Conditional Effects of Development Aid on Political Perceptions – Mixed-Methods Evidence from North-East Afghanistan

APPENDIX

I. The role of the Woluswali in the eyes of the population

That the woluswali does, in fact, represent the first and sometimes only point of interaction of the population with state authority in rural Afghanistan is reflected in the semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives of all village clusters in 2012. We have systematically coded interviewees' explicit references to different governance functions as well as to different levels of state administration. We then investigated combinations of references to governance functions and levels of state administration – essentially, we counted the number of interviewee statements referring to specific governance functions and administrative levels. The number of coding intersections is depicted in Table 1 below. Most people interviewed did, in fact, refer to the district-level when talking about security and service provision as well as the rule of law (e.g. 309 qualitative interviewee statements linked the provision of security to the province level, whereas 384 statements linked this function to the district level). While even more people seem to see a strong role of the village/cluster level, these units do not represent functional entities of the formal state administration.

Table A.1: Coding Intersections in Qualitative Interviews – Governance Levels and Functions

	Peace, Security & Control	Good Governance & Rule of Law	Development, Services, Economy & Responsiveness
National	285	188	54
Kabul	213	59	14
City	57	25	4
Province	309	201	22
District	**384**	**300**	**111**
Village/Cluster	437	358	213

II. Measurement of access to aid

A substantial share of state services in the study region is being provided in the framework of international cooperation. Respective projects come in a variety of forms, ranging from food aid provided directly by international development agencies to substantial infrastructure projects implemented under the auspices of state institutions. While individual sectoral services may be more or less relevant in terms of shaping people's attitudes, previous research has not established any specific hierarchy that would allow us to establish an a priori assumptions of heterogeneous effects across different service sectors (Mcloughlin 2015). Similarly, we do not expect attitudinal

effects of aid to be limited to projects that are delivered by the state directly. The state is often clearly visible to the population as an "enabler" of development aid even if state institutions do not implement aid projects themselves. Previous research clearly demonstrates that aid has the potential to positively influence political perceptions of the state even if it is delivered by donors and/or non-state actors (Sacks 2012). After all, we are interested in more general effects rather than in the role of specific sectors and development institutions. We therefore combine sectors and the state/donors into one aggregated aid measure.

There are two main ways to measure development aid. The first approach relies on interviewee's perception of aid activities, and the second involves using objective information on actual development activity. The primary advantage of subjective measures is that they tell us about people's actual valuation of development aid. They can be seen as "net"-indicators of aid because, contrary to objective measures, they are factoring in people's actual awareness of projects and their subjectively perceived benefit (as compared, for example, to projects that have not been finalized or that are not functional). We therefore decided to focus our analysis on a subjective measure of aid.

We have also tested two alternative measures of aid: while we lack georeferenced information on all aid interventions in the study area, we have access to such data for all German projects. We used the number of these projects per village impact area as an alternative, objective measure of aid provision. Expectedly, the presence of German aid project is a strong but by no means perfect predictor of subjective aid: residuals are likely to be driven (a) the presence of aid projects by other donors and (b) variation in people's awareness/use of aid outputs (see table A.8 and figure A.2. below). In addition, we also used people's subjective assessment of service improvements within the past two years (mean across services). Estimations with alternative measures of aid reproduce our main results (see tables A.9. to A.10. below).

Independent of the exact measure of aid, close conceptual proximity of aid violence in insecure areas may pose challenges for analyses. We are interested in the effects that aid has on political trust, conditional on insecurity and violence. In many areas of Afghanistan, the provision of development aid has been closely intertwined with military stabilization efforts. In cases in which aid is provided by (or in close cooperation with) the military in a counter insurgency context – as was often the case in US-controlled parts of Afghanistan – the difference between aid and security provision may be blurred in the eyes of the affected communities. This, could affect our empirical analyses: if we find correlations between aid and trust to be stronger in secure than in

insecure areas this may either indicate a dampening effect of violence in line with our theoretical argument or it may result from respondents' inability to conceptually disentangle aid provision from security provision in contexts of intense violence. In our research area in Northern Afghanistan, however, international troops were much less active as development providers and major development programmes were largely disconnected from a military COIN logic – in terms of aid allocation patterns and modes of delivery. Instead, aid delivery has been dominated by non-military local and international organizations running their field operations without military protection. We are therefore convinced that - in our research region - development and security are clearly distinguishable elements of the process of state formation in the eyes of the local population.

