Supplementary Data Appendix

The Rise of Democratic Rhetoric: Why International Organizations Adopt Democratic Legitimation Narratives

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This document supplements the information provided in AUTHOR "The Rise of Democratic Rhetoric: Why International Organizations Adopt Democratic Legitimation Narratives". This Supplementary appendix presents the sample of international organizations (IOs), the operationalization of variables, and shows alternative models not shown in full in the paper.

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A1 Sample of international organizations

A1.1 IO Sample

The following table provides an overview of the IOs in our sample. The values for IO purpose are based on the FIGO dataset (Volgy et al. 2008).

Organization	Acronym	Inception	Purpose	Time period	Years covered	Coded para.	Leg. intensity	Share of democratic legitimation
Bank for International Settlements	BIS	1930	Economic	1980-2011	32	1912	.12	.02
Commonwealth of Nations	CON	1965	Political/ Military	1980-2011	16	843	.40	.23
Global Environmental Facility	GEF	1991	Economic	1995-2011	15	820	.26	.12
International Atomic Energy Agency	IAEA	1957	Political/ Military	1980-2011	31	1578	.19	.01
World Bank	IBRD	1944	Economic	1980-2011	32	1904	.26	.07
International Civil Aviation Organization	ICAO	1947	Economic	1980-2011	31	1920	.08	.01
International Criminal Court	ICC	2002	Social	2004-2011	7	420	.18	.06
International Labour Organization	ILO	1919	Social	1980-2011	32	1884	.25	.08
International Monetary Fund	IMF	1944	Economic	1980-2011	32	1583	.30	.08
International Seabed Authority	ISBA	1994	Social	1997-2011	15	884	.10	0
International Whaling Commission	IWC	1946	Economic	1980-2011	31	1381	.06	.04
Permanent Court of Arbitration	PCA	1899	Social	1980-2011	31	1212	.15	0
Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development	OECD	1961	Economic	1980-2011	32	1234	.28	.05
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries	OPEC	1960	Economic	1980-2011	29	1359	.13	.01

A1.1 IO Sample, continued

Organization	Acronym	Inception	Purpose	Time period	Years covered	Coded para.	Leg. intensity	Share of democratic legitimation
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSCE	1975	General	1993-2011	18	816	.29	.18
United Nations	UN	1945	General	1980-2011	32	1892	.32	.12
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	UNESCO	1945	Social	1980-2011	15	790	.21	.09
United Nations Industrial Development Organization	UNIDO	1967	Economic	1980-2011	30	1472	.25	.03
World Meteorological Organization	WMO	1947	Economic	1980-2005	26	1196	.22	.01
World Trade Organization	WTO	1947/ 1995	Economic	1980-2011	30	1644	.21	.13
Total (Mean)					516	26753	(.21)	(.07)

A1.2 Excluded IOs

For the following organizations, we lacked access to English-language annual reports for a sufficient amount of years. Values for IO purpose are based on the FIGO dataset (Volgy et al. 2008).

Organization	Acronym	Inception	Purpose
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	APEC	1989	Economic
Central Office for International Railway Transport	OCTI	1890	Economic
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	FAO	1945	Economic
International Criminal Police Organization	INTERPOL	1923	Social
International Maritime Organization	IMO	1948	Economic
International Organization for Migration	IOM	1951	Political/Military
International Telecom Union	ITU	1865	Economic
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO	1949	Political/Military
Organization of American States	OAS	1980	General
South Pacific Commission	SPC	1947	General
Universal Postal Union	UPU	1874	Economic
World Customs Organization	WCO	1950	Economic
World Health Organization	WHO	1946	Social
World Intellectual Property Organization	WIPO	1967	Economic
World Tourism Organization	UNWTO	1975	Economic

A2 Operationalization of dependent variable

A2.1 Versions of dependent variable

The dependent variable is the count of paragraphs in IO annual reports that use democratic legitimation narratives, that is, identity or purpose revealing language that links the organization to democratic norms. We have calculated several variations of our dependent variable. The following table summarizes those variables.

