Appendix to:
"The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding"

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Contents

A Democratically Committed IOs 2

B Summary Statistics, Main Results 4

C Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Country and Year Fixed Effects 5

D Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, 3, 7 and 10 Year Changes 7

E Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding: Cold War vs. Post Cold War Eras 11

F Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, International Factors 14

G Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Developing Democracies and Anocracies 16

H Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Two-Stage Selection Models 18

I Estimating the Effect of EU Accession: the Generalized Synthetic Control Method 21

J Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding: No European Union 26

K Summary Statistics, Executive Power 28

L Summary Statistics, Domestic Policy Space 29

A Democratically Committed IOs

Table 5 lists all 56 international organizations (IO) that von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2018) code as democratically committed. An IO is democratically committed if its constitutive documents reference democracy, human rights, or rule of law. Since not all IOs referenced support for democracy at their founding, Table 5 also indicates the year when an IO first expressed official support for democracy.

Table 5: Democratically Committed IOs

IO Name	Year of Commitment
ACP Group	1992
ACP/EU Joint Assembly	2000
African Union	2000
Andean Pact	1989
Andean Parliament	1979
Arab Maghreb Union	1989
Association of Caribbean States	1994
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	2007
Benelux Community	1958
Black Sea Economic Council	1992
Caribbean Community	2001
Central African Economic & Monetary Union	1994
Central American Integration System	1991
Central European FTA	1992
Central European Initiative	1989
Comm Market for East/South Africa	1993
Comm Portuguese Speaking Countries	1996
Commonwealth of Independent States	1994
Commonwealth Secretariat	1971
Conf. on Interaction & Confidence-Building Measures in Asia	2002
Council of Europe	1949
Economic Community of Central African States	1983
Economic Community of Great Lakes States	2006
Economic Community of West African States	1995
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development	1991
European Coal & Steal Community	1951
European Union	1988
Francophone Agency	2005
Fund 4 Devel. of Indigen Peoples of LA/Carib	1992
Global Environ. Fund	1991
Ibero-American General Secretariat	2003
Inter-American Defense Board	1942
Instit Nutrition for Cent Am & Pan	1949
International Criminal Court	1998
Intl Criminal Police Comm	1956
Intl Comm on Civil Status	1952
Intl Labour Org	1919
MERCOSUR	1998
North Atlantic Treaty Org	1949
Observatorie economique statistique sub-Saharan Afr.	1993
Org. Eastern Caribbean States	1981
Org. Islamic Conference	1974
Org. Security Cooperation Europe	1990
Pacific Island Forum	2000
Pan-African Parliament	2000
Pan-Am Union/Org of Am States	1948
Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons	2000
Rio Group	1999
Sec. for the Commission for East Afr. Coop.	2001
Southeast Asian Minist. of Educ. Org.	1968
Southern African CU	2002
Southern African Dev. Community	1992
UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Org	1945
United Nations	1945
Western European Union	1948
World Tourism Org.	1970

B Summary Statistics, Main Results

Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main models in Table 2.

Table 6: Summary Statistics, Democratic Backsliding

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Lib. dem. index (5 year change)	2,466	0.06	0.14	−0.37	0.85
Num. demo. IO memberships	2,513	9.10	4.06	0	18
Num. non universal demo. IO mems.	2,513	4.35	2.94	0	11
Num. political/economic IO mems.	2,513	21.44	8.33	0	39
Num. demo. political/economic IO mems.	2,513	5.75	2.91	0	12
Num. struc/interven IO mems.	2,513	20.79	7.98	0	40
GDP pc (logged)	2,276	8.81	0.99	6.22	10.74
GDP growth pc	2,250	2.82	5.95	−41.63	33.76
Lib. dem. index	2,510	0.53	0.19	0.05	0.88
State age (logged)	2,513	3.80	1.22	0.00	5.29
Time since demo. transition	2,512	19.92	22.33	1	192
Mean region lib. dem. change	1,474	0.03	0.05	−0.12	0.24
Effective number of parties (logged)	1,645	6.08	0.76	1.61	6.55
Internal conflict	2,513	0.14	0.34	0	1
Oil income pc	2,339	150.82	590.23	0.00	7,881.68
Ethnic frac.	2,219	0.49	0.30	0.0001	1.00
Trade openness	2,227	73.60	37.20	5.73	311.36
FDI inflow	2,086	3.49	8.13	−43.46	198.07
Lagged dependent variable	2,318	0.06	0.14	−0.57	0.85

C Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Country and Year Fixed Effects

I re-estimate the models from Table 2 using fixed effects models, the standard alternative to varying intercept models. Specifically, I estimate a series of OLS models with fixed effects by country and year. The results of these models are largely similar to those in Table 2, and can be found in Table 7.