III. Statistical appendix

Table A.2. Summary statistics

	mean	min	max	sd	count
HH Woluswal responsive	2.468	1.000	5.000	1.237	5034
HH aid beneficiary	3.430	0.000	9.000	2.065	4819
Vill violence (log)	1.558	0.000	5.724	1.409	5167
Vill cars	0.030	0.000	0.294	0.040	5151
Vill mech	0.389	0.000	1.000	0.488	5167
HH material	1.819	1.000	5.000	0.879	5128
HH illiterate	0.688	0.000	1.000	0.463	5063
Vill Taliban	0.065	0.000	1.000	0.246	5167
Vill remote	0.157	0.000	1.000	0.363	5167
Vill state pers	0.043	0.000	0.750	0.086	5138
Vill Madressa	0.303	0.000	1.000	0.459	5167
HH Pashtun	0.139	0.000	1.000	0.346	5167
Vill Pashtun >0	0.272	0.000	1.000	0.445	5167
HH modern values	14.740	4.000	16.000	1.841	4784
HH age	41.274	18.000	105.000	14.365	5165
HH age2	1909.841	324.000	11025.000	1332.099	5165
Vill households (log)	4.796	2.398	6.551	0.717	5167

Table A.3. Determinants of aid allocation

	(1)	
Vill violence (log)	0.080	(0.079)
Vill cars	2.280	(1.691)
Vill mech	0.039	(0.182)
HH material	0.120***	(0.036)
HH illiterate	-0.453***	(0.072)
Vill Taliban	-0.179	(0.338)
Vill remote	-0.795***	(0.238)
Vill state pers	1.661*	(0.945)
Vill Madressa	0.024	(0.165)
HH Pashtun	-0.438*	(0.258)
Vill Pashtun >0	0.043	(0.212)
HH modern values	0.006	(0.027)
HH age	0.019*	(0.011)
HH age2	-0.000	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.387***	(0.135)
Constant	1.165	(0.851)
Observations	4358	
R^2	0.222	

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4. Associations between subjective aid, violence and political trust - stepwise inclusion of controls (direct effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vill violence (log)	0.064**	0.055**	0.040	0.073**	0.069**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
HH aid beneficiary	0.048***	0.047***	0.045***	0.048***	0.048***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Vill cars		0.896	0.982	1.132	1.269
		(0.665)	(0.718)	(0.784)	(0.803)
Vill mech		0.071	0.062	0.082	0.070
		(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.068)
HH material		0.092***	0.091***	0.093***	0.092***
		(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
HH illiterate		0.046	0.050	0.051	0.070
		(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Vill Taliban			-0.309***	-0.295***	-0.282***
			(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.103)
Vill remote			-0.074	-0.055	-0.043
			(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Vill state pers			0.306	0.383	0.421
			(0.289)	(0.308)	(0.317)
Vill Madressa				-0.084	-0.101
				(0.062)	(0.065)
HH Pashtun				-0.047	-0.033
				(0.094)	(0.095)
Vill Pashtun >0				-0.141	-0.148
				(0.098)	(0.100)
HH modern values				-0.040***	-0.041***
				(0.015)	(0.014)
HH age					-0.019***
					(0.007)
HH age2					0.000***
					(0.000)
Vill households (log)					0.049
					(0.050)
Constant	1.946***	3.010***	1.779***	3.555***	3.759***
	(0.161)	(0.316)	(0.188)	(0.399)	(0.457)
Observations	4705	4557	4544	4263	4261
R^2	0.123	0.125	0.128	0.116	0.118

