

Supplementary Appendices for
“Real But Unequal Representation in Welfare State Reform”

Supplementary Appendix 1: Additional Descriptive Information

The first Supplementary Appendix provides additional descriptive statistics from our combined dataset of public attitudes and government policy regarding the welfare state. Table A1.1 includes summary statistics for the main independent, dependent and control variables. Table A1.2 lists the country-years used in our baseline models. And Figure A1.1 presents the bivariate association between the preferences of high income respondents on the one hand, and changes in welfare generosity and per capita spending on the other hand.

Table A1.1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
<i>General preferences</i>					
All respondents	29.79	24.27	-35.79	83.01	130
50 th percentile	30.55	25.47	-37.45	87.45	130
<i>Low income preferences</i>					
5 th percentile	39.00	20.84	-16.33	80.77	130
10 th percentile	38.25	21.34	-18.53	82.64	130
Quintile 1	38.30	21.43	-17.12	83.72	130
Tercile 1	36.55	22.30	-23.09	86.90	130
<i>High income preferences</i>					
95 th percentile	18.23	26.69	-52.94	71.30	130
90 th percentile	19.79	26.63	-51.67	74.22	130
Quintile 5	18.47	26.87	-52.07	67.58	130
Tercile 3	20.95	26.45	-52.07	74.40	130
<i>Policy outcomes</i>					
Δ Generosity, t+1 – t+4	0.60	3.75	-22.50	12.61	130
Δ PC spending, t+1 – t+4	9.05	22.66	-41.91	141.17	130
<i>Controls</i>					
Generosity (t)	9.96	3.53	0	16.80	130
Per capita spending (t)	1562.44	1137.22	0	4927.20	130
GDP (t)	40965.32	14723.42	19427.19	89887.02	130
GDP growth (t)	2.38	1.34	-1.09	6.96	130
Unemployment rate (t)	7.19	3.47	3.35	22.14	130

Table A1.2: Country-Years in ISSP and CWED

	RoG I	RoG II	RoG III	RoG IV
Australia	1986	1990	1997	2007
Austria	1986	.	.	.
Canada	.	.	1996	2006
Denmark	.	.	.	2008
Finland	.	.	.	2006
France	.	.	1997	2006
Germany	1985	1990	1996	2006
Great Britain	1985	1990	1996	2006
Ireland	.	.	1996	2006
Italy	1985	1990	1996	.
Japan	.	.	1996	2006
Netherlands	.	.	.	2006
New Zealand	.	.	1997	2006
Norway	.	1990	1996	2006
Portugal	.	.	.	2006
South Korea	.	.	.	2006
Spain	.	.	1996	2007
Sweden	.	.	1996	2006
Switzerland	.	.	1998	2007
United States	1985	1990	1996	2006





Figure A1.1: Descriptive Overview of 90th Percentile Preferences and Unemployment Policy

Supplementary Appendix 2: Alternative Dependent Variables

The second Supplementary Appendix explores a range of important alternative specifications of our sample and dependent variables. The first and most extensive issues involve maximizing the sample and focusing on a narrower conception of generosity using the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED). The second, briefer, discussion involves alternative time structures in conceptualizing subsequent policy change.

Maximizing Country-Years in ISSP and CWED Data-Matching

The results presented in the body of the article are based on a combination of ISSP and CWED data that, as it were, maximize the number of observations in country-topic-years that these datasets cover with respect to the broad generosity indices. Focusing on particular subcomponents of the data, however, could allow even more country-topic-years. This also entails sensitivity tests with respect to alternative measures of spending and generosity.

First, consider this overview of the countries we could not use for each ISSP wave:

Role of Government I: We use all countries.

Role of Government II: We do not use Northern Ireland and Israel because they are not in the CWED at all. We do not use Hungary because the survey was conducted in 1990 here and the CWED has missing data for Hungary before 1992 (and even after that for the main indices). We do not use Ireland because the spending questions were not asked there. In terms of the OECD spending data, we cannot use these country-years either. Northern Ireland is not in the data, and the data for Israel and Hungary only starts several years after the survey was conducted.

Role of Government III: We do not use Cyprus, Israel, the Philippines and Russia because they are not in the CWED at all. We do not use Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia because the main indices are missing there, although some of the separate indicators are not. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia are in the OECD data as well. So is Israel by the way, but here family income is missing in the ISSP and respondent income has over 50% missing values, which is why we do not use it at all.

Role of Government IV: We do not use Chile, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Israel, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela because they are not in the CWED at all. We do not use Taiwan because all control variables are missing there. We do not use Poland because the survey was conducted in 2008 there and even the separate

indicators are missing after 2010. We do not use the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia because the main indices are missing there, although some of the separate indicators are not. We do not use South Korea for pensions, because the pension-generosity index is missing and so is the replacement rate (some of the other separate indicators are not missing, but we use the replacement rates here because they have the most coverage otherwise). In Denmark, the pension generosity index is only available for two years after the survey, but some of the separate indicators are available for three years. As for the OECD data, we can use Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Israel, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia.

In short, “Real But Unequal Representation” uses all available country-years that match ISSP with CWED. However, there are some country-years from the third and fourth waves where we can use separate indicators instead of the generosity indices. Table A2.1 below shows in how many country-years each indicator is present in the CWED. This is limited to the 55 country-years that are in the ISSP Role of Government waves.

The indicators with the fewest missing values are the replacement rates for single and family households (in the case of pensions, minimum replacement rates), so these are the ones we consider in the sensitivity/robustness discussion of “Real But Unequal Representation.” This means that there are two indicators for each policy area. We standardize each of these before calculating the average.