Descriptive statistic on dependent variables

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
n_DemIO	516	0.620	1.343	0	11
n_DRall	516	0.959	1.912	0	15
n_Dthin	516	0.355	1.005	0	11
n_Dthick	516	0.368	0.845	0	6
n_DPromo	516	0.339	1.120	0	11

- n_DRall is the count of all democratic legitimation
- n_DemIO is the count of all procedural democratic legitimation
- n_Dthin is the count of thin procedural democratic legitimation
- n_Dthick is the count of thick procedural democratic legitimation

A2.2 Democratic legitimation by IOs

IO	Coded para.	Mean share of legitimation statements	Mean share of dem. leg.	n_DemIO	n_Dthin	n_Dthick	n_DRall
BIS	1912	0.12	0.02	6	3	3	6
CON	843	0.40	0.23	20	6	30	86
GEF	820	0.26	0.12	21	12	9	21
IAEA	1578	0.19	0.01	5	3	2	5
ICAO	1920	0.08	0.01	2	1	1	2
ICC	420	0.18	0.06	7	6	2	7
ILO	1884	0.25	0.08	16	2	19	41
IMF	1583	0.30	0.08	41	32	16	48
ISBA	884	0.10	0.00	0	0	0	0
IWC	1381	0.06	0.04	8	7	4	8
OECD	1243	0.28	0.05	20	3	18	28
OPEC	1359	0.13	0.01	1	0	1	2
OSCE	816	0.29	0.18	17	10	13	47
PCA	1212	0.15	0.00	0	0	0	0
IBRD	1904	0.26	0.07	28	16	13	40
UN	1892	0.32	0.12	66	45	23	82
UNESCO	790	0.21	0.09	9	1	9	19
UNIDO	1472	0.25	0.03	15	13	3	15
WMO	1196	0.22	0.01	2	2	0	2
WTO	1644	0.21	0.13	36	21	24	36

A2.3 Democratic legitimation by year

Year	Coded para.	Mean share of legitimation statements	Mean share of dem. leg.	n_DemIO	n_Dthin	n_Dthick	n_DRall
1980	360	0.12	0.01	1	0	1	1
1981	813	0.16	0.01	1	0	2	4
1982	669	0.14	0.02	1	0	1	2
1983	794	0.14	0.00	1	0	1	1
1984	766	0.15	0.01	1	0	1	2
1985	849	0.15	0.02	3	0	3	4
1986	767	0.13	0.01	1	0	1	2
1987	774	0.14	0.01	2	2	0	2
1988	754	0.15	0.02	4	0	4	4
1989	764	0.13	0.02	2	0	4	5
1990	648	0.15	0.01	1	0	1	2
1991	760	0.20	0.05	5	3	2	12
1992	785	0.19	0.05	4	1	3	10
1993	768	0.18	0.07	6	3	5	14
1994	746	0.21	0.06	7	2	5	13
1995	769	0.20	0.08	14	7	9	22
1996	901	0.21	0.07	10	6	8	20
1997	898	0.21	0.06	5	3	2	18
1998	869	0.21	0.03	5	1	6	7
1999	894	0.25	0.06	8	5	7	19
2000	910	0.23	0.09	17	11	11	22
2001	862	0.28	0.12	22	17	14	38
2002	883	0.25	0.07	12	7	8	14
2003	897	0.29	0.11	17	13	10	27
2004	868	0.23	0.10	12	10	6	15
2005	1065	0.26	0.13	26	18	12	40
2006	988	0.28	0.08	19	12	6	27
2007	969	0.29	0.08	22	13	10	32
2008	920	0.24	0.08	25	20	7	29
2009	1012	0.25	0.07	21	11	10	25
2010	1029	0.25	0.10	18	8	12	25
2011	1002	0.28	0.12	27	10	18	37

