

## Appendix

This appendix discusses and presents all additional empirical analyses for robustness checks.

### ***Mass vs. Elite Unrest between Democracy and Autocracy***

While the empirical results in Table 1 show that strategic rivalry increases the number of both mass and elite unrest, the positive effect of rivalry on mass unrests would be smaller in autocracies. The mass public in autocracies has limited channels through which to express its discontent because strong institutional protection on the freedom of expression is lacking or even absent. We test this conjecture by interacting strategic rivalry with regime type for mass unrests as the dependent variable. The results in Table A8 show that the positive effect of strategic rivalry on mass unrests is significant only in democracies, while the positive effect of rivalry on elite unrests remains significant in both democracies and autocracies.

### ***Different Types of Rivalry***

Although strategic rivalry captures contentious and competitive interstate relations in general, this concept does not guarantee the gravity of security threat by including relatively less contentious rivalrous relationships. To address this issue, we select only rivalries that pose relatively greater threats than others. We use three proxies for relatively more threatening rivalries: contiguous rivalry, stronger rivalry, and territorial rivalry. This auxiliary analysis serves as a more conservative test because as Hypothesis 3 suggests, when the threat perception is sufficiently high, domestic audiences in general are likely to be intolerant of nonconforming anti-government activities and strive for national unity. This logic would counteract our main conflict hypothesis. However, the results in Table A7 still reveal significant evidence for both conflict and repression hypotheses.

Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) offer an alternative measure for interstate rivalry (hereafter KGD), built upon the concept of enduring rivalry defined as recurring (not necessarily continuous) hostile interstate competition that has lasted for a sufficiently long period of time (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Diehl and Goertz 2001). However, this measure also includes proto-rivalries with short durations. Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) demonstrate that among 67 strategic rivalries that KGD does not identify, 56 cases are coded as isolated conflicts, while KGD include additional low-severity cases that are excluded from strategic rivalry. We ran our models using the KGD measure, excluding isolated conflict events, and found quite similar results for the primary hypothesis (except the conditioning hypotheses) as presented in Tables A4, A5 and A6.

### ***Matching***

Many rivalry relationships are sticky over time, lacking temporal dynamics. Thus, the impact of rivalry can be better understood as differences between states with strategic rivalry and those without. To analyze this possibility, it is useful to find states that are similar in many aspects that are captured by control variables other than rivalry. Matching is a useful method particularly suited to extract such a treatment effect. We test two primary hypotheses (1 and 5) using propensity score matching. Our main findings remain the same for both hypotheses, as shown in Table A9.

### ***Mediation Analysis***

The repression literature indicates that state repression intensifies as internal challenges or threats to the leadership in power increase (e.g., Tilly 1978; 1985; Gurr 1986; 1988; Davenport 1995). Thus, domestic conflict may serve as a mediating factor between strategic rivalry and repression, implying that the direct impact of rivalry on repression might be overestimated in our models because the indirect impact through the mediator is overlooked in the research

design. To address this issue, we run a causal mediation analysis to ensure that the direct impact of strategic rivalry is still significant when the mediating impact of domestic conflict is taken into account (Imai et al. 2011; Hicks and Tingley 2011). Table A10 shows that the mediation of domestic conflict occurs in the expected direction with the negative and significant average causal mediation effect on physical integrity. About eight percent of the total effect of rivalry is mediated by domestic conflict, which is statistically significant.

