

Online Appendix for:
In Plain Sight? Reconsidering the Linkage between Brideprice and Violent Conflict

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I. Time Dependence

In the following, we re-estimate the models presented in Tables 5 and 7 of the main text (those evaluating conditional relationships) after time dependence is accounted for. Where terrorism is the outcome, we use an approximation of the linear feedback model from Blundell, et al. (2002) by including the log of time-lagged observed count (plus one). A similar strategy is discussed and used for spatial dependence in Hays and Franzese (2009).

Table A1 – Brideprice and Terrorism w/ Temporal Dependence

	Model A1.1	Model A1.2	Model A1.3
<i>Brideprice</i>	-0.172 (0.149)	-0.795 (0.457)	-0.259** (0.093)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>	0.002 (0.005)		
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Marriage Diff</i>	-0.008 (0.007)		
<i>Youth Bulge</i>		-0.021 (0.015)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Youth Bulge</i>		0.027 (0.024)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>GDP Growth</i>			-0.004 (0.006)
<i>LnPopulation</i>	0.342** (0.032)	0.344** (0.029)	0.338** (0.027)
<i>LnGDP</i>	-0.098** (0.026)	-0.070** (0.024)	-0.062** (0.021)
<i>Polity</i>	0.003 (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)
<i>Population Growth</i>	0.003 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.019)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.006)
<i>Instability</i>	0.504** (0.095)	0.535** (0.088)	0.511** (0.085)
<i>EthFrac</i>	-0.090 (0.122)	0.042 (0.108)	0.058 (0.105)
<i>RelFrac</i>	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.104)
	(0.128)	(0.112)	(0.109)
<i>Ln(Y_{t-1}+1)</i>	0.982** (0.016)	1.019** (0.015)	1.009** (0.014)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.763** (0.393)	-3.760** (0.477)	-4.238** (0.325)
ln(alpha)	0.212** (0.037)	0.447** (0.030)	0.425** (0.030)
<i>N</i>	4038	5786	5960
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.

Consistent with Table A1, in the civil conflict incidence models we include the time lag of the dependent variable. Alternative strategies (time-since-event counters, etc.) produce similar results. We highlight that in the models that include time lags (Table A1 and A2) the negative effect of brideprice inflation (given by the interactions) is often no longer significant.

Table A2 – Brideprice and Civil Conflict w/ Temporal Dependence

	Model A2.1	Model A2.2	Model A2.3
<i>Brideprice</i>	-1.935** (0.649)	0.939 (1.541)	-1.150** (0.296)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>	-0.037 (0.025)		
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Marriage Diff</i>	0.027 (0.028)		
<i>Youth Bulge</i>		0.095 (0.057)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Youth Bulge</i>		-0.109 (0.080)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>GDP Growth</i>			0.004 (0.017)
<i>Population</i>	0.823** (0.134)	0.682** (0.086)	0.718** (0.085)
<i>GDP</i>	-0.268** (0.101)	-0.213** (0.063)	-0.225** (0.062)
<i>Polity</i>	-0.005 (0.016)	0.005 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)
<i>Population Growth</i>	-0.050 (0.090)	-0.027 (0.063)	-0.013 (0.062)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	0.017 (0.012)	0.005 (0.008)	0.002 (0.017)
<i>Instability</i>	-0.099 (0.305)	0.071 (0.222)	0.105 (0.221)
<i>EthFrac</i>	-0.087 (0.464)	0.396 (0.337)	0.370 (0.335)
<i>RelFrac</i>	-0.564 (0.457)	-0.000 (0.318)	-0.065 (0.318)
<i>Y_{t-1}</i>	4.872** (0.164)	4.397** (0.119)	4.401** (0.118)
<i>Constant</i>	-9.803** (1.451)	-11.240** (1.373)	-9.743** (0.913)
<i>N</i>	4155	6325	6345
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.

II. Correlated Standard Errors

In tables A3-A7 we replicate the analysis from the main text but account for possible correlation in the residuals via robust standard errors clustered by state. The results continue to indicate that there is no significant, positive effect of brideprice inflation on political violence. However, as with the LDV models in A1 & A2, so the negative effect of brideprice inflation (given by the interactions) is no longer significant.