A2.4 Correlation matrix

Looking at simple correlation, we see that, as expected, most variations of the variables correlate highly. However, the thin and thick versions of democratic legitimation only correlate lightly and are thus rather distinct phenomena.

	n_DemIO	n_DRall	n_Dthin	n_Dthick	n_DPromo
n_DemIO					
n_DRall	0.8188				
n_Dthin	0.8565	0.6706			
n_Dthick	0.7406	0.7590	0.3671		
n_DPromo	0.1981	0.7249	0.1172	0.4073	

A2.5 Distribution of dependent variable

Further, looking at the distribution of our main dependent variable – n_DRall – we see that it closely resembles a negative binomial distribution.



The test statistics of a Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test show that the n_DRall variable closely resembles a negative binomial distribution.

Data: Tr and Co
D = 0.027132, p-value = 0.9913
Alternative hypothesis: two-sided

A3 Operationalization of explanatory variables

In the following section, we present our selection and operationalization of independent variables.

A3.1 Authority-legitimation link

Authority

First, we operationalize the **authority** of IOs with the help of the MIA dataset by Liesbet Hooghe and colleagues (2017) on the pooling and delegation of IO authority at IOs. This dataset provides information on the number of tasks delegated to and the number of decisions pooled at IOs for all IOs in our sample. It covers the period between 1950 and 2010. Hence, the final year of our observation period is not covered by this data.

We combine these data with information from the FIGO dataset, which classifies IOs according to their purpose ("economic", "general", "political/military", "social") (Volgy et al. 2008). We add data for missing IOs according to the FIGO coding rules. We use this data on IO purpose as a proxy for IO issue intrusiveness, with which we weigh IO authority. IOs with a general-purpose have a very intrusive issue scope (3), economic purpose IOs have a lower but still intrusive issue scope (2) and political/military and social purpose IOs have a less intrusive issue scope (1). After matching our IOs and years to the MIA dataset, we created four versions of the authority variable:

- Authority (main variable): the sum of MIA scores for delpolicy (delegation of authority on the policy-making dimension) and poolpolicy (pooling of authority on the policy-making dimension). With this variable, we zero in on the policy-making authority of IOs, because we expect that this part of IO authority creates the strongest legitimation pressures.

- Authority × intrusiveness: Authority (first robustness check) multiplied with the intrusiveness variable. This variable weighs the policy-making authority of an IO with its intrusiveness.
- Authority in all areas (second robustness check): the sum of MIA scores on delegation (annual IO average of delegation, adjusted for bindingness and ratification, scaled to 0-1) and pooling (annual IO average of pooling, adjusted for bindingness and ratification, scaled to 0-1). This variable simply combines the scores for delegated and pooled authority.
- Authority in all areas × intrusiveness (third robustness check): Authority in all areas multiplied with the intrusiveness variable derived from the FIGO dataset. This variable weighs the overall authority of an IO with its intrusiveness.

Descriptive statistics on authority measures

	N	Mean	St. dev.	Min	Max
Authority	480	0.506	0.239	0.111	1.071
Authority × intrusiveness	480	0.865	0.463	0.192	2.143
Authority in all areas	480	0.451	0.193	0.066	0.772
Authority in all areas × intrusiveness	480	0.771	0.387	0.066	1.472

As the following correlation matrix illustrates, the related measures of authority correlate with each other, but none is a strong predictor of the count of democratic legitimation.

