

Appendices (1-5)

Appendix 1. Coding schedule of inter-state shaming cases 1991–2011

Below is the schedule based on which the data on inter-state shaming in the ILO was coded. The discussions in the CAS are documented and available at the ILO’s website. “Shaming” is defined as the public exposure and condemnation of violations committed by states (Schimmelfennig 2001: 64).

Shaming?	Yes	No
The government/shamer stresses the seriousness of violations and urges the target government to take action	x	
The shamer considers the target for a special paragraph*	x	
The shamer reminds the targets of its promises regarding improvements in labor rights and urges the target to take action	x	
The shamer explicitly agrees with the CEACR on the need to take appropriate actions	x	
The shamer stresses procedural concerns		x
The shamer stresses the seriousness of the violations and urges the target to receive ILO assistance	x	
The shamer mentions that the target should not be included in the CAS		x
The shamer urges the target to amend, adopt, or repeal specific legislation that is in violations of ILO conventions	x	
The shamer stresses the only progress that has been made by the target		x
The shamer expresses satisfaction despite the target’s violations		x
The shamer opposes putting the target in the special paragraph		x
The shamer opposes the target in the special paragraph but stresses the seriousness of the violation and urges the target to take appropriate action	x	
The shamer comments on whether the information provided by the CEACR is correct		x
The shamer presents additional information about violations (not	x	

mentioned by the CEACR) and condemns the target		
The shamer stresses cooperation and assistance but does not explicitly mention violations		x

* A special paragraph is a practice that singles out the worst violators among the cases discussed at the CAS.

Below are examples of cases that are considered to be inter-state shaming in the ILO.

1. The government representative of Hungary “noted with deep regret, the serious allegations presented in the report of the Committee of Experts concerning the grave violations of human rights, murder, arbitrary arrest and long-term imprisonment of trade unionists for the exercise of ordinary trade union activities” (ILO 2011)
2. “The Government member of the United States recalled that the ILO supervisory bodies had used, on many occasions, the strongest language available to them to deplore the persistent failure of the Burmese Government to guarantee the fundamental and inalienable right to freedom of association. Free and independent trade unions still did not exist in Burma” (ILO 2011)
3. “The Government member of the United States said that this case was perennially disturbing and that her Government remained concerned about the total lack of progress by the Myanmar authorities in providing a legal framework in which free and independent workers’ organizations could be established” (ILO 2004).
4. “The Government member of Norway, also speaking on behalf of all five Nordic Governments, stated that, while recognising the technical issues involved, this case concerning the right to organise in unions freely chosen was fundamentally a human rights case. The speaker indicated that in her country had a strong tradition in respect of the right to organise which included military personnel and police” (ILO 1991)
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMME_NT_ID:2554711
5. The Government member of Norway, speaking also on behalf of the Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, noted the information supplied to the direct contact mission by the Special Public Prosecutor's Office, indicating a significant decrease in physical violence, while the number of cases involving threats and coercion had increased considerably. According to the Government, all cases relating to murder and other offences were still at the stage of investigation. This situation was of grave concern. Criminal proceedings were extremely slow and impunity was the norm in cases concerning trade unionists. The Nordic countries emphasized that trade union rights could only be exercised in an atmosphere which is free from violence and coercion. As requested by the Committee of Experts, the Government should be asked to provide information on any offences against trade unionists reported to the Special Prosecutor's Office. It was hoped that the Government would make every effort to ensure full respect for trade union members’ human rights and that concrete progress on the above-mentioned point could be noted in the near future.(ILO, 2005)

Examples of cases that were not considered to be shaming in the ILO.

