**Supplementary file robustness checks with alternative cut-off values**

The tables below show the results for the analyses with the alternative cut-off values. Solutions that are new compared to the original analysis are highlighted (the shaded columns). After each table, we explain which solutions ae no longer observed.

**Robustness check for formal institutions**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ghana** | **Kenya** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2+ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| *Formal institutions:* regulatory voids | ● | ● |  | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  |  |
| *Informal institutions:* Trust | ● |  | ● |  | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ |  |  |  | ● | ● | ⊗ |  |
| *Informal institutions:* Relationship quality | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ |  |  | ● |
| *Firm resources:*Human capital | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● |  | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  | ⊗ |
| *Firm resources:*Managerial Experience | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ |  |  | ⊗ | ● |  | ⊗ |  |  | ● | ● |
| Consistency | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.91 | 0.93 | 0.75 | 1.0 | 0.88 | 0.85 | 0.95 |
| Raw Coverage | 0.04 | 0.027 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.14 | 0.178 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.054 | 0.592 | 0.154 |
| Unique coverage | 0.04 | 0.027 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.056 | 0.10 | 0.178 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.530 | 0.069 |
| **Solution consistency** | 1.0 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.86 |
| **Solution coverage** | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.178 | 0.77 |

+ = indicates that this solution was only observed in the parsimonious solution and not in the intermediate solution

Eight solutions of the original analysis (as displayed in Table 4 of the paper) were no longer observed in this robustness check: solutions 2 (substitutive effect coupled with high level of resources) and 3 (complementary effect coupled with low level of resources) for Ghana; solutions 3 (weak formal institutions compensated by high level of resources) and 4 (strong informal institutions) for Kenya; solutions 1 (substitutive effect coupled with low level of resources) and 2 (weak formal institutions compensated by high level of resources) for Tanzania and solutions 4 (accommodating effect coupled with high level of resources) and 5 (strong formal institutions) for Uganda.

**Robustness check for informal institutions: Trust**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ghana** | **Kenya** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| *Formal institutions:* regulatory voids | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ |  | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  |  |  |
| *Informal institutions:* Trust | ⊗ |  |  | ● | ● | ● |  | ● | ● | ⊗ |  | ● |  | ⊗ | ● | ● |
| *Informal institutions:* Relationship quality | ● | ● | ● | ● |  | ⊗ | ● | ● | ● |  | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ |  | ● |
| *Firm resources:*Human capital |  | ● | ⊗ |  | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● |  | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ |
| *Firm resources:*Managerial Experience | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● |  | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  |
| Consistency | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.83 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.86 | 0.92 | 1.0 | 0.95 | 0.82 | 0.92 | 1.0 |
| Raw Coverage | 0.013 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.042 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.054 | 0.138 | 0.323 | 0.085 | 0.154 |
| Unique coverage | 0.013 | 0.04 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.014 | 0.027 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.015 | 0.138 | 0.323 | 0.062 | 0.092 |
| **Solution consistency** | 1.0 | 0.92 | 0.90 | 0.89 |
| **Solution coverage** | 0.11 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 0.69 |

Four solutions of the original analysis (as displayed in Table 4 of the paper) were no longer observed: solution 3 (weak formal institutions compensated by high level of resources) for Kenya; solutions 3 (complementary effect coupled with low level of resources), 5 (strong formal institutions) and 7 (informal institutions combined with firm-specific resources) for Uganda.

**Robustness check for informal institutions: Quality of relationships**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ghana** | **Kenya** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8+ | 9+ |
| *Formal institutions:* regulatory voids | ● | ⊗ | ● |  | ● | ● |  | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ |  |  |  |  |
| *Informal institutions:* Trust | ● | ● |  | ● |  |  | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  |  | ● | ● | ⊗ |  | ⊗ |  | ● | ● |
| *Informal institutions:* Relationship quality | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ● |  |  |  | ⊗ |  | ● | ● | ⊗ |
| *Firm resources:*Human capital | ● | ⊗ |  | ● | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● |
| *Firm resources:*Managerial Experience | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ |  |  | ● |  |  | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ● | ● |  |  |
| Consistency | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.83 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.83 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.875 | 0.87 | 0.80 | 0.84 | 0.96 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Raw Coverage | 0.027 | 0.04 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.07 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.205 | 0.041 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.054 | 0.369 | 0.062 | 0.438 | 0.200 | 0.123 | 0.031 |
| Unique coverage | 0.027 | 0.04 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.07 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.205 | 0.041 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.123 | 0.031 | 0.162 | 0.100 | 0.085 | 0.031 |
| **Solution consistency** | 1.0 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.88 |
| **Solution coverage** | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.27 | 0.79 |

+ = indicates that this solution was only observed in the parsimonious solution and not in the intermediate solution

Three solutions of the original analysis (as displayed in Table 4 in the paper) were no longer observed: Solutions 2 for Ghana (substitutive effect coupled with high level of resources), 2 for Kenya (complementary effect coupled with high level of resources), and 3 for Tanzania (weak formal institutions compensated by high level of resources).

**Robustness check for firm resources: Managerial Experience**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ghana** | **Kenya** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6+ |
| *Formal institutions:* regulatory voids | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ |  |  |  |
| *Informal institutions:* Trust | ●$ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ |  |  | ⊗ |  | ⊗ |  | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ● | ● |
| *Informal institutions:* Relationship quality | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ |  | ● |  | ⊗ |  | ● | ⊗ |
| *Firm resources:*Human capital | ● |  | ● | ● | ⊗ | ● |  | ● | ● | ● | ● |  |  | ⊗ | ● |
| *Firm resources:*Managerial Experience | ● | ● |  | ● | ⊗ | ● | ● |  | ● |  |  |  | ● |  |  |
| Consistency | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Raw Coverage | 0.027 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.085 | 0.068 | 0.164 | 0.205 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.361 | 0.400 | 0.115 | 0.038 |
| Unique coverage | 0.027 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.085 | 0.068 | 0.055 | 0.096 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.154 | 0.192 | 0.115 | 0.038 |
| **Solution consistency** | 1.0 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| **Solution coverage** | 0.05 | 0.14 | 0.33 | 0.72 |

+ indicates that this solution was only observed in the parsimonious solution and not in the intermediate solution.

$ indicates that this condition was only observed in the parsimonious solution and not in the intermediate solution.

Eight solutions of the original analysis (as displayed in Table 4 in the paper) were not observed: solution 3 for Ghana; solutions 1 and 4 for Kenya; solution 1 for Tanzania and solutions 3, 4, 5, and 7 for Uganda. Two of these were substitutive effects, two others were complementary effects, and one was an accommodation effect.