**Supplemental Material**

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Verbatim Instructions**

In Study 1, to measure employees’ self-regulatory thought, they read:

Now we would like you to think about your project. You are free to think about

whatever aspects come to your mind that are related to your project. Let the mental images pass by in your thoughts and do not hesitate to give your thoughts and images free rein.

In Study 2, to measure participants’ self-regulatory thought, they read:

Now we would like you to think about your wish. You are free to think about whatever

aspects come to your mind that are related to your wish. Let the mental images pass

by in your thoughts and do not hesitate to give your thoughts and images free rein.

Take as much time and space as you need to describe your thoughts.

In Study 2, to measure whether participants would donate all or a part of their bonus to charity, they read:

In addition to the 0.50$ you receive for participating in this study, you are eligible for a bonus of 0.50$ for finishing the full questionnaire. You have the option to keep the bonus for yourself or to anonymously donate the whole 50 cents or a smaller amount to a child cancer aid organization.

In Study 3, to measure self-regulatory thought and to manipulate responsibility, the students in the no responsibility control condition read:

Now we would like you to imagine that you will have to prepare a presentation in the named class together with two fellow-students of yours. The instructor informs you that your presentation will neither influence your own course grade nor the course grades of your fellow students. Let the mental images pass by in your thoughts and do not hesitate to give your thoughts and images free rein. Take as much time and space as you need to describe your thoughts.

In the responsibility for self condition, students learned that their presentation will influence their own course grade but *not* that of their fellows; in the responsibility for others condition, they learned their presentation will *not* influence their own course grade but that of their fellows, and in the responsibility for self and others condition they learned their presentation will influence their own course grade as well as that of their fellows.

In Study 4, to measure participants’ self-regulatory thought, they read:

Now we would like you to think about your wish. You are free to think about

whatever aspects come to your mind that are related to your wish. Let the mental images pass by in your thoughts and do not hesitate to give your thoughts and images free rein.

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Employed Coding Scheme**

Employed coding scheme from Sevincer and Oettingen (2013).

|  |
| --- |
| Desired future |
| Descriptions of the desired future (“I would like to get to know some people with whom I can spend my leisure time”).Consequences of attaining the outcomes feelings (“starting a family would make me very happy”) events (“our whole family would be together at Christmas”) material gains (“moving in together allows us to afford a bigger apartment”) nonmaterial gains (“I would have someone to talk to”) improvements of current situation (“I would not feel lonely anymore”) |
| Present reality |
| Descriptions of the present reality (“currently I am not very satisfied”)Obstacles in the present reality to attaining the desired outcomesinternal(“I am still mad at my brother”)external (“it is difficult to find a nice apartment”)potential (“I might get sick“) |
| Other  |
| Statements that could not be categorized as pertaining to the desired future or to the present reality:Ambiguous (“I have to take risks”)Past (“we always had a lot of fun together”)Self in general (“I am studying Psychology”)Experimental situation (“I hope I win the lottery”) |

**Study 1: Example of Segmentation and Coding of One Employee’s Elaboration**

In Study 1, one participant wrote the following elaboration:

Optimizing work processes leads to an increase in job satisfaction of my work colleagues and more efficiency. To make the project a success it is important that everybody contributes and does his part implement the guidelines. When the group is large, it is difficult to please everybody. There are always people who are not happy. It is difficult to find an ideal solution and one is never finished. When the circumstances change, everything has to be newly adapted.

This elaboration was divided and coded as follows: Optimizing work processes leads to an increase in job satisfaction of my work colleagues and more efficiency (desired future). To make the project a success it is important that everybody contributes and does his part implement the guidelines (present reality). When the group is large, it is difficult to please everybody (present reality). There are always people who are not happy (present reality). It is difficult to find an ideal solution and one is never finished (present reality). When the circumstances change, everything has to be newly adapted (present reality).

**Study 3: Manipulation Check**

In Study 3, to verify that students understood the scenario they were instructed to imagine, we asked: “How much do you think your presentation will influence your own course grade?” and “How much do you think your presentation will influence the course grades of your fellow students.” (7-point scales; 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very*).