### ***Using Rivalry-MIDs as Independent Variable***

The rivalry indicator is too static to capture any dynamic relation between external threats and domestic politics. To address this issue, we ran an additional set of analysis using a measure that records whether a country has experienced a militarized dispute with its strategic rivalry. The results in Table A14 show that our main finding holds in five out of eight models. One interesting finding is that rivalry MIDs increase only mass unrests, not elite-level unrests. Actual incidents of militarized disputes can be used as a strong government signal that demands more public tolerance to the centralization and reallocation of political and economic power. That is because the public would take external threats more seriously than usual once they observe real military tensions. This dynamic appears to counteract to the public willingness and incentive to stand up against the government. This conjecture is signified by the finding that the size of coefficient estimates of rivalry-MID are smaller than those of rivalry. This discussion also indicates that elites would know that actual conflicts can make the public perception on enemy threat more realistic. Thus, elites in domestic out-groups may want to take more cautious steps to act against the government. In regressions models, presented in Table A15, actual rivalry-MIDs do not appear to have statistically significant impact on state repression, while the coefficient estimate is significant only in the bivariate model.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<b>Domestic Conflict Models</b>					
Domestic Conflict	5,350	0.994	1.932	0	27.31
Strategic Rivalry	5,350	0.41	0.492	0	1
Polity	5,350	1.397	7.408	-10	10
Economic Development	5,350	8.227	1.321	5.081	11.29
Economic Growth	5,350	2.031	6.754	-64.41	90.04
Population	5,350	9.213	1.45	5.749	14.1
Oil Rents	5,350	2.269	2.732	0	10.25
Political Capacity	5,350	0.924	0.412	0.066	3.674
Ethnic Fractionalization	5,350	0.474	0.264	0.0119	0.93
Economic Crisis	3,003	0.505	0.5	0	1
Recent War Experience	5,936	0.0425	0.202	0	1
Political Polarization	3,786	0.406	0.764	0	2
<b>Repression Models</b>					
Physical Integrity	2,141	4.686	2.391	0	8
Strategic Rivalry	2,141	0.423	0.494	0	1
Polity	2,141	2.426	7.184	-10	10
Economic Development	2,141	8.417	1.302	5.179	11.12
Population	2,141	9.513	1.367	5.901	14.06
Oil Rents	2,141	2.603	2.623	0	9.111
Domestic Instability	2,141	1.037	1.87	0	21.25
Intrastate War	2,141	0.0635	0.244	0	1
Judicial Independence	2,141	1.19	0.741	0	2
CAT	2,141	0.492	0.5	0	1
Economic Sanction	2,141	0.315	0.465	0	1

Table A2: Effect of Strategic Rivalry on Different Types of Domestic Conflict

DV	(1) Strikes	(2) Government Crises	(3) Purges	(4) Riots	(5) Revolutions	(6) Anti-Govt. Demonstrations	(7) Assassinations	(8) Guerrilla Warfare	(9) Coup
Strategic Rivalry	0.767*** (0.240)	0.324* (0.176)	0.982*** (0.205)	0.670*** (0.178)	0.358** (0.180)	0.453** (0.179)	0.678** (0.275)	0.896*** (0.210)	0.465** (0.199)
Polity	0.058*** (0.021)	0.038*** (0.011)	-0.114*** (0.018)	0.015 (0.011)	0.002 (0.010)	0.023* (0.012)	0.019 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.045*** (0.017)
Economic Development	0.011 (0.130)	-0.002 (0.078)	0.127 (0.130)	0.044 (0.103)	-0.420*** (0.085)	0.149 (0.101)	-0.020 (0.170)	-0.008 (0.097)	-0.384*** (0.114)
Economic Growth	-0.048*** (0.012)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.038*** (0.010)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.008)
Population	0.277*** (0.098)	0.200*** (0.065)	0.345*** (0.088)	0.564*** (0.070)	0.103 (0.078)	0.536*** (0.063)	0.386*** (0.094)	0.278*** (0.080)	-0.167* (0.091)
Oil Rents	-0.041 (0.056)	-0.027 (0.031)	-0.219*** (0.059)	-0.093** (0.046)	0.042 (0.034)	-0.064 (0.043)	-0.047 (0.062)	-0.094** (0.042)	0.032 (0.054)
Political Capacity	-0.496* (0.277)	-0.381** (0.181)	-0.300 (0.256)	-0.123 (0.189)	-0.397** (0.175)	-0.370** (0.187)	-0.888*** (0.339)	-0.128 (0.241)	-0.797*** (0.239)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.114** (0.563)	-0.388 (0.357)	-0.510 (0.433)	-0.141 (0.383)	0.164 (0.392)	-0.336 (0.402)	-1.210* (0.619)	-0.264 (0.466)	-0.157 (0.408)
Constant	-4.136** (1.701)	-3.198*** (1.031)	-6.594*** (1.738)	-6.680*** (1.316)	0.724 (0.995)	-6.652*** (1.202)	-3.939*** (1.481)	-4.225*** (1.022)	2.138 (1.426)
Observations	5,353	5,353	5,353	5,352	5,352	5,354	5,353	5,353	5,380

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

Table A3: Effect of Strategic Rivalry on Different Proxies of Human Rights Protection