Table 7: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Country and Year Fixed Effects

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.64^{***}	-0.46^{***}	-0.69^{***}	-0.41^{***}	-0.61^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.16)
GDP pc (log)	0.39^{***}	0.27^{*}	0.41^{***}	0.33^{**}	0.43^{***}
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
GDP growth pc	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lib. dem. index	-2.27^{***}	-2.28^{***}	-2.23^{***}	-2.27^{***}	-2.20^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.13^{***}	-0.13^{***}	-0.13^{***}	-0.13^{***}	-0.11^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
State age (log)	-0.01	-0.04	-0.07	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Time since demo transition	-0.12^{**}	-0.10^{*}	-0.09^{*}	-0.09^{*}	-0.09^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Internal conflict	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	1.95^{***}	1.96^{***}	1.69^{***}	1.90^{***}	1.78^{***}
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Ethnic frac.	-2.37^{***}	-2.04^{***}	-2.51^{***}	-2.20^{***}	-2.62^{***}
	(0.65)	(0.66)	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.67)
Mean region lib. democracy change	0.07^{**}	0.08^{***}	0.04	0.08^{***}	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lagged DV	0.01	0.004	-0.01	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	832	832	832	832	832
R^2	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.85
Adjusted R^2	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83
Residual Std. Error (df = 727)	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.57
F Statistic (df = 104; 727)	42.11^{***}	41.78^{***}	40.50^{***}	41.32^{***}	39.64^{***}
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Dependent variable: 5 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

D Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, 3, 7 and 10 Year Changes

The time period over which backsliding occurs can vary across cases. Therefore, I re-estimate the main models from Table 2, which tests the relationship between the number of IOs a state is a member of 5 years prior and the subsequent 5 year change in its liberal democracy index, for different time periods. Specifically, I use the 3, 7, and 10 year changes in a state's liberal democracy index as alternative dependent variables. In these models, all independent variables are lagged by the relevant time period, and all variables are standardized to facilitate interpretation. Overall, the results are similar to those for the 5 year time period.

Table 8: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, 3 Years

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 3 years prior	-0.29^{***}	-0.22^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.23^{***}	-0.39^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.16)
GDP pc (log)	0.81^{***}	0.78^{***}	0.73^{***}	0.79^{***}	0.70^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
GDP growth pc	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Lib. dem. index	-2.36^{***}	-2.34^{***}	-2.39^{***}	-2.37^{***}	-2.40^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
State age (log)	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.03	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Time since demo transition	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Internal conflict	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Oil income pc	0.60^{*}	0.56	0.51	0.62^{*}	0.65^{*}
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Ethnic frac.	-0.61^{***}	-0.59^{***}	-0.65^{***}	-0.60^{***}	-0.70^{***}
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Mean region DIS change	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lagged DV	0.04^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.04^{**}	0.04^{**}	0.04^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	2218.14	2217.80	2226.08	2217.56	2229.08
BIC	2295.03	2294.69	2302.98	2294.46	2305.97
Log. lik.	-1093.07	-1092.90	-1097.04	-1092.78	-1098.54
Observations	903	903	903	903	903
Num. countries	56	56	56	56	56
Num. regions	14	14	14	14	14
Variance: countries	1.42	1.38	1.48	1.43	1.66
Variance: regions	0.66	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.71
Variance: residual	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.51

Note: Dependent variable: 3 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 9: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, 7 Years

