## A1: Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Parties

| Country | 2016 | 2004 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Austria | FPO; BZO | FPO |
| Belgium | VB | VB |
| Finland | PS | PS |
| France | FN; MPF | FN; MPF |
| Germany | AfD; NDP | Rep; NDP |
| Netherlands | PVV | LPF; Wilders |
| Norway | FrP | FrP |
| Sweden | SD | - |
| Switzerland | SVP | SVP |
| United Kingdom | UKIP | - |

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | n | Min | q1 | Median | Mean | q3 | Max | sd |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| LGBT | 1,616 | 1 | 1.0 | 2 | 2.0 | 2 | 5 | 1.1 |
| EU | 1,616 | 1 | 2.0 | 3 | 3.0 | 4 | 5 | 1.3 |
| Rules | 1,616 | 1 | 2.0 | 3 | 2.8 | 4 | 5 | 1.3 |
| Strong Gov | 1,616 | 1 | 3.0 | 4 | 3.7 | 5 | 5 | 1.2 |
| Tradition | 1,616 | 1 | 2.0 | 4 | 3.3 | 4 | 5 | 1.3 |
| Women | 1,616 | 1 | 1.0 | 2 | 2.2 | 3 | 5 | 1.2 |
| Immigration | 1,616 | 1 | 3.0 | 3 | 3.3 | 4 | 5 | 0.8 |
| Income | 1,616 | 1 | 3.0 | 5 | 5.5 | 8 | 10 | 2.9 |
| Religiosity | 1,616 | 0 | 1.0 | 5 | 4.2 | 7 | 10 | 3.0 |
| Gender | 1,616 | 1 | 1.0 | 1 | 1.4 | 2 | 2 | 0.5 |
| Cohort | 1,616 | 1 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 6.0 | 1.6 |
| Education | 1,616 | 1 | 1.0 | 2 | 2.4 | 3 | 5 | 1.4 |
| Year | 1,616 | 2004 | 2004.0 | 2016 | 2011.8 | 2016 | 2016 | 5.7 |

Table 3: Counts by Country and Year

| Country | 2016 | 2004 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Austria | 157 | 30 |
| Belgium | 26 | 48 |
| Finland | 76 | 4 |
| France | 178 | 46 |
| Germany | 99 | 18 |
| Netherlands | 98 | 29 |
| Norway | 105 | 170 |
| Sweden | 73 | 0 |
| Switzerland | 191 | 222 |
| United Kingdom | 46 | 0 |

Note: The results are robust to the exclusion of Sweden and the United Kingdom, which are missing in 2004. The results are also robust to the exclusion of Finland, which has only 4 observations in 2004.

## A2: ESS Questions

- B31 - Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.
- B34 - Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?
- B35 - Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?
- B36 - How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?
- B37 - How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?
- B38 - Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?
- B39 - And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
- B40 - Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
- H - Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.
- HG - He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.
- HN - It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
- HT - Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family.
- B33a ${ }^{1}$ When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

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## A3: Latent Class Model Results

## Table 1: BIC for Alternative Class Number Specifications

| Class \# | Score |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 | 32,520 |
| 3 | $\mathbf{3 2 , 4 0 4}$ |
| 4 | 32,427 |
| 5 | 32,512 |
| 6 | 32,609 |

Table 2: Main LCA Model, 2004 and 2016
(Note: 1 indicates the most GAL/liberal response while 5 indicates the most TAN/conservative response.)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| EU | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.1146 | 0.1422 | 0.1338 | 0.3321 | 0.2273 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1559 | 0.3343 | 0.2966 | 0.1534 | 0.0598 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.1246 | 0.2303 | 0.2260 | 0.2053 | 0.2137 |
| Immigration | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0021 | 0.0852 | 0.2546 | 0.5359 | 0.1222 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0000 | 0.2303 | 0.5396 | 0.2297 | 0.0003 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0038 | 0.1936 | 0.3171 | 0.3997 | 0.0857 |
| Rules | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.1270 | 0.0931 | 0.1928 | 0.3783 | 0.2087 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.2048 | 0.2253 | 0.2927 | 0.2581 | 0.0191 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.3466 | 0.1839 | 0.1924 | 0.1927 | 0.0844 |
| Strong government | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0120 | 0.0424 | 0.0799 | 0.3894 | 0.4763 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0600 | 0.1330 | 0.2731 | 0.4312 | 0.1027 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.1060 | 0.0825 | 0.1588 | 0.2883 | 0.3645 |
| Tradition | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0396 | 0.0938 | 0.1312 | 0.3597 | 0.3757 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1272 | 0.1368 | 0.2397 | 0.3779 | 0.1185 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.2408 | 0.1528 | 0.2046 | 0.2420 | 0.1598 |
| Women | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.1991 | 0.2994 | 0.1602 | 0.2485 | 0.0928 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1369 | 0.4804 | 0.2214 | 0.1524 | 0.0089 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.7240 | 0.1720 | 0.0590 | 0.0175 | 0.0275 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |


