	2.52	1.33	0	4
– dishonest politicians can be shamed	396	2.82	1.11	0	4
– community can pressure politicians	396	2.94	1.01	0	4
– political efficacy index	396	-0.02	1.03	-3	1
Social Efficacy:					
– fair society achievable	396	4.16	0.87	1	5
– community stands up f. fair society	395	0.58	0.49	0	1
– inequality inevitable	387	0.37	0.48	0	1
– social efficacy index	386	-0.06	1.02	-3	2
Other Efficacy Variables:					
– protest type effectiven.	389	0.56	0.50	0	1
– combined efficacy index	396	-0.09	1.02	-4	2
Personal Power:					
– people listen to me	396	3.05	0.86	0	4
– my opinions are ignored	396	1.51	1.11	0	4
– my wishes not valued	396	1.52	1.08	0	4
– power index	396	-0.04	1.01	-3	2
Crime Blame:					

– blame people	394	0.19	0.40	0	1
– blame police	394	0.16	0.37	0	1
– blame government	394	0.32	0.47	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	394	0.32	0.47	0	1
Service Blame:					
– blame people	396	0.24	0.43	0	1
– blame agency	396	0.13	0.34	0	1
– blame government	396	0.32	0.47	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	396	0.32	0.47	0	1
– broad blame attrib.	394	5.48	1.72	2	8
Protest Scope:					
– choice docs & nurses march	393	0.42	0.49	0	1
– choice corruption march	393	0.37	0.48	0	1
– choice redistribution march	393	0.21	0.41	0	1
– net support redistribution march	396	-0.42	1.11	-3	3
– net support corruption march	396	-0.24	1.05	-3	3
Petition:					
– petition personnell	366	0.40	0.49	0	1
– petition corruption	366	0.39	0.49	0	1
– petition redistribution	366	0.21	0.41	0	1
Demographics:					
– female	396	0.59	0.49	0	1
– age	393	44.36	16.47	18	88
– secondary school degree	396	0.35	0.48	0	1

Table A.5: Summary Statistics: High Efficacy Treatment Group

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Grievances:					
– grievance level	383	3.27	0.55	1	4
Protest Efficacy:					
– protests make politicians listen	383	2.65	1.15	0	4
– protests waste of time	383	1.58	1.17	0	4
– protests make politicians respond	383	2.57	1.13	0	4
– protest efficacy index	383	0.20	0.91	-2	2
Political Efficacy:					
– can punish politicians	383	2.45	1.30	0	4
– dishonest politicians can be shamed	383	2.99	0.93	0	4
– community can pressure politicians	383	3.07	0.97	0	4
– political efficacy index	383	0.10	0.93	-3	1
Social Efficacy:					
– fair society achievable	383	4.23	0.84	1	5
– community stands up f. fair society	383	0.65	0.48	0	1
– inequality inevitable	368	0.39	0.49	0	1
– social efficacy index	368	0.08	1.01	-3	2
Other Efficacy Variables:					
– protest type effectiven.	379	0.57	0.50	0	1
– combined efficacy index	383	0.19	0.97	-4	2
Personal Power:					
– people listen to me	383	3.25	0.77	0	4
– my opinions are ignored	383	1.42	1.11	0	4
– my wishes not valued	383	1.47	1.08	0	4
– power index	383	0.12	0.96	-2	2
Crime Blame:					

– blame people	377	0.11	0.32	0	1
– blame police	377	0.11	0.31	0	1
– blame government	377	0.38	0.49	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	377	0.40	0.49	0	1
Service Blame:					
– blame people	383	0.17	0.38	0	1
– blame agency	383	0.10	0.30	0	1
– blame government	383	0.35	0.48	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	383	0.38	0.49	0	1
– broad blame attrib.	377	6.02	1.54	2	8
Protest Scope:					
– choice docs & nurses march	382	0.41	0.49	0	1
– choice corruption march	382	0.28	0.45	0	1
– choice redistribution march	382	0.31	0.46	0	1
– net support redistribution march	383	-0.35	1.13	-3	3
– net support corruption march	383	-0.33	0.96	-3	2
Petition:					
– petition personnell	348	0.40	0.49	0	1
– petition corruption	348	0.30	0.46	0	1
– petition redistribution	348	0.30	0.46	0	1
Demographics:					
– female	383	0.60	0.49	0	1
– age	383	44.64	16.48	18	87
– secondary school degree	383	0.34	0.48	0	1

