

**VAL TILL KOMMUNFULLMÄKTIGE**


**Moderata Samlingspartiet**

Du får bara markera en av dessa **anmälda** kandidater.


- ☐ 1 Hans Jonsson, Lantbrukare, Ringarum
- ☐ 2 Anna Nilsson, Leg. Sjuksköterska, Fil.mag., Gryt
- ☐ 3 Karin Magnusson, Fritidspedagog, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 4 Monica Stillnert, Fru, Ringarum
- ☐ 5 Hans Andersson, Key Account Manager, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 6 Per Hollertz, Lantbrukare, Redovisningskonsult, Ringarum
- ☐ 7 Anita Esbjörnsson, Revisor, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 8 Charlotta Hollertz, Agronom, Mäklarassistent, Ringarum
- ☐ 9 Jan Ekroth, Företagare, Östra Ed
- ☐ 10 Göran Österdahl, Projektledare, Ringarum
- ☐ 11 Lennart Andersson, Yrkesofficer, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 12 Tord Andersson, Egen företagare, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 13 Lars Ekblad, Konsult, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 14 Torbjörn Stackling, Företagsekonom, Gryt
- ☐ 15 Rolf Swärd, F.d. officer, Gryt
- ☐ 16 Joel M. Hodt, Organisationskonsult, Valdemarsvik
- ☐ 17 Per Gunnarsson, Lantbrukare, Östra Ed

**Valdemarsviks Kommun**  
0001—01416

**Figure W1.** Example of an electoral ballot from a Swedish municipal election.



**Figure W2.** Distribution of the number of elected politicians in Swedish local political parties by then number of parties (left) and number of politicians (right).



**Figure W3.** Share of politicians with three representational styles by electoral ballot rank.

## Section W1. Fractional logit estimations

**Table W1.** Preference votes and the voter–politician relationship, without party group fixed effects.

	All	Top 3	Below Top 3
<b>A. Communication</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Communication intensity of own policy proposals (0–5)	0.873*** (0.150)	0.361 (0.403)	0.239*** (0.059)
Observations	5,128	1,092	4,036
Intensity of independent electoral promises (0–10)	0.497*** (0.059)	0.704*** (0.173)	0.130*** (0.020)
Observations	5,021	1,077	3,944
<b>B. Voter influence over policy and voting</b>			
Voter consultation in policy formulation (1–5)	0.090 (0.124)	0.597 (0.495)	0.087** (0.043)
Observations	5,156	1,111	4,045
Voters' preferences are top priority in voting (1–0)	-1.266*** (0.333)	-1.831 (1.602)	0.127 (0.159)
Observations	5,287	1,133	4,154

Notes: The table shows OLS estimations of the proportion of preference votes of individual politicians with different behaviors and preferences. Robust standard errors. \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%. The sample includes local parties with seven or more elected municipal councilors.

**Table W2.** Preference votes and the voter–politician relationship, fractional logit.

	All	Top 3	Below Top 3
<b>A. Communication</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Communication intensity of own policy proposals (0–5)	0.162*** (0.025)	0.027 (0.030)	0.101*** (0.023)
Observations	5,128	1,092	4,036
Intensity of independent electoral promises (0–10)	0.091***	0.051***	0.054***

	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Observations	5,021	1,077	3,944
<b>B. Voter influence over policy and voting</b>			
Voter consultation in policy formulation (1–5)	0.018 (0.025)	0.045 (0.037)	0.039** (0.019)
Observations	5,156	1,111	4,045
Voters' preferences are top priority in voting (1–0)	-0.285*** (0.082)	-0.144 (0.131)	0.056 (0.068)
Observations	5,287	1,133	4,154

Notes The table shows fractional logit estimates of the proportion of preference votes of individual politicians with different behaviors and preferences. Robust standard errors. \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%. The sample includes local parties with seven or more elected municipal councilors.

**Table W3.** Preference votes and ideological cohesion, without party group fixed effects.

	All	Top 3	Below Top 3
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Left-right ideological divergence (0-10)	-0.347*** (0.130)	-0.931* (0.519)	0.036 (0.072)
Observations	5,493	1,175	4,318
Deviation of economic policy preferences (0-4)	-0.107 (0.337)	-0.947 (1.209)	0.094 (0.129)
Observations	5,457	1,175	4,282
Deviation of social policy preferences (0-4)	-0.503 (0.364)	-0.522 (1.357)	0.102 (0.116)
Observations	5,477	1,178	4,299
Party's preferences should be top priority in voting (1-0)	0.273 (0.267)	1.580 (0.984)	-0.411*** (0.088)
Observations	5,287	1,133	4,154

Notes: The table shows OLS estimations of the proportion of preference votes of individual politicians with different behaviors and preferences. Robust standard errors. \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%. The sample includes local parties with seven or more elected municipal councilors.

