# Supplemental Information

(for online appendix)

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# A Partisanship by Region Figure 1 Notes

Figure 1 uses AfroBarometer rounds 1-6 (1999-2015), AmericasBarometer 1-6 (2004-2014), and European Social Survey 1-5 (2002-2012) data. The countries used in each are listed below.

Afrobarometer countries include: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. More details can be found about the sampling and survey design in each round and country here: https://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods

Americasbarometer countries include: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. More details can be found about the sampling and survey design in each round and country here: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php

European Social Survey countries include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. More details can be found about the sampling and survey design in each round and country here: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/

# B Descriptive Statistics Main Analysis and Number of Observations by Country and Survey Round

The Afrobarometer dataset includes the following countries: since Round 1 - Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe;

since Round 2 - Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal; since Round 3 - Benin, Madagascar; since Round 4 - Burkina Faso, Liberia; since Round 5 - Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger, Sudan, Togo; since Round 6 - Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe.

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics

| **Variable** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** | **N** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Partisanship | 0.59 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 186548 |
| Rural | 0.61 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 186013 |
| Coethnic Candidate | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 | 187662 |
| Electoral Cycle | 0.49 | 0.20 | 0.03 | 0.99 | 187662 |
| Experience with Democracy | 10.07 | 8.67 | 0 | 77 | 187662 |
| Electoral Volatility | 12.49 | 13.99 | 0 | 54.22 | 187662 |
| Party Age | 21.85 | 11.31 | 1.67 | 52 | 187662 |
| Party Fractionalization | 0.51 | 0.18 | 0 | 0.89 | 187662 |
| Age | 36.62 | 14.54 | 18 | 100 | 187662 |
| Male | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 187547 |
| Educated | 0.66 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 | 187662 |

Table B.2: Percentage Partisan across Country-Rounds




*Notes:* Violin plot depicting the kernel density (bulge), range (line), interquartile range (bar), and median (dot) of the percentage partisan in country-rounds in the Afrobarometer Rounds 1-6.

Table B.3: Number of Observations by Country and Survey Round

| | Afrobarometer Round | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Total |
| Benin | – | – | 1194 | 1192 | 1189 | 1199 | 4774 |
| Botswana | 1180 | 1193 | 1187 | 1196 | 1199 | 1199 | 7154 |
| Burkina Faso | – | – | – | 1147 | 1186 | 1200 | 3533 |
| Burundi | – | – | – | – | 1200 | 1200 | 2400 |
| Cameroon | – | – | – | – | 1180 | 1179 | 2359 |
| Cape Verde | – | 1256 | 1251 | 1264 | 1203 | 1197 | 6171 |
| Gabon | – | – | – | – | – | 1198 | 1198 |
| Ghana | 2002 | 1164 | 1169 | 1183 | 2399 | 2374 | 10291 |
| Guinea | – | – | – | – | 1199 | 1194 | 2393 |
| Ivory Coast | – | – | – | – | 1192 | 1199 | 2391 |
| Kenya | – | 2372 | 1271 | 1100 | 2383 | 2389 | 9515 |
| Lesotho | 1137 | 1189 | 1155 | 1184 | 1190 | 1196 | 7051 |
| Liberia | – | – | – | 1197 | 1183 | 1166 | 3546 |
| Madagascar | – | – | 1338 | 1340 | 1193 | 1200 | 5071 |
| Malawi | 1139 | 1117 | 1139 | 1141 | 2353 | 2376 | 9265 |
| Mali | 1983 | 1225 | 1224 | 1217 | 1198 | 1200 | 8047 |
| Mozambique | – | 1193 | 1145 | 1147 | 2268 | 2318 | 8066 |
| Namibia | 1161 | 1191 | 1200 | 1200 | 1194 | 1200 | 7146 |
| Niger | – | – | – | – | 1196 | 1194 | 2390 |
| Nigeria | 3603 | 2416 | 2349 | 2316 | 2383 | 2400 | 15467 |
| Sao Tome And Principe | – | – | – | – | – | 1185 | 1185 |
| Senegal | – | 1166 | 1181 | 1186 | 1196 | 1197 | 5926 |
| Sierra Leone | – | – | – | – | 1179 | 1185 | 2364 |
| South Africa | 2190 | 2321 | 2392 | 2375 | 2361 | 2382 | 14021 |
| Sudan | – | – | – | – | 1186 | 1198 | 2384 |
| Tanzania | 2159 | 1197 | 1275 | 1193 | 2398 | 2373 | 10595 |
| Togo | – | – | – | – | 1194 | 1197 | 2391 |
| Uganda | 2204 | 2382 | 2393 | 2421 | 2381 | 2387 | 14168 |
| Zambia | 1174 | 1184 | 1195 | 1191 | 1198 | 1171 | 7113 |
| Zimbabwe | 1165 | 1097 | 1046 | 1189 | 2395 | 2395 | 9287 |
| Total | 21097 | 23663 | 25104 | 27379 | 43971 | 46448 | 187662 |

Table B.4: Percent Partisan by Country and Survey Round

| Country | Afrobarometer Round | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Total |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Benin | – | – | 32.9 | 37.4 | 38.4 | 41.4 | 37.5 |
| Botswana | 75.2 | 61.9 | 78.8 | 77.6 | 63.7 | 72.9 | 71.7 |
| Burkina Faso | – | – | – | 52.0 | 63.2 | 35.0 | 50.0 |
| Burundi | – | – | – | – | 67.3 | 71.4 | 69.4 |
| Cameroon | – | – | – | – | 41.5 | 45.8 | 43.6 |
| Cape Verde | – | 49.9 | 52.4 | 61.9 | 60.2 | 37.8 | 52.5 |
| Gabon | – | – | – | – | – | 31.3 | 31.3 |
| Ghana | 66.9 | 66.1 | 66.7 | 60.5 | 59.6 | 59.8 | 62.7 |
| Guinea | – | – | – | – | 57.0 | 57.6 | 57.3 |
| Ivory Coast | – | – | – | – | 53.7 | 58.7 | 56.2 |
| Kenya | – | 68.1 | 63.4 | 67.6 | 57.9 | 64.7 | 63.9 |
| Lesotho | 56.5 | 74.7 | 76.6 | 56.6 | 65.9 | 68.1 | 66.4 |
| Liberia | – | – | – | 44.8 | 68.1 | 70.3 | 60.9 |
| Madagascar | – | – | 37.9 | 37.0 | 29.9 | 51.7 | 39.1 |
| Malawi | 81.6 | 66.8 | 62.2 | 68.1 | 59.5 | 74.1 | 68.2 |
| Mali | 59.5 | 61.2 | 61.4 | 69.0 | 40.8 | 67.9 | 59.9 |
| Mozambique | – | 62.8 | 82.3 | 71.3 | 71.4 | 59.1 | 68.2 |
| Namibia | 70.8 | 78.8 | 81.5 | 65.7 | 69.2 | 76.4 | 73.7 |
| Niger | – | – | – | – | 80.4 | 77.2 | 78.8 |
| Nigeria | 36.8 | 50.3 | 46.9 | 48.7 | 44.5 | 68.9 | 48.4 |
| Sao Tome And Principe | – | – | – | – | – | 57.2 | 57.2 |
| Senegal | – | 54.9 | 53.1 | 52.5 | 60.1 | 59.4 | 56.0 |
| Sierra Leone | – | – | – | – | 73.7 | 71.7 | 72.7 |
| South Africa | 44.2 | 67.5 | 63.4 | 58.3 | 59.3 | 68.8 | 60.3 |
| Sudan | – | – | – | – | 41.2 | 38.9 | 40.1 |
| Tanzania | 79.0 | 70.7 | 76.2 | 81.7 | 83.2 | 75.3 | 78.2 |
| Togo | – | – | – | – | 34.4 | 36.3 | 35.4 |
| Uganda | 28.7 | 48.5 | 60.8 | 65.3 | 72.3 | 74.7 | 58.8 |
| Zambia | 36.6 | 38.9 | 52.4 | 58.8 | 49.7 | 52.7 | 48.2 |
| Zimbabwe | 44.8 | 43.8 | 64.7 | 52.1 | 63.6 | 67.3 | 58.7 |
| Total | 53.9 | 59.9 | 61.0 | 58.9 | 59.5 | 61.7 | 59.6 |

## C Notes on PIPES Dataset Updates

This dataset contains all of the countries and years which are included in Afrobarometer data from Rounds 1-6 (including six in-between Afrobarometer surveys from Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe). Data up to 2008 are taken from the PIPES data set (https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/adam-przeworski/home/data). Past that the data have been updated.