These new partial generosity indices are positively correlated with the overall generosity indices, but the strength of the correlation varies between sickness (0.87), pensions (0.30) and unemployment (0.75). This might be due to the fact that there are more indicators that make up the pension index than the others. The average change in partial generosity in the four-year period after the survey is correlated at 0.56 with the average change in overall generosity in the same period. There are also sizable differences between sickness (0.03), pensions (0.79) and unemployment (0.55) here.

Table A2.1: ISSP-CWED Combinations by Sub-Index

	T	T+1 - T+4
Total generosity	43	39
Average production worker wage (gross)	55	55
<i>Sickness</i>		
Generosity index	44	44
Replacement rate: single	55	50
Replacement rate: family	55	50
Qualification period	51	24
Duration	50	50
Waiting days	50	29
Coverage	47	45
<i>Pensions</i>		
Generosity index	43	43
Minimum replacement rate: single	54	54
Minimum replacement rate: family	54	54
Standard replacement rate: single	44	44
Standard replacement rate: family	44	44
Qualification period	44	37
Ratio of employee to employer pension contributions	42	36
Years of earnings used in the pension calculation	42	33
Coverage/Take-up	35	33
Female retirement age	44	44
Male retirement age	44	44
Life expectancy at age 65	44	44
<i>Unemployment</i>		
Generosity index	44	43
Replacement rate: single	55	55
Replacement rate: family	55	55
Qualification period	55	49
Duration	55	55
Waiting days	55	36
Coverage	46	46

Using these partial indices increases the number of country-topic-years in the model from 130 to 161. These 31 new observations come from the Czech Republic (6), Hungary (6), Slovenia (6), Latvia (6), Poland (3), Bulgaria (3) and Denmark (1). Table A2.2 contains the results of the baseline models if we replace the change in the overall generosity indices with the change in the partial generosity indices as the dependent variable. The only other change is that we now control for partial generosity at t instead of overall generosity at t .

Table A2.2: Changes in Replacement Rates as Alternative Dependent Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.157*** (0.055)	0.145*** (0.049)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.141* (0.083)	-0.158* (0.090)	-0.052 (0.068)	-0.165 (0.103)
High income preferences	-	-	0.245*** (0.079)	0.270*** (0.087)	0.172*** (0.064)	0.280*** (0.102)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-7.784 (18.574)	-6.186 (18.614)	-5.884 (19.242)	-6.725 (18.994)	-6.846 (19.245)	-5.402 (18.994)
Wald χ^2	41.79	46.73	29.53	30.56	30.93	29.95
Observations	161	161	161	161	161	161

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

The table reveals that the main effects stay intact. The same is true if we limit the observations to the 130 in the baseline models, although the effects are slightly weaker there (and not significant at $\alpha = 0.10$ in the quintile model). The effects also stay intact when we run the models separately for the three policy areas, with the notable exception of healthcare, where there is only a significant positive effect for P90 and P95 (Tables A2.3, A2.4 and A2.5 below). But this is surely related to the fact that change in the partial index is essentially unrelated to change in the overall index in this area.

Table A2.3: Changes in Pension Replacement Rates as Alternative Dependent Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.391** (0.173)	0.350** (0.160)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.114 (0.147)	-0.132 (0.161)	0.081 (0.147)	-0.129 (0.150)
High income preferences	-	-	0.377** (0.188)	0.414** (0.207)	0.236 (0.151)	0.412** (0.190)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-81.449*** (28.447)	-73.917** (28.930)	-60.489** (26.884)	-63.483** (26.590)	-72.233** (29.541)	-61.546** (27.511)
Wald χ^2	22.13	22.06	22.47	23.20	20.26	21.85
Observations	53	53	53	53	53	53

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A2.4: Changes in Unemployment Replacement Rates as Alternative Dependent Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.182* (0.094)	0.151** (0.071)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.346* (0.177)	-0.413** (0.207)	-0.337 (0.213)	-0.520** (0.245)
High income preferences	-	-	0.511*** (0.189)	0.567*** (0.210)	0.492** (0.217)	0.701*** (0.256)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	61.341 (60.221)	61.967 (60.133)	40.477 (45.695)	39.854 (45.023)	38.325 (45.418)	46.675 (47.590)
Wald χ^2	72.49	64.13	43.08	38.70	36.97	40.36
Observations	54	54	54	54	54	54

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A2.5: Changes in Health/Disability Replacement Rates as Alternative Dependent

Variable

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	(All)	(P50)	(P5 / P95)	(P10 / P90)	(Quint. 1 / 5)	(Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	-0.000 (0.053)	0.011 (0.051)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.106* (0.064)	-0.110 (0.071)	0.076 (0.082)	0.121 (0.119)
High income preferences	-	-	0.073* (0.041)	0.082* (0.047)	-0.091* (0.047)	-0.116 (0.076)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	10.671 (15.563)	8.512 (14.913)	4.727 (12.729)	3.833 (12.678)	20.735 (17.066)	17.652 (17.573)
Wald χ^2	15.25	15.20	20.15	18.86	14.70	13.91
Observations	54	54	54	54	54	54

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

As for the spending measures, the results do not change when we use as many of the country-years that are currently in the dataset as possible (see Table A2.6). The N increases from 130 to 157 in these models. In fact, the low and high-income effects change signs in the hypothesized direction, with the high-income effect now being positive when it was negative before and the low income effect being negative when it was positive before. But both effects are still far from significant in all models, so this is just a further indication that these are non-findings.