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 7 years prior	-0.23^{***}	-0.15^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-0.16^{***}	-0.34^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.12)
GDP pc (log)	0.71^{***}	0.67^{***}	0.67^{***}	0.66^{***}	0.65^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
GDP growth pc	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lib. dem. index	-1.87^{***}	-1.88^{***}	-1.90^{***}	-1.90^{***}	-1.91^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.11^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.11^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
State age (log)	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Time since demo transition	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Internal conflict	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	1.39^{***}	1.39^{***}	1.32^{***}	1.43^{***}	1.41^{***}
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Ethnic frac.	-0.26^{*}	-0.25^{*}	-0.29^{*}	-0.27^{*}	-0.34^{**}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Mean region DIS change	0.09^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	1427.29	1431.49	1435.82	1432.29	1438.28
BIC	1501.51	1505.71	1510.04	1506.51	1512.49
Log. lik.	-697.65	-699.75	-701.91	-700.14	-703.14
Observations	764	764	764	764	764
Num. countries	54	54	54	54	54
Num. regions	15	15	15	15	15
Variance: countries	0.99	1.00	1.07	1.02	1.15
Variance: regions	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.10
Variance: residual	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27

Note: Dependent variable: 7 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 10: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, 10 Years

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 10 years prior	-0.15^{***}	-0.08^{**}	-0.17^{**}	-0.07^{*}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.11)
GDP pc (log)	0.56^{***}	0.53^{***}	0.53^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.54^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
GDP growth pc	-0.05^{*}	-0.05^{*}	-0.05^{**}	-0.05^{*}	-0.05^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Lib. dem. index	-1.67^{***}	-1.70^{***}	-1.70^{***}	-1.72^{***}	-1.68^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
State age (log)	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Time since demo transition	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Internal conflict	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	1.78^{***}	1.81^{***}	1.78^{***}	1.83^{***}	1.79^{***}
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Ethnic frac.	-0.12	-0.12	-0.14	-0.13	-0.14
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Mean region lib. dem. change	0.07^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.09^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	1129.38	1135.18	1134.37	1137.04	1130.91
BIC	1201.61	1207.41	1206.61	1209.27	1203.15
Log. lik.	-548.69	-551.59	-551.19	-552.52	-549.46
Observations	675	675	675	675	675
Num. countries	54	54	54	54	54
Num. regions	14	14	14	14	14
Variance: countries	0.92	0.94	0.97	0.95	0.96
Variance: regions	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.15
Variance: residual	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21

Note: Dependent variable: 10 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

E Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding: Cold War vs. Post Cold War Eras

Because international democracy promotion became substantially more prevalent following the end of the Cold War, I also re-estimate the models from Table 2 for two different time periods: the Cold War era (1945–1989) and the post Cold War era (1990–2015). The results of these models, which can be found in Tables 11 and 12, find some evidence of this relationship between IOs and backsliding during the Cold War period, though these results are based on a small number of observations due to missing data. The fact that international democracy promotion accelerated significantly following the end of the Cold War is reflected in the results from the 1990–2015 models, which are consistent with the results reported in Table 2.

Table 11: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 1945–1989

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-1.45^{**}	-1.81^{**}	-0.82^{*}	-1.96^{***}	-0.96
	(0.46)	(0.56)	(0.37)	(0.53)	(0.58)
GDP pc (log)	1.75^{**}	0.74	1.04	1.21^{*}	1.25^{*}
	(0.60)	(0.55)	(0.57)	(0.52)	(0.60)
GDP growth pc	-0.13	-0.12	-0.14	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Lib. dem. index	-1.94^{***}	-1.68^{***}	-1.86^{***}	-1.79^{***}	-1.75^{***}
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.38)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.24	0.09	0.26	0.08	0.31
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
State age (log)	0.56	0.60	0.63	0.66^{*}	0.84
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.46)
Time since demo transition	-0.69	-1.00	-1.07^{*}	-1.01^{*}	-1.05
	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.48)	(0.59)
Internal conflict	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Oil income pc	-0.20	-0.02	-0.11	-0.05	-0.19
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.44)
Ethnic frac.	-0.46	-0.59	-0.41	-0.63^{*}	-0.21
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.37)
Mean region lib. democracy change	0.32^{***}	0.38^{***}	0.39^{***}	0.40^{***}	0.34^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Lagged DV	-0.20	-0.24	-0.27	-0.20	-0.30
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
AIC	201.61	200.82	206.97	198.13	208.25
BIC	241.96	241.17	247.32	238.48	248.60
Log. lik.	-84.81	-84.41	-87.49	-83.06	-88.13
Observations	92	92	92	92	92
Num. countries	20	20	20	20	20
Num. regions	10	10	10	10	10
Variance: countries	1.30	1.24	1.40	1.00	1.31
Variance: regions	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19
Variance: residual	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.19