Table A3 – Brideprice and Terrorism (Cluster SEs)

	Model A3.1	Model A3.2	Model A3.3
<i>Brideprice</i>	-0.143 (0.413)	-0.513 (0.342)	-0.200 (0.369)
<i>Population</i>		0.814** (0.144)	1.049** (0.130)
<i>GDP</i>		0.079 (0.113)	-0.093 (0.098)
<i>Polity</i>		0.013 (0.022)	0.045** (0.017)
<i>Population Growth</i>		0.083 (0.089)	-0.208** (0.067)
<i>GDP Growth</i>		-0.009** (0.003)	-0.013** (0.005)
<i>Instability</i>		0.615** (0.171)	0.705** (0.150)
<i>EthFrac</i>		-0.133 (0.702)	-0.079 (0.526)
<i>RelFrac</i>		-1.075 (0.615)	0.802 (0.515)
<i>Constant</i>	3.149** (0.237)	-12.110** (2.035)	-13.767** (1.366)
<i>ln(alpha)</i>	2.186** (0.075)	1.726** (0.083)	1.523** (0.065)
<i>N</i>	7460	6066	6054
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	N	N	Y

Note(s): * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors clustered by state.

Table A4 – Brideprice and Terrorism (Cluster SEs)

	Model A4.1	Model A4.2	Model A4.3
<i>Brideprice</i>	-0.032 (0.594)	3.834 (1.966)	-0.340 (0.374)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>	0.013 (0.026)		
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Marriage Diff</i>	-0.047 (0.032)		
<i>Youth Bulge</i>		0.125 (0.068)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Youth Bulge</i>		-0.229* (0.100)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>GDP Growth</i>			0.038** (0.014)
<i>Population</i>	1.088** (0.128)	1.019** (0.134)	1.041** (0.130)
<i>GDP</i>	-0.171 (0.107)	-0.059 (0.109)	-0.092 (0.098)
<i>Polity</i>	0.038* (0.017)	0.048** (0.018)	0.046** (0.017)
<i>Population Growth</i>	-0.145 (0.085)	-0.239** (0.064)	-0.201** (0.066)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-0.048** (0.011)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.048** (0.012)
<i>Instability</i>	0.729** (0.203)	0.633** (0.140)	0.709** (0.151)
<i>EthFrac</i>	-0.473 (0.626)	-0.337 (0.533)	-0.095 (0.521)
<i>RelFrac</i>	0.319 (0.616)	0.945 (0.517)	0.793 (0.513)
<i>Constant</i>	-13.029** (1.758)	-15.934** (2.050)	-13.554** (1.378)
ln(alpha)	1.324** (0.073)	1.515** (0.066)	1.518** (0.063)
<i>N</i>	4086	5880	6054
Regional Dummies?	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors clustered by state.

Table A5 – Brideprice and Civil Conflict Incidence (Cluster SEs)

	Model A5.1	Model A5.2	Model A5.3
<i>Brideprice</i>	0.783* (0.310)	0.091 (0.388)	-1.997* (0.831)
<i>Population</i>		0.828** (0.165)	1.005** (0.145)
<i>GDP</i>		-0.243** (0.091)	-0.274** (0.099)
<i>Polity</i>		0.017 (0.017)	0.011 (0.018)
<i>Population Growth</i>		0.144 (0.104)	-0.042 (0.110)
<i>GDP Growth</i>		-0.029* (0.011)	-0.026* (0.011)
<i>Instability</i>		0.345* (0.161)	0.351* (0.178)
<i>EthFrac</i>		1.129 (0.699)	0.747 (0.708)
<i>RelFrac</i>		-1.369* (0.540)	-0.321 (0.697)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.150** (0.255)	-9.766** (1.641)	-11.966** (2.068)
<i>N</i>	9312	6370	6345
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	N	N	Y

Note(s): * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors clustered by state.

Table A6 – Brideprice and Civil Conflict Incidence (Cluster SEs)

	Model A6.1	Model A6.2	Model A6.3
<i>Brideprice</i>	-2.896* (1.179)	-0.630 (2.922)	-2.053* (0.834)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>	-0.042 (0.033)		
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Marriage Diff</i>	0.018 (0.039)		
<i>Youth Bulge</i>		0.115 (0.094)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Youth Bulge</i>		-0.070 (0.129)	
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>GDP Growth</i>			0.013 (0.023)
<i>Population</i>	1.210** (0.240)	0.955** (0.141)	1.004** (0.145)
<i>GDP</i>	-0.368* (0.178)	-0.267** (0.100)	-0.274** (0.099)
<i>Polity</i>	0.007 (0.023)	0.012 (0.018)	0.010 (0.018)
<i>Population Growth</i>	-0.139 (0.151)	-0.054 (0.118)	-0.043 (0.111)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.028* (0.011)	-0.035* (0.016)
<i>Instability</i>	0.213 (0.216)	0.350+ (0.179)	0.351* (0.177)
<i>EthFrac</i>	0.074 (0.799)	0.841 (0.708)	0.753 (0.708)
<i>RelFrac</i>	-0.889 (0.964)	-0.237 (0.680)	-0.322 (0.696)
<i>Constant</i>	-12.228** (2.953)	-13.616** (2.530)	-11.955** (2.067)
<i>N</i>	4155	6325	6345
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.

