# CULTURE MODERATES THE RELATION

## BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND WELL-BEING

## SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

# Section A: Correlation coefficients for country level variables from Study 1-4

## Table A1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. GDP	1					
2. Quality of life	.929**					
3. Government services	.472**	.515**				
4. Religiosity	743**	812**	504**			
5. Hofstede's liberal value	.666**	.683**	.577**	642**		
6. Gini	342**	500**	-0.196	.531**	328**	
7. SWB	.620**	.524**	.435**	361**	.529**	0.08

## Correlation coefficients among country level variables in study 1

\*\* *p* <.01

## Table A2

# Correlation coefficients among country level variables in study 2

	1	1	2	3	4	5 6
1. GDP	1					
2. Quality of life	.838**					
3. Government services	.646**	.636**				
4. Religiosity	704**	767**	454**			
5. Hofstede's liberal value	.698**	.558**	.657**	516**		
6. Gini	-0.186	342*	-0.033	.342*	-0.161	
7. SWB	0.265	0.101	0.214	-0.038	0.133	.395*

\* *p* <.05

\*\* p < .01

## Table A3

# Correlation coefficients among country level variables in study 3

		1	2	3	4	5 6
1. GDP						
2. Quality of life	.894**					
3. Government services	.657**	.636**				
4. Religiosity	691**	765**	560**			
5. Hofstede's liberal value	.767**	.617**	.651**	535**		
6. Gini	426**	555**	312*	.552**	-0.281	
7. SWB	.467**	.376*	.475**	-0.218	.454**	0.235

\* *p* <.05

\*\* p < .01

## Table A4

# Correlation coefficients among country level variables in study 4

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. GDP							
2. Quality of life	.886**						
3. Government services	.548**	.581**					
4. Religiosity	540**	688**	490**				
5. Social issue scale	.676**	.676**	.582**	732**			
6. Hofstede's liberal value	.624**	.554**	.628**	533**	.673**		
7. Gini	268*	386**	359**	.477**	365**	304*	
8. SWB	.444**	.208*	0.023	0.046	0.162	0.221	.358**
* <i>p</i> <.05							

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\*\* p < .01

#### Section B: Testing Simple slopes of the Gini x Liberalism x SES in Study 2

Additional simple slopes analyses (see top half of Table B1 below) showed that at both high and low SES, higher inequality was related to greater SWB at low liberalism. At high liberalism, inequality was not significantly related to SWB. Additional analyses showed that under lower inequality, higher liberalism was positively related to SWB at low SES (see bottom half of Table B1). This relation was not significant at high SES. Under higher inequality, higher liberalism was negatively related to SWB at low SES but not at high SES.

### Table B1

Simple slopes predicting SWB from income inequality, SES, and liberalism (Study 2)

		Low on liberalism			High on lib	peralism	
		В	t	р	В	t	р
Slope of Gini	High SES	.27	3.53	.001	.03	.38	>.250
Slope of Gini	Low SES	.45	5.46	<.001	04	48	>.250

		Low Gini			High Gini		
		В	t	p	В	t	р
Slope of liberalism	High SES	.09	1.04	>.250	15	-1.61	.12
Slope of liberalism	Low SES	.20	2.08	.046	30	-2.92	.006

Note. Bs represent standardized coefficients.

### Section C: Testing Simple slopes of the Gini x Liberalism x SES in Study 3

Additional simple slopes analyses (top half of Table C1 below) showed that at both high and low SES, higher inequality was related to greater SWB at low liberalism. At high liberalism, the corresponding relation was not significant. Additional analyses (bottom half of Table C1) showed that under lower inequality, higher liberalism was related to greater SWB at both high and low SES. Under higher inequality, higher liberalism was related (at marginal significance) to lower SWB at low SES but the parallel relation was not significant at high SES.

Table C1Simple slopes predicting SWB from income inequality, SES, and liberalism (Study 3)

		Low on liberalism			High on libe	eralism	
		В	t	р	В	t	р
Slope of Gini	High SES	.30	5.26	<.001	.05	.76	>.250
Slope of Gini	Low SES	.43	5.71	<.001	00	05	>.250
		Low Gini			High Gini		
		В	t	р	В	t	р
Slope of liberalism	High SES	.14	2.00	.053	11	-1.45	.155
Slope of liberalism	Low SES	.25	2.70	.011	18	-1.83	.076

Note. Bs represent standardized coefficients.