A few non-PIPES variables are included. The number of cumulative years of democracy a country has experienced is coded as cum_dem_age. The variable transition is coded as the most recent transition to multiparty democracy, and ignores recent coups/military governments as most did not retain power very long in any given country.

There are two coup variables ? total number of successful coups since a country became independent and coups since the third wave of democracy really hit Africa ? beginning in 1991. They are coded as suc_coups and coups_after1991. These are different from Przeworksi?s coup codings which are only coded as 1 if the successful coup to place that year.

A few countries which would be coded as missing data in Przerworski?s dataset are coded as 0 in this version so that they will not be dropped from the analysis. As an example, Madagascar's electoral_age and republic_age variables should be coded as missing since the recent coup because there haven?t been two consecutive democratic elections. Guinea and Ivory Coast have these same codings because of relatively recent coups. Swaziland, has never had multi-party democratic elections, and there for is coded is having zero years of democracy, no transition or turnover either.

All of the variables are coded from the first full year of a phenomenon (democracy, age of the leadership, years of democracy, etc.). For example, if a leader was elected in 2005, the variable head_age would be coded as 0 because he/she had not been in power for a full year. Note: For head_age in Lesotho the variable is the prime minister, not the king.

Codings that were difficult calls (results are insensitive to recodes or dropping of whole countries):

(1) Burkina Faso: The democratic transition is coded as beginning from 1998, but Blaise Compaor? still won nearly 90 percent of the vote and it was boycotted by the opposition.

(2) Senegal has had elections since 1978, but it may be questionable as to whether to consider them as free and fair.

(3) Togo is coded as not having a transition even though the current president is from a different party from the previous president because he switched political parties during his second term.

# D Notes on Weghorst and Bernhard Electoral Volatility Updates

This section describes the data used in the 2014 article "From Formlessness to Structure? The Institutionalization of Competitive Party Systems in Africa" by Weghorst and Bernhard. This data is publicly available here: http://www.keithweghorst.com/parties-and-party-systems.html. We update the following variables, extending the data forward in time.

**elect_year** The year of the election, in which all the data for electoral volatility is coded.

**dominant** Whether the country has a dominant political party as originally defined by Sartori (1976) and updated by Bogaards (2008), which requires that the party controls the legislature and the executive for three consecutive terms. Bogaards (2008) coding used as data is available and updated for more recent elections (after 2004).[1]

**contiguous_elections** Following Weghorst and Bernhard (2014). These are uninterrupted democratic elections (meaning if a military coup took place, this number went back to 1).

**multi_mwc** This is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the party needed a minimum winning coalition of multiple ethnic groups and coded as 0 if they did not.

**no_mwc** This is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the party in power had no ethnic minimum winning coalition and 0 if they did.

**parliamentarism** A dichotomous variable where a country scores 1 if they have a parliamentary system and 0 if they do not. This is taken from Weghorst and Bernhard (2014), and extended for newer elections/political reforms.

**typea_100** Following Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) and Brader and Powell (2013). Type A volatility is the percentage share of parliamentary seats of new parties entering and old parties exiting between two parliamentary elections divided by two. This variable multiplies the proportion

[1] *Note:* in Bogaards coding elections do not need to be competitive, but they do need to take place. This practice is followed.

by 100, and so do subsequent electoral volatility variables (**typeb_100** and **totalvol_100**).

Following the authors, electoral volatility scores are missing for survey rounds in countries which have recently experienced coups, since electoral volatility scores require two consecutive elections without unconstitutional interruption or democratic breakdown to be calculated. For example, in our dataset there were coups in Guinea in 2009, Madagascar in 2009, Mali in 2012, Niger in 2010, interrupting elections, and they are coded with a missing score for surveys occurring in years afterwards.

Data from rounds 1-4 and some countries from round 5 are in the Weghorst and Bernhard dataset. The updates for newer elections for rounds 5 and 6 were conducted using the PARLINE database on national parliaments: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp. These data were corroborated with the African Elections Database: africanelections.tripod.com. The site is often not active, but Google Chrome stored a cache of the site which meant that it could be accessed. The final website that was used was Adam Carr's Election Archive: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, which contained data on nearly every election in the continent.

# E Presidential and Vice-Presidential Coethnicity Coding

Note, we have combined forces with other coauthors who were concurrently aiming to build a similar dataset (citation omitted). In the dataset, which will be publicly available, a research assistant has cross-checked coding from both endeavors and is currently adding more variables that are not used in this particular study.

This coding of presidents and vice-presidents, or the equivalent in parliamentary systems, entailed much archival investigation in reference books, as well as online investigation into local news sources, given the difficulty of finding information regarding especially losing parties' candidates. The coding protocol required that the ethnicity of the candidate be verified in at minimum two sources. Afrobarometer queries respondents' ethnicity, although the coding is not as fine-grained as would be ideal. We include candidates from any party with more than 5% of the presidential vote share.

Here are the original instructions from our coding below.

**Instructions for Coding the Ethnicity of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Winning and Losing Candidates (or Equivalent in Parliamentary Systems)**

- Purpose: to assess whether having a coethnic in a leadership position of a party affects partisanship, we code ethnicity of presidential and vice-presidential candidates (prime ministerial and deputy prime ministerial candidates in parliamentary system) for national elections in African countries.
- Time period: first national election in 1990s - 2016
- Subjects: presidential and vice-presidential candidates (deputy prime ministerial candidates from parties) that received greater than 5% of the vote for presidential election (general election) during the relevant election period.
- Categories: classifications of ethnic groups in Afrobarometer survey is used. In cases where there are two different levels of ethnic groups, both higher and lower levels are coded in our

raw data. The ethnic group (socially and politically salient) used in our main result is bolded in the data provided.

- Sources: our golden rule is to find two different sources other than Wikipedia. If this criterion is not met, corresponding information is highlighted. Our sources encompass published books, international and local media outlets, online encyclopedia, as well as Wikipedia.

**Instructions for Coding Place of Origin of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Winning and Losing Candidates (or Equivalent in Parliamentary Systems)**

- Purpose: We want to code the place of origin of a politician. The purpose of coding the birthplace is based on the premise that citizens might vote for a politician who comes from the same region as them. The birthplace will be coded instead of where the politician is raised, but if the place where a politician is born and raised are different, make a note of this.
- Time period: first national election in 1990s - 2016
- Subjects: presidential and vice-presidential candidates (deputy prime ministerial candidates from parties) that received greater than 5% of the vote for presidential election (general election) during the relevant election period.
- Categories of Region: classifications of regions in Afrobarometer survey. In cases where there are two different levels of ethnic groups, both higher and lower levels are coded in the raw data. The ethnic group (socially and politically salient) used in our main result is bolded in the data provided.
- Check out the regional classification used in Afrobarometer survey is used. In cases where there are multiple layers with regard to regional categories, we coded up to three levels of subnational units in our raw data. The regional level used in our main result is bolded in the data provided.

- Sources: our golden rule is to find two different sources other than Wikipedia. If this criterion is not met, corresponding information is highlighted. Our sources encompass published books, international and local media outlets, online encyclopedia, as well as Wikipedia.

# F Robustness Checks Main Findings

We use linear probability models with country and survey round fixed effects and standard errors clustered by survey-round as our primary model. Such models ease coefficient interpretation and avoid problems of identification via functional forms that can result from maximum likelihood. This approach allows us to estimate the impact of the time-varying contextual factors, while the impact of time-invariant contextual factors will be soaked up by the country fixed effects, thereby controlling for any unobservable and potentially confounding time-invariant factors at the country level. Further, linear probability models are also less prone to bias via the incidental parameter problem that can result from models with large numbers of fixed effects.