Table A2.6: Changes in Per Capita Spending as Dependent Variable (Maximizing Observations)

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.152 (0.118)	0.145 (0.116)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.099 (0.317)	-0.114 (0.346)	-0.134 (0.329)	-0.078 (0.384)
High income preferences	-	-	0.218 (0.227)	0.238 (0.260)	0.234 (0.242)	0.212 (0.308)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	45.128 (50.399)	45.661 (50.368)	44.839 (51.679)	44.246 (51.645)	47.071 (51.569)	45.699 (51.285)
Wald χ^2	65.14	63.38	70.61	70.33	68.05	75.24
Observations	164	164	164	164	164	164

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Tables A2.7–A2.9 contain the results by policy area, again using the four-year change in spending as the dependent variable. That is, they are the equivalent of Tables 3-5 in the main text, the difference being that those tables had the change in generosity as the dependent variable.

Table A2.7: Random Intercept Models of Changes in *Pension Spending*, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.364*** (0.075)	0.338*** (0.081)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	0.087 (0.139)	0.077 (0.149)	0.160 (0.133)	0.083 (0.173)
High income preferences	-	-	0.224* (0.116)	0.244* (0.130)	0.160 (0.104)	0.257* (0.147)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-127.246** (61.594)	-117.692* (60.176)	-134.630** (61.388)	-131.896** (61.300)	-134.809** (64.364)	-126.503** (61.272)
Wald χ^2	36.63	25.32	37.65	35.68	31.14	32.93
N	42	42	42	42	42	42

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A2.8: Random Intercept Models of Changes in *Unemployment Spending*, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.459 (0.302)	0.377 (0.266)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	0.669 (0.540)	0.684 (0.590)	0.663 (0.562)	0.547 (0.637)
High income preferences	-	-	0.054 (0.374)	-0.027 (0.421)	-0.020 (0.379)	-0.007 (0.476)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	172.824 (184.700)	179.651 (183.988)	132.823 (180.398)	139.276 (182.554)	156.597 (179.676)	160.073 (188.220)
Wald χ^2	66.40	67.79	73.32	69.63	62.95	63.25
N	44	44	44	44	44	44

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)Table A2.9: Random Intercept Models of Changes in *Healthcare Spending*, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.038 (0.074)	0.023 (0.074)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	0.047 (0.110)	0.043 (0.123)	0.090 (0.113)	0.019 (0.148)
High income preferences	-	-	0.013 (0.089)	0.010 (0.101)	-0.039 (0.082)	0.025 (0.113)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-15.733 (28.169)	-15.069 (28.516)	-16.537 (29.434)	-16.503 (29.666)	-17.241 (29.264)	-15.713 (30.797)
Wald χ^2	39.02	40.54	45.44	45.06	45.97	40.28
N	44	44	44	44	44	44

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)*Other Time Periods in the Dependent Variable*

The baseline models in the paper use the change in welfare state generosity in the first four years following the survey as the dependent variables. As indicated, however, this time period is considered to be a rough estimate of the time during which opinions can be expected to percolate through political decision-making and legislative struggle. Tables A2.10 and A2.11 below present models where the dependent variable is alternatively measured, as the

average change in welfare state generosity in the first three and five years after the survey, respectively. In all other respects, the models are the same as the baseline models.

In Tables A2.12 and A2.13, the dependent variable is the five-year change and three-year change, respectively, in per capita spending on health care, pensions and unemployment.

Table A2.10: Five-Year Change in Welfare State Generosity as Alternative Dependent

Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.057*** (0.021)	0.055*** (0.019)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.038 (0.043)	-0.044 (0.046)	-0.008 (0.030)	-0.068 (0.045)
High income preferences	-	-	0.086*** (0.033)	0.093** (0.037)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.115*** (0.040)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	24.963 (21.929)	25.944 (22.115)	20.682 (20.396)	20.805 (20.550)	22.194 (21.388)	22.460 (21.136)
Wald χ^2	65.32	52.29	49.53	47.06	76.77	57.18
Observations	123	123	123	123	123	123

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A2.11: Three-Year Change in Welfare State Generosity as Alternative Dependent

Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.036** (0.015)	0.037*** (0.013)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.024 (0.040)	-0.026 (0.043)	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.035 (0.041)
High income preferences	-	-	0.051** (0.025)	0.055* (0.029)	0.037* (0.020)	0.064** (0.031)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	20.940 (14.429)	21.127 (14.600)	19.993 (12.993)	19.799 (13.123)	20.177 (13.762)	20.572 (13.566)
Wald χ^2	70.59	62.96	91.23	89.95	103.60	79.74
Observations	131	131	131	131	131	131

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A2.12: Five-Year Change in Per Capita Spending as Alternative Dependent Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.194 (0.152)	0.169 (0.145)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	0.324 (0.349)	0.341 (0.378)	0.261 (0.324)	0.357 (0.382)
High income preferences	-	-	-0.043 (0.211)	-0.071 (0.243)	-0.029 (0.205)	-0.107 (0.263)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	24.968 (92.438)	29.131 (91.360)	6.278 (99.971)	9.131 (99.361)	19.050 (95.084)	12.653 (98.157)
Wald χ^2	132.79	122.96	122.75	121.90	127.47	131.58
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	128

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A2.13: Three-Year Change in Per Capita Spending as Alternative Dependent Variable

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.156 (0.106)	0.125 (0.102)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	0.186 (0.239)	0.186 (0.259)	0.119 (0.233)	0.224 (0.275)
High income preferences	-	-	0.032 (0.167)	0.018 (0.190)	0.064 (0.166)	-0.029 (0.211)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	63.593 (67.696)	68.636 (66.743)	50.584 (74.251)	53.559 (73.502)	59.085 (70.743)	55.547 (72.525)
Wald χ^2	98.29	90.98	107.63	103.07	102.53	98.25
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	128

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Supplementary Appendix 3: Alternative Specifications of Attitudes of High-Income Relative to Low-Income

An additional set of sensitivity and robustness tests focus on alternative modeling of the influence of the attitudes of high-income respondents relative to the influence of the attitudes of low-income respondents. We considered a range of specifications, most importantly the explicit modeling of differences. But first, the roughest alternative.