 The students who were instructed to imagine that their presentation would influence their own grades reported (responsibility for self and responsibility for self and others condition combined) reported that their presentation would influence their own grades (*M* = 5.83, *SD* = 1.15) more than those who imagined that their presentation would not influence their own grades (responsibility for others and no responsibility control condition combined; *M* = 3.43*, SD* = 2.01), *t*(180.44) = 11.23, *p* < .001. Similarly, the students who imagined that their presentation would influence their fellows’ grades (responsibility for others and responsibility for self and others condition combined) reported that their presentation would influence their fellows’ grades (*M* = 5.47, *SD* = 1.39) more so than those who imagined that their presentation would not influence their fellows’ grades (responsibility for others and no responsibility control condition combined; *M* = 3.13, *SD* = 1.84), *t*(197.62) = 10.95, *p* < .001. Overall the pattern indicates that participants understood the instructions to induce responsibility for themselves or others correctly.

 **Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Analyses on the Number of Generated Statements**

In Study 1, the number of statements did not correlate with employees’ experienced responsibility for their team project, *r* = -.06, *p* = .584, or with the number of coworkers on their project, *r* = -.14, *p* = .202. This finding speaks against the alternative explanation that the more responsibility participants felt, the more statements they generated, and therefore they are those who use mental contrasting. The average number of statements differed between the four modes of thought, *F*(3, 245) = 4.39, p = .007. Mental contrasting participants generated on average 4.50 statements (*SD* = 2.38), indulging participants 2.10 statements (*SD* = 1.20), dwelling participants 3.76 statements (*SD* = 2.91) and reverse contrasting participants 6.18 statements (*SD* = 3.22).

 In Study 2, the number of statements did not correlate with participants’ self-reported empathy, *r* = .07, *p* = .32, their self-reported prosocial behavior, *r* = .05, *p* = .46, or with whether they donated, *r* = .10, *p* = .16 (point-biserial correlation). This pattern speaks against the alternative explanation that the more social responsibility participants took, the more statements they generated, and therefore the participants who took high responsibility are those who use mental contrasting. The average number of statements differed between the four modes of thought, *F*(3, 184) = 4.98, *p* = .002. Mental contrasting participants generated on average 5.40 statements (*SD* = 2.41), indulging participants 3.68 statements (*SD* = 2.53), dwelling participants 4.00 statements (*SD* = 2.71) and reverse contrasting participants 6.15 statements (*SD* = 7.07).

 In Study 3, the number of statements did not differ between the four responsibility conditions, *F*(3, 236) = 1.04, *p* = .38. This pattern speaks against the alternative explanation that the more social responsibility participants imagined, the more statements they generated, and therefore the participants who imagined having responsibility are those who use mental contrasting. As in Studies 1 and 2 the number of statements differed between the four modes of thought, *F*(3, 224) = 5.67, *p* = .001. Mentally contrasting participants generated on average 8.42 statements (*SD* = 4.83), indulging participants 6.68 statements (*SD* = 4.35), dwelling participants 7.52 statements (*SD* = 5.82), and reverse contrasting participants 10.81 statements (*SD* = 6.82).

In Study 4, the number of statements differed between the four responsibility conditions, *F*(3, 234) = 5.40, *p* = .001. Participants in the no Responsibility control condition generated on average 8.29 statements (*SD* = 6.35), those in the responsibility for self condition generated 8.51 statements (*SD* = 5.16), and those in the responsibility for others condition 7.31 statements (*SD* = 4.21). The participants in the responsibility for self and other condition generated 5.07 statements (*SD* = 4.70). Moreover, as in Studies 1, 2, and 3 the number of statements differed between the four modes of thought, *F*(3, 234) = 3.93, *p* = .009. Mentally contrasting participants generated on average 8.47 statements (*SD* = 5.79), indulging participants 6.05 statements (*SD* = 5.15), dwelling participants 7.77 statements (*SD* = 5.08), and reverse contrasting participants 8.82 statements (*SD* = 4.78).