DV	(1) Political Imprisonment	(2) Disappearance	(3) Torture	(4) Extrajudicial Killing	(5) PTS Amnesty	(6) PTS State Dept.
Strategic Rivalry	-1.016*** (0.241)	-0.128 (0.247)	-0.484** (0.231)	-0.221 (0.225)	0.513** (0.244)	0.595** (0.235)
Polity	0.158*** (0.018)	0.011 (0.021)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.041** (0.017)	-0.050*** (0.017)
Economic Development	0.268** (0.108)	0.385** (0.167)	0.523*** (0.126)	0.688*** (0.130)	-0.527*** (0.104)	-0.715*** (0.105)
Population	-0.247** (0.099)	-0.122 (0.103)	-0.289*** (0.091)	-0.198** (0.099)	0.171* (0.102)	0.208* (0.109)
Oil Rents	-0.035 (0.056)	-0.084 (0.072)	-0.013 (0.054)	-0.083 (0.061)	0.068 (0.058)	0.054 (0.055)
Domestic Instability	-0.264*** (0.063)	-0.328*** (0.069)	-0.273*** (0.066)	-0.417*** (0.065)	0.326*** (0.083)	0.388*** (0.093)
Intrastate War	-1.739*** (0.527)	-1.689*** (0.390)	-0.995** (0.432)	-1.309*** (0.236)	1.636*** (0.415)	2.179*** (0.430)
Judicial Independence	0.449*** (0.148)	0.272* (0.155)	0.791*** (0.145)	0.601*** (0.165)	-0.474*** (0.139)	-0.855*** (0.136)
CAT	0.076 (0.175)	0.127 (0.182)	-0.914*** (0.165)	-0.038 (0.176)	0.065 (0.170)	0.387** (0.173)
Economic Sanction	-0.290 (0.207)	-0.605*** (0.208)	-0.457** (0.217)	-0.830*** (0.200)	0.266 (0.215)	0.722*** (0.187)
Observations	2,147	2,148	2,149	2,144	1,910	2,126

**Note:** The number of countries is 143 for all models. Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

Table A4: Effect of KGD Rivalry on Domestic Conflict

Estimator	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Negative Binomial	(7) Negative Binomial	(8) Negative Binomial
DV	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	ln(Domestic Conflict)	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	Unrest (Count)	Mass Unrest	Elite Unrest
KGD Rivalry	0.742*** (0.136)	0.515*** (0.132)	1.065*** (0.263)	0.272*** (0.069)	0.361** (0.169)	0.401*** (0.132)	0.404*** (0.139)	0.370** (0.170)
Polity		0.004 (0.012)	0.040** (0.018)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.012 (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	-0.004 (0.013)
Economic Development		-0.090 (0.081)	-0.268* (0.154)	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.490** (0.208)	0.066 (0.093)	0.059 (0.096)	0.089 (0.104)
Economic Growth		-0.013** (0.005)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.007)
Population		0.319*** (0.075)	0.776*** (0.107)	0.159*** (0.037)	0.378 (0.251)	0.446*** (0.055)	0.470*** (0.059)	0.342*** (0.071)
Oil Rents		-0.025 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.066)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.068 (0.050)	-0.041 (0.039)	-0.033 (0.042)	-0.049 (0.040)
Political Capacity		-0.171 (0.166)	-0.336 (0.322)	-0.082 (0.088)	-0.056 (0.180)	-0.357** (0.160)	-0.257 (0.162)	-0.578** (0.228)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.092 (0.326)	-0.113 (0.627)	0.078 (0.168)	5.802** (2.821)	-0.110 (0.355)	0.089 (0.376)	-0.561 (0.381)
Lagged DV				0.491*** (0.032)				
Constant	0.758*** (0.088)	-1.145 (0.832)	-1.330 (1.863)	-0.676 (0.427)	0.504 (2.133)	-3.882*** (1.027)	-4.617*** (1.113)	-3.870*** (1.165)
Observations	6,345	4,159	4,159	4,141	4,159	4,159	4,159	4,161
Fixed Effects					✓			