Separate Models for Low and High Incomes

Tables A3.1 and A3.2 present separate models for low and high incomes that are otherwise the same as the baseline models. These models do not control for the attitudes of other income groups. The effects of low-income preferences (Table A3.1) are positive and significant in most models, but the effect of high income preferences (Table A3.2) is stronger.

Table A3.1: Separate Models for Low Incomes of Change in Welfare State Generosity

	Model 1 (P05)	Model 2 (P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 1)
Low income preferences	0.039 (0.027)	0.044* (0.025)	0.044* (0.023)	0.043** (0.021)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	25.221 (18.659)	24.526 (18.598)	24.854 (18.810)	24.652 (18.630)
Wald χ^2	57.26	56.98	60.52	55.01
Observations	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.2: Separate Models for High Incomes of Change in Welfare State Generosity

	Model 5 (P95)	Model 6 (P90)	Model 7 (Quint. 5)	Model 8 (Terc. 3)
High income preferences	0.053*** (0.019)	0.054*** (0.018)	0.050*** (0.018)	0.053*** (0.018)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	19.416 (17.570)	19.530 (17.599)	20.371 (17.595)	20.873 (17.932)
Wald χ^2	53.80	51.72	58.66	53.07
Observations	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Rich-Minus-Poor Support As Alternative Independent Variable

Tables A3.3–A3.12 present models that use the explicit measure of the difference between high-income and low-income preference, *rich-minus-poor*, as an alternative independent variable. The order of the tables corresponds to Table 6 in the main body of the text. That is, the first two tables cover all policy areas, with Table A3.4 also containing median-income preferences. Tables A3.5–A3.10 do the same but separately for each of the three policy areas. Finally, Tables A3.11 and A3.12 use per capita spending as the dependent variable instead of generosity.

Table A3.3: Rich-Minus-Poor Support and Change in Welfare Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.073*** (0.027)	0.082*** (0.031)	0.054*** (0.021)	0.100*** (0.034)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	27.644 (18.150)	27.644 (18.150)	28.511 (19.087)	28.487 (18.951)
Wald χ^2	40.17	40.17	55.51	51.98
Observations	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.4: Rich-Minus-Poor and Median Support and Change in Welfare Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.054* (0.030)	0.060* (0.034)	0.041** (0.020)	0.081** (0.036)
Median pref.	0.042** (0.019)	0.042** (0.019)	0.046** (0.018)	0.043** (0.018)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	20.852 (17.080)	20.852 (17.080)	20.536 (17.481)	20.948 (17.449)
Wald χ^2	42.05	42.05	55.77	46.84
Observations	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.5: Rich-Minus-Poor Support and Change in Pension Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.160** (0.066)	0.180** (0.074)	0.112** (0.050)	0.193** (0.075)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	53.299* (29.135)	53.299* (29.135)	48.836 (30.642)	51.190* (30.180)
Wald χ^2	35.35	35.35	54.61	29.89
Observations	42	42	42	42

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.6: Rich-Minus-Poor and Median Support and Change in Pension Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.141** (0.069)	0.159** (0.078)	0.092 (0.057)	0.164** (0.082)
Median pref.	0.067 (0.042)	0.067 (0.042)	0.077* (0.047)	0.071 (0.044)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	38.545* (23.366)	38.545* (23.366)	34.120 (24.732)	37.146 (24.456)
Wald χ^2	48.18	48.18	35.25	48.39
Observations	42	42	42	42

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.7: Rich-Minus-Poor Support and Change in Unemployment Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.109** (0.053)	0.123** (0.059)	0.089 (0.057)	0.146** (0.070)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	34.855 (35.187)	34.855 (35.187)	36.491 (36.489)	38.010 (36.129)
Wald χ^2	35.97	35.97	36.16	36.12
Observations	44	44	44	44

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.8: Rich-Minus-Poor and Median Support and Change in Unemployment Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.086 (0.054)	0.097 (0.060)	0.071 (0.051)	0.132** (0.066)
Median pref.	0.061* (0.032)	0.061* (0.032)	0.066** (0.031)	0.068** (0.031)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	26.486 (34.539)	26.486 (34.539)	26.922 (34.771)	27.822 (34.735)
Wald χ^2	57.07	57.07	46.28	56.48
Observations	44	44	44	44

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.9: Rich-Minus-Poor Support and Change in Health/Disability Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.063** (0.031)	0.071** (0.034)	0.064** (0.027)	0.088** (0.035)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.479 (16.524)	-0.479 (16.524)	-1.174 (15.735)	0.339 (16.293)
Wald χ^2	20.65	20.65	20.78	24.20
Observations	44	44	44	44

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.10: Rich-Minus-Poor and Median Support and Change in Health/Disability Generosity, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	0.078** (0.037)	0.088** (0.042)	0.072** (0.030)	0.107** (0.046)
Median pref.	-0.030 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.029 (0.031)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	4.519 (16.035)	4.520 (16.035)	3.073 (15.403)	5.550 (15.601)
Wald χ^2	21.95	21.95	20.61	25.82
Observations	44	44	44	44

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.11: Rich-Minus-Poor Support and Change in Per Capita Spending, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	-0.055 (0.207)	-0.062 (0.233)	-0.022 (0.209)	-0.087 (0.252)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	69.008 (71.931)	69.008 (71.931)	69.389 (70.751)	68.551 (72.800)
Wald χ^2	92.34	92.34	92.56	93.07
Observations	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A3.12: Rich-Minus-Poor and Median Support and Change in Per Capita Spending, T+1 to T+4

	Model 1 (P95 - P05)	Model 2 (P90 - P10)	Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1)	Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1)
Rich minus poor	-0.129 (0.238)	-0.145 (0.267)	-0.066 (0.219)	-0.161 (0.274)
Median pref.	0.180 (0.141)	0.180 (0.141)	0.167 (0.134)	0.174 (0.134)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	42.699 (83.970)	42.699 (83.970)	45.723 (81.272)	42.796 (83.899)
Wald χ^2	99.67	99.67	91.18	96.66
Observations	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Win Rates with Respect to Attitudes of High-Income Versus Low-Income Respondents

The so-called win rate is obtained by looking at cases where a majority of one group is on one side of a policy change while the majority of another group is on the other side. In our case, these are cases where a majority of low incomes wants more spending in a certain area and a majority of high incomes wants less spending, or vice versa.