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Explorative Follow-Up Analyses for Responsibility Predicting Mental Contrasting vs. Each of the Other Modes of Thought**

In all three studies, we performed explorative follow-up analyses to investigate whether responsibility was related to mental contrasting as compared to each of the other modes of thought (indulging, dwelling, reverse contrasting).

 Specifically, in Study 1, we conducted multinomial regression analyses with the categorical self-regulatory thought variable as the dependent variable and the continuous experienced responsibility index as predictor. The reference category was mental contrasting. Experienced responsibility predicted mental contrasting as compared to dwelling, *OR* = 3.09, *p =* .011, 95% CI [1.30, 7.36], and reverse contrasting, *OR* = 3.14, *p* = .034, 95% CI [1.09, 9.04]. It did not predict mental contrasting as compared to indulging, *p =* .20, 95% CI [0.68, 6.14].

 In Study 2, we conducted multinomial regression analyses for each of the three measures of social responsibility (self-reported empathy, self-reported altruistic behavior, and observed donation behavior) separately. The categorical self-regulatory thought variable was the dependent variable and the respective responsibility measure was predictor. The reference category was mental contrasting. Self-reported empathy predicted mental contrasting as compared to indulging, *OR* = 0.52, *p =* .014, 95% CI [0.31, 0.88], and reverse contrasting (marginally), *p* = .055, 95% CI [0.25, 1.01]. It did not predict mental contrasting as compared to dwelling, *p =* .15, 95% CI [0.30, 1.20]. Self-reported altruistic behavior predicted mental contrasting as compared to indulging, *OR* = 0.60, *p =* .049, 95% CI [0.36, 1.00]. It did not predict mental contrasting mental contrasting as compared to dwelling, *p* = .31, 95% CI [0.33, 1.42], and reverse contrasting, *p =* .11, 95% CI [0.25, 1.16]. Whether or not participants donated tended to predict mental contrasting as compared to indulging, *OR* = 0.45, *p =* .029, 95% CI [0.22, 0.92], and reverse contrasting, *OR* = 0.13, *p =* .010, 95% CI [0.03, 0.61]. It did not predict mental contrasting mental contrasting as compared to dwelling, *p* = .34, 95% CI [0.22, 1.70].

In Study 3, we conducted multinomial regression analyses for the effect of responsibility (vs. no responsibility) on mental contrasting as compared to each of the other modes of thought. The categorical self-regulatory thought variable was the dependent variable and the dummy-coded responsibility condition variable (the three responsibility conditions vs. the no responsibility control condition) was predictor. The reference category was mental contrasting. The dummy-coded responsibility condition variable predicted mental contrasting as compared to indulging, *OR* = 5.27, *p* < .001, 95% CI [2.31, 12.03]. It did not predict mental contrasting as compared to dwelling, *OR* = 0.50, *p* = .26, 95% CI [0.15, 1.66], and reverse contrasting, *OR* = 0.99, *p* = .99, 95% CI [0.37, 2.67].

In Study 4, we conducted analogous analyses as in Study 3. Specifically, we conducted multinomial regression analyses with the categorical self-regulatory thought variable as the dependent variable and the dummy-coded responsibility condition variable (the three responsibility conditions vs. the no responsibility control condition) as predictor. The reference category was mental contrasting. The dummy-coded responsibility condition variable predicted mental contrasting as compared to indulging, *OR* = 8.20, *p* < .001, 95% CI [2.75, 24.44], dwelling, *OR* = 3.98, *p* = .03, 95% CI [1.19, 13.25], and reverse contrasting, *OR* = 5.76, *p* = .006, 95% CI [1.64, 20.28].

In sum, for mental contrasting versus indulging, the comparison was significant or nearly significant in Studies 2, 3, and 4; for mental contrasting versus dwelling the comparison was significant in Studies 1 and 4; and for mental contrasting versus reverse contrasting it was significant in Studies 1, 2, and 4 (in Study 2 for self-reported empathy and self-reported altruistic behavior). Because as in all studies the power was low to detect differences in the use of mental contrasting versus each of the other modes of thought, the results of the follow-up analyses should be interpreted with caution. Importantly, all comparisons were in the predicted direction.