We deal with missingness by assigning the variable mean and adding an indicator variable to indicate missing status on a particular observation for the particular variable. This practice allows observations to remain in the analysis to factor into other coefficient testing, while unable to affect results for the missing variable. For example, some Afrobarometer country-rounds lack data on respondent ethnicity and in some cases electoral volatility can not be calculated because it requires two contiguous elections.

In the following tables, we show robustness of our models in the main text to alternative operationalizations of variables, model specifications, and other estimation choices.

## F.1 Missingness

Table F.1: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Listwise Deletion

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0762** | 0.0759** | 0.0797** | 0.0693** | 0.0719** |
| | (0.0060) | (0.0059) | (0.0067) | (0.0081) | (0.0085) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0043 | -0.0047 | 0.0036 | -0.0090 | -0.0072 |
| | (0.0081) | (0.0081) | (0.0088) | (0.0126) | (0.0141) |
| Age | 0.0015** | 0.0003 | 0.0017** | 0.0014** | 0.0003 |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0005) |
| Male | 0.0715** | 0.0724** | 0.0684** | 0.0794** | 0.0767** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0060) | (0.0067) | (0.0087) | (0.0097) |
| Educated | 0.0189** | 0.0205** | 0.0223** | 0.0393** | 0.0317** |
| | (0.0069) | (0.0068) | (0.0070) | (0.0098) | (0.0104) |
| Experience with Democracy | | 0.0037** | | | 0.0031** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0009) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | 0.0003 | | -0.0008 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0009) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0017 | | -0.0006 |
| | | | (0.0015) | | (0.0028) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0353 | | 0.0066 |
| | | | (0.0842) | | (0.1285) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | 0.1393† | 0.1714† |
| | | | | (0.0794) | (0.0948) |
| Electoral Cycle$^2$ | | | | -0.0969 | -0.1367 |
| | | | | (0.0745) | (0.0935) |
| Observations | 136880 | 136880 | 115317 | 60631 | 53396 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 25 | 19 | 17 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.2: Coethnicity Robustness – Survey Rounds 3 to 6

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0762** | 0.0759** | 0.0756** | 0.0763** | 0.0755** |
| | (0.0060) | (0.0059) | (0.0061) | (0.0060) | (0.0060) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0043 | -0.0047 | -0.0055 | -0.0025 | -0.0044 |
| | (0.0081) | (0.0081) | (0.0083) | (0.0081) | (0.0083) |
| Age | 0.0015** | 0.0003 | 0.0015** | 0.0015** | 0.0003 |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) |
| Male | 0.0715** | 0.0724** | 0.0712** | 0.0715** | 0.0721** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0060) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0189** | 0.0205** | 0.0213** | 0.0190** | 0.0238** |
| | (0.0069) | (0.0068) | (0.0064) | (0.0068) | (0.0061) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0037** | | | 0.0039** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0000 | | 0.0003 |
| | | | (0.0006) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0029* | | -0.0026 |
| | | | (0.0014) | | (0.0015) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.1401* | | -0.1565** |
| | | | (0.0625) | | (0.0570) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.1277 | -0.1746 |
| | | | | (0.1355) | (0.1608) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.1755 | 0.1969 |
| | | | | (0.1402) | (0.1611) |
| Observations | 136880 | 136880 | 136880 | 136880 | 136880 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

## F.2 Other Model Specifications

Table F.3: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Education Robustness

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0735** | 0.0733** | 0.0744** | 0.0737** | 0.0744** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0055) | (0.0052) | (0.0054) | (0.0051) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0070 | -0.0073 | -0.0078 | -0.0039 | -0.0062 |
| | (0.0081) | (0.0081) | (0.0083) | (0.0082) | (0.0084) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0006* | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0005* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0746** | 0.0752** | 0.0743** | 0.0747** | 0.0751** |
| | (0.0058) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) |
| Secondary Edu. | 0.0068 | 0.0094 | 0.0092 | 0.0070 | 0.0122* |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0065) | (0.0062) | (0.0065) | (0.0061) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0037** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0005 | | -0.0001 |
| | | | (0.0006) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0008 | | -0.0008 |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0395 | | -0.0421 |
| | | | (0.0499) | | (0.0476) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0034 | -0.1729 |
| | | | | (0.1217) | (0.1211) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0714 | 0.2148† |
| | | | | (0.1098) | (0.1130) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.4: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Random Effects

| $DV = Partisanship$ | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0746** | 0.0742** | 0.0755** | 0.0749** | 0.0942** |
| | (0.0056) | (0.0055) | (0.0053) | (0.0054) | (0.0073) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0072 | -0.0076 | -0.0081 | -0.0042 | -0.0136 |
| | (0.0082) | (0.0082) | (0.0084) | (0.0083) | (0.0138) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0007** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0010* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0004) |
| Male | 0.0738** | 0.0746** | 0.0735** | 0.0739** | 0.0731** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0060) |
| Educated | 0.0128† | 0.0143* | 0.0157** | 0.0133* | 0.0239** |
| | (0.0066) | (0.0067) | (0.0060) | (0.0066) | (0.0087) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0028* |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0011) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0004 | | -0.0015 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0010) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0007 | | 0.0020† |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0011) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0401 | | 0.0240 |
| | | | (0.0508) | | (0.0750) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0065 | -0.2411 |
| | | | | (0.1221) | (0.2161) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0745 | 0.2701 |
| | | | | (0.1109) | (0.2091) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country random effects and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.5: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Without Fixed Effects

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0866** | 0.0882** | 0.0943** | 0.0868** | 0.0942** |
| | (0.0091) | (0.0088) | (0.0073) | (0.0092) | (0.0073) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0183 | -0.0204 | -0.0124 | -0.0173 | -0.0136 |
| | (0.0141) | (0.0138) | (0.0140) | (0.0140) | (0.0138) |
| Age | 0.0019** | 0.0009* | 0.0018** | 0.0019** | 0.0010* |
| | (0.0003) | (0.0004) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) |
| Male | 0.0721** | 0.0729** | 0.0725** | 0.0721** | 0.0731** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0060) | (0.0059) | (0.0060) |
| Educated | 0.0223* | 0.0234* | 0.0219* | 0.0231* | 0.0239** |
| | (0.0102) | (0.0102) | (0.0090) | (0.0099) | (0.0087) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0034** | | | 0.0028* |
| | | (0.0011) | | | (0.0011) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0016† | | -0.0015 |
| | | | (0.0010) | | (0.0010) |
| Party Age | | | 0.0021† | | 0.0020† |
| | | | (0.0011) | | (0.0011) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | 0.0070 | | 0.0240 |
| | | | (0.0719) | | (0.0750) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.4141† | -0.2411 |
| | | | | (0.2258) | (0.2161) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.4240† | 0.2701 |
| | | | | (0.2243) | (0.2091) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | | | | | |

*Note:* Linear probability models with year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.6: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Logistic Regression Models

| $DV = Partisanship$ | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.3289** | 0.3276** | 0.3334** | 0.3307** | 0.3345** |
| | (0.0237) | (0.0235) | (0.0227) | (0.0230) | (0.0221) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0327 | -0.0348 | -0.0377 | -0.0184 | -0.0307 |
| | (0.0362) | (0.0360) | (0.0373) | (0.0365) | (0.0378) |
| Age | 0.0074** | 0.0030** | 0.0074** | 0.0074** | 0.0026* |
| | (0.0009) | (0.0011) | (0.0009) | (0.0009) | (0.0011) |
| Male | 0.3293** | 0.3328** | 0.3290** | 0.3299** | 0.3331** |
| | (0.0249) | (0.0249) | (0.0250) | (0.0249) | (0.0250) |
| Educated | 0.0566† | 0.0631* | 0.0701** | 0.0593* | 0.0829** |
| | (0.0292) | (0.0294) | (0.0265) | (0.0289) | (0.0260) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0149** | | | 0.0165** |
| | | (0.0029) | | | (0.0025) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0018 | | 0.0001 |
| | | | (0.0029) | | (0.0026) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0036 | | -0.0037 |
| | | | (0.0058) | | (0.0055) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.1853 | | -0.1936 |
| | | | (0.2174) | | (0.2065) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0310 | -0.8286 |
| | | | | (0.5436) | (0.5532) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.3520 | 1.0340* |
| | | | | (0.4941) | (0.5191) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Logit models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.7: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Mixed Effects ML Regressions