Correlation matrix for authority measures

	n_DRall	Authority	Authority × intrusiveness	Authority in all areas	Authority in all areas × intrusiveness
n_DRall					
Authority	-0.0795				
Authority × intrusiveness	0.0260	0.6373			
Authority in all areas	-0.1287	0.5865	0.2450		
Authority in all areas × intrusiveness	-0.0295	0.3688	0.6845	0.6714	

A3.2 Alternative explanations: membership, design, politicization

Democratic density

First, we operationalize the **democratic quality of IO member states** with the help of the Polity IV dataset on the democratic quality of states (Marshall et al. 2016). This dataset combines a number of dimension into an index which measures the democratic quality of states per year. It provides data for member states of the IOs in our sample for the period 1800-2015. For IO membership information, we rely on the COW-2 International Organizations Dataset, which provides annual membership information for IOs (Pevehouse et al. 2004). We add missing membership information. We use the combined information to create our measure of IO democratic density:

- Democratic density (main variable): mean value of Polity IV score for IO member states in a given IO-year. This measure tells us the average democratic quality of an IO's membership in a given year.

Alternatively, we create a measure of democratic density using the democracy-dictatorship dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010). This dataset classifies states as being either a democracy or a dictatorship:

- Democracy-Dictatorship (first robustness check): share of IO member states which are considered democratic according to the democracy-dictatorship dataset. Like DM.share, this indicator tells us the share of democratic member states of an IO in a given year.

Based on the same data, we calculate alternative variables that may explain the usage of democratic legitimation.

- Young democracies (second robustness check): We assume that there may be an effect of young democracies on the democratic legitimation of IOs. Thus, we identify young democracies (that is, states that have taken the threshold to democracy according to the democracy-dictatorship dataset in the previous year) and then calculate the share of those in each IO-year.
- Major power democracies (third robustness check): Finally, we calculate a variable that assigns 1 to IO-years during which major democratic powers (France, UK, USA, Germany post-1990, Japan post-1990) are unchallenged by major autocratic powers (China, Russia) in a given IO-year.

The following correlation matrix shows that, as expected, the alternative calculations for the share of democratic member states and the mean of Polity IV values correlate highly. The young democracies share, however, appears to measure a very distinct feature of IOs, that is not directly related to the overall democratic membership of IOs.

Correlation matrix for IO membership variables

	n_DRall	Democracy-Dictatorship	Democratic density	Young democracies	Major power democracies
n_DRall					
Democracy-Dictatorship	0.0969				
Democratic density	0.1458	0.9868			
Young democracies	-0.0924	-0.1314	-0.1762		
Major power democracies	0.1209	0.4426	0.4089	-0.0654	

Weak IO members

We create a measure of weak IO member states using data provided by the UN Committee for Development Policy Secretariat on the developmental status of states (2017). This data provides a list of least developed countries (LDCs) in a given year. We use this information, combined with COW data on IO-membership, to create a measure of IO inequality for the period 1980-2011:

- Weak IO members: share of LDCs per IO-year. This indicator tells the share of LDCs in an IO's membership in a given IO-year.

Alternatively, we operationalize economic inequality of IO member states with the help of data from the Penn World Tables dataset on the real GDP of IO member states at constant 2005 national prices in 2005 U.S. Dollar (Feenstra et al. 2015). We combine this data with COW IO membership information. We use this to create a measure of IO inequality for the period 1980-2011:

- Economic inequality (Gini): Gini coefficient for all IO member states in a given IO-year.

The following correlation matrix illustrates that both correlate highly with each other, but only weakly to our main dependent variable.

Correlation matrix for economic inequality among IO members

	n_DRall	Economic inequality (Gini)	Weak IO members
n_DRall			
Economic inequality (Gini)	0.2088		
Weak IO members e	0.1313	0.723	

Democratic institutional features

We test if democratic design features of IOs influence the use of democratic legitimation. Our main measure of this concept is an index of institutional IO democracy. The index is composed of the following five dimensions and indicators. It provides annual data for all IOs in the sample and the period between 1980-2011.

