**Appendix 1**

**Link Items Included in Additive Score (dichotomies)**

The strongest possible type of links between a central party organization and union are those regulated by union/party statutes since they create overlapping organizational structures (e.g. collective affiliation of unions to party and mutual/one-sided formal representation in union/party decision-making bodies). To ensure comparability, however, only inter-organizational links are a part of our additive score, i.e. ‘joint arrangements/ agreements’ (reciprocal, durable links) and ‘Party-arranged meetings’ (one-way occasional links). These are the ties unions also might have to legislative party groups. The relevant dichotomous link items from the LPTU dataset that we have used, is presented in Table A1, in hierarchical order of strength. One-way occasional links initiated by unions are excluded due to our analytical focus on parties and their incentives. ‘Invitation to organization to participate in the party’s national congress’ is omitted as it only applies to the central party organization.

*Table A1. Sub-groups of inter-organizational links a party unit (CPO/LPG) can have to unions with items listed in hierarchical order of strength.*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Reciprocal, durable: Joint arrangements/ agreements** | **One-way, occasional: Party-arranged meetings** |
| Tacit (de facto official) agreements about mutual representation in national decision-making bodies  Permanent joint committee(s)  Temporary joint committee(s)  Formal (written) agreements about regular meetings between party and union  Tacit (de facto official) agreements about regular meetings between party and union  Joint conferences  Joint campaigns | Invitations to organization to participate in ordinary party meetings, seminars, and conferences  Invitations to organization to special consultative arrangements initiated by the party |
|

Table A2 presents how common these kinds of links are in the LPTU dataset. The results below confirm that these links scale well and can be included in an index measuring the overall *Party link score* (number of links that parties have to unions).

*Table A2. Mokken Scaling*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Link** | **Type** | **Share** | **Hi** |
| Organization has been invited to special consultative meetings and seminars | One-Sided | 0.72 | 0.69 |
| Organization has been invited to ordinary meetings and seminars | One-sided | 0.55 | 0.79 |
| Tacit (but official) agreements about regular meetings | Joint | 0.32 | 0.74 |
| Joint Campaigns | Joint | 0.16 | 0.54 |
| Tacit (but official) agreements about one-side or mutual representation in decision-making bodies | Joint | 0.14 | 0.64 |
| Temporary Joint Committee(s) | Joint | 0.12 | 0.60 |
| Permanent Joint Committee(s) | Joint | 0.12 | 0.58 |
| Joint Conferences | Joint | 0.12 | 0.58 |
| Formal (written) agreements about regular meetings | Joint | 0.03 | 0.80 |
| Entire scale |  |  | 0.65 |

\*Joint: Reciprocal, Durable, Joint Arrangements or Agreements

\*One-sided: One-way, Occassional, Party-arranged meetings

**Appendix 2**

**Coding information for public party subventions and traditional ally-variables**

**Size of public party subventions (in 1 000 000 euros): Overview of all 12 countries**

**Austria**

**Size of subventions:** 13.11 (SPÖ). 12.19 (ÖVP). Only has permanent subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: 13.11 (SPÖ). 12.19 (ÖVP). 2011: NA. 2012: NA  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2010

**Data source for size of subventions:** PPDB

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election

**Finland**

**Size of subventions:** 5.87 (SDP). 2.03 (VAS). Only has permanent subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: NA. 2012: NA. 2015: 5.87 (SDP). 2.03 (VAS).  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2015

**Data source for size of subventions:** PAIRDEM-PPDB

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from IDEA Political Finance Database):** funding is proportional to seats won in previous election

**France**

**Size of subventions:** 2.94 (PCF). 22.9 (PS). Both permanent and electoral subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: NA. 2012: 22.9 (PS). NA (PCF). 2014: 2.94 (PCF).  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** PS: based on 2012. PCF: based on 2014

**Data source for size of subventions:** PS: PPDB. PCF: PAIRDEM-PPB.

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of votes received in last national election; proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature

**Germany**

**Size of subventions:** 40.69 (SPD). 11.48 (Linke). Only has permanent subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: 38.98 (SPD). 10.83 (Linke). 2011: 42.41 (SPD). 12.13 (Linke). 2012: NA  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2010-2011

**Data source for size of subventions:** PPDB

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of votes received in last national election; number of party members; amount of funds received by party from non-subsidy sources

**Italy**

**Size of subventions:** 57.83 (PD). Only has electoral subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 57.83. 2012: NA  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2011