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0763** | 0.0758** | 0.0764** | 0.0763** | 0.0758** |
| | (0.0025) | (0.0024) | (0.0025) | (0.0025) | (0.0024) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0062 | -0.0061 | -0.0070 | -0.0062 | -0.0068 |
| | (0.0080) | (0.0080) | (0.0080) | (0.0080) | (0.0080) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0006** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0006** |
| | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| Male | 0.0734** | 0.0742** | 0.0734** | 0.0734** | 0.0742** |
| | (0.0022) | (0.0022) | (0.0022) | (0.0022) | (0.0022) |
| Educated | 0.0187** | 0.0206** | 0.0187** | 0.0187** | 0.0206** |
| | (0.0026) | (0.0026) | (0.0026) | (0.0026) | (0.0026) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0037** | | | 0.0037** |
| | | (0.0002) | | | (0.0002) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0013 | | -0.0013 |
| | | | (0.0010) | | (0.0010) |
| Party Age | | | 0.0028* | | 0.0026* |
| | | | (0.0012) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | 0.0252 | | 0.0415 |
| | | | (0.0659) | | (0.0661) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.4887† | -0.2740 |
| | | | | (0.2743) | (0.2666) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.5071† | 0.3216 |
| | | | | (0.2594) | (0.2504) |
| *Random-effects Parameters:* | | | | | |
| var(Coethnic Candidate) | 0.0043 | 0.0042 | 0.0043 | 0.0043 | 0.0043 |
| | (0.0008) | (0.0008) | (0.0008) | (0.0008) | (0.0008) |
| var(cons) | 0.0148 | 0.0148 | 0.0126 | 0.0143 | 0.0124 |
| | (0.0019) | (0.0019) | (0.0017) | (0.0019) | (0.0017) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of survey-rounds | 122 | 122 | 122 | 122 | 122 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Mixed-effects ML regressions, with random intercepts and random slopes for Coethnic Candidate estimated by survey-round. Standard errors in parentheses. Random-effects parameters report variances.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Figure F.1: Estimates of Random Intercepts and Slopes across Countries




(a) Random Intercepts across Countries




(b) Random Slopes for Coethnic Candidate across Countries

*Note:* Empirical Bayes estimates of (a) random intercepts and (b) random slopes for coethnic candidate, across countries. Estimates computed from Model 5 in Table F.7.

### F.3 Additional Control Variables

Tables F.8 and F.9 present results from a series of estimates that include additional control variables. In Table F.8 these include individual level controls for a range of factors that might influence partisanship. The first of these is *Media Exposure*, which consists of an index constructed through factor analysis of responses to a set of questions asking how often respondents get news from radio, television, and newspapers. The estimates in columns (2) and (3) control for poverty and asset ownership indices. The *Poverty Index* is an index of lived poverty constructed following the approach of Mattes (2008),[2] using factor analysis of responses to a series of questions asking respondents how often over the past year they have gone without enough food, enough clean water, medicines, and cooking fuel. The *Assets Index* is constructed using factor analysis of responses to a set of questions whether respondents personally own a radio, a television, and a motor vehicle.

The estimates in column (4) control for a measure of *Election Quality*, based on responses to a question asking respondents to rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election (with responses coded as 1=*Not free and fair*, 2=*Free and fair, with major problems*, 3=*Free and fair, but with minor problems*, 4=*Completely free and fair*). Column (5) includes a control for *Election Handouts*, based on whether the respondent reported being offered "something, like food or a gift or money" in return for their vote during the last national election. Column (6) includes two controls for measure of contact with political party representatives, capturing whether and how often respondents had contacted an MP or political party official during the past year.

The survey questions underlying these measures were not all included in all six of the Afrobarometer survey rounds used for the analysis. As with all the other analyses, missing data is imputed using the mean value for the variable, with a dummy variable capturing missingness at the individual level for each measure. Some of these additional individual level controls are positively and significantly correlated with partisanship. In all of these estimates the main results (for *Rural* and *Coethnic Candidate*) are unaffected.

[2]Mattes, Robert (2008), "The Material and Political Bases of Lived Poverty in Africa: Insights from the Afrobarometer", *Afrobarometer Working Paper*, No. 98.

Table F.8: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Additional Controls

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0855** | 0.0743** | 0.0767** | 0.0738** | 0.0750** | 0.0715** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0050) | (0.0053) | (0.0051) | (0.0051) | (0.0048) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0074 | -0.0064 | -0.0068 | -0.0040 | -0.0067 | -0.0056 |
| | (0.0084) | (0.0085) | (0.0084) | (0.0080) | (0.0083) | (0.0083) |
| Age | 0.0006* | 0.0005* | 0.0005* | 0.0005* | 0.0006* | 0.0004† |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0712** | 0.0742** | 0.0737** | 0.0681** | 0.0732** | 0.0633** |
| | (0.0056) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0057) | (0.0058) | (0.0057) |
| Educated | 0.0104† | 0.0196** | 0.0175** | 0.0133* | 0.0183** | 0.0099† |
| | (0.0058) | (0.0059) | (0.0058) | (0.0056) | (0.0058) | (0.0056) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | 0.0037** | 0.0036** | 0.0036** | 0.0030** | 0.0036** | 0.0031** |
| | (0.0005) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0005) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.0001 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | -0.0002 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | -0.0008 | -0.0007 | -0.0008 | -0.0011 | -0.0009 | -0.0008 |
| | (0.0012) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | -0.0454 | -0.0437 | -0.0433 | -0.0714 | -0.0469 | -0.0439 |
| | (0.0474) | (0.0475) | (0.0477) | (0.0443) | (0.0451) | (0.0472) |
| Electoral Cycle | -0.1912 | -0.1795 | -0.1747 | -0.1734 | -0.1972 | -0.1599 |
| | (0.1223) | (0.1213) | (0.1215) | (0.1177) | (0.1192) | (0.1220) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | 0.2339* | 0.2207† | 0.2171† | 0.1990† | 0.2447* | 0.2027† |
| | (0.1141) | (0.1131) | (0.1132) | (0.1105) | (0.1121) | (0.1143) |
| Media Exposure | 0.0207** | | | | | |
| | (0.0042) | | | | | |
| Poverty Index | | 0.0053 | | | | |
| | | (0.0033) | | | | |
| Assets Index | | | 0.0075 | | | |
| | | | (0.0048) | | | |
| Election Quality | | | | 0.0250** | | |
| | | | | (0.0038) | | |
| Election Handouts | | | | | 0.0387** | |
| | | | | | (0.0069) | |
| MP Contact | | | | | | 0.0318** |
| | | | | | | (0.0029) |
| Party Contact | | | | | | 0.0804** |
| | | | | | | (0.0047) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *Coethnic Candidate* based on previous election only.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.9 presents the results from estimates that include additional control variables coded at the national level. For all these we deal with missing data as above, imputing at the mean value and including an indicator for missingness. The estimates in column (1) include a measure of *Party Strength* taken from Bizzarro et al. (2019),[3] constructed using a range of measures from the V-Dem dataset. This variable is coded for each country year, and the coefficient is positively correlated with partisanship, significant at the 10% level. The main results are all robust to its inclusion.

The estimates in columns (2) and (3) include measures of the influence of traditional leaders, constructed following the approach of Baldwin (2014).[4] Baldwin uses responses to two questions included in round 4 of the Afrobarometer Series to construct two measures of traditional leader influence at the sub-national level, taking the average for each regional or provincial unit. The first question ask respondents who they think has primary responsibility for allocating land, and the measure takes the proportion of respondents citing traditional leaders in each sub-national unit. The second question asks respondents how much influence traditional leaders currently have in governing the local community, and the measure takes the proportion of respondents saying that traditional leaders have 'a great deal' of influence. We do the same thing, but coded at the national level. Because the sub-national units change over time with each sampling of the Afrobarometer, we cannot code the sub-national unit for all rounds off of R4.