The first thing to note is that these cases are not common. There are clear preference gaps between the rich and poor, but both are usually on the side of more spending. Out of our 130 observations, there are 20 where groups are on different sides, using the 10th and 90th percentiles. (There are 26 when using the 5th and 95th percentiles, 24 using quintiles and 16 using terciles.) All 20 of these are in the area of unemployment and in each case the rich want

less spending while the poor want more. In two of these cases, generosity stayed constant after the survey. In nine cases, generosity increased, while generosity decreased in another nine cases. This would imply the poor and rich both ‘won’ 50% of the time. (Using the partial generosity indices, there are 23 cases where the two groups are on different sides. Generosity decreased in 14 of those cases while it increased in 9.)

Another way to look at this is to compare this 50% chance to the chance of generosity increasing when both groups either want more or less spending. Here, we just look at unemployment. If both the rich and poor want more spending, generosity increases in 14 out of 16 cases, or 88% of the time. If they both want less spending, generosity increases in 3 out of 9 cases, or 33% of the time. In other words, the poor being in favor of more spending seems to raise the odds of generosity increasing (from 33% to 50%), but it is still much lower than the odds of generosity increasing when the rich are also in favor (88%). Note that we are working with very few observations here though.

We can also look at the size of the change in generosity after the survey, again just in the area of unemployment, which produces the results shown in Table A3.13.

Table A3.13: Four-Year Change in Generosity by Preferences of Rich and Poor

	Rich want less spending	Rich want more spending
Poor want less spending	0.61 (9)	N/A (0)
Poor want more spending	-0.01 (19)	3.64 (16)

The number between parentheses indicates the number of observations in each cell. If both the rich and poor are in favor of more spending, generosity clearly increases (by 3.64%), while there is no clear increase if only the rich are opposed or both the rich and poor are opposed. The figure even seems to be higher if both groups are opposed than when only the rich are opposed, which does not make much sense. We should note that these figures are sensitive to outliers though. For the figures in the table above, we already removed one extreme outlier (Sweden 2006) where generosity decreased by 22.5% after the survey. (To put that into perspective, the biggest decrease after that in the area of unemployment is 3.88%.) Taking this outlier into account would have changed -0.01% in the *poor want more / rich want less* cell to -1.13%. There are also positive outliers, though not as extreme. There is

one country-year (New Zealand 1997) in the *poor want less / rich want less* cell where generosity increased by 7.5 percent after the survey. If we remove all outliers with a change of more than seven percent, we get the numbers shown in Table A3.14:

Table A3.14: Four-Year Change in Generosity by Preferences of Rich and Poor After Removing Outliers

	Rich want less spending	Rich want more spending
Poor want less spending	-0.24 (8)	N/A (0)
Poor want more spending	-0.01 (19)	2.25 (13)

The picture is the same: a clear increase when both groups are in favor and not much of a change when the rich are opposed, regardless of what the poor want.

To sum up the win-rates discussion, both rich and poor are usually on the side of more spending. When the groups are on different sides, the win rates for rich and poor are similar. However, this is kind of an awkward statistic here, because one of the cells (where the poor want less spending and the rich want more) in this calculation is empty. We can also look at how the odds of generosity increasing change when the poor become in favor of more spending and when the rich do. This seems to indicate that the odds especially increase when not just the poor but also the rich are in favor, although again we are hampered by the empty cell. Finally, and unlike in Gilens' data, we can look at the size of the change, which seems to indicate that what matters is mostly whether the rich are in favor of more spending. Incidentally, all of these findings also apply when we compare the 50th to the 90th percentile, although the number of observations where the two groups are on different sides is even smaller here (15 instead of 20). However, with the existing data, we suspect that the number of observations is just too low, and the survey questions too limited in variation, for this kind of analysis to be very useful.

Supplementary Appendix 4: Additional Control and Moderating Variables

A major set of sensitivity tests focused on a wide range of alternative controls to those key factors in the baseline that can be expected to be important upstream determinants of welfare-state attitudes and policy change. Particularly important of the alternative controls are those relevant to getting at cross-country differences in political-institutional footholds for citizens. To explore such possibilities, we added a number of contextual variables relevant to such footholds. An overview of these variables is provided in Table A4.1. The descriptive statistics are calculated for the country-topic-years that make up the models presented below.

Table A4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Contextual Variables

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Source	Notes
Age of democracy	107.32	88.63	0	300	QoG	Top-coded to 300 years because Great Britain is an extreme outlier
Effective number of parties	3.29	1.12	1.91	6.07	CPDS	-
Gallagher index of disproportionality	1.51	0.99	-0.71	3.13	CPDS	Transformed by taking the natural logarithm
Cabinet composition (left-right index)	2.43	1.55	1	5	CPDS	-
Share of right-wing parties in cabinet	40.09	42.22	0	100	CPDS	-
Share of left-wing parties in cabinet	33.52	37.87	0	100	CPDS	-
Federalism index	3.02	1.66	1	5	CPDS	-
Union density	33.45	18.32	7.59	85.06	CPDS	-

QoG = Quality of Government Standard Dataset; CPDS = Comparative Political Data Set

We add these variables to the baseline model, first as control variables. We only control for one variable at a time here, partly because several of them are highly correlated with each other and partly because the different variables have different missing country-years, which would mean a model with several institutional controls at once would have a quite limited number of observations.

