Online Supplemental Appendices

A Campaign Knowledge Index Details

Individual summated scores across all items were averaged each day. The components to each index are as follows:

2000: This measure was modified on dates prior to July 5 by using each day's four day moving averages in order to reduce the sampling error from each day's very low sample size (< 100).

- A. Taxes (cbb03): "To the best of you knowledge, who favors the biggest tax cut, George W. Bush or Al Gore?" Bush response coded as correct.
- B. Social Security (cbc07/cbc08): "[George W. Bush/ Al Gore] –do you think he favors or opposes allowing workers to invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market?" [Favor/Oppose] coded as correct.
- C. Suing HMOs (cbe18/cbe19): "[George W. Bush/ Al Gore] –do you think he favors or opposes giving patients the right to sue their health maintenance organization or HMO?" [Oppose/Favor] coded correct.
- D. Abortion (cbf09/cbf10): "[George W. Bush/ Al Gore] –do you think he favors or opposes making it harder for a woman to get an abortion?" [Favor/Oppose] coded correct.
- E. Handguns (cbg08/cbg09): "[George W. Bush/ Al Gore] –do you think he favors or opposes requiring a license for a person to buy a handgun?" [Oppose/Favor] coded correct.

2004: One item in the 2004 index was not asked until July 7, so I used a respondent's performance on the other three knowledge items (along with demographic variables) to estimate each respondent's probability of giving a correct response on the fourth item (using logit model estimates from post-July 7 observations). This process essentially transforms the three-item index measure onto a scale representative of the four-item index. Given data availability, items 2-4 were used to predict probability of a correct item 1 prior to July 7, items 1-4 were used thereafter.

- A. Support Tax Cuts (ccb25): "To the best of your knowledge, who favors making the recent tax cuts permanent–George W. Bush, John Kerry, both, or neither?" Bush coded correct
- B. Repeal Tax Cuts (ccb27): "John Kerry says that he would eliminate George W. Bush's tax cuts on those making how much money–over \$50,000 a year; over \$100,000 a year; over \$200,000 a year; or over \$500,000 a year?" 200,000 coded correct
- C. Overseas taxes (ccb46): "To the best of your knowledge, who favors eliminating tax breaks for overseas profits of American corporations and using the money to cut corporate income taxes—George W. Bush, John Kerry, both, or neither?" Kerry coded correct.
- D. Social Security (ccc34): "To the best of your knowledge, who favors allowing workers to invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market–George W. Bush, John Kerry, both, or neither?" Bush coded correct.

B Alternative Partisanship Specification Tests and Results

Using a nominal measure of partisanship requires an assumption of whether independents with partisan leanings interact with campaign information more like partisans or independents. Specification tests were performed by using a model with separate interactions for Republicans, Democrats, leaning Republicans, and leaning Democrats. Wald joint restriction tests estimate whether there is a difference in the coefficient estimates for leaning partisans compared to either partisans or independents.

[Table B.1 About Here]

With $\alpha=.10$, the restriction that rejects the null of no significant difference in estimation varies by year. In 2000, the evidence is more supportive of restricting leaners to act like independents. In 2004, the evidence is more supportive of leaners acting like partisans. The 2000 coefficient estimates are very similar to those shown in Table 1, with the only difference in significance testing finding significant partisan differences in response to campaign engagement. The 2004 estimates and significance testing are fully consistent with the results presented in Table 1. A combination

of coefficient estimates provide the estimate of the campaign's agreement or disagreement effect. When calculating the agreement score for these estimates, there is little difference in the estimate of each campaign's agreement effect.

[Table B.2 About Here]

When specifying leaners to act like partisans, the estimates find slightly less agreement in 2000. Instead of averaging a 3.2 and 4.5 percentage point increase in agreement, we find a 2.8 and 3.5 increase. This small decline is largely a function of decreasing magnitude, not greater disagreement. Depending on the measure, either 77 or 82 percent of the country experience greater, which is very similar to the estimates of 81 and 84 percent presented in the paper. So under a less supported restriction, there is only a slight decline in agreement effects.

In 2004, the Wald tests were more supportive of leaners acting like partisans. However, the estimate of the campaign's agreement effect turns out to be greater under this specification. Instead of average changes of 2.0 or 5.1 percentage points, the respective two party and three party measures show an average effect of 3.2 and 6.4 percent. Moreover, across both measures, these estimates suggest near universal positive agreement effects. When coding leaners as partisans, the two and three party measure show 98.0% and 100.0% of Americans had positive agreement effects. This suggests a more universal two-party agreement effect, where only 87.2% were estimated to have greater agreement when coding leaners as partisans.

In summary, the 2000 estimates find slightly less agreement when coding leaners as partisans as opposed to independents, but Wald tests indicate the restriction presented in Table 1 has greater support. The 2004 estimates suggest restricting leaners to act as partisans is preferable, but this restriction only makes the estimates more supportive of the hypotheses.

Table B.1. Comparing Wald Restriction Tests (p-values in parentheses)

Year	Leaners Respond Like Partisans	Leaners Respond Like Independents
2000	9.18	7.62
	(.057)	(0.107)
2004	4.44	8.72
	(.250)	(.069)

 Table B.2. Campaign Consensus Estimates When Coding Leaners as Partisans

Year	Measure	Average Change in Agreement	Percentage $\hat{\Delta} > 0$
2000	Agree ²	2.8	82.1%
		(3.4)	
	Agree ³	3.5	77.4%
		(3.5)	
2004	Agree ²	3.2	98.0%
		(1.3)	
	Agree ³	6.4	100.0%
		(0.7)	

National average percentage point change in agreement, with standard deviations in parentheses.