Index of democratic institutional features

Indicator	Score	Explanation	Source
Fair state representation	0	Executive council with limited membership and seats reserved for specific countries	IO statutes
	1	Executive council with limited membership	
	2	No executive council or major decisions only made in General Assembly	
Fair voting	0	Weighted voting	Blake and Payton (2015), own research
	1	Unanimity voting	
CSO access	0	Absent or passive participation in General Assembly	Transaccess dataset (Tallberg et al. 2013), own research
	1	Active and indirect or active and direct participation	
	2	Non-state voting right	
Public access to information (transparency)	0	No information policy	(Donaldson and Kingsbury 2013; Grigorescu 2007), own research
	1	Presence of information policy	
Parliamentary oversight	0	No institutionalized oversight, no relation with parliamentary associations	(Rocabert et al. 2017), own research
	1	Institutionalized relationships with parliamentary associations	
	2	Presence of parliamentary assembly	

To create the index, we simply add up the score of a given IO in a given year. As a result, the index ranges from zero for no democratic institutional features to eight for a high density of democratic institutional design features.

Politicization

We test if public politicization shapes the use of democratic legitimation. We use two alternative measures, the public visibility of IOs and public visible protest against IOs. Both measures provide annual data for all IOs in the sample and the period between 1980-2011.

Media visibility

We operationalize the media visibility of IOs with the help of data generated by keyword searches for the IO name or acronym in the online newspaper database *LexisNexis*. We use this information to create two alternative measures of media visibility for the period 1980-2011:

- Media visibility (total): number of hits for a keyword search in the New York Times (available since 1980), Jiji Press English News Service (available since 1981), Associated Press Newswires (available since 1985), Times of India (available since 1986), Reuters News (available since 1987), Xinhua General News Service (available since 1989), Inter Press Service (available since 1992), ITAR-TASS World Service (available since 1997), All Africa (available since 1998) for IO name and acronym per IO-year divided by the count of *Newshole-Articles*, that is, those articles that include either "and" or "or" or "the" or "of" or "a" published in the listed sources during the respective year. By dividing the number of hits by the total number of published articles, we correct for changes in the newshole of the selected corpus over time.
- Media visibility (NYT): number of hits for a keyword search in the New York Times for IO name and acronym per IO-year divided by the newshole.

Protest

We operationalize protest against IOs with the help of data generated by keyword searches for the IO name or acronym and the terms “protestor” or “demonstrator” in the *Major World Newspapers* corpus of the online newspaper database *LexisNexis* (see also Tallberg et al. 2013). These searches produced a high number of hits unrelated to our IOs. Hence, we applied a second step of human coding and excluded those articles that did not refer to the IOs in the sample. We use this information to create a measure of protest against IOs for the period 1980-2011:

- Protest: number of articles for keyword searches during the respective year

The following correlation matrix illustrates that the total visibility and visibility in the New York Times measures are highly correlated. In addition, there is a positive correlation between media visibility and protest against IOs.

Correlation matrix for politicization variables

	Media visibility (NYT)	Media visibility (total)	Protest
Media visibility (NYT)			
Media visibility (total)	0.9124		
Protest	0.3905	0.4180	

A.3.3 Controls

Democracy mandate

We check the founding documents (Treaties, Conventions) of IOs for direct references to democracy (as defined in the context of this study). We code years where such references are found with 1, other years with 0. To check for changes over time, we consulted changes in the founding documents during our period of examination.

Legitimation intensity

This indicator is based on our coding of IO annual reports (1980-2011). It reports the share of paragraphs containing identity and purpose statements of all coded paragraphs per IO-year.

Participatory discourse

This indicator is based on keyword searches using the **Google NGram Tool** which includes more than five million publications from the Google books database. The search routine includes the terms "participatory governance", "democratic deficit", and "global democracy". The indicator reports the annual number of publications that include these terms for the period 1980-2010. We thank Tallberg and colleagues (2013) for providing the data.

A4 Modelling

To model the causal relationships in our data, we use a negative binomial count model with a log link. In the following section, we present the various models we also discuss in the paper.

