

# Online Appendix

**Table A1: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy – Omits Oil**

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.058 (.113)	.632 (.266)**	.097 (.105)	.832 (.265)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year					-.244 (.252)	1.616 (.682)**
% Dem. world	.257 (.653)**	1.515 (.273)			.267 (.256)	2.198 (.737)***
Growth rate (3 yrs. ave.)	-.013 (.005)***	-.016 (.012)	-.013 (.005)***	-.016 (.012)	-.012 (.005)***	-.015 (.014)
Hegemonic shock	2.547 (1.078)**	1.292 (2.889)	2.504 (1.087)**	1.018 (2.837)	2.686 (1.064)**	.812 (3.122)
GDP pc (logged)	.0005 (.049)	.171 (.123)	.0005 (.049)	.134 (.119)	-.010 (.047)	.290 (.145)**
# Past trans.	.122 (.050)**	.305 (.074)***	.126 (.050)**	.315 (.072)***	.126 (.050)**	.288 (.090)***
Muslim	.0004 (.002)	-.005 (.003)	.0005 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	.0003 (.002)	-.006 (.004)
Catholic	.003 (.002)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.002)**	-.002 (.003)
Protestant	-.0002 (.002)	.006 (.004)	-.0002 (.002)	.005 (.004)	-.0005 (.002)	.008 (.005)
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.002)	-.00007 (.003)	.002 (.001)	.0003 (.003)	.002 (.002)	-.001 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.0008 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.0009 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.113 (.089)	-.031 (.193)	-.109 (.090)	.007 (.176)	-.096 (.089)	-.116 (.220)
N	5574	388	5574	388	5506	382
Pseudo log-likelihood	-1544.481		-1547.472		-1520.691	

Note: Redoes Table 1 without the oil variable. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. \*\*\* $p < .01$ , \*\* $p < .05$  and \* $p < .1$ .

**Table A2: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy – Economic Crisis Dummies**

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.111 (.104)	.698 (.251)***	.104 (.104)	.687 (.252)***	.109 (.105)	.693 (.248)***
Growth below 0%	.147 (.061)**	.145 (.132)				
Growth below -1%			.161 (.068)**	.188 (.143)		
Growth below -2%					.172 (.073)**	.112 (.150)
Hegemonic shock	2.571 (1.105)**	1.243 (2.767)	2.543 (1.098)**	1.240 (2.749)	2.536 (1.093)**	1.199 (2.793)
GDP pc (logged)	-.005 (.049)	.255 (.129)**	-.008 (.048)	.255 (.130)**	-.010 (.048)	.246 (.128)*
# Past trans.	.124 (.051)**	.263 (.073)***	.125 (.051)**	.264 (.071)***	.125 (.051)**	.268 (.071)***
Muslim	.0004 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.0004 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.0004 (.002)	-.003 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)*	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.002 (.003)
Protestant	-.0002 (.002)	.004 (.004)	-.0003 (.002)	.004 (.004)	-.0002 (.002)	.005 (.004)
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.001)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.109 (.090)	.023 (.168)	-.113 (.091)	.013 (.166)	-.111 (.090)	.020 (.170)
Oil	-.00004 (.00003)	-.0003 (.0002)**	-.00004 (.00003)	-.0003 (.0002)**	-.00004 (.00003)	-.0003 (.0002)**
N	5552	388	5552	388	5552	388
Pseudo log-likelihood	-1535.02		-1534.766		-1535.28	

Note: Redoes model 2 of Table 1 with economic crisis dummy variables rather than the economic growth variable used in the main analysis. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. \*\*\* $p < .01$ , \*\* $p < .05$  and \* $p < .1$ .

**Table A3: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy – Change over the Last 1 or 2 Years**

	(1)		(2)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.091 (.104)	.717 (.256)***	.088 (.104)	.718 (.256)***
Growth rate (1 yr.)	-.006 (.003)**	.003 (.006)		
Growth rate (2 yrs. ave.)			-.010 (.004)**	-.009 (.010)
Hegemonic shock (1 yr.)	5.157 (2.134)**	1.430 (5.676)		
Hegemonic shock (2 yrs. ave.)			3.965 (1.177)***	1.944 (3.322)
GDP pc (logged)	-.002 (.048)	.243 (.128)*	.006 (.048)	.241 (.127)*
# Past trans.	.131 (.050)***	.276 (.074)***	.129 (.051)**	.275 (.072)***
Muslim	.0008 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.0006 (.001)	-.003 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.002 (.003)
Protestant	.00004 (.002)	.006 (.004)	-.0001 (.002)	.005 (.004)
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.001)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.105 (.093)	.032 (.179)	-.119 (.090)	.037 (.173)
Oil	-.00004 (.00003)	-.0003 (.0002)**	-.00004 (.00003)	-.0003 (.0001)**
N	5657	392	5605	391
Pseudo log-likelihood	-1547.422		-1556.838	

Note: Redoes model 2 of Table 1 with the economic growth and hegemonic shock over the last 1 or 2 years rather than over the last three years as in the main analysis. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. \*\*\* $p < .01$ , \*\* $p < .05$  and \* $p < .1$ .

**Table A4: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy – Alternative Definitions of Neighbor**

	Share Borders		12 Miles		24 Miles		150 Miles	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.059 (.112)	.395 (.196)**	.047 (.111)	.404 (.191)**	.056 (.111)	.444 (.196)**	.069 (.106)	.559 (.235)**
Growth rate (3 yrs. ave.)	-.011 (.005)**	-.014 (.013)	-.011 (.005)**	-.015 (.012)	-.012 (.005)**	-.017 (.012)	-.012 (.005)***	-.012 (.013)
Hegemonic shock	2.637 (1.128)**	1.526 (2.642)	2.616 (1.126)**	1.543 (2.611)	2.648 (1.113)**	1.222 (2.617)	2.590 (1.084)**	.885 (2.828)
GDP pc (logged)	.005 (.048)	.292 (.136)**	.011 (.048)	.298 (.135)**	.014 (.049)	.288 (.132)**	.010 (.049)	.299 (.137)**
# Past trans.	.155 (.049)***	.305 (.073)***	.154 (.049)***	.297 (.071)***	.152 (.049)***	.293 (.070)***	.126 (.050)**	.258 (.074)***
Muslim	-.00007 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	-.00009 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	-.00002 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.0002 (.002)	-.003 (.003)
Catholic	.002 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.002 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.002 (.003)
Protestant	-.0008 (.002)	.003 (.004)	-.0008 (.002)	.002 (.004)	-.0005 (.002)	.003 (.004)	-.0002 (.002)	.005 (.004)
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.002)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.122 (.094)	-.037 (.175)	-.122 (.093)	-.020 (.168)	-.125 (.094)	-.026 (.163)	-.107 (.090)	.029 (.173)
Oil	-.00003 (.00002)	-.0003 (.0002)**	-.00003 (.00002)	-.0003 (.0002)**	-.00003 (.00003)	-.0003 (.0002)*	-.00003 (.00002)	-.0004 (.0002)**
N	5242	370	5302	372	5400	375	5499	382
Pseudo log-likelihood	-1454.651		-1464.185		-1480.316		-1512.016	

Note: Redoes model 2 of Table 1 with alternative definitions of neighbor. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. \*\*\* $p < .01$ , \*\* $p < .05$  and \* $p < .1$ .