

# EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AND THE INVESTIGATION OF FORMER LEADERS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

## ONLINE APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

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## TABLES

**Table A1. Summary Statistics for Key Variables**

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>
Investigation of former leader	196	.35	.48	0	1
Former leader vulnerability					
Insider witness	196	.11	.31	0	1
Vote share	196	38.64	16.61	0	98.20
Successor admin.					
Co-partisan	196	.20	.40	0	1
GDP growth	196	2.14	4.53	-12.76	15.27
Share of legis. seats	196	32.56	19.59	0	72.78
Judicial independence	196	.61	.17	.31	.95
Presidential system	196	.58	.49	0	1
Former leader gender (female)	196	.06	.24	0	1

**Table A2. Countries and Democratic Years Included in the Analyses**

<i>COW code</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Democratic years included in the analysis (updated through 2011)</i>
70	Mexico	2000-2011
90	Guatemala	1986-2011
91	Honduras	1982-2008
92	El Salvador	1984-2011
93	Nicaragua	1984-2011
95	Panama	1989-2011
130	Ecuador	1979-2011
135	Peru	1980-1989, 2001-2011
140	Brazil	1985-2011
145	Bolivia	1982-2011
150	Paraguay	1989-2011
155	Chile	1990-2011
160	Argentina	1983-2011
165	Uruguay	1985-2011
230	Spain	1977-2011
235	Portugal	1976-2011
290	Poland	1989-2011
310	Hungary	1990-2011
316	Czech Republic	1993-2011
317	Slovakia	1993-2011
339	Albania	1991-2011
343	North Macedonia	1991-2011
344	Croatia	1991-2011
349	Slovenia	1991-2011
350	Greece	1974-2011
352	Cyprus	1983-2011
355	Bulgaria	1990-2011
359	Moldova	1991-2011
360	Romania	1990-2011
366	Estonia	1991-2011
367	Latvia	1991-2011
368	Lithuania	1991-2011
369	Ukraine	1991-2011
371	Armenia	1991-2011
432	Mali	1992-2011
434	Benin	1991-2011
451	Sierra Leone	1998-2011
452	Ghana	1993-2011
475	Nigeria	1999-2011
501	Kenya	1998-2011
553	Malawi	1994-2011
580	Madagascar	1993-2008
640	Turkey	1983-2011
712	Mongolia	1990-2011
713	Taiwan	1996-2011
732	South Korea	1988-2011

770	Pakistan	1988-1998
771	Bangladesh	1986-2006
780	Sri Lanka	1989-2011
800	Thailand	1979-1990, 1992-2005, 2008-2011
840	Philippines	1986-2011
850	Indonesia	1999-2011
910	Papua New Guinea	1975-2011

Source: Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010; hereafter, CGV). CGV define a country as democratic if the top post and the legislature are subject to election; there is more than one party; and there is turnover in the top post. Countries and their leaders are included here if they experienced a transition to democracy or became independent and democratic after 1969; had two democratically elected leaders in succession; and the former leader left office by regularized means (i.e., was not removed by force such as a coup or uprising).

**Table A3. Types of Allegations Against Former Leaders**

Among leaders facing an investigation, allegations about:	% of leaders	% of allegations
Corruption – such as bribery, embezzlement, influence-peddling, money laundering, undisclosed sources of wealth	59.0	80.8
Other types of abuse of office – such as election-tampering, disclosing state secrets	24.0	32.9
Human rights violations – such as illegal extradition, wiretapping, extra-judicial use of force	15.0	20.5
Treason/fomenting rebellion	2.0	1.4
Total percent	100.0	137.0

The categories reflect whether a former leader was accused of any corrupt activity, any other type of abuse of office, any human rights violation, etc. Note that the percentage of allegations column adds up to more than 100 because some former leaders were accused of multiple types of infractions.

**Table A4. Instrumental Variables/Two-Stage Least Squares Regression on Investigation, with Presidential Executive**

Former leader vulnerability	
Insider witness	0.45*** (0.10)
Former leader vote share	-0.00 (0.00)
Successor admin.	
Co-partisan	-0.03 (0.09)
GDP growth	-0.01 (0.01)
Share of legis. seats	0.00 (0.00)
Presidential exec.	0.27** (0.13)
Former leader gender (female)	0.33** (0.14)
Root MSE	.442
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	91.77
N	196

Instrumented: presidential executive

Instruments: indep. variables plus whether country was ever colonized (1=yes; 0=no) from Graham, Miller, and Cheibub (2017).