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

Table A5: Conditional Effect of KGD Rivalry on Domestic Conflict

Hypothesis	(1) H2	(2) H2	(3) H3
KGD Rivalry	0.006 (0.233)	0.480*** (0.123)	0.646*** (0.180)
Economic Crisis	-0.004 (0.162)		
Rivalry $\times$ Economic Crisis	0.521* (0.311)		
Recent War Experiences		1.016** (0.454)	
Rivalry $\times$ Recent War		-0.369 (0.539)	
Political Polarization			-0.182* (0.093)
Rivalry $\times$ Political Polarization			-0.094 (0.164)
Polity	0.004 (0.021)		0.032** (0.013)
Economic Development	-0.212 (0.151)	-0.079 (0.054)	-0.175* (0.091)
Economic Growth	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)
Population	0.387*** (0.117)	0.321*** (0.071)	0.256*** (0.083)
Oil Rents	-0.017 (0.041)	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.036)
Political Capacity	-0.423 (0.329)		-0.082 (0.176)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.506 (0.519)		0.015 (0.377)
Constant	-0.493 (1.187)	-1.376* (0.721)	-0.021 (1.099)
Observations	2,428	4,801	2,779

**Note:** All models are estimated using OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . (two-tailed tests)



Table A6: Effect of KGD Rivalry on Human Rights Protection

	(1)	(2)	(3)
KGD Rivalry	-0.989*** (0.213)	-0.394** (0.197)	-0.419 (0.294)
Polity		0.072*** (0.017)	0.090*** (0.026)
Economic Development		0.541*** (0.114)	-0.332 (0.650)
Population		-0.260*** (0.096)	-2.618** (1.109)
Oil Rents		-0.048 (0.060)	-0.192 (0.225)
Domestic Instability		-0.406*** (0.073)	-0.183*** (0.064)
Intrastate War		-1.971*** (0.403)	-1.858*** (0.395)
Judicial Independence		0.665*** (0.159)	0.484*** (0.173)
CAT		-0.327** (0.163)	-0.057 (0.258)
Economic Sanctions		-0.592*** (0.200)	-0.377** (0.161)
Observations	2,764	1,930	1,930
Fixed Effects			✓

**Note:** All models are estimated using ordered logit. The number of countries is 150 for Model (1), and 111 for the rest. For all models, higher values of the DV represent greater respect for human rights. The cut-point estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . (two-tailed tests)

Table A7: Effect of Contiguous, Strong, and Territorial Strategic Rivalry on Domestic Conflict

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Estimator	Domestic Conflict OLS	Number of Unrests Negative Binomial	Physical Integrity Ordered Logit	Domestic Conflict OLS	Number of Unrests Negative Binomial	Physical Integrity Ordered Logit	Domestic Conflict OLS	Number of Unrests Negative Binomial	Physical Integrity Ordered Logit
Contiguous Strategic Rivalry	0.630*** (0.145)	0.568*** (0.131)	-0.734*** (0.228)						
Strong Strategic Rivalry				0.364** (0.171)	0.380** (0.184)	-0.432** (0.213)			
Territorial Rivalry							0.454*** (0.156)	0.478*** (0.151)	-0.766*** (0.237)
Polity	0.007 (0.010)	0.014 (0.009)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.001 (0.010)	0.009 (0.009)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.005 (0.011)	0.014 (0.009)	0.062*** (0.017)
Economic Development	-0.099 (0.065)	0.019 (0.086)	0.538*** (0.113)	-0.104 (0.068)	0.041 (0.092)	0.550*** (0.112)	-0.115* (0.067)	0.018 (0.090)	0.573*** (0.117)
Population	0.312*** (0.064)	0.463*** (0.054)	-0.292*** (0.093)	0.325*** (0.064)	0.480*** (0.054)	-0.296*** (0.091)	0.313*** (0.064)	0.471*** (0.058)	-0.278*** (0.096)
Oil Rents	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.058 (0.036)	-0.046 (0.058)	-0.031 (0.027)	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.030 (0.058)
Domestic Instability			-0.403*** (0.065)			-0.421*** (0.072)			-0.406*** (0.066)
Intrastate War			-1.897*** (0.358)			-2.061*** (0.372)			-1.933*** (0.346)
Judicial Independence			0.721*** (0.158)			0.708*** (0.153)			0.670*** (0.154)
CAT			-0.345** (0.170)			-0.299* (0.164)			-0.347** (0.163)
Economic Sanctions			-0.677*** (0.192)			-0.640*** (0.193)			-0.684*** (0.198)
Economic Growth	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.006)		-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.006)		-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.006)	
Political Capacity	-0.230* (0.130)	-0.409*** (0.133)		-0.224* (0.133)	-0.385*** (0.147)		-0.198 (0.139)	-0.334** (0.149)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.029 (0.293)	-0.291 (0.323)		0.008 (0.295)	-0.202 (0.341)		-0.015 (0.295)	-0.241 (0.344)	
Constant	-0.967 (0.719)	-3.611*** (0.953)		-0.955 (0.742)	-3.887*** (1.028)		-0.812 (0.733)	-3.699*** (1.054)	
Observations	5,350	5,350	2,141	5,350	5,350	2,141	5,350	5,350	2,141