Table A.6: Randomization

	(1) sex	(2) secondary education	(3) age	(4) grievance level	(5) identity scope
High Efficacy	-0.014	0.003	2.589*	0.039	0.029
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(1.018)	(0.031)	(0.051)
Low Efficacy	-0.024	0.023	1.920	0.011	-0.073
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(1.011)	(0.031)	(0.051)
Observations	1482	1482	1478	1482	1418

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A.1: Treatment Effect on March Choice: Marginal Effects

Table A.7: Petition and System Justification Outcomes

	(1) Petition Corruption	(2) Petition Redistribution	(3) System Justification
High Efficacy	-0.021	0.061*	-0.026
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.060)
Low Efficacy	0.056	-0.023	0.091
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.060)
Observations	1358	1358	1478

Note: Results from OLS regressions of the outcome variables in the column on treatment condition. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.8: Alternative Specification of Blame Attribution Variables

	(1) Blame People	(2) Blame Agencies	(3) Blame Government	(4) Blame Inequality
High Efficacy	-0.163***	-0.046	0.053	0.077*
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Low Efficacy	-0.071*	0.034	-0.010	0.021
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Observations	1459	1459	1459	1459

Note: Results from OLS regressions of the outcome variables in the column on treatment condition. Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, completed secondary schooling. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A.2: Treatment Effect on Efficacy Scope: Marginal Effects

B Internal Validity

The experimental approach allows us to establish the causal effect of our treatments. However, our theoretical framework concerns the causal effect of efficacy perceptions. Attributing the causal effect to efficacy requires the assumption that the treatment has not brought about other changes in the individual relevant to our results besides affecting their efficacy perceptions.

Although we designed the two treatment conditions with this concern in mind by changing only one word between these conditions, asking individuals to recall successful/ unsuccessful protest may induce different memories that may lead to different perceptions or thoughts. While we cannot exhaustively partial out all these, we can verify two important issues. First, we examine if respondents in the high versus low condition had different recall rates, which would induce potentially problematic sample selection. Second, we examine if the characteristics of the protests recalled by respondents in the high versus low condition differ in systematic ways. We base test assessment on the questions we asked respondents directly after they remembered a successful/ unsuccessful protest. These questions asked about the time period, the protest motive, and the protest size of the remembered protest, among others.

Table B.1 shows the results. Reassuringly, recall rates between the two conditions are identical. Furthermore, some characteristics of the recalled protest are similar, such as whether the individual was present or knew someone in the protest in question. However, other characteristics differ substantially. Respondents asked to recall a successful protest are more likely to recall a larger one, one having occurred during Apartheid, and with a topic other than services.

These differences could potentially have important implications for the validity of the results. In particular, protests during Apartheid were more likely to be of broad scope, i.e. about changing the political regime. Accordingly, it is plausible that respondents asked to recall a successful protest subsequently report broader attribution and protest scope, not because of efficacy perceptions, but because of respondents' memories of Apartheid-era protests.

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Table B.1: Treatment effect on characteristics of remembered protest

	(1) Remem. Protest	(2) Particip./ Knew someone	(3) When Recent	(4) When last 10 yrs	(5) When Aparth.	(6) >1000 People	(7) Topic Services	(8) Topic Crime	(9) Topic Work
High Efficacy vs. low	-0.013 (0.024)	0.021 (0.036)	-0.056 (0.037)	-0.092* (0.037)	0.148*** (0.027)	0.121*** (0.036)	-0.116*** (0.034)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.012 (0.028)
N	776	663	663	662	662	663	659	659	659

Note: Results from OLS regressions of the outcome variables in the column on treatment condition. Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, completed secondary schooling. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To address this issue, we investigate if the results hold when we control for the characteristics of the protests recalled, in particular for the time period, the size, and the topic of the recalled protest. Strictly speaking, these variables are endogenous, and this makes coefficients of this regression hard to interpret. Nevertheless, we believe that the exercise is useful because if results remain similar to the benchmark specification, it suggests that our results are *not* driven by Apartheid or large protests.