III. Alternative IV Construction

In the following, we re-estimate the models presented in Tables 5 and 7 of the main text (those evaluating conditional relationships) employing different coding choices for the main independent variables. In Table A3, we demonstrate that the finding for *Marriage Diff* does not change when we evaluate different age ranges.

Table A7 – Different Ages for Marriage Diff

	Model A7.1 Terr	Model A7.2 Terr	Model A7.3 CC	Model A7.4 CC
<i>Brideprice</i>	-0.810** (0.172)	0.299 (0.238)	-2.455** (0.283)	-2.171** (0.415)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>				
- 15 to 19	-0.027** (0.010)		0.005 (0.011)	
- 20 to 24		-0.002 (0.007)		-0.016 (0.010)
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Marriage Diff</i>	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.47** (0.007)	-0.024 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)
<i>Population</i>	1.219** (0.051)	1.188** (0.052)	1.355** (0.088)	1.350** (0.088)
<i>GDP</i>	-0.307** (0.043)	-0.289** (0.045)	-0.475** (0.066)	-0.486** (0.066)
<i>Polity</i>	0.034** (0.007)	0.037** (0.007)	0.009 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)
<i>Population Growth</i>	-0.120** (0.036)	-0.093* (0.036)	-0.121 (0.064)	-0.089 (0.063)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-0.048** (0.006)	-0.048** (0.006)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.023* (0.010)
<i>Instability</i>	0.768** (0.153)	0.686** (0.153)	0.192 (0.193)	0.209 (0.193)
<i>EthFrac</i>	-0.141 (0.209)	-0.283 (0.202)	0.271 (0.305)	0.316 (0.292)
<i>RelFrac</i>	0.342+ (0.191)	0.188 (0.190)	-0.880** (0.279)	-1.035** (0.279)
<i>Constant</i>	-11.575** (0.591)	-11.423** (0.658)	-12.904** (0.907)	-11.971** (0.927)
<i>N</i>	4035	4086	4117	4155
Regional Dummies?	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.

Similarly, in Table A4, we demonstrate that the finding for *Youth Bulge* does not change when we evaluate different age ranges.

Table A8 – Different Ages for Youth Bulge

	Model A8.1 Terr	Model A8.2 Terr	Model A8.3 Terr	Model A8.4 CC	Model A8.5 CC	Model A8.6 CC
<i>Brideprice</i>	2.967** (0.482)	1.888** (0.504)	3.935** (0.726)	-1.626* (0.787)	-1.867* (0.848)	-0.570 (0.976)
<i>Youth Bulge</i>						
- 0 to 24	0.084** (0.007)			0.091** (0.012)		
- 12 to 18		0.175** (0.026)			0.202** (0.040)	
- 18 to 23			0.182** (0.040)			-0.123 (0.085)
<i>Brideprice</i> × <i>Youth Bulge</i>	-0.067** (0.009)	-0.169** (0.035)	-0.395** (0.065)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.011 (0.055)	-0.047 (0.089)
<i>Population</i>	0.809** (0.054)	0.933** (0.053)	1.027** (0.047)	0.715** (0.064)	0.844** (0.060)	0.971** (0.056)
<i>GDP</i>	0.152** (0.047)	0.020 (0.044)	-0.070+ (0.039)	-0.025 (0.052)	-0.164** (0.046)	-0.280** (0.041)
<i>Polity</i>	0.054** (0.006)	0.046** (0.006)	0.048** (0.006)	0.021** (0.008)	0.013 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)
<i>Population Growth</i>	-0.317** (0.029)	-0.255** (0.028)	-0.229** (0.028)	-0.296** (0.058)	-0.093 (0.049)	-0.052 (0.046)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-0.014** (0.002)	-0.014** (0.002)	-0.012** (0.002)	-0.026** (0.007)	-0.028** (0.007)	-0.027** (0.007)
<i>Instability</i>	0.627** (0.134)	0.651** (0.135)	0.633** (0.135)	0.311* (0.151)	0.338* (0.151)	0.350* (0.150)
<i>EthFrac</i>	-0.332* (0.167)	-0.229 (0.172)	-0.323 (0.173)	0.869** (0.229)	0.921** (0.228)	0.829** (0.227)
<i>RelFrac</i>	0.958** (0.169)	0.935** (0.170)	0.955** (0.168)	-0.180 (0.212)	-0.213 (0.211)	-0.252 (0.209)
<i>Constant</i>	-18.825** (0.698)	-16.410** (0.672)	-15.569** (0.694)	-17.175** (0.940)	-14.743** (0.867)	-13.105** (0.885)
<i>N</i>	5880	5880	5880	6325	6325	6325
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.