A4.1 Final model (negative binomial regression, dependent variable: count of democratic legitimation, with different lagged DVs, IO dummies omitted from output)

	(1) visibility, 3-year rolling mean	(2) protest, 3-year rolling mean	(3) visibility, 1-year lagged DV	(4) protest, 1-year lagged DV	(5) visibility, no lag/rolling mean	(6) protest, no lag/rolling mean
Authority, scaled	-0.948	0.298	-0.677	-0.016	-0.901	-0.256
	(0.716)	(0.722)	(0.812)	(0.768)	(0.809)	(0.762)
Democratic density, scaled	-0.133	0.130	0.054	0.275	0.108	0.304
	(0.321)	(0.328)	(0.370)	(0.359)	(0.378)	(0.363)
Weak IO members, scaled	-0.602*	-0.601*	-0.341	-0.425	-0.294	-0.397
	(0.264)	(0.287)	(0.304)	(0.310)	(0.307)	(0.310)
Inst. democratic features, scaled	-0.200	-0.316	-0.091	-0.174	-0.031	-0.123
	(0.171)	(0.186)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.216)
Media visibility (total), scaled	0.533***		0.372**		0.337*	
	(0.116)		(0.135)		(0.136)	
Protest, scaled		0.087*		0.123*		0.130**
		(0.041)		(0.048)		(0.048)
dem. leg. (3-year rolling mean)	0.334***	0.315***				
	(0.035)	(0.038)				
dem. leg. (1-year lagged)			0.081*	0.066*		
			(0.033)	(0.033)		
Democracy mandate	3.713***	3.861**	3.366**	3.853**	3.369**	3.878**
	(1.103)	(1.179)	(1.276)	(1.285)	(1.293)	(1.291)
Legitimation intensity, scaled	-0.593	-0.537	1.262*	1.171	1.959***	1.718**
	(0.504)	(0.538)	(0.624)	(0.623)	(0.563)	(0.556)
Participatory discourse, scaled	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Year	0.087**	0.077*	0.096**	0.088**	0.099**	0.090**
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Constant	-181.033**	-161.118*	-198.516**	-182.288**	-203.686**	-186.732**
	(60.929)	(63.742)	(68.151)	(67.103)	(69.132)	(67.594)
Observations	460	460	477	477	477	477
Log Likelihood	-411.335	-417.897	-463.550	-464.245	-466.169	-465.945
Theta	26.410	8.459*	2.964***	2.862***	2.685***	2.731***
	(26.532)	(3.452)	(0.774)	(0.728)	(0.675)	(0.692)
AIC	880.670	893.793	985.100	986.490	988.337	987.890
Note:						*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

A4.2 Robustness: Logistic regression model (dependent variable: dichotomous variable for democratic legitimation/no democratic legitimation, IO dummies omitted from output)

	(1) visibility	(2) protest	
Authority, scaled	4.931		7.911*
	(2.818)		(3.410)
Inst. democratic features, scaled	-1.278*		-1.643**
	(0.587)		(0.630)
Democratic density, scaled	-1.357		-1.157
	(0.813)		(0.794)
Weak IO members, scaled	-0.278		-0.219
	(0.699)		(0.699)
Media visibility (total), scaled	0.809		
	(0.477)		
Protest, scaled			1.366
			(0.702)
dem. leg. (3-year rolling mean)	2.233***		2.198***
	(0.361)		(0.365)
Legitimation intensity, scaled	-1.631		-1.846
	(1.564)		(1.582)
Participatory discourse, scaled	-0.0001		-0.0001
	(0.0003)		(0.0003)
Democracy mandate	-0.640		-0.918
	(3.079)		(3.201)
Year	0.193*		0.185*
	(0.088)		(0.087)
Constant	-385.609*		-370.344*
	(175.908)		(173.390)
Observations	460		460
Log Likelihood	-131.763		-131.071
AIC	321.527		320.143
Note:			*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

A4.3 Robustness: Authority (negative binomial regression, dependent variable: count of democratic legitimation, with three alternative specifications of the authority variable, IO dummies omitted from output)