### Section D: Study 4A

This stay examined the relation between a social issues measure of liberalism and party affiliation in the US.

#### Sample and measures

We administered a 7-item social issues measure to 969 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. This measure included the three items of interest, using the same question that appeared in the WVS, plus a similar item concerning pre-marital sex (we saw this item in wave 6 and assumed, mistakenly as it turned out, that it was included in all six WVS waves). Participants rated on a 1-10 scale whether an activity (e.g., divorce) was justifiable (1 = never justifiable, 10 = always justifiable). The three remaining items checked respondent's attention by asking how justifiable are stealing property, accepting a bribe, and cheating on taxes. The seven items were randomly ordered for each participant. In addition to the social issues measure, we assessed party affiliation, using a five-point scale (1= republican, 2=leaning republican, 3 = neither/not applicable, 4=leaning democrat, and 5= democrat).

We deleted 26 respondents who chose the same option on all seven items, and additional 42 respondents with mean scores of 6 or above on the three attention-check items. This left 901 participants (60% female; 76.1% White, 8.9% African-American, 8.4% Asian, and 8.8% Latino; percentages sum to more than 100 because some participants chose more than one option). Average age was 35.5 (SD = 11.17). Twenty-six percent of the participants had high school diploma or less, 16% had associate degree, 42% a Bachelor degree, 12.8% a Masters degree, and 2.8% a doctoral or professional degree. Income was assessed with a 9-category scale, ranging from less than \$5,000 (2.0%) to more than \$100,000 (13.7%). The majority (25.7%) chose the \$50,000 – 75,000 category. The final sample did not differ from the

68 people who failed the attention check in age (t = .47), education (t = -1.47), and income (t = -1.01). However, compared to the final sample, more males (52.94%, chi-square = 4.75, p = .029) and fewer Whites (57.35%, chi-square =36.67, p < .001) were excluded.

## Results

The three liberalism items were combined into a liberalism composite ( $\alpha = .83$ ). Mean (*SD*) liberalism scores for the five party affiliation categories ascended linearly from the first (republican) category to the last (democrat) category: 3.36 (1.64), 4.21 (1.70), 5.01 (1.57), 5.48 (1.41), and 5.80 (1.45). To assess the association between the liberalism composite and party affiliation, controlling for the demographic variables, we conducted a regression analysis with liberalism as the dependent variable. Age, gender, ethnicity (dummy codes for African-Americans, Asians, and Latinos), income, and education, were entered in the first step. Party affiliation, entered in the second step, was significantly related to liberalism ( $\beta = .46$ . t = 15.40, p < .001, partial r = .45). This result points out to a fairly strong association between the social issues measure of liberalism and party affiliation in the US.

### Section E: Testing the Effects of Liberalism as an Individual Difference Measure

The data available for Study 4b (all six waves from the WVS) allowed a test of liberalism at both country and individual levels. For this purpose, we used a three-level HLM model with individual variables (including the social issues measure of liberalism) at level 1, wave at level 2, and country level variables (including either the social issues or Hosfstede's, 2010, power distance plus individualism measure) at level 3. Control variables at both level 1 and 3 were identical to those used in Studies 2-4.

Of interest were three interactions. First, the Gini x Liberalism (at country level) was significant with both the social issues (p<.05) and the power distance (p<.001) measures. Second, we tested the Liberalism (at individual level) x Liberalism (at country level) which, as could be expected, was significant for country level measures of liberalism (ps<.05)): more conservative individuals reported greater SWB, especially in more conservative countries.

Third, the Gini x Liberalism (at individual level) was not significant regardless of how liberalism was measured at country level (ps > .25). Note that even at country level, the social issues measure produced a weaker effect than the power distance plus individualism measure. Perhaps the social issues measure is not good enough to produce a moderator effect at the individual level. It is also possible that the moderator effect of liberalism exists only at the aggregate level, influencing both liberal and conservative individuals included in this aggregate.