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Responsibility and the Other Modes of Thought**

To investigate whether responsibility was related to mental contrasting only or also to the other modes of thought, we tested whether responsibility predicted each of the other modes of thought (indulging, dwelling, reverse contrasting). In each study, we dummy-coded each mode of thought as a dichotomous variable (mode thought vs. all other modes of thought combined) and conducted hierarchical binary logistic regression analyses with the responsibility variable as predictor and the dummy-coded mode of thought variable as the dependent variable

In Study 1, felt responsibility did not predict indulging, *b* = .14, *p* = .74, *OR* = 1.15, and reverse contrasting, *b* = -.31, *p* = .42. It marginally predicted dwelling, *b* = -.53, *p* = .070, *OR* = 0.73, 95% CI [0.32, 1.05]. The higher the felt responsibility, the fewer employees tended to dwell. Given responsibility, measured by the number of team members, did not predict indulging, dwelling, or reverse contrasting, *p*s > .27.

In Study 2, felt responsibility measured by self-reported empathy marginally predicted indulging, *b* = -.33, *p* = .09, *OR* = 0.72, 95% CI [0.49, 1.05]. The higher their self-reported empathy, the more of the participants indulged. Self-reported empathy did not predict dwelling, *b* = -.02, *p* = .95, and reverse contrasting, *b* = -21, *p* = .46. Chronically taken responsibility measured by self-reported prosocial behavior did not predict indulging, b = -.28, *p* = .19, dwelling, *b* = .01, p = .99, or reverse contrasting, *b* = -.27, *p* = .44. Finally, observed ad-hoc taken responsibility, measured by whether or not participants donated a part or all of their bonus did not predict indulging, *b* = -.34, *p* = .28,, and dwelling, *b* = .16, *p* = .74. It predicted reverse contrasting however, *b* = -1.55, *p* = .042, *OR* = 0.21, 95% CI [0.05, 0.95]. Of the 62 participants who donated, 3% (2 participants) used reverse contrasting whereas of the 126 participants who did not donate 14% (18 participants) used reverse contrasting.

In Study 3, of the students in the three resonsibility conditions (responsibility for self, for others, and for self and others), more students used dwelling (24%; 44 out of 187) and fewer students used indulging (16%; 29 out of 187) than of those in the no responsibility control condition (dwelling: 8%; 4 out of 53; indulging: 53%; 28 out of 53), *b* = -1.36, *p* = .013, *OR* = 0.24, 95% CI [0.09, 0.76], and *b* = 1.83, *p* < .001, *OR* = 7.03, 95% CI [3.15, 12.27], respectively. There was no difference in the number of reverse contrasting students, *b* = -.58, *p* = .17.

In Study 4, of the participants in the three responsibility conditions, fewer participants used indulging (35%; 63 out of 179) than of those in the no responsibility control condition (60%; 39 out of 65), *b* = -1.02, *p* = .001, *OR* = 0.36, 95% CI [0.20, 0.65]. There was no difference in the number of dwelling and reverse contrasting students, *ps* > .51.

In summary, across four studies responsibility was systematically related to more participants using mental contrasting but it was unsystematically linked to each of the other modes of thought. This pattern suggests that the lower number of indulging, dwelling, and reverse contrasting participants when responsibility was high is likely due to the greater number of mentally contrasting participants rather than the other way around. In Study 1, responsibility was marginally related to fewer dwelling participants and to fewer reverse contrasting participants (for observed ad-hoc responsibility); in Study 3, it was related to more dwelling participants.

In Studies 2, 3, and 4 responsibility was linked to fewer indulging participants. We speculate that perhaps, when people feel responsible for bringing about an important outcome, they do not afford to daydream about having attained that outcome but rather engage in spontaneous self-regulation (by mental contrasting) geared at actually shouldering their responsibility.