	(1) Visibility	(2) Protest	(3) Visibility	(4) Protest	(5) Visibility	(6) Protest
Authority × intrusiveness, scaled	-0.081	0.940				
	(0.614)	(0.572)				
Authority in all areas, scaled			-0.864**	-0.771**		
			(0.266)	(0.290)		
Authority in all areas × intrusiveness, scaled					-1.502**	-1.144*
					(0.531)	(0.576)
Democratic density, scaled	-0.113	0.159	-0.101	0.129	-0.153	0.087
	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.319)	(0.327)	(0.318)	(0.328)
Weak IO members, scaled	-0.609*	-0.605*	-0.324	-0.338	-0.432	-0.449
	(0.267)	(0.285)	(0.274)	(0.296)	(0.266)	(0.290)
Inst. democratic features, scaled	-0.221	-0.299	-0.221	-0.327	-0.235	-0.336
	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.170)	(0.185)	(0.169)	(0.185)
Media visibility (total), scaled	0.465***		0.507***		0.518***	
	(0.120)		(0.100)		(0.101)	
Protest, scaled		0.089*		0.080*		0.083*
		(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.040)
dem. leg. (3-year rolling mean)	0.338***	0.326***	0.335***	0.312***	0.333***	0.310***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Democracy mandate	3.332**	4.921***	2.566*	3.193**	0.347	1.593
	(1.284)	(1.300)	(1.107)	(1.178)	(1.549)	(1.656)
Legitimation intensity, scaled	-0.630	-0.655	-0.636	-0.448	-0.654	-0.460
	(0.511)	(0.535)	(0.497)	(0.529)	(0.496)	(0.530)
Participatory discourse, scaled	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Year	0.085**	0.076*	0.086**	0.080*	0.089**	0.081*
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Constant	-177.064**	-159.731*	-177.278**	-164.919**	-182.204**	-167.540**
	(61.590)	(63.245)	(59.715)	(63.067)	(59.804)	(63.386)
Observations	460	460	460	460	460	460
Log Likelihood	-412.179	-416.625	-406.712	-414.437	-408.416	-416.156
Theta	19.368	9.046*	31.861	9.145*	34.801	9.000*
	(15.128)	(3.864)	(35.131)	(3.763)	(42.345)	(3.732)
AIC	882.359	891.249	871.424	886.874	874.832	890.311
Note:						*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

A4.4 Robustness: Democratic membership (negative binomial regression, dependent variable: count of democratic legitimation, with three alternative specifications of the democratic membership variable, IO dummies omitted from output)

	(1) Visibility	(2) Protest	(3) Visibility	(4) Protest	(5) Visibility	(6) Protest
Authority, scaled	-0.750	0.200	-0.986	0.242	-0.929	0.291
	(0.747)	(0.719)	(0.714)	(0.718)	(0.711)	(0.724)
Democracy-Dictatorship, scaled	0.412	0.786				
	(0.464)	(0.450)				
Young democracies, scaled			0.088	0.089		
			(0.076)	(0.082)		
Major power democracies, scaled					0.114	-0.222
					(0.369)	(0.440)
Weak IO members, scaled	-0.576	-0.591	-0.624*	-0.611*	-0.626*	-0.579*
	(0.307)	(0.325)	(0.263)	(0.286)	(0.265)	(0.287)
Inst. democratic features, scaled	-0.194	-0.322	-0.192	-0.286	-0.206	-0.318
	(0.187)	(0.197)	(0.169)	(0.184)	(0.168)	(0.186)
Media visibility (total), scaled	0.401**		0.517***		0.523***	
	(0.128)		(0.113)		(0.112)	
Protest, scaled		0.078		0.082*		0.097*
		(0.042)		(0.041)		(0.043)
dem. leg. (3-year rolling mean)	0.325***	0.309***	0.328***	0.315***	0.331***	0.318***
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Democracy mandate	4.314***	4.861***	3.933***	3.601***	4.020***	3.548***
	(1.268)	(1.332)	(0.932)	(1.007)	(0.942)	(1.019)
Legitimation intensity, scaled	-0.527	-0.475	-0.542	-0.511	-0.588	-0.555
	(0.568)	(0.588)	(0.507)	(0.542)	(0.502)	(0.541)
Participatory discourse, scaled	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Year	0.064	0.050	0.080***	0.089***	0.078***	0.087***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Observations	425	425	460	460	457	457
Log Likelihood	-367.448	-370.122	-410.765	-417.405	-411.372	-417.843
	16.997	9.168*	28.075	8.360*	29.441	8.013*
Theta	(12.675)	(4.250)	(28.888)	(3.340)	(32.277)	(3.153)
AIC	792.896	798.245	879.530	892.809	880.744	893.686
Note:					*p<0.05, **p<0.01,*** p<0.001	

