

**Online Appendix for
“Support for a Universal Basic Income: A Demand-Capacity Paradox?”**

Contents:

- **Table S1:** Descriptive statistics
- **Table S2:** Unconditional correlations of indicators of support for UBI and other indicators of support for greater redistribution
- **Table S3:** Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI conditional on support for redistribution
- **Table S4:** Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI using ordered logistic regression models (outcome variable as ordinal indicator of whether individual is “strongly in favour”, “in favour”, “not in favour”, “strongly in favour” of UBI)
- **Table S5:** Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI with welfare chauvinism as categorical variable
- **Table S6:** Fixed effects logistic regression estimates of support for a universal basic income: moderating effects of macroeconomic indicators
- **Table S7:** Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI: moderating effects with alternative spending variable (total spending as a percent of GDP)

Table S1: Descriptive statistics.

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Age 15 to 24	0.112	0.316	0	1
Age 25 to 34	0.148	0.355	0	1
Age 55 to 65	0.192	0.394	0	1
Age 66+	0.213	0.409	0	1
Female	0.520	0.500	0	1
Minority Race/Ethnicity	0.062	0.242	0	1
Household Income	5.251	2.732	1	10
Low Subjective Health	2.191	0.913	1	5
Low Education	0.245	0.430	0	1
High Education	0.395	0.489	0	1
Unemployed	0.060	0.238	0	1
Self-Employed	0.109	0.312	0	1
Household Size	2.631	1.378	1	20
Child in HH	0.355	0.479	0	1
Left Ideology	4.846	2.243	0	10
Union Membership	0.175	0.380	0	1
Chauvinism	2.286	0.878	1	4
Supports Basic Income	0.549	0.498	0	1
Supports Redistribution	0.861	0.345	0	1
Spending (SD)	0.104	0.946	-1.27	2.38

Table S2: Unconditional correlations of indicators of support for UBI and other indicators of support for greater redistribution

	<i>In favour of a basic income scheme</i>	Government should reduce differences in income levels	For a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small	The standard of living for the old is the government's responsibility
Government should reduce differences in income levels	0.16			
For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small	0.17	0.40		
The standard of living for the old is the government's responsibility	0.08	0.20	0.19	
The standard of living for the unemployed is the government's responsibility	0.12	0.20	0.21	0.45

Note: Weights applied. All variables coded so that higher value indicates more favourable attitudes toward the respective question. All correlations estimated with variables in ordinal format (strongly do not support, do not support, support, strongly support).

Table S3: Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI conditional on support for redistribution.

	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>
Left Ideology	0.059** (2.71)	0.059** (2.71)	0.059** (2.72)	0.051*** (4.45)	0.059** (2.68)	0.043** (2.89)
Union Member	-0.13** (-2.61)	-0.13* (-2.52)	-0.12* (-2.50)	-0.14** (-2.67)	-0.12* (-2.50)	-0.14** (-2.91)
Chauvinism	-0.13*** (-6.13)	-0.13*** (-6.12)	-0.084 (-1.07)	-0.12*** (-5.93)	-0.13*** (-6.34)	-0.066 (-1.81)
Support for Redistribution	0.63*** (6.12)	0.63*** (6.12)	0.63*** (6.06)	0.60*** (5.50)	0.63*** (6.14)	0.60*** (5.65)
Spending		-0.26** (-3.27)	-0.061 (-0.44)	-0.45*** (-4.22)	-0.28*** (-3.52)	-0.35+ (-1.77)
Chauvinism # Spending			-0.085+ (-1.90)			-0.090+ (-1.70)
Left Ideology # Spending				0.045*** (3.88)		0.057*** (4.53)
Union Member # Spending					0.093* (2.10)	0.094* (2.02)
Individual Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Household Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038

z statistics in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S4: Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI using ordered logistic regression models (outcome variable as ordinal indicator of whether individual is “strongly in favour”, “in favour”, “not in favour”, “strongly in favour” of UBI).

