

APPENDIX

“UN Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual Violence” (JCR-17-0164)

Table A1: Summary statistics for government observations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std dev	Min	Max
Sexual violence	1,427	0.050	0.219	0	1
Troops	1,429	0.542	2.468	0	29.209
Police	1,429	0.061	0.328	0	4.636
No PoC mandate	1,429	0.964	0.187	0	1
Weak control	1,429	0.460	0.499	0	1
Free media	1,428	0.503	0.646	0	2
Gender equality	1,429	4.111	1.894	1.195	7.869
Post UNSCR 1325	1,429	0.406	0.491	0	1
Mission duration	1,429	1.936	4.090	0	20
Battle deaths	1,429	3.032	2.940	0	10.330
One-sided violence	1,429	1.256	2.236	0	13.122
Population	1,429	17.198	1.761	12.906	20.897
Democracy	1,429	0.418	0.235	0.072	0.919
Rebel strength	1,388	1.854	0.803	1	5

Table A2: Summary statistics for rebel observations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std dev	Min	Max
Sexual violence	2,301	0.033	0.178	0	1
Troops	2,303	0.817	3.123	0	29.209
Police	2,303	0.090	0.432	0	4.636
No PoC mandate	2,303	0.937	0.243	0	1
Weak control	2,087	0.706	0.456	0	1
Free media	2,301	0.511	0.662	0	2
Gender equality	2,303	4.472	2.000	1.195	7.869
Post UNSCR 1325	2,303	0.413	0.492	0	1
Mission duration	2,303	1.724	3.530	0	20
Battle deaths	2,303	3.779	3.018	0	10.330
One-sided violence	2,303	0.644	1.670	0	10.313
Population	2,303	17.045	1.655	12.906	20.897
Democracy	2,303	0.397	0.233	0.072	0.919
Rebel strength	2,263	1.954	0.794	1	5

In the paper, we raise the potential concern about non-random deployment of peacekeeping operations and that might bias our estimates of the effect of peacekeeping on sexual violence. We explore this concern in a few different ways below. We begin by showing cross tabulations to give a sense of what situations we are more likely to see peacekeeping operations. Tables A3 and A4 show that peacekeeping operations are more likely when there have been high levels of sexual violence at t-1. Peacekeeping operations are deployed in 40% of cases with government sexual violence, compared to 31% of cases with no government sexual violence. The difference is not statistically significant though. For rebels the difference is greater: peacekeeping operations are deployed in 54% of cases with rebel sexual violence, compared to only 34% without rebel sexual violence. This difference is also statistically significant. These findings show that, if anything, a selection of peacekeeping operations to the hardest cases should make it more difficult to find any positive impact that peacekeeping may have.

Table A3: Is peacekeeping more likely when governments use sexual violence?

	No sexual violence t-1	Sexual violence t-1
PKO	380 (31%)	27 (40%)
No PKO	844 (69%)	40 (60%)
Total	1224 (100%)	67 (100%)

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 2.5193$, Pr = 0.112

Table A4: Is peacekeeping more likely when rebels use sexual violence?

	No sexual violence t-1	Sexual violence t-1
PKO	659 (34%)	38 (54%)
No PKO	1277 (66%)	33 (46%)
Total	1936 (100%)	71 (100%)

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 11.4675$ Pr = 0.001

Since internal control play a significant part in our theoretical argument, we also show to what extent control may be correlated with peacekeeping deployment. Tables A5 and A6 show that while peacekeeping may be more likely when government have strong control (34% compared to 24%), it is less likely when the rebels have strong control (26% compared to 35%). These differences are all statistically significant. This suggests that we need to take the concern about selection bias seriously. We therefore opt for estimating simultaneously both stages of peacekeeping presence and sexual violence, using an instrumental variable approach. We describe this next.

Table A5: Is peacekeeping more likely when governments exercise internal control?

	Weak control	Strong control
PKO	158 (24%)	263 (34%)
No PKO	500 (76%)	508 (66%)
Total	658 (100%)	771 (100%)

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 17.4245$ Pr = 0.000

Table A6: Is peacekeeping more likely when rebels exercise internal control?