We interact these measures of traditional leader influence with the *Rural* indicator, on the basis that the impact of rural residence might be greater in countries where traditional leaders have more influence. The constituent terms for the measures of traditional leader influence are soaked up by the country fixed effects included in our estimates. The results in Table F.9 show that the relationship between rural residence and partisanship is not conditional on variations in the influence of traditional leaders, at least measured in this way. The main results are robust.

[3]Bizzarro, Fernando et al. (2019) "Party Strength and Economic Growth", *World Politics*, 70(2), pp. 275-320.

[4]Baldwin, Kate (2014), "When Politicians Cede Control of Resources: Land, Chiefs, and Coalition-Building in Africa", *Comparative Politics*, 46(3), pp. 253-271.

Table F.9: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Additional Controls

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0753** | 0.0664** | 0.0754** |
| | (0.0051) | (0.0105) | (0.0113) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0066 | -0.0067 | -0.0067 |
| | (0.0084) | (0.0084) | (0.0084) |
| Age | 0.0005* | 0.0005* | 0.0006* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0743** | 0.0742** | 0.0742** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0185** | 0.0186** | 0.0186** |
| | (0.0058) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | 0.0039** | 0.0037** | 0.0037** |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.0001 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | -0.0007 | -0.0007 | -0.0008 |
| | (0.0013) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | -0.0370 | -0.0440 | -0.0439 |
| | (0.0466) | (0.0476) | (0.0477) |
| Electoral Cycle | -0.1512 | -0.1796 | -0.1787 |
| | (0.1213) | (0.1215) | (0.1216) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | 0.2018† | 0.2218† | 0.2206† |
| | (0.1134) | (0.1133) | (0.1134) |
| Party Strength | 0.0906† | | |
| | (0.0496) | | |
| Rural × Trad. Leader Influence (Land) | | 0.0317 | |
| | | (0.0325) | |
| Rural × Trad. Leader Influence (Governance) | | | -0.0002 |
| | | | (0.0437) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *Coethnic Candidate* based on previous election only.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.10: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – Government/Party Survey Controls

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0732** | 0.0729** | 0.0741** | 0.0735** | 0.0740** |
| | (0.0053) | (0.0053) | (0.0051) | (0.0052) | (0.0050) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0061 | -0.0065 | -0.0071 | -0.0032 | -0.0058 |
| | (0.0079) | (0.0079) | (0.0081) | (0.0080) | (0.0082) |
| Age | 0.0015** | 0.0006* | 0.0015** | 0.0015** | 0.0005* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0702** | 0.0709** | 0.0698** | 0.0703** | 0.0706** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0081 | 0.0095 | 0.0112† | 0.0087 | 0.0141* |
| | (0.0064) | (0.0065) | (0.0058) | (0.0064) | (0.0056) |
| Survey by Gov. | 0.0096 | 0.0091 | 0.0110† | 0.0099 | 0.0113† |
| | (0.0067) | (0.0067) | (0.0066) | (0.0066) | (0.0064) |
| Survey by Party | 0.0171† | 0.0173† | 0.0188* | 0.0185† | 0.0196* |
| | (0.0098) | (0.0098) | (0.0091) | (0.0094) | (0.0090) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0032** | | | 0.0035** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0005) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0005 | | -0.0000 |
| | | | (0.0006) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0010 | | -0.0009 |
| | | | (0.0012) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0478 | | -0.0508 |
| | | | (0.0491) | | (0.0467) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0195 | -0.1967 |
| | | | | (0.1222) | (0.1188) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0845 | 0.2342* |
| | | | | (0.1098) | (0.1116) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

### F.4 By Country Results

We examine by-country regressions. The coefficients on candidate coethnicity from these by-country regressions follow a very similar pattern to estimates of random slopes across countries following mixed-effects maximum likelihood regressions, providing confidence that they are not an artifact of the estimation method.

Table F.11: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – By Country

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *DV = Partisanship* | Benin | Botswana | Burkina Faso | Burundi | Cameroon | Cape Verde | Gabon | Ghana |
| Rural | 0.0750** | 0.0416** | 0.1554** | 0.1773** | 0.0592** | 0.0216 | 0.0849* | 0.0673** |
| | (0.0142) | (0.0118) | (0.0188) | (0.0252) | (0.0206) | (0.0132) | (0.0333) | (0.0099) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0017 | -0.0167 | -0.0035 | 0.2075** | 0.0024 | 0.0018 | | 0.0388** |
| | (0.0149) | (0.0156) | (0.0167) | (0.0611) | (0.0289) | (0.0424) | | (0.0126) |
| Age | -0.0017* | -0.0007 | -0.0034** | -0.0010 | 0.0040* | -0.0006 | -0.0003 | -0.0019** |
| | (0.0008) | (0.0014) | (0.0008) | (0.0012) | (0.0019) | (0.0006) | (0.0026) | (0.0005) |
| Male | 0.1744** | 0.0067 | 0.1020** | 0.1033** | 0.0360† | 0.0526** | 0.1033** | 0.0633** |
| | (0.0141) | (0.0113) | (0.0167) | (0.0190) | (0.0205) | (0.0126) | (0.0268) | (0.0097) |
| Educated | 0.0329† | -0.0282† | 0.0449* | -0.0791** | -0.0091 | 0.0532** | -0.0382 | -0.0027 |
| | (0.0174) | (0.0152) | (0.0211) | (0.0207) | (0.0246) | (0.0155) | (0.0445) | (0.0105) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | 0.0054** | 0.0049** | 0.0148** | 0.0042† | 0.0036 | 0.0096** | 0.0067† | 0.0060** |
| | (0.0018) | (0.0017) | (0.0024) | (0.0025) | (0.0030) | (0.0015) | (0.0039) | (0.0012) |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.0013* | -0.1815** | 0.0275** | | 0.0841* | -0.1051** | | 0.0105† |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0431) | (0.0037) | | (0.0367) | (0.0141) | | (0.0058) |
| Party Age | 0.0034 | 0.0337** | -0.0292** | 0.0066 | | -0.1162** | | -0.0036† |
| | (0.0069) | (0.0118) | (0.0020) | (0.0094) | | (0.0099) | | (0.0019) |
| Party Fractionalization | -0.3289† | 0.9584** | | | | 32.0198** | | 1.8890† |
| | (0.1990) | (0.1938) | | | | (3.1278) | | (1.1301) |
| Observations | 4773 | 6003 | 3532 | 2400 | 2356 | 6113 | 1198 | 10231 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with year fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.12: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – By Country

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *DV = Partisanship* | Guinea | Ivory Coast | Kenya | Lesotho | Liberia | Madagascar | Malawi | Mali |
| Rural | 0.1152** | 0.0644** | 0.0735** | 0.0668** | -0.0055 | -0.0186 | 0.0665** | 0.0715** |
| | (0.0221) | (0.0210) | (0.0110) | (0.0130) | (0.0163) | (0.0163) | (0.0131) | (0.0123) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.1205** | 0.0108 | 0.0338** | -0.1095 | -0.0016 | -0.0113 | -0.0368** | 0.0359* |
| | (0.0209) | (0.0249) | (0.0114) | (0.0896) | (0.0170) | (0.0138) | (0.0130) | (0.0181) |
| Age | 0.0004 | 0.0041** | -0.0009 | 0.0024** | -0.0008 | -0.0017** | -0.0001 | -0.0014** |
| | (0.0007) | (0.0008) | (0.0006) | (0.0004) | (0.0008) | (0.0006) | (0.0005) | (0.0004) |
| Male | 0.0511* | 0.0668** | 0.1316** | 0.0175 | 0.1041** | 0.1194** | 0.0346** | 0.1170** |
| | (0.0217) | (0.0206) | (0.0099) | (0.0112) | (0.0161) | (0.0135) | (0.0099) | (0.0112) |
| Educated | 0.0027 | 0.0412† | 0.0638** | -0.0143 | 0.1017** | 0.0905** | 0.0156 | 0.0925** |
| | (0.0235) | (0.0214) | (0.0107) | (0.0130) | (0.0168) | (0.0149) | (0.0146) | (0.0145) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | | 0.0040** | 0.0001 | 0.0227** | 0.0055* | -0.0005 | 0.0119** |
| | | | (0.0013) | (0.0020) | (0.0046) | (0.0025) | (0.0013) | (0.0020) |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.0015 | | -0.2628 | -0.0065** | 0.0205** | -0.0025** | -0.1194** | -0.0611** |
| | (0.0014) | | (0.9546) | (0.0016) | (0.0032) | (0.0005) | (0.0395) | (0.0073) |
| Party Age | | 0.0468* | -0.0512 | 0.0009 | -0.0108 | -0.0209 | -0.0322** | 0.0339** |
| | | (0.0202) | (0.2017) | (0.0012) | (0.0074) | (0.0252) | (0.0029) | (0.0108) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | 44.9145 | 0.7016** | | 0.2047 | -19.1880** | -2.7047** |
| | | | (161.6952) | (0.0620) | | (0.2623) | (6.3785) | (0.2005) |
| Observations | 2393 | 2391 | 9475 | 6969 | 3538 | 5071 | 8976 | 8003 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with year fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.13: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – By Country