**Table W4.** Preference votes and ideological cohesion, fractional logit.

	All	Top 3	Below Top 3
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Left–right ideological divergence (0–10)	-0.074** (0.029)	-0.072* (0.041)	0.016 (0.032)
Observations	5,493	1,175	4,318
Deviation of economic policy preferences (0–4)	-0.022 (0.069)	-0.072 (0.093)	0.041 (0.057)
Observations	5,457	1,175	4,282
Deviation of social policy preferences (0–4)	-0.104 (0.076)	-0.039 (0.103)	0.045 (0.051)
Observations	5,477	1,178	4,299
Party’s preferences should be top priority in voting (1–0)	0.056 (0.055)	0.120 (0.075)	-0.184*** (0.039)
Observations	5,287	1,133	4,154

Notes: The table shows fractional logit estimations of the proportion of preference votes of individual politicians with different behaviors and preferences. Robust standard errors. \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%. The sample includes local parties with seven or more elected municipal councilors


## Section W2. Regression Discontinuity Design for the preference vote threshold

If preference votes affect the voter–politician relationship or ideological cohesion, our estimation results would suffer from reverse causality. We would be capturing (at least to some extent) the politicians’ responses to votes rather than voters’ choices from among politicians.

To examine whether preference vote support shifts politicians’ preferences and behaviors, we use exogenous variation introduced by the system’s vote threshold of 5% of the party’s total vote in a precinct (following the method of Folke and Rickne 2012). Over 95% of the politicians who exceed this threshold would have been elected anyway via their list rank. For these politicians, passing the threshold thus only has a symbolic effect; we explore this symbolic effect

in this analysis. Exceeding the threshold changes the politician's formal "mode of election." People who pass it are counted as elected by the preference vote and not as elected from the party list. This also has some practical implications. One relates to the procedure for roll-call voting in the municipal assembly, where the people elected via preference votes are called before their party colleagues. Another is that passing the threshold signals voter popularity to the party, which according to Folke and Rickne (2012) increases the probability of being selected as the list leader in the next election by 8 percentage points (or 25% in relative terms). Because it is well known who passes this threshold or not, we argue that passing it induces a discrete shock in the politician's view of themselves as being more supported by voters, i.e., the same theoretical mechanism that is administered in a continuous fashion by the share of preference votes.

The regression discontinuity design (RDD) is straightforward. The forcing variable is the distance to the threshold for being elected via preference votes, and the treatment is a dummy variable for passing the 5% threshold and being elected via preference votes. Figure W1 displays the standard RDD graphs constructed using the *RDRobust* package of Calonico et al. (2017). On each side of the threshold we use 10 bins, and the fitted line is based on a second-order polynomial.



**Figure W4.** RD analysis of exceeding the preference vote threshold.

Notes: The graphs are constructed with the *RDRobust* package for STATA by Calonico et al. (2017). On each side of the threshold we use 10 bins and the using line is based on a second order polynomial.

None of the eight outcomes displays a clear jump at the threshold, indicating that preference votes do not impact the voter–politician relationship *or* ideological cohesion. To investigate this in a regression framework we employ the default options in the *RDRobust* package and summarize the results in Table W5.

**Table W5.** RD regression analysis of passing the preference vote threshold.



	Communication intensity of own policy proposals (0–5)	Intensity of independent electoral promises (0–10)
Preference vote elected	-0.128 (0.359)	-0.231 (0.888)
Observations	198	267
Bandwidth	0.013	0.017
	Voter consultation in policy formulation (1–5)	Voters' preferences are top priority in voting (1–0)
Preference vote elected	-0.097 (0.240)	-0.040 (0.058)
Observations	274	213
Bandwidth	0.017	0.010
	Left-right ideological divergence (0–10)	Deviation of economic policy preferences (0–4)
Preference vote elected	-0.389 (0.288)	-0.400** (0.131)
Observations	213	186
Bandwidth	0.013	0.011
	Deviation of social policy preferences (0–4)	Party's preferences should be top priority in voting (1–0)
Preference vote elected	-0.244* (0.123)	-0.048 (0.132)
Observations	199	162
Bandwidth	0.012	0.016

Notes: The analysis was conducted with the default options of the *RDRobust* STATA package by Calonico et al. (2017).

The results in Table W5 confirm the graphical findings that there is no effect with two exceptions: we find a negative and statistically significant effect of being elected through preference votes on deviation on both social and economic policy. The two estimates that are statistically significant at conventional levels should be interpreted with caution, as the estimated effect is driven by the observations right at the threshold, which can be seen in the figure. Furthermore, if preference votes have an actual effect on ideological deviation, the effect would increase – not lessen – the ideological cohesion within party groups.

## **Appendix References**

- Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., Farrell, M. H., & Titiunik, R. (2017). rdrobust: Software for regression-discontinuity designs. *The Stata Journal*, 17(2): 372–404.
- Folke, O., & Rickne, J. (2012). Personröster och politiska karriärer. *SNS analys*, 4, 1–11.