	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>
Left Ideology	0.077** (2.72)	0.077** (2.72)	0.077** (2.71)	0.099*** (5.18)	0.077** (2.72)	0.061*** (3.47)
Union Member	-0.071* (-1.98)	-0.068 (-1.89)	-0.064 (-1.80)	-0.080* (-2.29)	0.018 (0.15)	-0.071* (-2.15)
Chauvinism	-0.12*** (-6.44)	-0.12*** (-6.45)	-0.041 (-0.60)	-0.100*** (-4.96)	-0.12*** (-6.17)	-0.059* (-2.03)
Spending		-0.31*** (-3.43)	-0.094 (-0.82)	-0.60*** (-4.16)	-0.30** (-3.25)	-0.49*** (-3.54)
Chauvinism # Spending			-0.093** (-2.65)			-0.074* (-2.43)
Left Ideology # Spending				0.063*** (3.76)		0.073*** (6.94)
Union Member # Spending					0.073 (1.52)	0.035 (1.20)
Individual Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Household Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038

z statistics in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S5: Multi-level logistic regression estimate of support for a UBI with welfare chauvinism as categorical variable.

	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>
Left Ideology	0.066** (2.58)	0.048 (1.79)
Union Member	-0.076 (-1.66)	-0.11** (-2.61)
Chauvinism (categorical): (Reference: Immigrants should obtain rights to social benefits and services “immediately on arrival”)		
After a year, whether or not have worked	-0.025 (-0.22)	0.024 (0.19)
After worked and paid taxes at least a year	-0.33** (-3.01)	-0.21 (-1.61)
Once they have become a citizen	-0.35*** (-4.09)	-0.15 (-1.46)
They should never get the same rights	-0.41*** (-6.56)	-0.10 (-0.76)
Spending	-0.20+ (-1.70)	0.014 (0.12)
Chauvinism (Categorical) # Spending		
After a year, whether or not have worked		-0.17* (-2.13)
After worked and paid taxes at least a year		-0.25* (-2.01)
Once they have become a citizen		-0.32*** (-3.55)
They should never get the same rights		-0.33** (-2.76)
Individual Controls	X	X
Household Controls	X	X
Observations	30,038	30,038

z statistics in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S6: Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Estimates of Support for a Universal Basic Income: Moderating Effects of Macroeconomic Indicators

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Left Ideology	0.067* (2.46)	0.069*** (4.13)	0.068* (2.51)	0.068*** (3.98)
Union Member	-0.067 (-1.49)	-0.079 (-1.69)	-0.078 (-1.85)	-0.088* (-2.22)
Chauvinism	-0.13*** (-7.17)	-0.12*** (-8.40)	-0.13*** (-9.41)	-0.12*** (-9.10)
Spending as %GDP	-1.78*** (-29.84)	-2.23*** (-27.47)	-1.91*** (-61.51)	-2.16*** (-19.27)
Chauvinism # Spending	-0.047** (-2.85)			-0.031* (-2.14)
Left Ideology # Spending		0.066*** (4.33)		0.064*** (4.10)
Union Member # Spending			0.080* (2.31)	0.065 (1.80)
Individual Controls	X	X	X	X
Household Controls	X	X	X	X
Country FE	X	X	X	X
Observations	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038

z statistics in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S7: Multi-Level Logistic Regression Estimate of Support for a UBI: Moderating Effects with Alternative Spending Variable (total spending as a share of GDP)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Left Ideology	0.068* (2.52)	0.068* (2.48)	0.059* (2.31)	0.068* (2.51)	0.042* (2.51)
Union Member	-0.069 (-1.54)	-0.068 (-1.54)	-0.085 (-1.89)	-0.069 (-1.39)	-0.11 (-1.68)
Chauvinism	-0.13*** (-9.18)	-0.086 (-1.78)	-0.11*** (-7.87)	-0.13*** (-9.60)	-0.037 (-1.07)
Spending	-0.20+ (-1.69)	-0.074 (-0.54)	-0.37+ (-1.96)	-0.22+ (-1.82)	-0.28 (-1.49)
Chauvinism # Spending		-0.058* (-2.53)			-0.086* (-2.31)
Left Ideology # Spending			0.037* (2.13)		0.049*** (3.30)
Union Member # Spending				0.057 (1.33)	0.060 (1.05)
Individual Controls	X	X	X	X	X
Household Controls	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038	30,038

z statistics in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Cross-level interactions estimated as random coefficient models.