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

Table A8: Effect of Strategic Rivalry on Mass vs. Elite Unrest between Democracies and Autocracies

DV	(1)	(2)
	Mass Unrest	Elite Unrest
Strategic Rivalry	0.221 (0.159)	0.266 (0.207)
Polity	-0.117 (0.141)	-0.273 (0.260)
Rivalry $\times$ Democracy	0.810*** (0.250)	0.758** (0.321)
Economic Development	0.030 (0.089)	0.057 (0.102)
Economic Growth	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.008)
Population	0.483*** (0.055)	0.334*** (0.067)
Oil Rents	-0.072* (0.039)	-0.073** (0.034)
Political Capacity	-0.295** (0.142)	-0.563*** (0.206)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.123 (0.321)	-0.650* (0.360)
Constant	-4.338*** (1.071)	-3.523*** (1.070)
Observations	5,345	5,348
$\beta$ (democracy)	1.031*** (0.223)	1.024*** (0.250)
$\beta$ (autocracy)	0.221 (0.159)	0.266 (0.207)

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . (two-tailed tests)

Table A9: Matching

	(1)	(2)
	Average Treatment Effect	
DV	Domestic Conflict	Physical Integrity
Strategic Rivalry	0.548*** (0.064)	-0.432*** (0.128)
Observations	5,350	2,141
Rubin's Variance Ratio	0.84	1.01

**Note:** Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The results from the balance tests are shown by Rubin's Variance Ratio in which the ratio close to one indicates that significant imbalances between the treated and untreated groups are not detected ([Rubin 2001](#)).

Table A10: Mediation Analysis on Physical Integrity

Dependent Variable:	Physical Integrity
Treatment:	Strategic Rivalry
Mediator:	Domestic Conflict
Average Causal Mediation Effect	-0.045*** (-.081, -.013)
Direct Effect of Strategic Rivalry	-0.500*** (-.646, -.352)
Total Effect of Strategic Rivalry	-0.544*** (-.688, -.396)
% of Total Effect Mediated	8.2%*** (6.5%, 11.3%)
<b>Note:</b> Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *	
p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)	

Table A11: Effect of Strategic Rivalry on Domestic Conflict (LDV and Driscoll-Kraay)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Estimator	OLS	Driscoll-Kraay	Driscoll-Kraay	Driscoll-Kraay
Autocorrelation Structure		AR(1)	AR(3)	AR(5)
Lagged Domestic Conflict	0.509*** (0.032)			
Strategic Rivalry	0.279*** (0.070)	0.413*** (0.121)	0.413*** (0.145)	0.413** (0.158)
Polity	0.001 (0.005)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.024* (0.014)	-0.024 (0.015)
Economic Development	-0.047 (0.032)	-0.514*** (0.100)	-0.514*** (0.114)	-0.514*** (0.111)
Economic Growth	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)
Population	0.138*** (0.030)	0.272* (0.137)	0.272** (0.127)	0.272** (0.119)
Oil Rents	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.067** (0.028)	-0.067** (0.029)	-0.067** (0.028)
Political Capacity	-0.110 (0.068)	-0.192** (0.094)	-0.192* (0.110)	-0.192 (0.115)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.018 (0.137)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-0.367 (0.343)	2.942* (1.466)	2.942** (1.438)	2.942* (1.469)
Observations	5,331	5,350	5,350	5,350
Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses for Model (1). \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . (two-tailed tests)

Table A12: Effect of Strategic Rivalry on Civil Unrest (Using SPEED Events Data)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Estimator	Civil Unrest Negative Binomial	Civil Unrest Negative Binomial	Political Violence OLS	Political Violence OLS
Strategic Rivalry	0.858*** (0.220)	0.573*** (0.148)	0.425*** (0.105)	0.273*** (0.071)
Lagged DV		0.038*** (0.012)		0.336*** (0.028)
Economic Development	0.303** (0.119)	0.079 (0.073)	0.069 (0.049)	0.048 (0.032)
Economic Growth	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Population	0.558*** (0.087)	0.413*** (0.060)	0.306*** (0.041)	0.206*** (0.030)
Oil Rents	-0.136*** (0.045)	-0.053* (0.028)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.014)
Polity	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)
Political Capacity	-0.406* (0.244)	-0.174 (0.145)	-0.081 (0.092)	-0.052 (0.062)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.871* (0.468)	-0.571** (0.270)	-0.289 (0.200)	-0.183 (0.132)
Constant	-5.298*** (1.212)	-3.135*** (0.812)	-2.290*** (0.566)	-1.565*** (0.389)
Observations	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