The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\* $p \leq .01$  \*\* $p \leq .05$  \* $p \leq .10$

Instrumental variables analysis with data from Graham, Miller, and Cheibub (2017), in their study of how power-sharing institutions affect the survival of democracy. They focus on a country's legal heritage and experience in the colonial era to test for endogeneity of power-sharing institutions. One element of colonial history proved to be most highly correlated with presidentialism in the analysis here: whether the country had ever been a colony.

**Table A5. Instrumental Variables/Two-Stage Least Squares Regression on Investigation, with Judicial Independence**

Former leader vulnerability	
Insider witness	0.39*** (0.12)
Former leader vote share	-0.00 (0.00)
Successor admin.	
Co-partisan	-.08 (0.09)
GDP growth	-0.00 (0.01)
Share of legis. Seats	0.00 (0.00)
Judicial independence	-1.20** (0.61)
Former leader gender (female)	0.18 (0.15)
Root MSE	.456
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	21.55
N	196

Instrumented: judicial independence

Instruments: indep. variables plus whether country was ever colonized (1=yes; 0=no) from Graham, Miller, and Cheibub (2017).

The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.


\*\*\* $p \leq .01$  \*\* $p \leq .05$  \* $p \leq .10$

Instrumental variables analysis with data from Graham, Miller, and Cheibub (2017), in their study of how power-sharing institutions affect the survival of democracy. They focus on a country's legal heritage and experience in the colonial era to test for endogeneity of power-sharing institutions. One element of colonial history proved to be most highly correlated with judicial independence in the analysis here: whether the country had ever been a colony.



## FIGURES\*\*

Figure A1. Logit of Investigation, Including Veto Players (Political Constraints)



The political constraints (veto players) data are from Henisz (2002, 2017).

Log likelihood= -110.41

Wald chi2=21.78 ( $p \leq .01$ )

Pseudo R2= .13

N=196

\*\*Unless otherwise noted, all figures include bootstrapped standard errors, with 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure A2. Logit of Investigation, with Polity Democracy Score**



The Polity2 scale is from Polity IV.


Log likelihood= -111.22

Wald chi2=19.86 ( $p \leq .01$ )

Pseudo R2= .12

N=196

**Figure A3. Logit of Investigation, Including V-Dem Polyarchy Score**



The V-Dem polyarchy score is from V-Dem 8.


Log likelihood= -110.86

Wald chi2=21.59 ( $p \leq .01$ )

Pseudo R2= .12

N=196

**Figure A4. Logit of Investigation, Including V-Dem Corruption Score under Successor**



The corruption score is from V-Dem 8.


Log likelihood= -106.53

Wald chi2=38.62 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .16

N=196


**Figure A5. Logit of Investigation, Including Investigations of Former Leaders in Neighboring New Democracies**



Following the logic in Escriba-Folch and Wright (2015) on human-rights prosecutions of autocratic leaders, the measure here of neighbors investigated is a count of the former, democratically elected leaders in neighboring new democracies who were investigated by a successor in the previous 3 years, weighted by the inverse of distance (the further the neighbor, the lower the expected effect). A country is counted as a neighbor if it is within 950 km (cf. Gleditsch and Ward 2001).

Log likelihood= -107.75  
Wald chi2=37.78 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .15  
N=195

**Figure A6. Logit of Investigation, Including Investigations of Former Leaders in Contiguous New Democracies**



The measure here of neighbors investigated is a count of the former, democratically elected leaders in contiguous new democracies who were investigated by a successor in the previous 3 years.


Log likelihood= -107.72

Wald chi2=38.34 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .15

N=195

**Figure A7. Logit of Investigation, Including Whether the Former Leader is Term-Limited**



The term limit data are from Baturo (2016).


Log likelihood= -97.81

Wald chi2=44.07 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .15

N=178

**Figure A8. Logit of Investigation, Including Whether the Former Leader Continues to be a Leader in High National Politics after Leaving Office**



Leadership in high national politics includes posts such as a return to the same office or serving as president/speaker of a chamber of the legislature (Baturu 2016).

Log likelihood= -98.99


Wald chi2=33.22 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .15

N=179




**Figure A9. Logit of Investigation, Including Whether the Former Leader Continues to be Active in Any National Political Post After Leaving Office**



“Any national political post” includes posts in high politics such as president or speaker of a chamber of the legislature, plus serving as an MP, cabinet minister, or party leader (Baturu 2016).

Log likelihood= -100.20  
Wald chi2=32.26 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .14  
N=179

**Figure A10. Logit of Investigation, Including Country's Receipt of Overseas Development Aid as a Share of GNI**



Aid data are from the World Development Indicators.