1. “The Government member of the Russian Federation said that his country recognized that it was important for ILO Members to meet the international obligations that they had assumed. Myanmar had undertaken wide-reaching constitutional reforms. General elections had been held and its new parliament was functioning. The reforms had aimed in particular at granting trade unions fundamental rights. Those rights were enshrined in the new Constitution, and a new labour organization act would be adopted with a view to bringing legislation into line with the Convention”(ILO 2011).
2. The Government member of Costa Rica pointed out that the acts of violence performed by the narco-terrorists did not discriminate either between rich landlords and trade unionists or between diplomats and politicians, young and old, children and women. No doubt, Colombia would be able to find a way out with the assistance of friendly States and international organizations, as well as through dialogue and reinforcement of democratic institutions. (ILO 2004)
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2556001
3. The Government member of Argentina indicated that she had read carefully the written information submitted by the Government, which contained a summary of recently adopted legislative decrees, in the light of the observations made by the Committee of Experts. She considered that those texts answered practically all the observations of the Committee of Experts. She said that only one subject would remain pending, concerning the right to strike in the public sector. She expressed the hope that the Committee's conclusions would reflect the view that those legislative measures answered and satisfied almost all the observations levelled against the Government. She recalled that the Committee's conclusions were one of the most important factors in encouraging cooperation and compliance by governments which had the political will to improve their situation and the honest desire to fulfil their commitments, as, in her view, was the case of Guatemala. That would no doubt encourage the Government to overcome any remaining difficulties. (ILO 2001)
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2555776
4. The Government member of Namibia expressed his delegation's appreciation for the information the Government had provided to the Committee. He was happy to note that the legislative amendment process had been carried out with the participation of workers and employers. He wished to recognize that the Government of Kenya had made significant progress in bringing its legislation into line with the provisions of the Convention and encouraged the Government to continue its work. (ILO 2006)
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2556190
5. The Government member of Zimbabwe said that the ongoing labour law reforms in Kenya which were taking issues of child labour into consideration should be commended. He found it unfair that a country that had shown such commitment to reforming its labour laws with a view to bringing them into line with the obligations of the Convention should be listed at this session. Legislative reform took considerable time and Kenya was positively moving towards these reforms (ILO 2006)

Appendix 2A. Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression models

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Inter-state shaming (DV)	41,271	0.0360	0.186	0	1
Left	41,270	0.274	0.446	0	1
Alliance	41,270	0.0665	0.249	0	1
PTAs	33,362	0.312	0.463	0	1
Workers' rights protection	38,174	0.385	0.951	-2	2
Distance	40,662	3.815	0.322	0	4.297
ILO observation	41,270	1.699	1.530	0	9
Lagged DV	39,140	0.0320	0.156	0	1
Number of times in the CAS	41,271	16.07	4.899	1	21
Number of democracies	41,271	54.53	8.019	40	68
Ratification	41,271	5.418	1.950	0	7
Relative capabilities	40,790	21.78	60.33	0.0351	1,094
Total bilateral trade	41,270	2.978	1.650	0	4.313
Democracy	41,270	0.510	0.500	0	1
Democratic dyad	41,270	0.231	0.421	0	1
Year	41,271	2,001	6.308	1991	2011

Appendix 2B. Variable names, measures and sources

Variable name	Measure construction	Variable source
Dependent		
Shaming	0=no action, 1=shaming,	ILO
Independent		
Democratic (H1)	0=non-democracy, 1=democracy Lagged one year	Marshall and Jaggers 2014
Both democracy (H2a-2b)	Both the shamer and the target are democracies (=1), otherwise (=0). Lagged 1 year.	Marshall and Jaggers 2014
Left	0=otherwise, 1=left Lagged one year	World Bank (DPI) Beck et al
Relative Capabilities	Composite Index of National Capabilities(CINC) version 5.0. CINC score of the shamer/ CINC score of the target. Higher values indicate stronger shamer state. Log10(amount), lagged 1 year	Correlates of War Project
Alliance	In Alliance (=1), otherwise (=0). Lagged 1 year.	Correlates of War Project
Bilateral Trade	Total bilateral trade between the shamer and the target (export+import). Log10(amount), lagged 1 year	World Bank (DPI) Beck et al.