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Responsibility and Mental Contrasting vs. Reverse Contrasting**

 Our finding that responsibility was systematically linked to the use of mental contrasting but not reverse contrasting is in line with theory and evidence that mental contrasting and reverse contrasting involve different processes. Specifically, mental contrasting but not reverse contrasting is a purposeful problem-solving strategy. In mental contrasting, imagining the desired study first and then reflecting on the present reality that stands in the way of the desired future leads people to realize that the reality is an obstacle to fulfilling their desired future (Kappes, Wendt, Reinelt, & Oettingen, 2013). Mental contrasting also strengthens implicit associative links between the future and the reality (A. Kappes & Oettingen, 2014) and between the reality and means to surmount the reality (A. Kappes, Singmann, & Oettingen, 2012). On the contrary, in reverse contrasting, the desired future is not taken as an anchor to which the present reality is then contrasted. As a consequence, people do not perceived the reality as an obstacle to fulfilling their desired future (Kappes et al., 2013). Accordingly, reverse contrasting does not strengthen implicit associative links between the future and the reality (A. Kappes & Oettingen, 2014) and between the reality and means to surmount the reality (A. Kappes, Singmann, & Oettingen, 2012). These findings hint that mental contrasting involves more complex information processing and is more cognitively demanding (i.e. effortful) than reverse contrasting.

 Support for the idea that mental contrasting is more cognitively effortful than reverse contrasting comes from two studies by Sevincer, Schlier, and Oettingen (2015) on the effect of ego-depletion on the spontaneous use of mental contrasting. In these studies, participants were either depleted or not depleted. As predicted, presumably because mental contrasting requires cognitive effort, the depleted participants were less likely to use mental contrasting than the non-depleted participants. There was no difference between in the use of reverse contrasting however between the depleted and the non-depleted participants. This pattern indicates that mental contrasting but not reverse contrasting is a cognitively effortful self-regulation strategy. Moreover, neuropsycholgical evidence indicates that mental contrasting involves more complex information processing than other modes of thought (Achtziger, Fehr, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Rockstroh, 2009).

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Frequency of the Other Modes of Thought**

When we inspected the proportion of indulging and dwelling participants, this proportion varied from study to study. The proportion of indulging participants ranged between 11% (Study 1) and 50% (Study 2), the proportion of dwelling participants between 12% (Study 2) and 42% (Study 1). This pattern is in line with previous research suggesting that the use of indulging and dwelling depends on the context of the participants (Sevincer & Oettingen, 2013; Sevincer et al., 2015, 2017). The proportion of reverse contrasting participants ranged between 13% (Study 4) and 28% (Study 3) and resembled the proportion of mentally contrasting participants. This finding is also in line with other studies (between 20 and 24%).

**Studies 3 and 4: Explorative Follow-Up Analyses for the Single Responsibility Conditions Predicting Mental Contrasting**

We conducted explorative follow-up analyses to explore whether each of the single responsibility conditions - responsibility for self only, responsibility for others only, and responsibility for self and others, led participants to use mental contrasting.

In Study 3, only in the responsibility-for-self-only condition more participants (37%) used mental contrasting than in the control condition (21%), *p* = .035. The difference between each of the other two conditions and the control condition was in the predicted direction but it was not statistically significant (33% vs. 21% and 26% vs 21%, *p* = .14, and *p* =.45, respectively).

In Study 4, in each of the three responsibility conditions (responsibility for self: 24%, responsibility for others: 30%, responsibility for self and others: 29%), more participants used mental contrasting than in the no-responsibility-control condition (6%), *p*s < .006.

Supplementary Tables 1 to 6 depict summaries of the regression analyses.

**Studies 3 and 4: Proportion of Mentally Contrasting Participants Between the Three Responsibility Conditions**

To investigate, whether responsibility for oneself, for others, or for both self and

others, differentially impacts the use of mental contrasting, we compared the number of mentally contrasting participants between the three responsibility conditions (responsibility for self, for others, or for both self and others).

 In Study 3, the proportion of participants using mental contrasting did not differ between the responsibility for self and the responsibility for others conditions (37% vs. 33%), 2(1) = 0.54, *p* = .46. Nor did it differ between the responsibility for self and the responsibility for self and others condition, (37% vs. 26%), 2(1) = 2.31, *p* = .13, and between the responsibility for others and the responsibility for self and others condition (33% vs. 26%), 2(1) = 0.67, *p* = .42.