Note: Dependent variable: 5 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 12: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 1990–2015

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.29^{***}	-0.22^{***}	-0.66^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.47^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.14)
GDP pc (log)	0.88^{***}	0.86^{***}	0.95^{***}	0.86^{***}	0.82^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
GDP growth pc	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lib. dem. index	-2.23^{***}	-2.23^{***}	-2.21^{***}	-2.26^{***}	-2.30^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Effec. num. parties (log)	−0.06	−0.06	-0.07^{*}	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
State age (log)	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Time since demo transition	−0.06	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Internal conflict	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	−1.63	−1.74	−1.55	−1.72	−1.67
	(1.03)	(1.02)	(1.03)	(1.04)	(1.07)
Ethnic frac.	−0.33	−0.31	-0.39^{*}	−0.33	-0.45^{*}
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Mean region lib. democracy change	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lagged DV	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	1445.34	1444.77	1434.25	1450.90	1461.53
BIC	1519.04	1518.48	1507.95	1524.61	1535.24
Log. lik.	-706.67	-706.39	-701.12	-709.45	-714.77
Observations	740	740	740	740	740
Num. countries	50	50	50	50	50
Num. regions	11	11	11	11	11
Variance: countries	0.95	0.91	0.98	0.97	1.17
Variance: regions	0.45	0.48	0.62	0.46	0.35
Variance: residual	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.29

Note: Dependent variable: 5 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

F Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, International Factors

The main results from Table 2 linking increased IO membership to democratic backsliding may simply be the result of international factors in general, rather than IOs specifically. To test if IOs specifically contribute to backsliding, or if they are simply one aspect of globalization, which has made states more likely to backslide, I estimate the same models from Table 2, this time including proxies for globalization as control variables. Specifically, I control for a state's foreign direct investment inflow and its trade openness (World Bank, 2017). I also focus exclusively on the post Cold War period (1989–2015) since IOs became more involved in democracy promotion during this time period. The results are largely the same, and can be found in Table 13.

Table 13: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, International Factors (1990–2017)

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.14^{**}	-0.12^{***}	-0.39^{***}	-0.11^{**}	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.17)
GDP pc (log)	0.63^{***}	0.62^{***}	0.73^{***}	0.62^{***}	0.46^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
GDP growth pc	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lib. dem. index	-2.39^{***}	-2.37^{***}	-2.38^{***}	-2.40^{***}	-2.46^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.06^{**}	-0.06^{**}	-0.07^{**}	-0.06^{**}	-0.06^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
State age (log)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	−0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Time since demo transition	−0.06	−0.06	−0.04	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Internal conflict	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	−0.80	−0.84	−0.93	−0.82	−0.65
	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.96)	(0.97)	(0.99)
Ethnic frac.	-0.37^{*}	-0.37^{*}	-0.37^{*}	-0.38^{*}	-0.42^{*}
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Mean region DIS change	0.06^{**}	0.06^{**}	0.05^{*}	0.07^{***}	0.08^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
FDI inflow	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trade openness	−0.09	−0.09	−0.08	−0.09	−0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Lagged DV	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	1158.48	1157.38	1151.60	1158.76	1162.08
BIC	1239.50	1238.41	1232.63	1239.79	1243.10
Log. lik.	-561.24	-560.69	-557.80	-561.38	-563.04
Observations	666	666	666	666	666
Num. countries	49	49	49	49	49
Num. regions	11	11	11	11	11
Variance: countries	1.23	1.20	1.16	1.24	1.38
Variance: regions	0.52	0.54	0.58	0.54	0.55
Variance: residual	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22

Note: Dependent variable: 5 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

G Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Developing Democracies and Anocracies

Although backsliding is a process particularly relevant to democracies, it may be that anocracies, or states between democracy and autocracy, also experience similar processes. Therefore, I re-estimate the models from Table 2 with a universe of cases that includes both developing democracies as well as developing anocracies, defined as country-years with a Polity score between -5 and 5. The results of these models, which can be found in Table 14 are similar to those in Table 2.