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5. Associations between subjective aid, violence and political trust - stepwise inclusion of controls (interaction effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vill violence (log)	0.189***	0.186***	0.177***	0.229***	0.222***
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)
HH aid beneficiary	0.112***	0.113***	0.112***	0.121***	0.119***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Vill violence (log) # HH aid beneficiary	-0.038***	-0.040***	-0.039***	-0.044***	-0.043***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Vill cars		0.835	0.967	1.158	1.271
		(0.684)	(0.720)	(0.784)	(0.795)
Vill mech		0.064	0.053	0.075	0.065
		(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.069)
HH material		0.092***	0.092***	0.094***	0.093***
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
HH illiterate		0.039	0.041	0.042	0.060
		(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Vill Taliban			-0.291***	-0.278***	-0.267**
			(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.103)
Vill remote			-0.022	0.003	0.012
			(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Vill state pers			0.251	0.334	0.366
			(0.290)	(0.311)	(0.320)
Vill Madressa				-0.093	-0.107
				(0.063)	(0.066)
HH Pashtun				-0.119	-0.105
				(0.088)	(0.089)
Vill Pashtun >0				-0.136	-0.143
				(0.102)	(0.103)
HH modern values				-0.043***	-0.043***
				(0.014)	(0.014)
HH age					-0.016**
					(0.007)
HH age2					0.000**
					(0.000)
Vill households (log)					0.041
					(0.051)
Constant	2.799***	2.664***	2.649***	3.201***	3.401***
	(0.309)	(0.315)	(0.311)	(0.395)	(0.459)
Observations	4705	4557	4544	4263	4261
R^2	0.132	0.134	0.136	0.126	0.128

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.6. Associations between aid, violence and political trust - Ordinal Logistic model

	(1)		(2)	
Vill cars	2.328*	(1.406)	2.252	(1.397)
Vill mech	0.081	(0.113)	0.075	(0.114)
HH material	0.144***	(0.040)	0.148***	(0.040)
HH illiterate	0.123	(0.075)	0.105	(0.075)
Vill Taliban	-0.684***	(0.232)	-0.659***	(0.229)
Vill remote	-0.091	(0.130)	0.011	(0.134)
Vill state pers	0.628	(0.544)	0.545	(0.554)
Vill Madressa	-0.182	(0.112)	-0.195*	(0.114)
HH Pashtun	-0.029	(0.157)	-0.151	(0.148)
Vill Pashtun >0	-0.237	(0.154)	-0.235	(0.159)
HH modern values	-0.065***	(0.024)	-0.068***	(0.024)
HH age	-0.033***	(0.011)	-0.029**	(0.011)
HH age2	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.097	(0.093)	0.081	(0.095)
Vill violence (log)	0.109**	(0.051)	0.400***	(0.080)
HH aid beneficiary	0.103***	(0.027)	0.231***	(0.035)
HH aid beneficiary # Vill violence (log)			-0.078***	(0.016)
cut1				
Constant	-3.109***	(0.739)	-2.453***	(0.754)
cut2				
Constant	-1.583**	(0.737)	-0.913	(0.755)
cut3				
Constant	-0.229	(0.737)	0.454	(0.755)
cut4				
Constant	0.536	(0.734)	1.224	(0.756)
Observations	4261		4261	
R^2				

Regressions are Ordinal Logistic models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A.1. Results of linear regression based on pre-specified bins (left) and locally linear regressions based on Gaussian kernel reweighting (right)



Table A.7. Associations between subjective aid, violence and political trust – alternative measure of violence (GED)

	(1)		(2)	
GED vill violence (log)	0.196***	(0.061)	0.499***	(0.095)
HH aid beneficiary	0.046***	(0.016)	0.072***	(0.016)
Vill cars	1.818**	(0.813)	1.859**	(0.840)
Vill mech	0.068	(0.066)	0.054	(0.067)
HH material	0.093***	(0.024)	0.094***	(0.024)
HH illiterate	0.072	(0.045)	0.069	(0.045)
Vill Taliban	-0.403***	(0.105)	-0.407***	(0.099)
Vill remote	-0.088	(0.076)	-0.059	(0.077)
Vill state pers	0.458	(0.312)	0.352	(0.312)
Vill Madressa	-0.128*	(0.065)	-0.146**	(0.066)
HH Pashtun	-0.018	(0.096)	-0.084	(0.091)
Vill Pashtun >0	-0.120	(0.094)	-0.113	(0.094)
HH modern values	-0.043***	(0.015)	-0.043***	(0.014)
HH age	-0.019***	(0.007)	-0.018***	(0.007)
HH age2	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.067	(0.049)	0.077	(0.049)
HH aid beneficiary # GED vill violence (log)			-0.084***	(0.019)
Constant	3.763***	(0.462)	3.552***	(0.457)
Observations	4261		4261	
R^2	0.120		0.126	

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.8. Associations between German projects and subjective aid