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *DV = Partisanship* | Mozambique | Namibia | Niger | Nigeria | S. T. & Principe | Senegal | Sierra Leone | S. Africa |
| Rural | 0.1042** | 0.0813** | 0.0897** | 0.0900** | 0.0638* | 0.1558** | 0.1117** | 0.0681** |
| | (0.0124) | (0.0108) | (0.0218) | (0.0082) | (0.0308) | (0.0133) | (0.0195) | (0.0099) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0575** | 0.0673** | -0.0382* | -0.0180† | -0.0450 | -0.0558** | -0.6523 | 0.0056 |
| | (0.0170) | (0.0125) | (0.0169) | (0.0102) | (0.0726) | (0.0147) | (0.4426) | (0.0121) |
| Age | 0.0024** | -0.0005 | 0.0000 | 0.0004 | 0.0008 | -0.0015 | -0.0018* | -0.0005 |
| | (0.0007) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0004) | (0.0013) | (0.0011) | (0.0009) | (0.0004) |
| Male | 0.0335** | 0.0318** | 0.1144** | 0.1652** | 0.0008 | 0.0185 | 0.0318† | 0.0463** |
| | (0.0120) | (0.0102) | (0.0175) | (0.0079) | (0.0287) | (0.0132) | (0.0185) | (0.0091) |
| Educated | -0.0154 | -0.0249* | 0.0307† | -0.0207* | 0.0364 | 0.0077 | 0.0167 | -0.0135 |
| | (0.0132) | (0.0122) | (0.0178) | (0.0085) | (0.0342) | (0.0148) | (0.0195) | (0.0118) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | 0.0008 | 0.0110** | 0.0639** | 0.0031* | 0.0100 | 0.0069** | 0.0090* | 0.0064** |
| | (0.0016) | (0.0013) | (0.0183) | (0.0014) | (0.0063) | (0.0016) | (0.0038) | (0.0015) |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.0088** | -0.6961** | | 0.0043** | | 0.0020* | -0.1045† | -0.4912** |
| | (0.0009) | (0.1152) | | (0.0007) | | (0.0009) | (0.0616) | (0.0370) |
| Party Age | -0.0352** | 0.0328** | -0.0796** | 0.1216** | | -0.0040 | | 0.7104** |
| | (0.0063) | (0.0087) | (0.0191) | (0.0070) | | (0.0199) | | (0.0531) |
| Party Fractionalization | -1.7108** | -39.9849** | | -10.0566** | | 0.1496 | | 266.5059** |
| | (0.4245) | (6.3050) | | (0.6716) | | (0.1093) | | (19.9125) |
| Observations | 5678 | 6876 | 2390 | 15344 | 1185 | 5926 | 2364 | 11274 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with year fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table F.14: Determinants of Partisanship in Africa – By Country

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *DV = Partisanship* | Sudan | Tanzania | Togo | Uganda | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
| Rural | 0.1053** | 0.0512** | 0.1290** | 0.0355** | 0.0754** | 0.1402** |
| | (0.0206) | (0.0089) | (0.0198) | (0.0102) | (0.0125) | (0.0109) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0280 | 0.0630** | -0.0782** | -0.0229* | 0.0046 | -0.0086 |
| | (0.0200) | (0.0164) | (0.0273) | (0.0101) | (0.0150) | (0.0126) |
| Age | 0.0030** | 0.0044** | 0.0012 | 0.0012** | 0.0019** | -0.0030 |
| | (0.0008) | (0.0004) | (0.0008) | (0.0003) | (0.0007) | (0.0020) |
| Male | 0.0372† | 0.0002 | 0.1365** | 0.0774** | 0.1164** | 0.0565** |
| | (0.0199) | (0.0081) | (0.0199) | (0.0080) | (0.0118) | (0.0101) |
| Educated | -0.0103 | 0.0249* | 0.0846** | 0.0343** | 0.0731** | 0.0083 |
| | (0.0206) | (0.0106) | (0.0210) | (0.0089) | (0.0128) | (0.0123) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | -0.0012 | 0.0123 | 0.0130** | -0.0000 | 0.0056* |
| | | (0.0012) | (0.0146) | (0.0033) | (0.0015) | (0.0022) |
| Electoral Volatility | | 1.0392** | -0.0035 | -0.0012 | -0.0109* | 0.0146** |
| | | (0.3056) | (0.0043) | (0.0019) | (0.0048) | (0.0029) |
| Party Age | | -0.0385** | | -0.0010 | 0.0312 | 0.0001 |
| | | (0.0059) | | (0.0051) | (0.0206) | (0.0025) |
| Party Fractionalization | | 2.3428** | | -0.1038** | 1.1162* | -0.6932** |
| | | (0.5052) | | (0.0359) | (0.5413) | (0.1253) |
| Observations | 2384 | 10565 | 2391 | 14138 | 7017 | 9137 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with year fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

## F.5 Predictive Margins of Partisanship over Electoral Cycle

Figure F.2: Predictive Margins of Partisanship Over the Electoral Cycle




*Note:* Predictive margins of partisanship calculated from the estimates presented in column (5) of Table 3 using the margins command in Stata. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.

# G Coethnicity Finding Robustness

## G.1 Coethnicity Operationalization Alternatives

Table G.1: Coethnicity Robustness – Coding Based on Previous Election Only

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0744** | 0.0740** | 0.0753** | 0.0747** | 0.0753** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0055) | (0.0053) | (0.0054) | (0.0051) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0118 | -0.0124 | -0.0117 | -0.0082 | -0.0109 |
| | (0.0081) | (0.0080) | (0.0083) | (0.0082) | (0.0084) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0007** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0006* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0738** | 0.0745** | 0.0735** | 0.0739** | 0.0742** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0128† | 0.0144* | 0.0158** | 0.0133* | 0.0186** |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0066) | (0.0059) | (0.0065) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0037** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0004 | | 0.0000 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0007 | | -0.0007 |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0411 | | -0.0443 |
| | | | (0.0500) | | (0.0475) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0084 | -0.1835 |
| | | | | (0.1225) | (0.1218) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0758 | 0.2245† |
| | | | | (0.1105) | (0.1136) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *Coethnic Candidate* based on previous election only.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table G.2: Coethnicity Robustness – Presidential Candidates Only

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0747** | 0.0743** | 0.0756** | 0.0749** | 0.0755** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0055) | (0.0053) | (0.0054) | (0.0051) |
| Coethnic Candidate – President | -0.0042 | -0.0042 | -0.0023 | -0.0007 | -0.0010 |
| | (0.0089) | (0.0089) | (0.0091) | (0.0091) | (0.0092) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0007** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0005* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0738** | 0.0746** | 0.0735** | 0.0739** | 0.0743** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0127† | 0.0142* | 0.0156** | 0.0132* | 0.0184** |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0065) | (0.0059) | (0.0064) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0037** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0004 | | -0.0000 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0008 | | -0.0008 |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0395 | | -0.0427 |
| | | | (0.0502) | | (0.0477) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0051 | -0.1777 |
| | | | | (0.1228) | (0.1218) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0737 | 0.2203† |
| | | | | (0.1107) | (0.1137) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table G.3: Coethnicity Robustness – Incumbent President Only