| LGBT | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.1874 | 0.4120 | 0.1610 | 0.1453 | 0.0943 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1564 | 0.5812 | 0.1525 | 0.0889 | 0.0209 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.7104 | 0.2175 | 0.0472 | 0.0000 | 0.0250 |

Predicted Class Membership (percentage of respondents in each class)
Conservative Nativists: 0.2605
Moderate Nativists: 0.4059
Sexually-Modern Nativists: 0.3335

Table 3: Alternative LCA Model, 2004, 2008, and 2016
(Note: 1 indicates the most GAL/liberal response while 5 indicates the most TAN/conservative response.)

| EU | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0714 | 0.1422 | 0.3051 | 0.3102 | 0.1731 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1419 | 0.2675 | 0.2492 | 0.2233 | 0.1181 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.1079 | 0.2320 | 0.2853 | 0.2066 | 0.1681 |
| Immigration | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0005 | 0.1571 | 0.4198 | 0.3608 | 0.0618 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0015 | 0.1924 | 0.4410 | 0.3246 | 0.0405 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0048 | 0.2182 | 0.3685 | 0.3472 | 0.0614 |
| Rules | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0528 | 0.0914 | 0.1455 | 0.2568 | 0.4535 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1978 | 0.2181 | 0.2810 | 0.2840 | 0.0191 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.2696 | 0.1951 | 0.2010 | 0.2155 | 0.1189 |
| Strong government | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0025 | 0.0318 | 0.0490 | 0.2120 | 0.7047 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0608 | 0.1297 | 0.2419 | 0.4631 | 0.1045 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0808 | 0.0856 | 0.1924 | 0.2857 | 0.3554 |
| Tradition | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0115 | 0.0533 | 0.0994 | 0.2125 | 0.6231 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1274 | 0.1410 | 0.2321 | 0.3990 | 0.1004 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.2018 | 0.1605 | 0.1941 | 0.2750 | 0.1686 |
| Women | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.2684 | 0.3859 | 0.1176 | 0.1558 | 0.0723 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0786 | 0.4443 | 0.2261 | 0.2271 | 0.0239 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.7226 | 0.2178 | 0.0402 | 0.0022 | 0.0172 |
| LGBT | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.2725 | 0.4423 | 0.1097 | 0.1115 | 0.0641 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.1461 | 0.5343 | 0.1700 | 0.1052 | 0.0443 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.6762 | 0.2436 | 0.0558 | 0.0056 | 0.0187 |
| Predicted Class Membership (percentage of respondents in each class) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.3255 |  |  |  |  |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.3503 |  |  |  |  |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.3242 |  |  |  |  |



Figure 1: Latent Class Proportions by Year, Alternative LCA Model

Table 4: Alternative LCA Model, 2008 only
(Note: 1 indicates the most GAL/liberal response while 5 indicates the most TAN/conservative response.)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| EU | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0000 | 0.0660 | 0.2592 | 0.3590 | 0.3158 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0635 | 0.1363 | 0.4448 | 0.3199 | 0.0356 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0212 | 0.1522 | 0.4823 | 0.2891 | 0.0552 |
| Immigration | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0064 | 0.0000 | 0.3926 | 0.4897 | 0.1112 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0000 | 0.2973 | 0.5368 | 0.1609 | 0.0049 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0064 | 0.2507 | 0.4252 | 0.2962 | 0.0214 |
| Rules | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0087 | 0.1886 | 0.0731 | 0.1373 | 0.5922 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0135 | 0.0521 | 0.1530 | 0.2397 | 0.5416 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0335 | 0.2865 | 0.2155 | 0.2186 | 0.2459 |
| Strong government | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0145 | 0.0764 | 0.0730 | 0.0277 | 0.8083 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0000 | 0.0314 | 0.0445 | 0.2746 | 0.6495 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0229 | 0.1002 | 0.2445 | 0.1881 | 0.4443 |