 The same pattern emerged in Study 4. The proportion of participants using mental contrasting did not differ between the responsibility for self and the responsibility for others conditions (24% vs. 30%), 2(1) = 0.69, *p* = .41. Nor did it differ between the responsibility for self and the responsibility for self and others condition, (24% vs. 29%), 2(1) = 0.56, *p* = .45, and between the responsibility for others and the responsibility for self and others condition (30% vs. 29%), 2(1) = 0.01, *p* = .94.

This pattern suggest that feeling responsibility for oneself leads people to use mental contrasting just as feeling responsibility for others does and, moreover, that feeling responsibility for both self and others has no incremental effect on the use of mental contrasting.

**Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4: Meta-Analysis for the Relation between Responsibility and the Use of Mental Contrasting**

In three studies we investigated the relationship between responsibility and the use of mental contrasting. In the correlational Studies 1 and 2, we observed a relationship between greater responsibility and the use of mental contrasting (Study 1:felt responsibility*, p* = .01, *d* = 0.56; given responsibility, *p* = .21, *d* = 0.30; Study 2: felt responsibility: *p* = .01, *d* = 0.38, self-reported taken responsibility, *p* = .04, *d* = 0.30, observed taken responsibility: *p* = .01, *d* = 0.38). In the experimental Studies 3 and 4 we observed an effect of responsibility (for self, others, or self and others vs. no responsibility) on the use of mental contrasting (Study 3: *p* = 0.097, *d* = 0.35, Study 4: *p* = .001, *d* = 1.03). Because in Study 3, the effect was only marginally significant, we conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the overall *p*-value and effect size across all four studies.

Because in Studies 1 and 2 we had multiple responsibility measures, we first estimated the combined *p*-value and averaged effect size for each Study 1 and Study 2. To combine the *p*-values we used Stouffer's method (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949; Whitlock, 2005). This procedure yielded *p* = .013, and *d* = .43 for Study 1, and *p* = .0001, *d* = .35 for Study 2.

We then combined the *p*-values across all four studies, again using Stouffer’s method, which yielded *p* = 0.00000012. The average weighted effect size was *d* = 0.58, which is a medium effect.

**References for the Supplemental Material**

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Supplementary Table 1

*Study 3: Summary of Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Responsibility for Self Only (Responsibility Self vs. No Responsibility Control Condition), Expectations, Incentive Value, and Number of Statements Predicting the Dummy-Coded Mental Contrasting Variable (Mental Contrasting vs. Not)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor  | *B* | *SE B* | *p* | *OR* | 95% CI  |
| Step 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | .93 | .44 | .035 | 0.39 | [0.17, 0.94] |
| Step 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | 1.06 | .46 | .02 | 0.35 | [0.14, 0.86] |
|  Expectations | .23 | .20 | .25 | 1.25 | [0.85, 1.85] |
|  Incentive | .15 | .21 | .47 | 1.17 | [0.77, 1.76] |
|  Number of Statements | -.05 | .05 | .32 | 0.96 | [0.88, 1.04] |

*Note*. *R*2 = .06, *p* = .03 for Step 1, Δ*R*2 =.06,*p* = .18, for Step 2

Supplementary Table 2

*Study 3: Summary of Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Responsibility for Others Only (Responsibility for Others vs. No Responsibility Control Condition), Expectations, Incentive Value, and Number of Statements Predicting the Dummy-Coded Mental Contrasting Variable (Mental Contrasting vs. Not)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor  | *B* | *SE B* | *p* | *OR* | 95% CI  |
| Step 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | .32 | .22 | .14 | 0.72 | [0.47, 1.11] |
| Step 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | .33 | .22 | .13 | 0.72 | [0.47, 1.11] |
|  Expectations | .08 | .21 | .72 | 1.08 | [0.71, 1.64] |
|  Incentive | .04 | .22 | .84 | 1.05 | [0.68, 1.61] |
|  Number of Statements | -.01 | .04 | .80 | 0.99 | [0.92, 1.07] |