PTAs	PTAs between the shamer and the target (=1), otherwise (=0). Lagged 1 year. Data for 1991-2009 period.	Dür et al. (2013)
Workers' rights protection	Difference between the workers' rights score of the shamer and the target. -2 to +2. Higher values indicate better the shamer has better workers' rights than the target. Lagged 1 year.	CIRI
Distance	Distance between capital cities in the kilometers. Log10(km).	Gleditsch and Ward (2001)
Ratification	Number of fundamental conventions ratified by the shamer. 1-7. Lagged 1 year.	ILO
ILO shaming	Number of observations by the CEACR and the CAS. Lagged 1 year.	ILO
Lagged state-shaming	Lagged dependent variable	ILO
Number of Democracies	Yearly number of democratic countries in the CAS.	ILO
Yearly effects	Yearly binary variables	

Appendix 3. Explaining inter-state shaming in the ILO

Model 1 and 3 are restricted to the period 1991–2004. Model 3 use a continuous Polity IV score. Model 4 includes worker rights score for the sender and the target separately. Model 5 estimates shaming onset, excluding the observations for consecutive years of continued shaming.

	Restricted logistic regression	Restricted logistic regression	Logistic regression	Logistic regression	Logistic regression
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy (shamer)	0.445** (0.188)	0.420** (0.198)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.624*** (0.111)	0.452*** (0.127)
Democratic dyad	0.245 (0.164)	0.233 (0.165)	0.140 (0.105)	0.045 (0.117)	-0.011 (0.129)
Left (shamer)	-0.094 (0.124)	-0.091 (0.126)	0.011 (0.076)	0.006 (0.075)	-0.226* (0.093)
Relative capabilities	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Alliance	-0.383* (0.188)	-0.335 (0.198)	0.217 (0.008)	0.182 (0.111)	0.687** (0.127)

	(0.227)	(0.230)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.133)
Total bilateral trade	-0.031	-0.036	-0.056**	-0.061**	-0.100***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)
PTAs		-0.137			
		(0.156)			
Workers' rights protection	0.582***	0.542***	0.452***		0.400***
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.047)		(0.051)
Worker0 (shamer)				-0.419***	
				(0.111)	
Worker1 (shamer)				-0.407***	
				(0.085)	
Worker0 (target)				1.163***	
				(0.219)	
Worker1 (target)				0.588***	
				(0.218)	
Distance	-1.190***	-1.233***	-1.155***	-1.167***	-1.219***
	(0.179)	(0.190)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.133)
Ratification (shamer)	-0.113*	-0.105*	0.016	0.018	-0.045
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)
ILO shaming (shamer)	-0.021	-0.021	-0.002	-0.024	0.032
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Lagged state-shaming	2.911***	2.986***	3.178***	3.086***	
	(0.145)	(0.153)	(0.093)	(0.096)	
Number of democracies	0.091***	0.081***	0.199***	0.190***	0.150***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Number of times in the CAS	0.271***	0.266***	0.102***	0.100***	0.101***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)
1992	-0.571	-0.807*	-0.098	-0.120	-0.692
	(0.437)	(0.441)	(0.473)	(0.476)	(0.488)
1993	-0.650	-0.868*	-0.191	-0.190	-0.214
	(0.457)	(0.463)	(0.486)	(0.488)	(0.455)
1994	-0.304	-0.457	-0.350	-0.320	-0.658*
	(0.382)	(0.392)	(0.375)	(0.379)	(0.385)
1995	0.577**	0.438*	-0.019	0.069	-0.282
	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.221)
1996	-1.007***	-1.134***	-2.450***	-2.293***	-2.333***
	(0.312)	(0.326)	(0.285)	(0.286)	(0.295)
1997	-0.292	-0.372	-1.613***	-1.464***	-1.524***
	(0.221)	(0.228)	(0.192)	(0.190)	(0.248)
1998	0.202	0.102	-1.075***	-0.907***	-0.795***
	(0.221)	(0.228)	(0.190)	(0.187)	(0.215)
1999	0.135	-0.005	-1.059***	-0.915***	-0.571***
	(0.232)	(0.239)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.210)
2000	-1.432***	-1.494***	-3.016***	-2.836***	-3.135***
	(0.319)	(0.316)	(0.330)	(0.324)	(0.459)
2001	-0.045	-0.197	-1.756***	-1.544***	-1.358***
	(0.208)	(0.216)	(0.205)	(0.198)	(0.221)
2002	-0.206	-0.263	-1.863***	-1.704***	-1.493***
	(0.240)	(0.243)	(0.221)	(0.213)	(0.261)
2003	-0.183	-0.276	-2.360***	-2.183***	-1.869***