Table 14: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Democracies and Anocracies

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.26^{***}	-0.16^{***}	-0.40^{***}	-0.18^{***}	-0.42^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.14)
GDP pc (log)	0.71^{***}	0.67^{***}	0.72^{***}	0.68^{***}	0.70^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
GDP growth pc	-0.05^{*}	-0.06^{*}	-0.06^{*}	-0.06^{*}	-0.07^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lib. dem. index	-1.45^{***}	-1.46^{***}	-1.46^{***}	-1.47^{***}	-1.49^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
State age (log)	−0.02	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Time since demo transition	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Internal conflict	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	0.18	0.19	0.05	0.22	0.10
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Ethnic frac.	−0.04	−0.04	−0.06	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Mean region lib. democracy change	0.04	0.05	0.06^{*}	0.05	0.06^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lagged DV	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	3608.50	3616.72	3613.28	3615.26	3621.55
BIC	3691.57	3699.80	3696.36	3698.34	3704.63
Log. lik.	-1788.25	-1792.36	-1790.64	-1791.63	-1794.78
Observations	1329	1329	1329	1329	1329
Num. countries	81	81	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17	17	17
Variance: countries	0.65	0.64	0.66	0.66	0.75
Variance: regions	0.68	0.70	0.68	0.71	0.82
Variance: residual	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71

Note: Dependent variable: 5 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

H Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, Two-Stage Selection Models

Since not all new democracies are equally likely to join certain types of international organizations, there may be a selection problem in the data. To verify that selection bias is not driving the main results, I estimate a two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). The first stage models the selection process by using a probit model to estimate a state's probability of joining different types of IOs. Following Poast and Urpelainen (2015), the selection models include indicators for 4 continents—the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania—with Africa as the omitted category; these indicators are interacted with year (scaled) to model regional trends in IO membership over time. I also include an indicator for whether a state is in its first 5 years as a democracy, since research shows that new democracies are particularly likely to join IOs (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008).

The second stage outcome models draw on Table 2 and estimate the impact of IO memberships on a state's subsequent democratic trajectory; these models include the Mill's ratio, calculated using the predicted probabilities from the first stage selection models, as a control variable. The results of the first stage selection models can be found in Table 15, and the outcome models controlling for selection and with robust standard errors can be found in Table 16.

Controlling for potential selection effects, I still find evidence that membership in democratically committed and political and economic IOs makes subsequent democratic backsliding more likely in new democracies.

Table 15: Selection Models (First Stage)

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Interven IO
First 5 years as democracy	0.29^{**}	0.30^{**}	0.23^{*}	0.10	0.29^{**}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Americas	−0.06	−0.08	−0.21	−0.19	0.14
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Asia	-0.82^{***}	-0.84^{***}	-0.92^{***}	-1.11^{***}	−0.26
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.23)
Europe	−0.02	−0.04	−0.02	−0.03	0.55^{***}
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Oceania	0.30	−3.93	−0.45	−3.89	0.34
	(0.51)	(190.45)	(0.70)	(196.66)	(0.66)
Year	−0.20	−0.13	-0.47^{***}	−0.16	−0.06
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Americas × year	0.27	0.14	0.30	0.17	−0.03
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Asia × year	0.26	0.22	0.58^{**}	0.41	0.11
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.28)
Europe × year	0.06	−0.04	0.22	0.03	−0.14
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Oceania × year	0.79	−0.01	−0.05	0.12	−0.34
	(0.67)	(200.92)	(0.93)	(226.19)	(0.88)
Adjusted R^2	0.80	0.82	0.76	0.81	0.78
Observations	1331	1360	1202	1378	1304
Censored	1215	1264	1048	1292	1200
Observed	116	96	154	86	104

Note: Africa is the omitted category. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 16: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding with Selection Correction and Robust Standard Errors