Table B.2 shows the results, focusing on the key outcome variables. The table shows comparisons between the high efficacy and the low efficacy condition only, because there is no information on types of protest for the control group. Our main results clearly hold even when controlling for protest characteristics. The top panel (benchmark model) reproduces the results from before and the second panel "with protest characteristics controls" shows the results from the same analysis with dummy variables for key protest characteristics, namely time period, topic, and size of the remembered protests. The coefficients shown in the first and second panel are very similar, suggesting that the Apartheid protest memories of the high efficiency condition are not driving our results.

We perform a further test to check that our results reflect the treatment working as intended. Because they are thought experiments ("please remember..."), the treatments in this experiment require a degree of effort and engagement from respondents to serve their purpose. If results are driven by the intended treatment effect, they should be stronger for people who have engaged more intensively with the treatments. We built three items into the survey that measure respondent engagement as reported by the enumerators. At the end of the survey, the enumerators rated engagement with the treatment, and overall boredom, and distraction of the respondents during the survey on a scale from one to five.

The third panel of table B.2 reproduces the analysis in panel 2 but restricting the sample to respondents scoring maximum levels of engagement and minimum levels of boredom and distraction. Comparing the coefficients to the benchmark model, we observe that we have larger and significant coefficients across the board for efficacy, choosing and the redistribution march, and systemic blame attribution. In contrast, the coefficient for

believing that broad protest are effective remains small and insignificant.

Table B.2: Robustness Checks

	(2) Combined Efficacy	(3) March Redistribution	(4) Support March Redistribution	(5) Broad Blame Attrib.	Broad Protests Effective
Benchmark model					
High Efficacy vs. low	0.289*** (0.068)	0.096** (0.031)	0.101 (0.077)	0.515*** (0.117)	0.022 (0.034)
Observations	751	772	776	768	765
With Protest Characteristics Controls					
High Efficacy vs. low	0.362*** (0.076)	0.090* (0.037)	0.156 (0.091)	0.561*** (0.135)	0.048 (0.039)
Observations	625	644	646	638	639
With Protest Characteristics Controls & restricted to motivated					
High Efficacy vs. low	0.441*** (0.104)	0.134** (0.048)	0.292* (0.118)	0.562** (0.173)	0.028 (0.050)
Observations	399	410	410	405	405

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .001$. All models control for fieldworker, female, age, secondary schooling.

Protest Characteristics are dummy variables for the time period, topic, and size of the remembered protest. *Motivated Respondents*: Fieldworkers subjectively rated how engaged respondents were with the treatment and how bored or distracted they were during the survey (possibly by the presence of other people or chores, etc.) (all on scales from 1 to 5). "Motivated" captures respondents that were most engaged and least bored and distracted. It takes value 1 if respondents had the highest value in engagement, and lowest in boredom and distraction.

C Results power treatment

The *power treatment* seeks to induce a sense of power / powerlessness in respondents to study whether personal power is related to protest scope. We attempt to operationalize the approach in **?** in our setting. In their study, students are asked to write an essay about a situation where they had power over someone/ where someone else had power over them. In our setting - face to face interviews - respondents are asked to *think* about such situations but without telling the interviewer any details about the experience. A series of follow-up questions is asked to make respondents dwell on the situation (setting of the experience, age, sex, race of other person involved, how happy/unhappy powerful/powerless they felt).

Table C.1 shows that respondents asked to remember situations where they had power over someone report similar power perceptions (as well as efficacy ones) as those asked to remember a situation where someone had power over them. Both high and low power conditions induce individuals to report being more powerful (and perceive higher political efficacy) than the control. It is not clear why this is the case. It may be that respondents asked to recall a situation where someone had power over them reacted by reasserting their dignity. Irrespective of the reason, the implication is that the power treatment is not able to yield insights on the role of power/ efficacy for protest scope.

Table C.1: Manipulation Check Power Treatment

	(1) Personal power	(2) Protest efficacy	(3) Political efficacy	(4) Social efficacy
power_high	0.099	0.031	0.111	-0.027
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.061)
power_low	0.113*	0.036	0.081	-0.056
	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)
Observations	1422	1422	1422	1388

Note: Results from OLS regressions of the outcome variables in the column on treatment condition. Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, completed secondary schooling. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$