**Data source for size of subventions:** PPDB.

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election

**Netherlands**

**Size of subventions:** 1.65 (CDA) 3.68 (SP). 2.84 (PvdA). 1.1 (GreenLeft). Only has permanent subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 1.81 (CDA) 3.7 (SP). 2.97 (PvDA). 1.09 (GreenLeft). 2012: 1.49 (CDA). 3.66 (SP). 2.7 (PvDA). 1.12 (GreenLeft).  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2011-2012

**Data source for size of subventions:** PPDB

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature; number of party members

**Sweden**

**Size of subventions:** 3.59 (VP). 15.45 (SAP). Only has permanent subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 3.59 (VP). 15.45 (SAP). 2012: NA  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2011

**Data source for size of subventions:** PPDB

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election; proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature

**Switzerland**

No public funding

**UK**

No public funding

**United States**

**Size of subventions:** 12.92 (Democratic Party). Only has electoral subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: 0. 2010: 0. 2011: 0. 2012: 68200000 (51690162 euro)

**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2009-2012

**Data source for size of subventions (from IDEA Political Finance Database):** <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43976.pdf> (p. 3-4). total federal funding supporting the 2012 presidential nominating conventions

**Subsidy allocation reflects:** presidential nominating convention (funding is earmarked to be used for presidential nominating conventions)

**Australia**

**Size of subventions:** 3.23 (ALP). Only has electoral subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: 0. 2009: 0. 2010: $21 225 869.96 (16158549 euro). 2011: 0. 2012: 0.  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2008-2012

**Data source for size of subventions:** <http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/Reports_On_Federal_Electoral_Events/2010/fad-report.pdf> (p. 7)

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of votes received in last national legislative election

**Israel**

**Size of subventions:** 1.85 (Labour). 4.43 (Likud). 0.63 (Histadrut). Both permanent and electoral subsidies.

**Years:** 2008: NA. 2009: NA. 2010: NA. 2011: 1.85 (Labour). 4.43 (Likud). 0.63 (Histadrut). 2012: NA  
**Mean (in 1 000 000 euros):** based on 2011

**Data source for size of subventions:** PPDB

**Subsidy allocation reflects (from PPDB):** proportion or number of seats in lower house of national legislature

**Traditional ally variable**

The LPTU dataset originally coded union confederations as ‘traditional left-of-centre union ally’ (0), ‘traditional right-of-centre union ally’ (1) and others (2), based on existing historical studies on organizational links. The pairs of historical allies identified are: SPÖ and both PRÖ-GE and ÖGB, ÖVP and GÖD in Austria, SDP and SAK in Finland, PCF and CGT, PS and both CFDT and FO in France, SPD and DGB, IGBCE, GEW, IGMetall, Ver.di in Germany, PD and CGIL in Italy, PvdA and FNV, CDA and CNV in the Netherlands, SAP and LO in Sweden, SP and SGB, CVP and Travail.Suisse in Switzerland, the Labour Party and TUC, GMB, Unite, Unison, NUT and USDAW in the United Kingdom, the Democratic Party and AFL-CIO in the United States, the ALP and ACTU, ANMF, AWU and SDA in Australia, HaAvoda and Histadrut and Likud and HL in Israel. In this paper, these dyads are thus coded as traditional allies (=1) on this particular variable.

**Appendix 3**

**Robustness tests with actual available numbers: Re-estimation of interaction effect as: donation/party budget \* subsidy/party budget:**