*Note*. *R*2 = .03, *p* = .13 for Step 1, Δ*R*2 =.01,*p* = .92, for Step 2

Supplementary Table 3

*Study 3: Summary of Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Responsibility for Both Self and Others (Responsibility Self and Others vs. No Responsibility Control Condition), Expectations, Incentive Value, and Number of Statements Predicting the Dummy-Coded Mental Contrasting Variable (Mental Contrasting vs. Not)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor  | *B* | *SE B* | *p* | *OR* | 95% CI  |
| Step 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | .33 | .44 | .45 | 0.72 | [0.30, 1.70] |
| Step 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition | .46 | .46 | .32 | 0.63 | [0.26, 1.55] |
|  Expectations | .25 | .25 | .32 | 1.28 | [0.79, 2.07] |
|  Incentive | .02 | .24 | .94 | 1.02 | [0.63, 1.63] |
|  Number of Statements | .04 | .04 | .36 | 1.04 | [0.96, 1.13] |

*Note*. *R*2 = .01, *p* = .45 for Step 1, Δ*R*2 =.03,*p* = .50, for Step 2

Supplementary Table 4

*Study 4: Summary of Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Responsibility for Self Only (Responsibility Self vs. No Responsibility Control Condition), Expectations, Incentive Value, and Number of Statements Predicting the Dummy-Coded Mental Contrasting Variable (Mental Contrasting vs. Not)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor  | *B* | *SE B* | *p* | *OR* | 95% CI  |
| Step 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | 1.65 | .59 | .005 | 5.19 | [1.63, 16.56] |
| Step 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | 1.83 | .65 | .005 | 6.24 | [1.76, 22.14] |
|  Expectations | -.03 | .19 | .89 | 0.96 | [0.68, 1.40] |
|  Incentive | -.28 | .24 | .25 | 0.76 | [0.48, 1.21] |
|  Number of Statements | .07 | .04 | .07 | 1.07 | [1.00, 1.16] |

*Note*. *R*2 = 0.12, *p* = .002 for Step 1, Δ*R*2 =.02,*p* = .15, for Step 2

Supplementary Table 5

*Study 4: Summary of Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Responsibility for Others Only (Responsibility for Others vs. No Responsibility Control Condition), Expectations, Incentive Value, and Number of Statements Predicting the Dummy-Coded Mental Contrasting Variable (Mental Contrasting vs. Not)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor  | *B* | *SE B* | *p* | *OR* | 95% CI  |
| Step 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | .99 | .29 | .001 | 2.69 | [1.52, 4.78] |
| Step 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | 1.08 | .32 | .001 | 2.94 | [1.56, 5.53] |
|  Expectations | -.06 | .15 | .71 | 0.95 | [0.71, 1.26] |
|  Incentive | .48 | .29 | .11 | 1.58 | [0.90, 2.77] |
|  Number of Statements |  .07 | .04 | .12 | 1.07 | [0.98, 1.16] |

*Note*. *R*2 = .18, *p* < .001 for Step 1, Δ*R*2 =.08,*p* = .07, for Step 2

Supplementary Table 6

*Study 4: Summary of Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Responsibility for Both Self and Others (Responsibility Self and Others vs. No Responsibility Control Condition), Expectations, Incentive Value, and Number of Statements Predicting the Dummy-Coded Mental Contrasting Variable (Mental Contrasting vs. Not)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor  | *B* | *SE B* | *p* | *OR* | 95% CI  |
| Step 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition  | .65 | .20 | .001 | 1.91 | [1.30, 2.82] |
| Step 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Responsibility condition | .72 | .23 | .002 | 2.06 | [1.31, 3.22] |
|  Expectations | -.16 | .16 | .33 | 0.85 | [0.62, 1.17] |
|  Incentive | .61 | .36 | .09 | 1.83 | [0.90, 3.73] |
|  Number of Statements | .03 | .04 | .56 | 1.03 | [0.94, 1.11] |

*Note*. *R*2 = .18, *p* < .001 for Step 1, Δ*R*2 =.05,*p* = .24, for Step 2