	(1)	
Vill German coop	0.069***	(0.011)
Vill violence (log)	-0.016	(0.080)
Vill cars	3.233**	(1.555)
Vill mech	0.127	(0.178)
HH material	0.121***	(0.036)
HH illiterate	-0.436***	(0.071)
Vill Taliban	-0.270	(0.328)
Vill remote	-0.897***	(0.237)
Vill state pers	1.912**	(0.917)
Vill Madressa	0.062	(0.162)
HH Pashtun	-0.359	(0.237)
Vill Pashtun >0	0.058	(0.194)
HH modern values	0.001	(0.026)
HH age	0.018*	(0.011)
HH age2	-0.000	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.311**	(0.135)
Constant	1.753**	(0.807)
Observations	4358	
R^2	0.234	

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A.2. Association between German aid projects (count) and subjective aid



Binned scatter plot and linear prediction controlling for covariates included in main models

Table A.9. Associations between German projects, violence and political trust

	(1)		(2)	
Vill violence (log)	0.058*	(0.032)	0.062*	(0.032)
Vill German coop	0.005	(0.005)	0.199***	(0.076)
Vill cars	1.462*	(0.793)	1.551*	(0.821)
Vill mech	0.090	(0.068)	0.089	(0.067)
HH material	0.089***	(0.025)	0.088***	(0.025)
HH illiterate	0.032	(0.045)	0.035	(0.045)
Vill Taliban	-0.280***	(0.098)	-0.236**	(0.092)
Vill remote	-0.099	(0.076)	-0.100	(0.075)
Vill state pers	0.458	(0.329)	0.396	(0.319)
Vill Madressa	-0.086	(0.063)	-0.094	(0.062)
HH Pashtun	-0.040	(0.089)	-0.031	(0.089)
Vill Pashtun >0	-0.141	(0.099)	-0.192*	(0.102)
HH modern values	-0.045***	(0.014)	-0.045***	(0.014)
HH age	-0.021***	(0.006)	-0.021***	(0.006)
HH age2	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.048	(0.054)	0.043	(0.052)
Vill German coop # Vill violence (log)			-0.035**	(0.013)
Constant	1.991***	(0.367)	4.192***	(0.455)
Observations	4522		4522	
R^2	0.126		0.128	

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.10. Associations between subjective assessment of actual improvement through aid, violence and political trust

	(1)		(2)	
Vill violence (log)	0.056*	(0.029)	0.462***	(0.067)
HH aid improvement	0.296***	(0.075)	0.735***	(0.075)
Vill cars	1.339*	(0.762)	0.997	(0.786)
Vill mech	0.083	(0.065)	0.054	(0.066)
HH material	0.084***	(0.024)	0.084***	(0.024)
HH illiterate	0.058	(0.045)	0.059	(0.044)
Vill Taliban	-0.250***	(0.094)	-0.189**	(0.086)
Vill remote	-0.054	(0.076)	0.032	(0.075)
Vill state pers	0.392	(0.298)	0.326	(0.309)
Vill Madressa	-0.088	(0.061)	-0.133**	(0.064)
HH Pashtun	-0.016	(0.090)	-0.072	(0.087)
Vill Pashtun >0	-0.150	(0.096)	-0.175*	(0.103)
HH modern values	-0.054***	(0.014)	-0.045***	(0.014)
HH age	-0.022***	(0.006)	-0.019***	(0.006)
HH age2	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.031	(0.048)	0.043	(0.052)
HH aid improvement # Vill violence (log)			-0.235***	(0.036)
Constant	3.763***	(0.466)	2.520***	(0.465)
Observations	4518		4518	
R^2	0.138		0.162	

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.11. Associations between aid, violence and political trust - control for baseline trust levels

	(1)		(2)	
Vill cars	0.315	(0.740)	0.292	(0.737)
Vill mech	0.102	(0.069)	0.099	(0.070)
HH material	0.097***	(0.025)	0.098***	(0.025)
HH illiterate	0.070	(0.047)	0.059	(0.047)
Vill Taliban	-0.155	(0.145)	-0.145	(0.154)
Vill remote	-0.116	(0.076)	-0.067	(0.077)
Vill state pers	0.418	(0.295)	0.390	(0.296)
Vill Madressa	-0.109	(0.067)	-0.115*	(0.068)
HH Pashtun	-0.009	(0.103)	-0.077	(0.097)
Vill Pashtun >0	-0.190*	(0.111)	-0.190*	(0.115)
HH modern values	-0.050***	(0.014)	-0.053***	(0.014)
HH age	-0.015**	(0.007)	-0.013*	(0.007)
HH age2	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)
Vill households (log)	0.044	(0.050)	0.040	(0.051)
Vill baseline trust	0.127*	(0.068)	0.144**	(0.067)
Vill violence (log)	0.069**	(0.033)	0.201***	(0.047)
HH aid beneficiary	0.045***	(0.016)	0.104***	(0.020)
HH aid beneficiary # Vill violence (log)			-0.037***	(0.009)
Constant	1.397***	(0.420)	3.404***	(0.447)
Observations	3970		3970	
R^2	0.128		0.135	