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-1.06^{***}	-0.89^{***}	-0.21	-0.95^{***}	-0.36
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.29)
GDP pc (log)	1.08^{***}	1.12^{***}	1.20^{***}	1.17^{***}	1.24^{***}
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.22)
GDP growth pc	0.13	0.01	-0.00	0.09	-0.11
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Lib. dem. index	-1.77^{***}	-1.62^{***}	-1.96^{***}	-1.74^{***}	-2.10^{***}
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.11	-0.13	-0.07	-0.08	-0.20
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)
State age (log)	0.50^{***}	0.23	0.28^{**}	0.09	0.19
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.13)
Time since demo transition	-0.40^{***}	-0.39^{***}	-0.27^{**}	-0.42^{***}	-0.28^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Internal conflict	0.05	-0.00	-0.16^{**}	0.05	-0.22^{**}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Oil income pc	-14.12^{***}	-13.08^{***}	-11.43^{***}	-11.28^{***}	-14.05^{***}
	(3.43)	(3.57)	(2.74)	(3.41)	(3.90)
Ethnic frac.	0.04	-0.07	-0.11	-0.13	-0.16
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Mean region lib. democracy change	-0.12	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Lagged DV	-0.08	-0.09^{*}	0.05	-0.05	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Mills Ratio	-1.17^{**}	-1.23^{**}	-1.22^{**}	-1.16^{*}	-0.62
	(0.49)	(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.69)	(0.60)
Sigma	1.34	1.37	1.42	1.29	1.04
Rho	-0.88	-0.90	-0.86	-0.90	-0.60
R^2	0.66	0.67	0.62	0.65	0.65
Adjusted R^2	0.63	0.64	0.58	0.62	0.62
Observations	1383	1383	1383	1383	1383
Censored	1215	1215	1215	1215	1215
Observed	168	168	168	168	168

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

I Estimating the Effect of EU Accession: the Generalized Synthetic Control Method

There may be an unobservable third variable predicting both IO membership and backsliding, a problem endemic to non-experimental methods. An ideal experimental framework would include cases that received treatment (IO membership) and ones that are similar on all dimensions except for treatment status. Unfortunately, this scenario is not observable: all new democracies are members of IOs associated with democracy. Therefore, to approximate an experimental test of my argument, I use the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method (Xu, 2017).

This method combines the synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2015) and interactive fixed effects models (Bai, 2009), both of which have been used to estimate average treatment effects in time-series cross-sectional data. To approximate the counterfactual, the GSC method uses pre-treatment characteristics of treated units to choose weights for control units. These weighted control units are used to construct synthetic counterfactual cases. The estimated treatment effect is the difference in outcomes between the synthetic and observed units. The GSC method allows for heterogenous treatment effects across units and over time, and accounts for variations in time of treatment (Xu, 2017).

Since virtually all new democracies are members of the different groups of IOs considered in Table 2, it is difficult to identify a binary treatment status across groups of IOs. Therefore, I focus on a specific organization: the EU. The EU is a democratically committed, political and economic, and interventionist IO, so it captures all characteristics of IOs encapsulated in my theory. Furthermore, the EU is widely viewed as unparalleled in its democracy promoting abilities; therefore, this should be a particularly hard test for the theory. Using the `gsynth` package in `R`, I estimate the average treatment effect of EU accession on new democracies' subsequent democratic trajectories (Xu, 2017), and find additional support for my theory: EU accession has a negative and statistically significant treatment effect on states' democratic trajectories.

Since my theory focuses in particular on the impact of the EU on new democracies, I estimate the treatment effect for these states only. I include control units from several

regions. First, I include non-EU countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, since these states, like many of the newly democratic EU member states, have experiences with communism. I also include Latin American countries; after Europe, Latin America is the most densely democratic region in the world, and new democracies in these regions experienced similar transitions to democracy during the third wave of democracy. The treatment status plot in Figure 4 shows the treated and control cases.


EU Treatment Status
Country
Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Belarus (Byelorussia)
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia
Georgia
German Federal Republic
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Italy/Sardinia
Jamaica
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)
Mexico
Moldova
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia (Soviet Union)
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
Uruguay
Venezuela
year
Treated (Pre)
Treated (Post)
Controls
Missing

Figure 4

I use the same data and variables as those used for the main results reported in Table 2, with one difference. Instead of using the change in level of democracy as the dependent variable, I instead use a state's overall level of democracy. This is because, by estimating the average treatment effect on democracies only, the model conceptually captures the same process: does EU accession lead to an increase or decrease (positive or negative change) in a state's subsequent democratic trajectory? Since the dependent variable is now simply a state's liberal democracy score, the main independent variable (EU membership) and all of the control variables are not lagged as they were in Table 2. The results of the model are shown in Table 17. As my theory would predict, I find a negative and statistically significant average treatment effect of EU accession on states' subsequent democratic trajectories.

Table 17: The Effect of EU Accession on Democratic Trajectories

	Dependent variable: Liberal Democracy Index
Average Treatment Effect	-0.13^{*}
	(0.03)
Controls included	Yes
Unobserved factors	2
Observations	975
Treated states	8
Control states	17

Note: Standard errors based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 5 illustrates the treatment effect of EU accession, showing the average democratic trajectory of treated cases compared to control ones.