	(0.173)	(0.179)	(0.224)	(0.211)	(0.244)
2004			-2.842***	-2.620***	-2.004***
			(0.304)	(0.288)	(0.307)
2005			-1.537***	-1.370***	-1.356***
			(0.178)	(0.164)	(0.218)
2006			-0.786***	-0.688***	-0.639***
			(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.191)
2007			-0.653***	-0.521***	-0.390**
			(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.162)
2008			-0.849***	-0.720***	-0.661***
			(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.180)
2009			-1.402***	-1.274***	-0.733***
			(0.157)	(0.146)	(0.176)
2010			-2.317***	-2.254***	-1.551***
			(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.251)
Constant	-11.229***	-7.131***	-11.635***	-11.685***	-8.500***
	(1.281)	(1.119)	(1.300)	(1.331)	(1.258)
<i>N</i>	37,938	31,145	37,938	37,938	36,484

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 4. Explaining inter-state shaming in the ILO 1991–2011, per convention type

	Forced Labor	Organizing and Bargaining Rights	Discrimination	Child Labor
VARIABLES	C29 and 105	C87 and 98	C100 &111	C138 & 182
Democracy (shamer)	0.943***	0.430***	0.728*	0.815**
	(0.259)	(0.142)	(0.428)	(0.363)
Democratic dyad	0.137	0.084	-0.882	-0.967**
	(0.274)	(0.138)	(0.598)	(0.440)
Left (shamer)	-0.372*	0.058	-0.192	-0.028
	(0.206)	(0.085)	(0.346)	(0.289)
Relative capabilities	-0.037***	-0.000	0.005	-0.010
	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Alliance	-0.839	0.138	0.549	1.763***
	(0.543)	(0.153)	(0.654)	(0.429)

Total bilateral trade	0.053 (0.076)	-0.074*** (0.029)	0.055 (0.095)	-0.245*** (0.090)
Workers' rights protection	0.502*** (0.133)	0.342*** (0.054)	0.249 (0.237)	-0.005 (0.174)
Distance	-1.195*** (0.321)	-1.250*** (0.123)	-1.839*** (0.465)	-2.271*** (0.386)
Ratification (shamer)	-0.031 (0.094)	0.015 (0.057)	-0.054 (0.107)	-0.009 (0.135)
ILO observation (shamer)	-0.152** (0.066)	0.021 (0.029)	0.006 (0.095)	-0.065 (0.095)
Lagged state-shaming	3.526*** (0.236)	3.028*** (0.111)	2.527*** (0.447)	4.093*** (0.350)
Number of democracies	0.049 (0.030)	0.177*** (0.023)	0.097*** (0.036)	-0.111*** (0.039)
Number of times in the CAS	0.174*** (0.040)	0.095*** (0.014)	0.078* (0.047)	0.114*** (0.036)
Constant	-4.106* (2.482)	-10.145*** (1.376)	96.648 (95.253)	-446.780*** (122.577)
Observations	6,586	24,385	4,467	2,139
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Appendix 5. Full results of Table 2