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0749** | 0.0744** | 0.0758** | 0.0750** | 0.0757** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0054) | (0.0052) | (0.0053) | (0.0051) |
| Coethnic President | -0.0016 | -0.0012 | -0.0013 | -0.0025 | -0.0018 |
| | (0.0132) | (0.0131) | (0.0133) | (0.0130) | (0.0132) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0007** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0006* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0738** | 0.0745** | 0.0735** | 0.0738** | 0.0742** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0126† | 0.0141* | 0.0155** | 0.0132* | 0.0184** |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0066) | (0.0059) | (0.0065) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0036** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0005) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0004 | | 0.0000 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0007 | | -0.0006 |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0415 | | -0.0449 |
| | | | (0.0500) | | (0.0475) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0213 | -0.1970 |
| | | | | (0.1224) | (0.1223) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0864 | 0.2359* |
| | | | | (0.1104) | (0.1140) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table G.4: Co-Regional Candidates

| $DV = Partisanship$ | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0746** | 0.0741** | 0.0755** | 0.0748** | 0.0754** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0055) | (0.0053) | (0.0054) | (0.0051) |
| Co-Regional Candidate | -0.0072 | -0.0076 | -0.0082 | -0.0042 | -0.0067 |
| | (0.0082) | (0.0081) | (0.0084) | (0.0082) | (0.0084) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0007** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0006* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0738** | 0.0746** | 0.0735** | 0.0739** | 0.0742** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0128† | 0.0143* | 0.0157** | 0.0133* | 0.0186** |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0066) | (0.0059) | (0.0065) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0037** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0004 | | 0.0000 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0008 | | -0.0008 |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0408 | | -0.0439 |
| | | | (0.0501) | | (0.0477) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0052 | -0.1787 |
| | | | | (0.1223) | (0.1216) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0734 | 0.2206† |
| | | | | (0.1103) | (0.1134) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table G.5: Co-Regional Candidates – Presidential Candidates Only

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0747** | 0.0743** | 0.0756** | 0.0749** | 0.0755** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0055) | (0.0053) | (0.0054) | (0.0051) |
| Co-Regional Candidate – President | -0.0042 | -0.0042 | -0.0023 | -0.0007 | -0.0010 |
| | (0.0089) | (0.0089) | (0.0091) | (0.0091) | (0.0092) |
| Age | 0.0016** | 0.0007** | 0.0016** | 0.0016** | 0.0005* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0738** | 0.0746** | 0.0735** | 0.0739** | 0.0743** |
| | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0127† | 0.0142* | 0.0156** | 0.0132* | 0.0184** |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0065) | (0.0059) | (0.0064) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | | 0.0033** | | | 0.0037** |
| | | (0.0006) | | | (0.0006) |
| Electoral Volatility | | | -0.0004 | | -0.0000 |
| | | | (0.0007) | | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | | | -0.0008 | | -0.0008 |
| | | | (0.0013) | | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | | | -0.0395 | | -0.0427 |
| | | | (0.0502) | | (0.0477) |
| Electoral Cycle | | | | -0.0051 | -0.1777 |
| | | | | (0.1228) | (0.1218) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | | | | 0.0737 | 0.2203† |
| | | | | (0.1107) | (0.1137) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

## G.2 Coethnicity with Moderators

We investigate the following country-level moderators that may yield country-level heterogeneity in the relationship, but find no evidence. Specifically,

- As parties develop a performance record with successive years of democracy, they often successfully demonstrate greater inclusion to citizens beyond coethnics (Elischer 2013, Ferree and Horowitz 2010). Thus, candidate coethnicity may be more important as a marginal signal of party fit in the earlier days of democracy, and less important with increasing experience with democracy.

- The importance of ethnic identity decreases in urban areas (Robinson 2014), thus candidate coethnicity may be more important in rural areas.

- Ethnic group structure may render coethnicity with candidates differentially important. We examine (a) ethnic heterogeneity, measured in a variety of ways, and (b) presence of a single or multiple ethnic minimum winning coalition, using data from Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) (drawing on Ferree (2006)).

- The electoral cycle may render ethnic identity, and thus candidate coethnicity, more salient at election time than otherwise (Eifert et al. 2010).

- Dominant party presence may reduce the salience of candidate coethnicity by forging a reliable multi-ethnic coalition (Arriola 2012). We use Weghorst and Bernhard (2014)'s coding of dominant party systems.[1]

Table G.6: Coethnicity Robustness – Ethnic Structure Interactions

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0779** | 0.0780** | 0.0780** | 0.0779** | 0.0775** | 0.0774** |
| | (0.0052) | (0.0052) | (0.0052) | (0.0052) | (0.0051) | (0.0051) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0147 | -0.0216 | -0.0040 | 0.0157 | -0.0095 | -0.0030 |
| | (0.0131) | (0.0244) | (0.0359) | (0.0326) | (0.0110) | (0.0091) |
| Coethnic Candidate×PREG | 0.0161 | | | | | |
| | (0.0315) | | | | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×ELF | | 0.0196 | | | | |
| | | (0.0353) | | | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×Alesina | | | -0.0048 | | | |
| | | | (0.0493) | | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×Fearon | | | | -0.0305 | | |
| | | | | (0.0433) | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×No MWC | | | | | 0.0139 | |
| | | | | | (0.0179) | |
| Coethnic Candidate×Multiple MWCs | | | | | | -0.0111 |
| | | | | | | (0.0378) |
| Age | 0.0006* | 0.0006* | 0.0006* | 0.0006* | 0.0005* | 0.0005* |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0755** | 0.0755** | 0.0754** | 0.0754** | 0.0742** | 0.0741** |
| | (0.0061) | (0.0061) | (0.0061) | (0.0061) | (0.0060) | (0.0060) |
| Educated | 0.0180** | 0.0181** | 0.0181** | 0.0180** | 0.0170** | 0.0171** |
| | (0.0061) | (0.0061) | (0.0061) | (0.0061) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) |
| Adult Multiparty Years | 0.0035** | 0.0035** | 0.0035** | 0.0035** | 0.0037** | 0.0037** |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0005) | (0.0005) |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.0001 | -0.0001 | -0.0001 | -0.0001 | -0.0000 | -0.0000 |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | -0.0007 | -0.0007 | -0.0007 | -0.0007 | -0.0005 | -0.0005 |
| | (0.0013) | (0.0013) | (0.0013) | (0.0013) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | -0.0417 | -0.0419 | -0.0416 | -0.0424 | -0.0390 | -0.0390 |
| | (0.0474) | (0.0474) | (0.0474) | (0.0470) | (0.0472) | (0.0470) |
| Electoral Cycle | -0.2340† | -0.2334† | -0.2341† | -0.2363† | -0.1464 | -0.1505 |
| | (0.1238) | (0.1238) | (0.1237) | (0.1237) | (0.1193) | (0.1197) |
| $ElectoralCycle^2$ | 0.2691* | 0.2685* | 0.2686* | 0.2700* | 0.1908† | 0.1940† |
| | (0.1153) | (0.1152) | (0.1152) | (0.1150) | (0.1104) | (0.1108) |
| Observations | 171595 | 171595 | 171595 | 171595 | 174169 | 174169 |
| Number of countries | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 28 | 28 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table G.7: Coethnicity Robustness – Additional Interactions