With eight variables, we have eight models. These are presented in Table A4.2 in the model with median income preferences and in Table A4.3 in the model with the 10th and 90th income percentiles. For reasons of space, the other measurements of overall, low and high income preferences are not shown here; they produce the same results. None of the contextual variables ever has a significant effect on changes in welfare state generosity. Furthermore, the effects of preferences barely changes compared to the baseline models.

Table A4.2: Random Intercept Models of Changes in Welfare State Generosity with Median Preferences and Contextual Control Variables

	Model 1 (Age of dem.)	Model 2 (Eff. parties)	Model 3 (Gall. index)	Model 4 (Cab. comp.)
Median preferences	0.049*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.045*** (0.017)	0.047*** (0.016)
Contextual variable	-0.005 (0.006)	0.142 (0.283)	-0.341 (0.388)	0.069 (0.265)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	20.867 (19.181)	17.379 (23.213)	15.603 (20.274)	14.066 (21.922)
Wald χ^2	58.33	46.67	57.38	60.54
Observations	130	128	128	128

	Model 5 (% Right part.)	Model 6 (% Left part.)	Model 7 (Federalism)	Model 8 (Union dens.)
Median preferences	0.049*** (0.017)	0.047*** (0.017)	0.045*** (0.017)	0.058*** (0.022)
Contextual variable	-0.007 (0.009)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.089 (0.257)	-0.047 (0.034)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	13.665 (20.638)	14.654 (21.549)	13.867 (21.375)	2.621 (21.410)
Wald χ^2	44.99	52.54	65.79	60.66
Observations	128	128	128	128

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A4.3: Random Intercept Models of Changes in Welfare State Generosity with Low and High Income Preferences and Contextual Control Variables

	Model 1 (Age of dem.)	Model 2 (Eff. parties)	Model 3 (Gall. index)	Model 4 (Cab. comp.)
Low income preferences	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.043 (0.042)	-0.042 (0.040)	-0.040 (0.041)
High income preferences	0.073** (0.036)	0.082*** (0.032)	0.082*** (0.031)	0.081** (0.032)
Contextual variable	-0.004 (0.006)	0.218 (0.272)	-0.386 (0.354)	0.054 (0.265)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	18.232 (17.341)	18.153 (21.392)	14.906 (18.455)	13.915 (19.978)
Wald χ^2	66.66	79.98	61.33	72.88
Observations	130	128	128	128

	Model 5 (% Right part.)	Model 6 (% Left part.)	Model 7 (Federalism)	Model 8 (Union dens.)
Low income preferences	-0.036 (0.038)	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.044 (0.041)	-0.037 (0.049)
High income preferences	0.080*** (0.030)	0.081** (0.032)	0.081** (0.032)	0.086** (0.035)
Contextual variable	-0.007 (0.009)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.107 (0.245)	-0.039 (0.032)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	13.260 (18.890)	14.372 (19.682)	13.570 (19.214)	4.184 (20.362)
Wald χ^2	56.63	61.58	120.45	64.04
Observations	128	128	128	128

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Next, we add multiplicative interaction terms between the contextual variables and preferences (Tables A4.4 and A4.5). The models are OLS with standard errors clustered by country. In these models, all contextual variables are centered. In Table A4.5, the interaction is with low income preferences – the segment of the polity whose influence on subsequent policy change can most be expected to be moderated by the political-institutional conditions measured, here. We get similar findings if we interact the contextual variable with high

income preferences. Again, other measurements of the various income positions produce the same results. The overall picture is quite clear: we do not find any moderating effects of contextual variables and preferences on the dependent variable. This is likely to reflect the limited number of observations and limited coverage in some other respects. The sole exception to this pattern is found in model 1 of Table A4.5, but this is only barely significant at $\alpha = 0.10$, with a small effect size that is in the opposite direction of what we expected.

Table A4.4: OLS Models of Changes in Welfare State Generosity with Interactions Between Median Preferences and Contextual Variables

	Model 1 (Age of dem.)	Model 2 (Eff. parties)	Model 3 (Gall. index)	Model 4 (Cab. comp.)
Median preferences	0.059** (0.025)	0.045* (0.025)	0.044* (0.023)	0.044* (0.023)
Contextual variable	-0.000 (0.007)	0.300 (0.438)	-0.285 (0.368)	-0.112 (0.305)
Interaction	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	11.107 (17.683)	16.662 (20.422)	9.211 (18.740)	7.752 (17.525)
R ²	0.143	0.098	0.097	0.096
Observations	130	128	128	128

	Model 5 (% Right part.)	Model 6 (% Left part.)	Model 7 (Federalism)	Model 8 (Union dens.)
Median preferences	0.051** (0.022)	0.045* (0.023)	0.041** (0.020)	0.063** (0.029)
Contextual variable	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.053 (0.311)	-0.063 (0.068)
Interaction	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.800 (17.088)	8.951 (18.286)	7.977 (18.680)	-5.213 (19.856)
R ²	0.109	0.092	0.093	0.138
Observations	128	128	128	128

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A4.5: OLS Models of Changes in Welfare State Generosity with Interactions Between Low Income Preferences and Contextual Variables

	Model 1 (Age of dem.)	Model 2 (Eff. parties)	Model 3 (Gall. index)	Model 4 (Cab. comp.)
Low income preferences	-0.041 (0.049)	-0.067 (0.044)	-0.069 (0.042)	-0.067 (0.044)
High income preferences	0.101** (0.045)	0.106*** (0.040)	0.107*** (0.038)	0.102** (0.040)
Contextual variable	0.013 (0.012)	0.049 (0.555)	-0.105 (0.472)	-0.262 (0.439)
Interaction (P10 * context. variable)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	12.712 (17.695)	18.819 (20.244)	12.873 (18.557)	11.246 (17.235)
R ²	0.184	0.133	0.136	0.130
Observations	130	128	128	128