| Tradition | 1 (anti) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (pro) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.0477 | 0.0935 | 0.0659 | 0.1121 | 0.6808 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.0066 | 0.0179 | 0.1231 | 0.2322 | 0.6202 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.0829 | 0.1936 | 0.1455 | 0.2778 | 0.3002 |
| Women | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.2609 | 0.1752 | 0.0335 | 0.3648 | 0.1656 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.2637 | 0.5380 | 0.1236 | 0.0747 | 0.0000 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.5373 | 0.4002 | 0.0340 | 0.0285 | 0.0000 |
| LGBT | 1 (pro) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (anti) |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.3314 | 0.3817 | 0.0940 | 0.0852 | 0.1077 |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.2773 | 0.4576 | 0.1199 | 0.1207 | 0.0245 |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.5864 | 0.3252 | 0.0623 | 0.0000 | 0.0261 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Predicted Class Membership (percentage of respondents in each class) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Conservative Nativists: | 0.2107 |  |  |  |  |
| Moderate Nativists: | 0.4967 |  |  |  |  |
| Sexually-Modern Nativists: | 0.2926 |  |  |  |  |

As the results from Figure 1 indicate, the prevalence of sexually modern nativists in 2008 falls in between that of 2004 and 2016. In 2004, the prevalence was about $12.2 \%$; in $2008,24.6 \%$; and in 2016, $47.4 \%$. The main results (p. 20) placed the prevalence of sexually-modern nativists at $12.7 \%$ in 2004 and $44.5 \%$ in 2016, which comports with the alternative specification. I also examine the 2008 data alone (Table 4), and that model classifies about $29 \%$ of respondents as sexually-modern nativists. Taken together, these results provide further support for the main contention of the article, that the prevalence of sexually-modern nativists is increasing overtime.

## A4: Difference in Means Tests

To determine whether the mean responses differ significantly by latent class, I performed difference in means tests by issue. As Table 1 shows, for all issues, the mean responses for moderate and sexually-modern nativists are significantly more leftist than the conservative nativist mean responses, as indicated by their positive and significant coefficients ( $p<.01$ ). Recall from above that 1 is the most leftist response possible. To get the means of the moderate nativists and the sexually-modern nativists, one should subtract their respective coefficients to that of the reference category, the conservative nativists. For example, the mean response to the tradition question for a sexually-modern nativist is 3.003.

|  | Tradition | Women | LGBT | Rules | Strong Gov. | EU | Immigration |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Constant (Conservative Nativist) | $\begin{aligned} & 4.029 * * * \\ & (0.059) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.749 * * * \\ & (0.071) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 2.612*** } \\ & (0.069) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.604 * * * \\ (0.068) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4.387 * * * \\ & (0.046) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3.808 * * * \\ & (0.067) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3.885^{* * *} \\ & (0.039) \end{aligned}$ |
| Moderate Nativist | $\begin{aligned} & -0.716^{* * *} \\ & (0.074) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.158 * * \\ & (0.080) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.303 * * * \\ & (0.078) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.878 * * * \\ (0.081) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.954 * * * \\ & (0.060) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.159 * * * \\ & (0.080) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.873^{* * *} \\ & (0.048) \end{aligned}$ |
| Sexually-Modern Nativist | $\begin{aligned} & -1.026^{* * *} \\ & (0.082) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.435^{* * *} \\ & (0.078) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.249 * * * \\ (0.076) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.975 * * * \\ & (0.087) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.676^{* * *} \\ & (0.070) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.710^{* * *} \\ (0.087) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.600^{* * *} \\ & (0.056) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 1,616 | 1,616 | 1,616 | 1,616 | 1,616 | 1,616 | 1,616 |

## A5: Supplemental Figures



Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Latent Class by Religiosity (Note: 0 is not religious at all and 10 is very religious)


Latent Classes
Conservative nativists
Moderate nativists
Sexually-modern nativists

Figure 2: Latent Class Proportion by Country, 2004 and 2016


Figure 3: Latent Class Proportion by Country in 2004


Figure 4: Latent Class Proportion by Country in 2016


Figure 5: Radical Right "Social Lifestyle" Positions from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
Note: 10 is most traditionalist and 0 is most progressive


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Listed as G8 in ESS2