A4.5 Robustness: Economic inequality (negative binomial regression, dependent variable: count of democratic legitimation, with one alternative specification of the weak member state variable, IO dummies omitted from output)

	(1) Visibility	(2) Protest	
Authority, scaled	-0.941		0.219
	(0.749)		(0.741)
Democratic density, scaled	-0.200		0.067
	(0.324)		(0.329)
Economic inequality (Gini), scaled	0.462		0.541
	(0.565)		(0.577)
Inst. democratic features, scaled	-0.146		-0.257
	(0.177)		(0.190)
Media visibility (total), scaled	0.515***		
	(0.122)		
Protest, scaled			0.075
			(0.042)
dem. leg. (3-year rolling mean)	0.340***		0.325***
	(0.037)		(0.039)
Democracy mandate	1.362		1.428
	(1.169)		(1.209)
Legitimation intensity, scaled	-0.491		-0.426
	(0.524)		(0.551)
Participatory discourse, scaled	-0.0002		-0.0001
	(0.0001)		(0.0001)
Year	0.079*		0.068*
	(0.031)		(0.032)
Observations	460		460
Log Likelihood	-413.312		-419.477
	13.078		6.641**
Theta	(7.266)		(2.274)
AIC	884.624		896.954
Note:			*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

A5: Table: Types of arguments linked to democratic legitimation

The following table provides an overview of the types of arguments in our sample that are linked to democratic legitimation and correspond to our explanatory models.

Model	Type of argument	Organizations
Authority and democratic features	Democracy promotion (or the promotion of a single democratic value) is a core value or core objective of the organization	CON, ILO, OECD, OSCE, World Bank, UNESCO
	Specific institutional bodies attest to the organization's commitment to democracy or to specific democratic values	GEF, OSCE, World Bank, UN
	(Changes in) Decision-making rules in institutional bodies attest to the democratic quality of the organization	IMF, ILO, IWC, World Bank, WTO, UN
	Access for and/or interaction with civil society organizations demonstrate commitment to democratic value(s)	CON, GEF, UN, WTO
	Specific declarations, decisions, reports or rules adopted by the organization demonstrate a commitment to democratic value(s)	CON, IMF, OSCE, WTO, UNIDO
	Specific policies, activities, strategies, programs or events demonstrate a commitment to democratic value(s)	CON, GEF, ICC, ILO, World Bank, UNESCO, UNIDO, WTO
	Growth of the organization and/or its authority make transparency and accountability necessary / (Increasingly) global reach triggers greater inclusiveness	OSCE, UN / BIS
Membership	Democratic membership makes democracy promotion – as well as the assistance for young democracies – an important goal	CON, ILO, OECD, UN
	Democratic membership provides the basis for a democratic IO	CON
	Economic inequality is a threat to democracy – the IO is committed to reversing it / LDC members require special assistance to enable them to exercise their rights	CON; WTO
Politicization	Public interest triggers heightened attention to the transparency of the IO	BIS, WTO
	Protest triggers heightened attention to the transparency of IO	IMF, WTO

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