*Table A3. The effect of donation/party budget, financial restrictions and public party subsidies/party budget on party link scores. Poisson regression.*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Donation/party budget | 40.62\*\*\* | 15.51 | 44.26\*\*\* |
|  | (7.77) | (15.58) | (13.17) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.82\*\*\* | -0.30\* | -0.14 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| Subsidy/party budget | -0.66\* | -1.31\*\*\* | -1.43\*\*\* |
|  | (0.39) | (0.37) | (0.34) |
| Strength of union |  | 2.84\*\* | 3.20\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.25) | (1.16) |
| Traditional union ally |  | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.46\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Union organization type |  | -0.65\*\*\* | -0.62\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.25) | (0.23) |
| Party unit type |  | -0.15\* | -0.18\*\* |
|  |  | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  | 0.37\* | 0.46\*\* |
|  |  | (0.20) | (0.19) |
| State party autonomy: high |  | -0.42 | -0.32 |
|  |  | (0.31) | (0.28) |
| Corporatism |  | 0.27\*\* | 0.48\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.14) | (0.17) |
| Donation/party budget\*subsidy/party budget |  |  | -88.89\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (30.25) |
| Constant | 1.25\*\*\* | 1.07\*\*\* | 0.73\*\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.26) | (0.31) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 142 | 142 | 142 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Here we lose 6 observations (dyads with CVP, Switzerland) because missing info on party budget and 6 observations due to missing values on Finnish donations. The size of the actual donations/direct financial contributions vary from a yearly average of 4096 euros to a yearly average of 934 801 euros during the time frame 2008-2012 (we take the average corresponding to the time frame (for the direct financial contribution-question) asked about in the survey). Trade unions in Australia, Finland, Sweden and UK donated money. We have identified the actual values through the Australian Electoral Commission (donor and party reports), the British Electoral Commission (donations to parties), GMB’s annual returns, Unite’s annual returns, and the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s annual returns. The Finnish donations were validated on basis of sources used in Allern and Bale (2017) but the exact (albeit modest) numbers are not available and thus coded as missing in this particular analysis.

**

Party links score as a function of subsidies at no donations (black line) and the highest level of donations (grey line). Estimated values with 95% confidence interval.

*Figure A1. The effect of donations as share of party income on parties’ total union link score for different levels of public party subsidies as share of party income (budget). Both substantial variables as share of party budget to account for both national economic factors and party size (larger parties = larger budget).* *Because there are not many cases at the highest level of donations, the uncertainty is quite large.*

**

Party links score as a function of donations at no subsidies (black line) and the highest level of subsidies (grey line). Estimated values with 95% confidence interval.

*Figure A2. The effect of subsidies as share of party income on parties’ total union link score for different levels of donations as share of party income (budget). Both substantial variables as share of party budget to account for both national economic factors and party size (larger parties = larger budget).*

**Appendix 4**

**Robustness tests with less computationally demanding statistical models: Linear model and Poisson model without clustered standard errors and models with substantial variables only**

*Table A4. Linear regression model*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 4.26\*\*\* | 3.74\*\*\* | 4.71\*\*\* |
|  | (0.55) | (0.64) | (0.64) |
| Financial contribution: none |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Financial restrictions | -1.31\*\*\* | -1.13\*\* | -1.00\*\* |
|  | (0.32) | (0.41) | (0.38) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Strength of union |  | 1.69 | 1.96 |
|  |  | (1.87) | (1.88) |
| Traditional union ally |  | 0.99\*\* | 1.05\*\* |
|  |  | (0.35) | (0.37) |
| Union organization type |  | -0.47 | -0.37 |
|  |  | (0.57) | (0.54) |
| Party unit type |  | -0.56\*\* | -0.56\*\* |
|  |  | (0.21) | (0.21) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  | 1.25 | 1.37 |
|  |  | (0.86) | (0.87) |
| State party autonomy: high |  | 0.53 | 0.64 |
|  |  | (0.56) | (0.56) |
| Corporatism |  | -0.13 | 0.03 |
|  |  | (0.37) | (0.39) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  |  | -0.18\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.07) |
| Constant | 2.42\*\*\* | 2.58\*\*\* | 2.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.49) | (0.60) | (0.66) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 154 | 154 | 154 |
| R-squared | 0.52 | 0.63 | 0.64 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Table A5. Poisson results without clustered standard errors*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.24\*\*\* | 1.06\*\*\* | 1.51\*\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.24) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.75\*\*\* | -0.46\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.00 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Strength of union |  | 0.59 | 1.02\* |
|  |  | (0.60) | (0.61) |
| Traditional union ally |  | 0.47\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Union organization type |  | -0.27\* | -0.20 |
|  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Party unit type |  | -0.27\*\* | -0.27\*\* |
|  |  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.69\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| State party autonomy: high |  | 0.50\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.21) | (0.21) |
| Corporatism |  | 0.25 | 0.38\*\* |
|  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  |  | -0.08\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.82\*\*\* | 0.47\* | 0.15 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.25) | (0.27) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 154 | 154 | 154 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Table A6. Poisson results with substantial variables only*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.40\*\*\* |
|  | (0.22) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.75\*\*\* |
|  | (0.18) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.01\*\* |
|  | (0.01) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies | -0.03\* |
|  | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.81\*\*\* |
|  | (0.20) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 154 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Table A7. Linear regression results with substantial variables only*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 5.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.67) |
| Financial restrictions | -1.31\*\*\* |
|  | (0.30) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.02 |
|  | (0.02) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies | -0.15\*\* |
|  | (0.06) |
| Constant | 2.41\*\*\* |
|  | (0.49) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 154 |
| R-squared | 0.53 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix 5**