	Model 5 (% Right part.)	Model 6 (% Left part.)	Model 7 (Federalism)	Model 8 (Union dens.)
Low income preferences	-0.055 (0.043)	-0.071 (0.044)	-0.078* (0.043)	-0.056 (0.047)
High income preferences	0.100** (0.039)	0.106** (0.041)	0.106*** (0.039)	0.104*** (0.039)
Contextual variable	0.005 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.092 (0.432)	-0.055 (0.083)
Interaction (P10 * context. variable)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.000 (0.002)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	9.953 (17.042)	12.481 (18.002)	11.884 (18.308)	1.144 (19.924)
R ²	0.139	0.127	0.128	0.157
Observations	128	128	128	128

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Beyond the institutional variables, we estimated models using a different specification of GDP, economic growth and unemployment as control variables. In the baseline models, these are all measured at t . In Table A4.6 below, they are measured as the average between $t+1$ and $t+4$.

Table A4.6: Controlling for Average GDP, Economic Growth and Unemployment between $T+1$ and $T+4$

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.057*** (0.021)	0.056*** (0.019)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.032 (0.041)	-0.037 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.030)	-0.052 (0.044)
High income preferences	-	-	0.079*** (0.030)	0.085** (0.034)	0.058*** (0.021)	0.099*** (0.038)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	29.571* (16.893)	30.502* (16.913)	26.257* (15.720)	26.426* (15.764)	27.555* (16.456)	27.966* (16.835)
Wald χ^2	105.35	103.17	84.31	83.41	93.07	93.08
Observations	130	130	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Alternatively, we can measure the average *change* in GDP, growth and unemployment between $t+1$ and $t+4$. The results of these models are provided in Table A4.7.

Table A4.7: Controlling for Average Change in GDP, Economic Growth and Unemployment between T+1 and T+4

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.059 ^{***} (0.022)	0.057 ^{***} (0.020)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.040 (0.038)	-0.046 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.061 (0.042)
High income preferences	-	-	0.087 ^{***} (0.033)	0.094 ^{**} (0.037)	0.069 ^{***} (0.025)	0.107 ^{***} (0.040)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.086 (1.630)	-1.062 (1.642)	0.268 (1.345)	0.178 (1.362)	-0.121 (1.301)	0.365 (1.353)
Wald χ^2	43.62	39.19	35.09	35.01	37.57	33.94
Observations	127	127	127	127	127	127

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

In short, the main results do not change much across many specifications with respect to contextual controls. Also, most of the controls have no significant effect on the dependent variable, except for the average (logged) GDP and the change in growth, which are marginally significant at $\alpha = 0.10$.

Supplementary Appendix 5: Alternative Embedding and Jackknife Analysis

Finally, our robustness and sensitivity tests focus on a range of alternative estimators. The estimators on which we focus below include alternative multi-level models in terms of embedding and random intercept and random slope models, as well as various kinds of jackknife analyses.

Alternative Embedding in Multi-Level Models

Tables A5.1–A5.5 present a number of alternative estimators. These include the baseline multi-level model and embedding, but with random coefficients for the attitudinal variables (in addition to the random intercepts). And then they include alternative embedding (in two-level and three-level models), that are otherwise the same as the baseline models with respect to controls. In all cases, the results do not change appreciably relative to the baseline models.

Table A5.1: Two-Level Random Intercept, Random Slope Models of Change in Welfare State Generosity With Country as Clusters (Preference Variables as Random Coefficients)

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.052*** (0.018)	0.051*** (0.017)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.036 (0.041)	-0.041 (0.043)	-0.013 (0.030)	-0.057 (0.043)
High income preferences	-	-	0.078*** (0.029)	0.084*** (0.032)	0.059*** (0.020)	0.099*** (0.036)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	21.949 (18.168)	22.570 (18.322)	19.775 (16.411)	19.729 (16.531)	20.376 (17.323)	21.144 (17.331)
Wald χ^2	57.16	46.63	51.09	49.12	71.92	55.44
Observations	130	130	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A5.2: Two-Level Random Intercept Models of Change in Welfare State Generosity
With Country-Year as Clusters

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.053 ^{***} (0.016)	0.050 ^{***} (0.015)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.058 [*] (0.035)	-0.067 [*] (0.038)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.086 [*] (0.044)
High income preferences	-	-	0.097 ^{***} (0.032)	0.107 ^{***} (0.036)	0.080 ^{***} (0.028)	0.125 ^{***} (0.043)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	15.486 (15.732)	16.242 (15.708)	16.311 (14.111)	16.392 (14.104)	16.349 (14.871)	17.973 (14.598)
Wald χ^2	18.57	20.31	24.87	25.44	19.59	23.36
Observations	130	130	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A5.3: Two-Level Random Intercept Models of Change in Welfare State Generosity
With Country-Topic as Clusters

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.056 ^{**} (0.024)	0.053 ^{**} (0.022)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.063 (0.040)	-0.071 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.038)	-0.088 [*] (0.048)
High income preferences	-	-	0.100 ^{***} (0.033)	0.109 ^{***} (0.037)	0.082 ^{***} (0.029)	0.126 ^{***} (0.041)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	17.025 (18.345)	17.698 (18.486)	16.636 (17.382)	16.571 (17.467)	15.900 (17.518)	17.951 (17.782)
Wald χ^2	26.53	26.64	26.47	26.69	25.36	26.60
Observations	130	130	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A5.4: Three-Level Random Intercept Models of Change in Welfare State Generosity
With Country and Wave as Clusters