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0794** | 0.0755** | 0.0755** | |
| | (0.0052) | (0.0051) | (0.0051) | |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0039 | 0.0186 | -0.0144 | 0.0044 |
| | (0.0107) | (0.0357) | (0.0116) | (0.0106) |
| Coethnic Candidate×Dominant Party | 0.0093 | | | |
| | (0.0202) | | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×Electoral Cycle | | -0.0179 | | |
| | | (0.1595) | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×Electoral Cycle$^2$ | | -0.0725 | | |
| | | (0.1641) | | |
| Coethnic Candidate×Experience with Dem. | | | 0.0007 | |
| | | | (0.0006) | |
| Coethnic Candidate× Rural | | | | -0.0183† |
| | | | | (0.0092) |
| Age | 0.0003 | 0.0005* | 0.0005* | 0.0006* |
| | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0704** | 0.0743** | 0.0742** | 0.0742** |
| | (0.0055) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0204** | 0.0184** | 0.0186** | 0.0186** |
| | (0.0061) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) | (0.0058) |
| Experience with Democracy | 0.0041** | 0.0037** | 0.0034** | 0.0037** |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0005) |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.0002 | 0.0000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (0.0007) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0006) |
| Party Age | 0.0010 | -0.0007 | -0.0008 | -0.0008 |
| | (0.0013) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) | (0.0012) |
| Party Fractionalization | 0.0368 | -0.0439 | -0.0441 | -0.0438 |
| | (0.0695) | (0.0470) | (0.0476) | (0.0477) |
| Electoral Cycle | -0.0893 | -0.1379 | -0.1782 | -0.1770 |
| | (0.1186) | (0.1286) | (0.1216) | (0.1217) |
| Electoral Cycle$^2$ | 0.1401 | 0.1963† | 0.2197† | 0.2194† |
| | (0.1085) | (0.1181) | (0.1133) | (0.1135) |
| Observations | 162436 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 29 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

Figure G.1: Coethnicity, rural residence and partisanship




*Note:* Marginal effect of coethnicity on partisanship, over urban/rural location. Calculated from the estimates presented in column (4) of Table E.8 using the margins command in Stata. Bars show 95% confidence intervals. Note that the coefficient on the interaction term in column (4) of Table E.8 is the opposite sign of that expected, but that it is only statistically significant at the 10% level, and not substantively large. The marginal effects show no statistically significant relationship between coethnicity and partisanship for either urban or rural residents. On this evidence there is therefor eno support for the hypothesis stated in the paper about rural location moderating the effect of coethnicity on partisanship.

# H Rural Dwelling Extension

To examine whether more trust and contact with traditional authorities is associated with partisanship we leverage the following Afrobarometer survey questions: (1) *"How much do you trust [traditional leaders], or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (Not at all = 0, Just a little = 1, Somewhat = 2, A lot =3)* and (2) *"During the past year, how often have you contacted [a traditional ruler] about some important problem or to give them your views?" Never = 0, Only once = 1, A few times = 2, Often =3).* We also combine the two into an additive index.

Both questions were asked in Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 4, and 6, and the contact question was also asked in Round 3. As with other missing data we impute using the mean values, and include indicator variables for where data is missing.

Table H.1: Urban-Rural Mechanisms

| *DV = Partisanship* | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 0.0773** | 0.0983** | 0.0990** | 0.0961** |
| | (0.0062) | (0.0115) | (0.0115) | (0.0100) |
| Contact with Trad. Leaders | 0.0561** | | 0.0511** | |
| | (0.0049) | | (0.0049) | |
| Rural × Contact | -0.0206** | | -0.0181** | |
| | (0.0047) | | (0.0046) | |
| Trust in Trad. Leaders | | 0.0354** | 0.0291** | |
| | | (0.0053) | (0.0053) | |
| Rural × Trust | | -0.0152** | -0.0141* | |
| | | (0.0056) | (0.0055) | |
| Index of Trad. Leader Influence | | | | 0.0393** |
| | | | | (0.0035) |
| Rural × Index | | | | -0.0135** |
| | | | | (0.0035) |
| Coethnic Candidate | -0.0058 | -0.0062 | -0.0049 | -0.0047 |
| | (0.0080) | (0.0081) | (0.0079) | (0.0079) |
| Age | 0.0014** | 0.0016** | 0.0014** | 0.0014** |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Male | 0.0685** | 0.0735** | 0.0686** | 0.0697** |
| | (0.0058) | (0.0059) | (0.0058) | (0.0059) |
| Educated | 0.0125† | 0.0145* | 0.0140* | 0.0148* |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0065) | (0.0065) | (0.0065) |
| Observations | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 | 180091 |
| Number of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*Note:* Linear probability models with country and year fixed effects, survey-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

# I Relationship of Partisanship to Political Behavior

Table I.1: Descriptive Statistics Partisanship/Behavior Variables (Round AB6)

| **Variable** | **Proportion/Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** | **N** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Partisanship | 0.62 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 46431 |
| Voted Last Election | 0.78 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 | 41755 |
| Attended Election Rally | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 46300 |
| Attended Election Meeting | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 | 46271 |
| Mobilized Others Informally | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 | 46220 |
| Mobilized Others Formally | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 | 46202 |
| Attend Community Meetings | 1.17 | 1.17 | 0 | 3 | 46187 |
| Raise Issues to Authorities | 0.94 | 1.14 | 0 | 3 | 46083 |
| Total Participation Count | 4.05 | 2.93 | 0 | 11 | 41213 |

Table I.2: Partisanship and Political Behavior in Africa

| | (1) Voted Last Election | (2) Attended Election Rally | (3) Attended Election Meeting | (4) Informally Mobilized Others | (5) Formally Mobilized Others | (6) Attended Community Meeting | (7) Raised an Issue | (8) Total Participation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Partisanship | 0.74*** | 0.90*** | 0.94*** | 1.06*** | 1.26*** | 0.53*** | 0.50*** | 1.32*** |
| | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.034) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.028) |
| Constant | -0.03 | -0.60*** | -0.82*** | -1.45*** | -2.09*** | -0.98*** | -0.14** | 3.27*** |
| | (0.064) | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.068) | (0.079) | (0.063) | (0.058) | (0.087) |
| Observations | 41739 | 46283 | 46254 | 46203 | 46185 | 46170 | 46066 | 41197 |

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Table I.3: Partisanship and Political Behavior in Africa, with "Controls"

| | (1) Voted Last Election | (2) Attended Election Rally | (3) Attended Election Meeting | (4) Informally Mobilized Others | (5) Formally Mobilized Others | (6) Attended Community Meeting | (7) Raised an Issue | (8) Total Participation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Partisanship | 0.69*** | 0.86*** | 0.89*** | 1.03*** | 1.22*** | 0.42*** | 0.43*** | 1.17*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.034) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.028) |
| Rural | 0.23*** | 0.31*** | 0.31*** | 0.15*** | 0.23*** | 0.49*** | 0.74*** | 0.87*** |
| | (0.029) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.032) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.032) |
| Age | 0.03*** | 0.01*** | 0.01*** | 0.01*** | 0.01*** | 0.02*** | 0.02*** | 0.02*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Male | 0.07*** | 0.42*** | 0.46*** | 0.46*** | 0.54*** | 0.43*** | 0.32*** | 0.76*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.027) |
| Educated | 0.01 | 0.06*** | 0.05*** | 0.08*** | 0.09*** | 0.08*** | 0.05*** | 0.13*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.008) |
| Poverty Index | -0.05*** | 0.13*** | 0.08*** | 0.09*** | 0.12*** | 0.12*** | 0.14*** | 0.16*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.018) |
| Assets Index | 0.08** | 0.07*** | 0.13*** | 0.20*** | 0.19*** | 0.14*** | 0.11*** | 0.20*** |
| | (0.037) | (0.024) | (0.029) | (0.035) | (0.039) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.051) |
| Constant | -1.33*** | -1.44*** | -1.71*** | -2.40*** | -3.34*** | -1.43*** | -2.26*** | 1.12*** |
| | (0.090) | (0.075) | (0.079) | (0.086) | (0.102) | (0.075) | (0.080) | (0.103) |
| Observations | 41116 | 45570 | 45542 | 45495 | 45474 | 45359 | 45461 | 40597 |

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$




Figure I.1: Marginal effect of partisanship with "controls" (for rural/urban, age, gender, poverty, assets, and educat
participation from logistic regressions using Afrobarometer Round 6.

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