Figure 5: EU membership has a negative and statistically significant average treatment effect on states' democratic trajectories.

J Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding: No European Union

The European Union (EU) is arguably the IO most commonly associated with democracy promotion and the organization most likely to both increase executive power and to constrain its member states' domestic policy space. This, coupled with the results reported in Appendix I, raises the concern that EU membership is largely driving the results in Table 2. Although this is less likely since the main models include varying intercepts for region, I nevertheless re-estimate the models from Table 2, excluding EU membership altogether from the analysis. These models can be found in Table 18. The results from Table 2 hold even when the EU is removed from the data.

Table 18: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, No European Union

	Demo IO	Non-Univ Demo IO	Pol/Econ IO	Demo Pol/Econ IO	Struc/Interven IO
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.26^{***}	-0.19^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.36^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.13)
GDP pc (log)	0.81^{***}	0.76^{***}	0.75^{***}	0.77^{***}	0.72^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
GDP growth pc	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Lib. dem. index	-2.08^{***}	-2.07^{***}	-2.11^{***}	-2.09^{***}	-2.12^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
State age (log)	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Time since demo transition	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Internal conflict	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil income pc	0.95^{***}	0.93^{***}	0.86^{***}	0.99^{***}	0.98^{***}
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Ethnic frac.	-0.35^{**}	-0.34^{**}	-0.39^{**}	-0.35^{**}	-0.42^{**}
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Mean region lib. democracy change	0.07^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.09^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Lagged DV	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	1746.85	1748.35	1757.97	1747.54	1760.44
BIC	1822.43	1823.93	1833.55	1823.12	1836.02
Log. lik.	-857.43	-858.18	-862.98	-857.77	-864.22
Observations	832	832	832	832	832
Num. countries	58	58	58	58	58
Num. regions	15	15	15	15	15
Variance: countries	1.17	1.16	1.22	1.19	1.35
Variance: regions	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.39	0.37
Variance: residual	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34

Note: Dependent variable: 5 year change in Lib. Dem. index. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

K Summary Statistics, Executive Power

Table 19 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the executive power models in Table 3.

Table 19: Summary Statistics, Executive Power

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Horizontal account. index (5 year change)	2,357	0.16	0.50	−1.62	2.82
Num. struc/interven IO mems.	2,513	20.79	7.98	0	40
Num. pol/econ IO mems.	2,513	21.44	8.33	0	39
Num. pol/econ struc/interven IO mems.	2,513	10.59	4.14	0	20
Executive years in office	2,010	4.21	3.94	1	30
Executive controls legislature	1,891	0.39	0.49	0	1
Government fractionalization	2,012	−28.07	165.83	−999.00	0.89
Horizontal account. index	2,512	0.85	0.62	−1.41	2.43
GDP pc (logged)	2,276	8.81	0.99	6.22	10.74
GDP growth pc	2,250	2.82	5.95	−41.63	33.76
Lib. dem. index	2,510	0.53	0.19	0.05	0.88
State age (logged)	2,513	3.80	1.22	0.00	5.29
Time since demo transition	2,513	0.14	0.35	0	1

L Summary Statistics, Domestic Policy Space

Table 20 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the domestic policy space models in Table 4.

Table 20: Summary Statistics, Domestic Policy Space

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Distinct party platforms (5 year change)	2,349	0.13	0.50	−1.18	4.46
Num. pol/econ IO mems.	2,513	21.44	8.33	0	39
Num. struc/interven IO mems.	2,513	20.79	7.98	0	40
Num. pol/econ struc/interven IO mems.	2,513	10.59	4.14	0	20
GDP pc (logged)	2,276	8.81	0.99	6.22	10.74
GDP growth pc	2,250	2.82	5.95	−41.63	33.76
Lib. dem. index	2,510	0.53	0.19	0.05	0.88
Electoral system type	2,026	0.24	0.43	0	1
Presidential vs. parliamentary	2,070	1.83	0.95	1	3
Urbanization level	2,341	52.80	21.52	4.44	95.31
Distinct party platforms	2,512	1.29	1.00	−1.92	3.27
State age (logged)	2,513	3.80	1.22	0.00	5.29