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.053 ^{***} (0.018)	0.051 ^{***} (0.016)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.040 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.058 (0.047)
High income preferences	-	-	0.084 ^{**} (0.035)	0.078 ^{**} (0.031)	0.060 ^{**} (0.024)	0.100 ^{**} (0.039)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	22.640 (18.204)	23.585 (18.201)	20.387 (16.920)	20.234 (16.810)	21.668 (17.680)	22.194 (17.337)
Wald χ^2	13.36	14.49	28.80	28.03	29.09	25.34
Observations	130	130	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A5.5: Three-Level Random Intercept Models of Change in Welfare State Generosity
With Country-Year as Third level

	Model 1 (All)	Model 2 (P50)	Model 3 (P5 / P95)	Model 4 (P10 / P90)	Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5)	Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3)
Overall / median preferences	0.053 ^{***} (0.018)	0.051 ^{***} (0.016)	-	-	-	-
Low income preferences	-	-	-0.040 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.058 (0.047)
High income preferences	-	-	0.084 ^{**} (0.035)	0.078 ^{**} (0.031)	0.060 ^{**} (0.024)	0.100 ^{**} (0.039)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	22.640 (18.204)	23.585 (18.201)	20.387 (16.920)	20.234 (16.810)	21.668 (17.680)	22.194 (17.337)
Wald χ^2	13.36	14.49	28.80	28.03	29.09	25.34
Observations	130	130	130	130	130	130

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Outliers, Influential Cases and Jackknife Analysis

To further investigate the sensitivity of the results to the baseline specification, we performed a range of jackknife analyses, including step-wise removal of country-waves or country-topics, but also full country levels. In addition, we consider jackknifing of standard errors

based on such clustering. In outlier analysis of the country-topic-year data distribution, and as already discussed above, we find a major outlier – Swedish unemployment assistance in 2006. But this is not an influential outlier, as captured in the leverage-versus-residual-squared plot below (based on the 10th and 90th percentile baseline model).




Figure A5.1: Leverage-Versus-Residual-Squared Plot

In any event, we focus below on what we consider the most aggressive jackknife analysis, where all the observations for each country were removed from the sample “one by one” and the model was estimated using the remaining countries. This results in twenty models, the key results of which are presented in Table A5.6. The table shows the coefficients and standard errors of low and high income preferences when leaving out the country in the first column. Note that the table contains results of two sets of models, one with the 10th and 90th percentiles and another with the lowest and highest quintiles, so there are forty models in total. Despite some variation between countries, the significant effect of high-income preferences – and the non-effect of low income preferences – is quite stable.

Table A5.6: Results of Jackknife Analysis by Country

Country	P10	P90	Quintile 1	Quintile 5
None	-0.041 (0.043)	0.084 (0.032) ^{***}	-0.013 (0.030)	0.059 (0.020) ^{***}
Australia	-0.043 (0.044)	0.097 (0.033) ^{***}	-0.014 (0.030)	0.071 (0.020) ^{***}
Austria	-0.041 (0.043)	0.083 (0.032) ^{**}	-0.015 (0.029)	0.060 (0.019) ^{***}
Canada	-0.044 (0.046)	0.085 (0.033) ^{**}	-0.015 (0.032)	0.059 (0.020) ^{***}
Denmark	-0.041 (0.043)	0.083 (0.032) ^{**}	-0.013 (0.030)	0.058 (0.020) ^{***}
Finland	-0.035 (0.044)	0.079 (0.033) ^{**}	-0.007 (0.031)	0.054 (0.021) ^{***}
France	-0.053 (0.046)	0.095 (0.033) ^{***}	-0.020 (0.031)	0.066 (0.020) ^{***}
Germany	-0.024 (0.043)	0.076 (0.033) ^{**}	-0.001 (0.028)	0.056 (0.021) ^{***}
Great Britain	-0.009 (0.038)	0.068 (0.032) ^{**}	0.001 (0.027)	0.060 (0.023) ^{**}
Ireland	-0.070 (0.040)	0.100 (0.031) ^{***}	-0.036 (0.028)	0.071 (0.019) ^{***}
Italy	-0.046 (0.045)	0.077 (0.032) ^{**}	-0.023 (0.031)	0.057 (0.021) ^{***}
Japan	-0.043 (0.046)	0.088 (0.035) ^{**}	-0.009 (0.032)	0.058 (0.022) ^{**}
Netherlands	-0.043 (0.044)	0.088 (0.033) ^{***}	-0.013 (0.031)	0.061 (0.020) ^{***}
New Zealand	-0.058 (0.040)	0.104 (0.032) ^{***}	-0.017 (0.029)	0.066 (0.021) ^{***}
Norway	-0.034 (0.046)	0.077 (0.031) ^{**}	-0.010 (0.034)	0.055 (0.019) ^{***}
Portugal	-0.039 (0.042)	0.075 (0.031) ^{**}	-0.014 (0.029)	0.052 (0.019) ^{***}
South Korea	-0.041 (0.043)	0.081 (0.032) ^{**}	-0.013 (0.030)	0.056 (0.020) ^{***}
Spain	-0.008 (0.042)	0.056 (0.031) [*]	0.006 (0.030)	0.042 (0.020) ^{**}
Sweden	-0.064 (0.047)	0.095 (0.035) ^{***}	-0.028 (0.032)	0.063 (0.021) ^{***}
Switzerland	-0.042 (0.048)	0.091 (0.036) ^{**}	-0.008 (0.034)	0.060 (0.022) ^{***}
United States	-0.031 (0.049)	0.075 (0.037) ^{**}	-0.003 (0.036)	0.051 (0.026) ^{**}

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)