## **Supplemental Online Appendix**

## Variable Pay Systems and/or Collective Wage Bargaining? Complements or Substitutes? Barbara Bechter, Nils Braakmann, and Bernd Brandl

**Table OA.1.** Collective Wage Bargaining and the Incidence of Variable Pay Systems (Sensitivity Tests on Basis of Different VCE Estimators)

	Models		
	(a)	<i>(b)</i>	<i>(c)</i>
		oit with robust stand	lard errors
Single-level bargaining	-0.004		
	(0.028)		
Only company bargaining		0.052	0.054
		(0.034)	(0.034)
Only sectoral bargaining		-0.027	-0.032
		(0.038)	(0.038)
Only national bargaining		-0.118***	-0.113**
		(0.044)	(0.044)
Multilevel bargaining	0.114***	0.098***	` /
2 2	(0.035)	(0.036)	
Governed multilevel bargaining	()	(* ***)	-0.009
			(0.054)
Ungoverned multilevel bargaining			0.149***
ongo vermen marime ver ourgaming			(0.041)
	Probit with	clustered standard e	\ /
Single-level bargaining	-0.004	crustered standard e	11013 (20 clusters)
Single-level barganning	(0.032)		
Only company hargaining	(0.032)	0.052	0.054
Only company bargaining			
0.1		(0.034)	(0.035)
Only sectoral bargaining		-0.027	-0.032
		(0.036)	(0.038)
Only national bargaining		-0.118*	-0.113*
		(0.067)	(0.063)
Multilevel bargaining	0.114**	0.098*	
	(0.053)	(0.053)	
Governed multilevel bargaining			-0.009
			(0.102)
Ungoverned multilevel bargaining			0.149***
			(0.051)
	LPM wi	ith parametric Moul	ton correction
Single-level bargaining	-0.004	-	
	(0.008)		
Only company bargaining	,	0.012	0.013
J 1 J 6 6		(0.010)	(0.010)
Only sectoral bargaining		-0.010	-0.013
and againing		(0.012)	(0.012)
Only national bargaining		-0.042***	-0.040***
Omy national bargaining		(0.013)	(0.014)
		(0.013)	(0.014)

Multilevel bargaining	0.033***	0.028***	
	(0.010)	(0.010)	
Governed multilevel bargaining			-0.008
			(0.015)
Ungoverned multilevel bargaining			0.047***
			(0.012)

*Notes:* The three models based on Table 2 in the article. 1) Probit with robust standard errors, 2) Probit with clustered standard errors (clustering on the 28 countries), and 3) a linear probability model with a parametric Moulton correction as suggested in Angrist and Pischke (*Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*, 2009).

**Table OA.2.** Collective Wage Bargaining and the Incidence of Variable Pay Systems (Leave-One-Country-Out Results)

 Variable	Апанаса	Median	Jut Results)  Minimum	Maximum	0/ of actimates
variable	Average coefficient	coefficient	coefficient	coefficient	% of estimates where coefficient is significant
		Mo	del (a)		<i>O V</i>
Single-level bargaining	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	0.004	0
Multilevel bargaining	0.033	0.032	0.027	0.040	100
<u> </u>		Mo	del (b)		
Only company bargaining	0.015	0.015	0.011	0.020	4
Only sectoral bargaining	-0.008	-0.008	-0.012	-0.001	0
Only national bargaining	-0.034	-0.034	-0.041	-0.015	96
Multilevel bargaining	0.028	0.028	0.022	0.036	100
		Mo	del (c)		
Only company bargaining	0.016	0.016	0.012	0.021	7
Only sectoral bargaining	-0.009	-0.009	-0.015	-0.002	0
Only national bargaining	-0.032	-0.032	-0.040	-0.015	93
Governed multilevel bargaining	-0.003	-0.003	-0.028	0.014	0
Ungoverned multilevel bargaining	0.043	0.043	0.037	0.051	100

Notes: The leave-one-out (one country is left out) models are based on Table 2 in the article. The table shows the variation of the coefficient (and the significance) if one country is left out for all countries considered in the sample.

Table OA.3. Incidence (in Percentage) of Collective Bargaining Structure and Variable Pay: Country-Level Information