Log likelihood= -99.56

Wald chi2=41.24 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .15


N=181

**Figure A11. Logit of Investigation, Including Whether the Executive Regime Is Semi-presidential**



Log likelihood= -108.35  
Wald chi2=38.49 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .14  
N=196

**Figure A12. Logit of Investigation, Including Whether the Former Leader Ruled During the Country's Authoritarian Era**




Log likelihood= -108.01

Wald chi2=20.00 ( $p \leq .02$ )

Pseudo R2= .15


N=196

**Figure A13. Logit of Investigation, Omitting Former Leader Vote Share in Last Election and Including GDP Per Capita Growth Under Former Leader**




Log likelihood= -100.15  
Wald chi2=37.57 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .15  
N=182

**Figure A14. Logit of Investigation, Omitting Former Leader Vote Share in Last Election and Including Inflation Rate (logged) under Former Leader**



Log likelihood= -107.10  
Wald chi2=33.73 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .15  
N=195

**Figure A15. Logit of Investigation, Omitting Former Leader Vote Share in Last Election and Including Interrupted Term**



For presidents, interrupted term involves resignation, removal by a legislature or court, or abandonment of office. For prime ministers, it involves resignation (other than pro forma resignation after an election), or removal.


Log likelihood= -106.12

Wald chi2=38.44 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .16

N=196


**Figure A16. Logit of Investigation, Omitting Successor GDP Per Capita Growth and Including Inflation Rate (Logged) Under Successor**



Log likelihood= -108.66  
Wald chi2=37.14 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .14  
N=196



**Figure A17. Logit of Investigation, Omitting Successor Seat Share and Including Successor Share of Vote in Last Election**



For presidents, vote share in first round of last election. For prime ministers, party's vote share in last election.


Log likelihood= -105.93

Wald chi2=36.08 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .16

N=194

**Figure A18. Logit of Investigation, Including Presidential Executive and Whether Former Leader's Predecessor Was Investigated**



This excludes first democratically elected leaders in the relevant democratic spell.


Log likelihood= -75.19

Wald chi2=45.68 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .19

N=144

**Figure A19. Logit of Investigation, Including Judicial Independence and Whether Former Leader's Predecessor Was Investigated**



This excludes first democratically elected leaders in the relevant democratic spell.


Log likelihood= -76.50

Wald chi2=32.10 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .17

N=144

**Figure A20. Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Investigation**




Penalized log likelihood= -91.49

Wald chi2=23.11 ( $p \leq .00$ )

N=196

**Figure A21. Logit of Investigation, Including Political Dynasty (Men Only)**




Log likelihood= -99.80

Wald chi2=39.77 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .14


N=184

**Figure A22. Logit of Investigation, Using Democracy Data from Boix, Miller, and Rosato in Place of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland Data**




Log likelihood= -102.19  
Wald chi2=28.15 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .13  
N=184

**Figure A23. Logit of Investigation with Judicial Independence, Omitting Cases with an Insider Witness**



Log likelihood= -100.36  
Wald chi2=10.59 ( $p \leq .10$ )  
Pseudo R2= .05  
N=175


**Figure A24. Logit of Investigation with Presidential Executive, Omitting Cases with an Insider Witness**



Log likelihood= -97.03  
Wald chi2=4.04 ( $p \leq .67$ )  
Pseudo R2= .03  
N=175




**Figure A25. Logit of Investigation, Using a Binary Measure for Successor GDP Growth**




Log likelihood= -107.43  
Wald chi2=37.57 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .15  
N=196

**Figure A26. Logit of Investigation, with an Interaction of Presidential Executive by Interrupted Term**



Log likelihood= -103.48  
Wald chi2=39.46 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .18  
N=196

**Figure A27. Logit of Investigation, with Clarity of Responsibility in Place of Presidential Executive**



Clarity of responsibility data are from the Database of Political Institutions.


Log likelihood= -98.60

Wald chi2=18.10 ( $p \leq .20$ )

Pseudo R2= .15

N=175

**Figure A28. Logit of Investigation, with Clarity of Responsibility and Interaction of Clarity and Insider Witness**



Clarity of responsibility data are from the Database of Political Institutions.


Log likelihood= -99.60

Wald chi2=610.24 ( $p \leq .00$ )

Pseudo R2= .14


N=177

**Figure A29. Logit of Investigation, with Former Leader's Margin of Votes in Place of Vote Share**



Log likelihood= -105.86  
Wald chi2=34.92 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .15  
N=194

**Figure A30. Logit of Investigation, with Successor's Margin of Votes in Place of Seat Share**



Log likelihood= -107.25  
Wald chi2=37.56 ( $p \leq .00$ )  
Pseudo R2= .14  
N=194

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