IV. Alternative Violence Outcomes

In the following, we re-estimate the models for the main text with different outcome variables used for political violence. In A9 we use GPI (estimated via OLS) and in A10 we use civil conflict onset (as opposed to incidence). As in the main text, these results do indicate a consistent positive relationship between brideprice or brideprice inflation and violence.

Table A9 – Brideprice and GPI

	Model A9.1	Model A9.2	Model A9.3	Model A9.4	Model A9.5	Model A9.6
<i>Brideprice</i>	0.335** (0.025)	-0.065* (0.031)	-0.198** (0.046)	-0.431** (0.142)	0.648** (0.174)	-0.195** (0.048)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>				0.006 (0.004)		
<i>Brideprice × Marriage Diff</i>				-0.021** (0.006)		
<i>Youth Bulge</i>					0.054** (0.006)	
<i>Brideprice × Youth Bulge</i>					-0.052** (0.009)	
<i>Brideprice × GDP Growth</i>						-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Population</i>		0.208** (0.010)	0.220** (0.012)	0.230** (0.022)	0.179** (0.013)	0.220** (0.012)
<i>GDP</i>		-0.133** (0.008)	-0.115** (0.011)	-0.094** (0.022)	-0.077** (0.013)	-0.115** (0.011)
<i>Polity</i>		-0.017** (0.002)	-0.014** (0.002)	-0.021** (0.003)	-0.012** (0.002)	-0.014** (0.002)
<i>Population Growth</i>		-0.006 (0.007)	-0.021** (0.008)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.036** (0.008)	-0.021** (0.008)
<i>GDP Growth</i>		-0.004* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
<i>Instability</i>		0.094 (0.054)	0.131** (0.050)	0.028 (0.106)	0.149** (0.051)	0.130** (0.050)
<i>EthFrac</i>		0.190** (0.049)	0.113* (0.049)	0.267** (0.082)	0.133** (0.050)	0.112* (0.049)
<i>RelFrac</i>		-0.047 (0.044)	0.015 (0.046)	-0.359** (0.080)	0.015 (0.046)	0.015 (0.046)
<i>Constant</i>	1.875** (0.017)	1.988** (0.145)	1.354** (0.159)	0.660* (0.318)	0.262 (0.230)	1.350** (0.160)
<i>N</i>	1359	1254	1254	325	1099	1254
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.

Table A10 – Brideprice and Conflict Onset

	Model A10.1	Model A10.2	Model A10.3	Model A10.4	Model A10.5	Model A10.6
<i>Brideprice</i>	0.853** (0.147)	0.167 (0.223)	-0.437 (0.470)	0.043 (1.093)	1.463 (2.277)	-0.417 (0.490)
<i>Marriage Diff</i>				0.020 (0.032)		
<i>Brideprice × Marriage Diff</i>				-0.020 (0.037)		
<i>Youth Bulge</i>					0.087 (0.083)	
<i>Brideprice × Youth Bulge</i>					-0.098 (0.116)	
<i>Brideprice × GDP Growth</i>						-0.002 (0.030)
<i>Population</i>		0.604** (0.088)	0.704** (0.114)	0.896** (0.184)	0.670** (0.114)	0.704** (0.114)
<i>GDP</i>		-0.298** (0.070)	-0.289** (0.086)	-0.275 (0.144)	-0.282** (0.087)	-0.289** (0.086)
<i>Polity</i>		0.006 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.026 (0.023)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.016)
<i>Population Growth</i>		0.069 (0.083)	0.088 (0.092)	0.209 (0.149)	0.066 (0.096)	0.088 (0.092)
<i>GDP Growth</i>		-0.010 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.015)	
<i>Instability</i>		0.613* (0.289)	0.598* (0.290)	0.678 (0.383)	0.551 (0.298)	0.598* (0.290)
<i>EthFrac</i>		1.004* (0.410)	0.459 (0.491)	-0.218 (0.689)	0.525 (0.495)	0.457 (0.491)
<i>RelFrac</i>		-0.948** (0.362)	-0.651 (0.445)	-1.685* (0.674)	-0.602 (0.445)	-0.651 (0.445)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.064** (0.116)	-6.744** (1.125)	-7.770** (1.322)	-11.027** (2.223)	-9.068** (1.982)	-7.783** (1.326)
<i>N</i>	7770	5337	5326	3480	5324	5326
<i>Regional Dummies?</i>	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note(s): * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01.