Table A13: Effect of Strategic Rivalry on Domestic Conflict (Controlling for Interstate and Intrastate Wars)

Estimator	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) PCSE	(5) OLS	(6) Negative Binomial	(7) Negative Binomial	(8) Negative Binomial
DV	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	ln(Domestic Conflict)	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	Unrest (Count)	Mass Unrest	Elite Unrest
Strategic Rivalry	0.715*** (0.142)	0.520*** (0.130)	1.001*** (0.275)	0.462*** (0.105)	0.315** (0.143)	0.580*** (0.141)	0.566*** (0.155)	0.589*** (0.165)
Polity		0.007 (0.010)	0.038** (0.018)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.023* (0.013)	0.015* (0.009)	0.020** (0.009)	0.002 (0.013)
Economic Development		-0.091 (0.063)	-0.268* (0.142)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.511*** (0.161)	-0.008 (0.083)	-0.018 (0.086)	0.041 (0.096)
Economic Growth		-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.006)
Population		0.256*** (0.058)	0.735*** (0.092)	0.286*** (0.040)	0.152 (0.207)	0.423*** (0.050)	0.453*** (0.053)	0.305*** (0.066)
Oil Rents		-0.031 (0.023)	-0.057 (0.055)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.056 (0.042)	-0.057* (0.034)	-0.050 (0.036)	-0.062* (0.035)
Interstate War		0.405 (0.404)	0.893 (0.868)	0.018 (0.251)	0.093 (0.341)	-0.543** (0.251)	-0.425 (0.306)	-0.967*** (0.269)
Intrastate War		1.879*** (0.212)	2.657*** (0.312)	0.808*** (0.178)	1.419*** (0.221)	0.406*** (0.157)	0.397** (0.179)	0.498** (0.219)
Political Capacity		-0.229* (0.118)	-0.545** (0.245)	-0.194** (0.084)	-0.221 (0.142)	-0.410*** (0.141)	-0.355** (0.146)	-0.559*** (0.209)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.122 (0.261)	-0.529 (0.530)	-0.061 (0.156)	7.691*** (2.329)	-0.409 (0.303)	-0.268 (0.317)	-0.728** (0.365)
Constant	0.733*** (0.081)	-0.547 (0.652)	-0.750 (1.630)	-0.917 (0.593)	2.339 (1.820)	-3.020*** (0.892)	-3.689*** (0.973)	-3.264*** (1.064)
Observations	7,682	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,358
Fixed Effects					✓			

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)



Table A14: Effect of Militarized Disputes between Strategic Rivalries on Domestic Conflict

Estimator	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) PCSE	(5) OLS	(6) Negative Binomial	(7) Negative Binomial	(8) Negative Binomial
DV	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	ln(Domestic Conflict)	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	Unrest (Count)	Mass Unrest	Elite Unrest
MID	0.456** (0.193)	0.529** (0.225)	0.937*** (0.337)	0.373 (0.240)	0.177 (0.135)	0.452*** (0.146)	0.530*** (0.169)	0.233 (0.250)
Polity		-0.005 (0.010)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.013)
Economic Development		-0.101 (0.065)	-0.275* (0.141)	-0.523*** (0.155)	-0.063 (0.048)	0.035 (0.091)	0.036 (0.096)	0.040 (0.095)
Economic Growth		-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.007)
Population		0.325*** (0.066)	0.860*** (0.087)	0.110 (0.195)	0.326*** (0.046)	0.471*** (0.053)	0.496*** (0.056)	0.367*** (0.065)
Oil Rents		-0.025 (0.025)	-0.039 (0.057)	-0.064 (0.042)	-0.031* (0.018)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.027 (0.038)	-0.044 (0.038)
Political Capacity		-0.192 (0.137)	-0.439 (0.271)	-0.191 (0.152)	-0.185** (0.088)	-0.346** (0.154)	-0.264* (0.159)	-0.550*** (0.206)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.001 (0.284)	-0.321 (0.564)	8.620*** (2.170)	0.014 (0.166)	-0.224 (0.332)	-0.063 (0.346)	-0.594 (0.377)
Constant	1.004*** (0.080)	-0.956 (0.715)	-1.634 (1.637)	2.582 (1.629)	-1.283** (0.650)	-3.721*** (1.010)	-4.472*** (1.106)	-3.667*** (1.039)
Observations	7,980	5,481	5,481	5,481	5,481	5,481	5,481	5,484
Fixed Effects					✓			