Regressions are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the village level to reflect similarity of preferences within villages; models include district dummy variables omitted from the regression output; Standard Errors in parantheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

III. Selection of matched village pairs

Table A.12. Village pair for comparison 1: high security

	Pul-e Zureban	Jangalak	Difference
District	Arganj Khaw/Shiwa	Arganj Khaw/Shiwa	
Political trust	3.000	1.933	1.067
Explanatory variables			
HH aid beneficiary	6.167	0.667	5.500
Vill violence (log)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Economic development			
Vill cars	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill mech	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH material	2.000	1.200	0.800
HH illiterate	0.857	0.733	0.124
State exposure			
Vill Taliban	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill remote	1.000	1.000	0.000
Vill state pers	0.000	0.067	-0.067
Socio-cultural context			
Vill Madressa	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH Pashtun	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill Pashtun >0	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH modern values	14.875	15.800	-0.925
Demography			
HH age	43.000	46.600	-3.600
HH age2	1898.250	2370.733	-472.483
Vill households (log)	3.807	2.708	1.099

Table A.13. Village pair for comparison 2: high security

	Hazrat Sayid	**Nawlij**	**Difference**
District	Yamgan	Yamgan	
Political trust	2.600	1.842	0.758
Explanatory variables			
HH aid beneficiary	5.533	0.263	5.270
Vill violence (log)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Economic development			
Vill cars	0.024	0.000	0.024
Vill mech	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH material	1.467	1.789	-0.323
HH illiterate	0.667	0.737	-0.070
State exposure			
Vill Taliban	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill remote	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill state pers	0.000	0.000	0.000
Socio-cultural context			
Vill Madressa	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH Pashtun	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill Pashtun >0	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH modern values	16.000	15.611	0.389
Demography			
HH age	40.200	40.526	-0.326
HH age2	1701.667	1776.737	-75.070
Vill households (log)	3.714	4.382	-0.668

Table A.14. Village pair for comparison 3: low security

	Maulawi Naqel	Tahiriyan	Difference
District	Aliabad	Aliabad	
Political trust	3.286	3.588	-0.303
Explanatory variables			
HH aid beneficiary	4.333	2.308	2.026
Vill violence (log)	3.401	3.332	0.069
Economic development			
Vill cars	0.025	0.030	-0.005
Vill mech	1.000	1.000	0.000
HH material	1.929	1.750	0.179
HH illiterate	0.500	0.824	-0.324
State exposure			
Vill Taliban	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill remote	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill state pers	0.000	0.020	-0.020
Socio-cultural context			
Vill Madressa	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH Pashtun	0.929	0.529	0.399
Vill Pashtun >0	1.000	1.000	0.000
HH modern values	13.857	14.273	-0.416
Demography			
HH age	42.571	40.529	2.042
HH age2	2004.429	1795.471	208.958
Vill households (log)	3.689	4.605	-0.916

Table A.15. Village pair for comparison 4: low security

	Masjid Jami	**Timuri Bala**	**Difference**
District	Baghlan-i Jadid	Baghlan-i Jadid	
Political trust	2.167	2.238	-0.071
Explanatory variables			
HH aid beneficiary	4.909	2.000	2.909
Vill violence (log)	2.944	3.761	-0.817
Economic development			
Vill cars	0.008	0.000	0.008
Vill mech	1.000	1.000	0.000
HH material	1.739	1.476	0.263
HH illiterate	0.417	0.667	-0.250
State exposure			
Vill Taliban	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill remote	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vill state pers	0.231	0.000	0.231
Socio-cultural context			
Vill Madressa	0.000	0.000	0.000
HH Pashtun	0.625	0.810	-0.185
Vill Pashtun >0	1.000	1.000	0.000
HH modern values	13.826	14.722	-0.896
Demography			
HH age	34.208	41.190	-6.982
HH age2	1302.875	2007.571	-704.696
Vill households (log)	4.868	4.700	0.167