**Robustness tests with two different measures of union’s ‘strike potential’**

Table A8 utilizes the country based union strike fund-variable from Visser (2016). Here, 0 = union has no strike fund, 1 = union has small strike funds from which some reimbursement (at less than 70% of the base wage) is guaranteed, and 2 = union has a large strike fund from which striking members are reimbursed at 70% or more of their base wage for each day of strike.

Table A9 uses a survey item from the LPTU data set measuring the type of organized employees. To measure the union’s ‘strike potential’ we separate between unions having (mainly) members that are particularly vital for the functioning of the service sector (i.e. confederations/unions organizing doctors, nurses, teachers etc.) and other unions. The former is coded as 1 and the latter as 0.

Results are robust across both types of measures.

*Table A8. The effect of direct financial contributions to party, financial restrictions and absolute size of public party subsidies on party link scores with union strike fund included as control. Poisson regression.*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.17\*\*\* | 0.90\*\*\* | 1.48\*\*\* |
|  | (0.21) | (0.26) | (0.34) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.74\*\*\* | -0.62\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.16) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.01\*\* | 0.01 | 0.01\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| Strength of union |  | 0.41 | 0.95 |
|  |  | (0.77) | (0.80) |
| Traditional ally |  | 0.47\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.12) | (0.15) |
| Union organization type |  | -0.20 | -0.17 |
|  |  | (0.25) | (0.23) |
| Party unit type |  | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  | 0.68\*\* | 0.69\*\* |
|  |  | (0.29) | (0.29) |
| State party autonomy: high |  | 0.73\*\*\* | 0.63\*\* |
|  |  | (0.25) | (0.26) |
| Corporatism |  | 0.34\* | 0.36\*\* |
|  |  | (0.19) | (0.18) |
| Union strike fund: small | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.13 |
|  | (0.35) | (0.38) | (0.40) |
| Union strike fund: large | 0.23 | -0.17 | 0.09 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.33) | (0.30) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  |  | -0.08\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.57\*\* | 0.41 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.38) | (0.39) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 154 | 154 | 154 |
| Pseudo log likelihood | -246.04 | -229.63 | -227.21 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, ref. cat. Union strike fund: no strike fund.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Table A9. The effect of direct financial contributions to party, financial restrictions and absolute size of public party subsidies on party link scores with union: type of organized employees (1 = members particularly vital for functioning of service sector) included as control. Poisson regression.*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.24\*\*\* | 1.04\*\*\* | 1.50\*\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.24) | (0.20) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.76\*\*\* | -0.48\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.14) | (0.11) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.01\*\* | 0.00 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Strength of union |  | 0.64 | 1.03 |
|  |  | (0.74) | (0.72) |
| Traditional ally |  | 0.47\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Union organization type |  | -0.26 | -0.20 |
|  |  | (0.24) | (0.22) |
| Party unit type |  | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  | 0.59\*\* | 0.69\*\* |
|  |  | (0.28) | (0.29) |
| State party autonomy: high |  | 0.50\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.22) | (0.22) |
| Corporatism |  | 0.23 | 0.37\*\* |
|  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Union: type of organized employees | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.17) | (0.14) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  |  | -0.08\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.82\*\*\* | 0.48\* | 0.16 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.25) | (0.27) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 154 | 154 | 154 |
| Pseudo log likelihood | -247.36 | -231.58 | -227.35 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix 6**

**Robustness test with central party organizations and legislative party organizations in separate analyses and as one (mean value across party faces if both answered).**