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.  
(two-tailed tests)

Table A15: Effect of Militarized Disputes between Strategic Rivalries on Human Rights Protection

	(1)	(2)	(3)
MID	-0.716*** (0.251)	-0.253 (0.351)	-0.222 (0.303)
Polity		0.074*** (0.017)	0.090*** (0.025)
Economic Development		0.545*** (0.114)	-0.227 (0.535)
Population		-0.303*** (0.091)	-2.218** (0.887)
Oil Rents		-0.048 (0.057)	-0.114 (0.183)
Domestic Conflict		-0.427*** (0.071)	-0.205*** (0.064)
Intrastate War		-2.029*** (0.358)	-1.898*** (0.411)
Judicial Independence		0.682*** (0.152)	0.515*** (0.173)
CAT		-0.278* (0.163)	-0.035 (0.252)
Economic Sanctions		-0.649*** (0.197)	-0.391*** (0.147)
Observations	4,221	2,141	2,141
Fixed Effects			✓

**Note:** All models are estimated using ordered logit. The number of countries is 150 for Model (1), and 112 for the rest. For all models, higher values of the DV represent greater respect for human rights. The cut-point estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

Table A16: Effect of Militarized Disputes between Strategic Rivalries on Domestic Conflict (adding squared ethnic fractionalization)

Estimator	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) PCSE	(5) OLS	(6) Negative Binomial	(7) Negative Binomial	(8) Negative Binomial
DV	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	ln(Domestic Conflict)	Domestic Conflict	Domestic Conflict	Unrest (Count)	Mass Unrest	Elite Unrest
Rivalry	0.715*** (0.142)	0.533*** (0.139)	1.065*** (0.286)	0.413** (0.167)	0.410*** (0.102)	0.535*** (0.143)	0.530*** (0.157)	0.516*** (0.173)
Polity		0.006 (0.010)	0.040** (0.019)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.013 (0.009)	0.018* (0.009)	0.002 (0.013)
Economic Development		-0.138** (0.066)	-0.329** (0.143)	-0.514*** (0.164)	-0.097** (0.046)	-0.020 (0.084)	-0.027 (0.088)	0.015 (0.091)
Economic Growth		-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)
Population		0.288*** (0.063)	0.782*** (0.096)	0.272 (0.214)	0.303*** (0.042)	0.436*** (0.053)	0.465*** (0.056)	0.320*** (0.067)
Oil Rents		-0.029 (0.025)	-0.053 (0.056)	-0.067 (0.043)	-0.034* (0.018)	-0.064* (0.035)	-0.058 (0.038)	-0.066* (0.035)
Political Capacity		-0.248* (0.133)	-0.503* (0.270)	-0.192 (0.156)	-0.231*** (0.088)	-0.421*** (0.134)	-0.346** (0.138)	-0.600*** (0.201)
Ethnic Fractionalization		1.922** (0.953)	1.147 (2.046)	6.364*** (2.379)	1.947*** (0.605)	1.343 (1.131)	1.277 (1.139)	1.938 (1.654)
Ethnic Fractionalization <sup>2</sup>		-2.243** (1.052)	-1.819 (2.200)		-2.207*** (0.677)	-1.900 (1.173)	-1.664 (1.196)	-2.970* (1.684)
Constant	0.733*** (0.081)	-0.676 (0.709)	-0.894 (1.668)	1.455 (1.837)	-1.140* (0.634)	-3.259*** (0.954)	-3.944*** (1.032)	-3.503*** (1.075)
Observations	7,682	5,350	5,350	5,350	5,350	5,350	5,350	5,353
Fixed Effects					✓			

**Note:** Robust standard errors, clustered by countries, are presented in parentheses. In Model (4), the squared term of ethnic fractionalization is automatically dropped in the estimation process. \* p<0.10; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01. (two-tailed tests)

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