	Collective bargaining					ariable Pay: 0	Variable pay				
Country	None	Only company	Only sector	Only national	Any multilevel	Governed multilevel	Ungoverned multilevel	Any	Payment by results	Performance- related pay	Team- related pay
Belgium	15	6	33	7	40	0	40	55	37	37	35
Bulgaria	85	10	1	1	3	0	3	68	39	47	53
Czech Republic	70	24	1	0	4	0	4	91	54	78	67
Denmark	27	17	14	6	36	36	0	79	44	61	51
Germany	36	18	23	3	19	19	0	70	36	52	47
Estonia	93	5	1	0	2	0	2	88	63	55	69
Ireland	45	16	3	17	19	0	19	70	36	49	44
Greece	11	15	11	24	39	0	39	61	33	43	36
Spain	8	15	39	11	28	0	28	61	42	43	43
France	25	23	11	8	33	0	33	73	39	43	58
Croatia	58	27	2	2	10	0	10	56	41	45	34
Italy	5	4	9	60	22	0	22	61	22	44	42
Cyprus	48	24	6	4	18	0	18	55	29	40	33
Latvia	94	4	1	0	1	0	1	74	30	56	48
Lithuania	84	11	1	1	4	0	4	88	73	72	69
Luxembourg	38	23	6	8	26	0	26	70	43	48	41
Hungary	80	12	2	1	5	0	5	60	28	44	35
Malta	77	11	0	3	9	0	9	75	52	51	37
Netherlands	34	24	14	8	20	20	0	73	40	54	54
Austria	15	4	57	4	21	21	0	83	55	63	62
Poland	51	43	2	1	4	0	4	82	44	59	63
Portugal	38	6	30	6	20	0	20	59	31	41	41
Romania	30	59	1	3	8	0	8	68	45	48	49
Slovenia	30	32	5	11	22	0	22	87	42	79	73
Slovakia	72	20	1	1	5	0	5	91	56	59	72
Finland	7	5	52	9	27	27	0	88	52	55	76
Sweden	12	3	19	11	54	54	0	71	35	46	54
UK	52	32	2	4	10	0	10	71	38	47	46

**Table OA.4.** Collective Wage Bargaining and the Incidence of Variable Pay Systems (Analogous to Table 2 but with Company-Level Bargaining as Reference Category)

	Models			
	(a)	<i>(b)</i>	(c)	
Differentiation between levels				
No collective bargaining	0.001	-0.015	-0.016	
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
Only sectoral bargaining	, ,	-0.023*	-0.025**	
		(0.012)	(0.012)	
Only national bargaining		-0.049***	-0.048***	
		(0.013)	(0.014)	
Multilevel bargaining	0.034***	0.013	` ,	
	(0.009)	(0.011)		
Differentiation in governability	·	, ,		
Governed multilevel bargaining			-0.018	
			(0.016)	
Ungoverned multilevel bargaining			0.027**	
			(0.012)	
Observations	18,524	18,524	18,524	

*Notes:* Probit average marginal effects, robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates control for country fixed effects as well as further control variables, which are listed in Table A.2.

<sup>\*</sup>, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table OA.5.** Collective Wage Bargaining and the Type of Variable Pay System (Analogous to Table 3 but Uses Trivariate Probit That Allows Errors to Be Correlated across Equations)

3 but Uses Trivariate Probli 1	Hat AHOWS EHOIS	Models	1000 Equations)
	(a)	Models (b)	(c)
Differentiation between levels		( /	nt by results (PbR)
Single-level bargaining	-0.031	Outcome is paymen	iit by results (1 bix)
Single level bargaining	(0.026)		
Only company bargaining	(0.020)	-0.009	-0.007
omy company ourgaining		(0.030)	(0.030)
Only sectoral bargaining		-0.040	-0.046
Only sectoral barganing		(0.036)	(0.036)
Only national bargaining		-0.083**	-0.079*
Only national bargaining		(0.042)	(0.042)
Multilevel bargaining	0.123***	0.117***	(0.042)
Multilevel bargaining	(0.032)	(0.032)	
Differentiation in governability	(0.032)	(0.032)	
Differentiation in governability Governed multilevel bargaining			0.037
Governed mutinever bargaining			
I I a a a serious and servited a seri			(0.048) 0.159***
Ungoverned multilevel			0.139***
bargaining			(0.027)
D'66 4 4 1 4 1 1	E ( 2.0		(0.037)
Differentiation between levels		itcome is performa	nce-related pay (PrP)
Single-level bargaining	-0.011		
	(0.026)	0.020	0.021
Only company bargaining		0.030	0.031
		(0.031)	(0.031)
Only sectoral bargaining		-0.055	-0.057
		(0.036)	(0.036)
Only <i>national</i> bargaining		-0.068	-0.065
		(0.042)	(0.042)
Multilevel bargaining	0.151***	0.138***	
	(0.033)	(0.033)	
Differentiation in governability			
Governed multilevel bargaining			0.103**
			(0.048)
Ungoverned multilevel			0.155***
bargaining			
			(0.038)
Differentiation between levels	Equation 3	: Outcome is team-	related pay (TrP)
Single-level bargaining	-0.043		
	(0.027)		
Only company bargaining		0.006	0.009
-		(0.031)	(0.031)
Only sectoral bargaining		-0.073**	-0.084**
		(0.037)	(0.037)
Only national bargaining		-0.140***	-0.132***
		(0.043)	(0.043)
Multilevel bargaining	0.101***	0.086**	` /
6 6	(0.033)	(0.034)	
Correlation errors Equation 1 and 2	0.35	0.35	0.35
Correlation errors Equations 1 and 3	0.35	0.35	0.34
Correlation errors Equations 2 and 3	0.48	0.48	0.48
Observations	18,524	18,524	18,524
Notage Prohit as officients, rehyst stands	10,327	·	Tohlo 2 vyhiah amely ala

*Notes*: Probit coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. See notes in Table 2, which apply also here. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.