VARIABLES	Logistic regression Model 1	Logistic regression Model 2	Marginal effects Model 3	Marginal effects Model 4
Democracy (shamer)	0.520*** (0.112)	0.512*** (0.127)	0.013** (0.003)	0.012** (0.003)
Democratic dyad	-0.068 (0.115)	0.005 (0.124)	-0.002 (0.59)	0.000 (0.003)
Left (shamer)	-0.006 (0.075)	-0.056 (0.084)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.67)
Relative capabilities	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (1.31)	-0.000** (2.75)
Alliance	0.195 (0.132)	0.227 (0.144)	0.005 (1.40)	0.006 (1.47)

Total bilateral trade	-0.065*** (0.024)	-0.059** (0.026)	-0.003** (2.77)	-0.001* (2.31)
PTAs between dyad members		-0.269** (0.100)		-0.006* (2.30)
Workers' rights protection	0.369*** (0.045)	0.359*** (0.051)	0.010** (7.61)	0.009** (6.69)
Distance	-1.166*** (0.111)	-1.124*** (0.120)	-0.009** (10.65)	-0.008** (9.57)
Ratification (shamer)	0.009 (0.049)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.000 (0.19)	-0.000 (0.01)
ILO shaming (shamer)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.000 (0.29)	-0.001 (0.87)
Lagged state shaming	3.138*** (0.095)	3.208*** (0.105)	0.244** (18.89)	0.240** (17.04)
Number of democracies	0.191*** (0.021)	0.102*** (0.017)		
Number of times in the CAS	0.099*** (0.013)	0.106*** (0.014)	0.015** (7.21)	0.014** (6.97)
1992	-0.081 (0.468)	-0.632 (0.455)	-0.003 (1.04)	-0.007 (1.84)
1993	-0.182 (0.484)	-0.752 (0.474)	-0.004 (1.22)	-0.007 (1.99)*
1994	-0.325 (0.375)	-0.448 (0.387)	0.002 (0.59)	-0.001 (0.34)
1995	0.050 (0.208)	0.287 (0.222)	0.020 (5.04)**	0.016 (3.75)**
1996	-2.289 (0.283)***	-1.418 (0.300)***	0.006 (1.37)	0.001 (0.27)
1997	-1.480 (0.189)***	-0.688 (0.201)***	0.012 (3.24)**	0.009 (2.04)*
1998	-0.942 (0.184)***	-0.186 (0.202)	0.024 (4.82)**	0.020 (3.61)**
1999	-0.931 (0.189)***	-0.305 (0.211)	0.019 (4.33)**	0.015 (2.93)**
2000	-2.877 (0.324)***	-1.861 (0.312)***	-0.000 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.81)
2001	-1.606 (0.193)***	-0.628 (0.196)***	0.021 (4.27)**	0.016 (3.01)**
2002	-1.740 (0.211)***	-0.730 (0.228)***	0.015 (3.22)**	0.012 (2.31)*
2003	-2.187 (0.210)***	-0.777 (0.177)***	0.032 (6.20)**	0.026 (4.63)**
2004	-2.614 (0.285)***	-0.706 (0.206)***	0.051 (8.73)**	0.047 (7.27)**
2005	-1.369 (0.164)***	-0.054 (0.127)	0.047 (9.43)**	0.045 (7.70)**
2006	-0.681	-0.019	0.031	0.024

	(0.158)***	(0.184)	(6.25)**	(4.48)**
2007	-0.534	0.532	0.059	0.058
	(0.128)***	(0.141)***	(9.64)**	(8.23)**
2008	-0.713	0.308	0.051	0.047
	(0.131)***	(0.146)**	(9.10)**	(7.47)**
2009	-1.256		0.052	0.047
	(0.146)***		(9.65)**	(7.72)**
2010	-2.255		0.050	
	(0.231)***		(9.41)**	
Constant	-11.229***	-7.131***		
	(1.281)	(1.119)		
<i>N</i>	37,938	31,145	37,938	31,145

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$