*Table A10. Central party organizations (CPOs) only, all variables*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.41\*\*\* | 1.46\*\*\* | 1.47\*\*\* | 1.39\*\*\* | 1.70\*\*\* |
|  | (0.27) | (0.34) | (0.37) | (0.30) | (0.29) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.73\*\*\* |  | -0.73\*\*\* | -0.30\* | -0.31\*\* |
|  | (0.18) |  | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.15) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.02\*\* | 0.01 | 0.02\*\* | 0.01\*\* | 0.01\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Strength of union |  |  |  | -0.36 | 0.05 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.95) | (1.04) |
| Traditional union ally |  |  |  | 0.62\*\*\* | 0.63\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.14) | (0.16) |
| Union organization type |  |  |  | -0.11 | -0.08 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.25) | (0.24) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  |  |  | 0.74\*\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.26) | (0.26) |
| State party autonomy: high |  |  |  | 0.71\*\* | 0.80\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.28) | (0.26) |
| Corporatism |  |  |  | 0.52\*\* | 0.57\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.22) | (0.19) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  | -0.002 | -0.01 |  | -0.05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |  | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.53\* | 0.85\*\*\* | -0.11 | -0.27 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.30) | (0.25) | (0.32) | (0.27) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Table A11. Legislative party organizations (LPGs) only, all variables*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 0.99\*\*\* | 1.51\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 0.50 | 1.17\*\*\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.33) | (0.16) | (0.36) | (0.39) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Financial restrictions | -0.78\*\*\* |  | -0.77\*\*\* | -0.71\*\*\* | -0.56\*\*\* |
|  | (0.21) |  | (0.20) | (0.24) | (0.14) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Strength of union |  |  |  | 1.91\* | 2.19\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (1.04) | (0.90) |
| Traditional union ally |  |  |  | 0.29\* | 0.39\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Union organization type |  |  |  | -0.48\* | -0.36 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.29) | (0.23) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  |  |  | 0.40 | 0.58\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.30) | (0.32) |
| State party autonomy: high |  |  |  | 0.22 | 0.43 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.24) | (0.28) |
| Corporatism |  |  |  | -0.11 | 0.16 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.23) | (0.22) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  | -0.10\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* |  | -0.12\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.01) |  | (0.04) |
| Constant | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.41 | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.97\*\*\* | 0.38 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.26) | (0.16) | (0.31) | (0.38) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Table A12. Mean value between central party organizations (CPOs) and legislative party groups (LPGs), all variables*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.17\*\*\* | 1.42\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* | 1.03\*\*\* | 1.42\*\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.31) | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.18) |
| Financial restrictions | -0.72\*\*\* |  | -0.72\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* |
|  | (0.17) |  | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.10) |
| Absolute size of public party subsidies | 0.01\* | 0.01 | 0.01\* | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Strength of union |  |  |  | 0.42 | 0.84 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.83) | (0.82) |
| Traditional union ally |  |  |  | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Union organization type |  |  |  | -0.24 | -0.17 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.22) | (0.19) |
| State party autonomy: moderate |  |  |  | 0.67\*\* | 0.76\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.27) | (0.27) |
| State party autonomy: high |  |  |  | 0.46\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.21) | (0.19) |
| Corporatism |  |  |  | 0.28\* | 0.40\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.16) | (0.14) |
| Direct financial contribution\*absolute size of public party subsidies |  | -0.03 | -0.02 |  | -0.07\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) |  | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.52\* | 0.84\*\*\* | 0.29 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.27) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.24) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 |

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix 7**

**Robustness test with direct financial contribution and country fixed effects**

*Table A13. The effect of direct financial contributions to party with country fixed effects. Poisson regression.*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
|  |  |
| Direct financial contribution | 1.24\*\*\* |
|  | (0.23) |
| Finland | -0.87\*\* |
|  | (0.34) |
| France | -1.52\*\*\* |
|  | (0.33) |
| Germany | -0.08 |
|  | (0.28) |
| Italy | -0.98\*\* |
|  | (0.42) |
| Netherlands | -0.78\*\*\* |
|  | (0.29) |
| Sweden | -0.99\*\*\* |
|  | (0.32) |
| Switzerland | 0.00 |
|  | (0.29) |
| United Kingdom | -0.56 |
|  | (0.38) |
| United States | -1.47\*\*\* |
|  | (0.39) |
| Australia | -1.01\*\* |
|  | (0.46) |
| Israel | -2.67\*\*\* |
|  | (0.51) |
| Constant | 1.39\*\*\* |
|  | (0.25) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 154 |
| Pseudo log likelihood | -225.46 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Ref. cat. Country: Austria.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

We have also tested whether the results are dependent on particular countries being included in the analysis. When omitting countries one by one, the interaction term is sensitive to remove some of the countries with donations from the analysis. This highlights the size-of-N issues. Apart from that, the results remain the same. Note also that models with standard errors clustered *by party* give similar results as *by country.*