	Weak control	Strong control
PKO	518 (35%)	160 (26%)
No PKO	955 (65%)	454 (74%)
Total	1473 (100%)	614 (100%)

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 16.3897$ Pr = 0.000

As a way of exploring the extent that non-random selection of peacekeeping operations might bias our results, we estimate a bivariate probit, using UNSC membership as an instrument. A valid instrument needs to be relevant to the independent variable (fulfilling the relevance criterion) and irrelevant to the outcome of interest (fulfilling the exclusion criterion). Vivalt (2017) demonstrates the relevance of UNSC membership as a strong instrument for peacekeeping deployment. Previous studies of states' election considerations in relation to the UNSC do not suggest that candidate countries' HR record has a large impact on the likelihood of attaining a seat (e.g. Malone, 2000; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). While candidacy and temporal membership does require a certain level of functional bureaucracy, a number of empirical examples furthermore demonstrate that civil war not necessarily hinders states from Security Council involvement. These examples include Pakistan's and Colombia's numerous mandates as well as the temporary seats held by Rwanda, Djibouti and Ethiopia in times of domestic armed conflicts. Data on UNSC membership come from Dreher et al (2009). The drawback with this set-up is that we have to dichotomize our peacekeeping variable. Hence, we are not able to test our hypotheses using this approach. However, by estimating the correlation between the two stages of peacekeeping presence and sexual violence, we can get a sense of whether selection bias is a severe problem when modelling the impact of peacekeeping on sexual violence. Our findings (Table A7) show that the instrument is indeed significant, but rho is not significant in any of the two models of government and rebel sexual violence. Important for our analysis is that weak control does not significantly influence the likelihood of peacekeeping presence, now that we estimate this impact more rigorously. We can also note that mere peacekeeping presence does not have a significant effect on sexual violence. Hence, we believe that the approach we pursue in the paper of estimating conditional effects, and assessing the impact of peacekeeping size, is more fruitful for understanding the impact of peacekeeping on sexual violence.

Table A7: Recursive bivariate probit with instrument

	Model 1: Government sexual violence		Model 2: Rebel sexual violence	
	Sexual violence equation	Peacekeeping equation	Sexual violence equation	Peacekeeping equation
Peacekeeping presence	0.730 (0.654)		0.764 (0.607)	
Weak control	-0.0473 (0.167)	0.0734 (0.219)	-0.590** (0.144)	0.216 (0.193)
Free media	-0.0961 (0.173)	-0.0945 (0.198)	-0.129 (0.138)	-0.290+ (0.154)
Gender equality	0.117* (0.0500)	0.0650 (0.0637)	0.125* (0.0548)	0.0543 (0.0486)
Post UNSCR 1325	0.355* (0.118)	0.0258 (0.123)	-0.0327 (0.146)	0.293* (0.112)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	0.0942* (0.0360)	-0.00710 (0.0287)	0.0409 (0.0281)	-0.0423* (0.0213)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.115** (0.0286)	0.0101 (0.0372)	0.156** (0.0311)	0.0112 (0.0369)
Population	0.0256 (0.0740)	0.141 (0.0924)	-0.278** (0.0787)	0.0363 (0.0660)
Democracy	-0.554 (0.549)	1.586* (0.626)	-0.751 (0.691)	2.875** (0.530)
Rebel strength	0.0562 (0.114)	0.0293 (0.157)	-0.103 (0.0874)	0.243* (0.121)
Sexual violence _{t-1}	0.465** (0.0908)	0.0405 (0.111)	0.554** (0.131)	0.332** (0.0915)
UNSC membership		-0.880** (0.254)		-1.123** (0.265)
Constant	-3.774* (1.521)	-3.863* (1.767)	2.025 (1.280)	-2.882* (1.278)
Rho		-0.431 (0.355)		-0.405 (0.314)
Observations		1227		1790

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

Next, as reported in the paper we also control for reported sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. It should be noted that the sample is severely reduced due to a shorter time period and missing data. However, the finding that more police deployed reduce sexual violence by rebel groups when the mission has a PoC mandate holds also with this specification. The negative coefficient of SEA in Models 3 and 4 should not be interpreted as anything but a correlation that could be explained by a number of factors relating to the mission environment and the context in which SEA by peacekeepers are reported.

Table A8: Control for sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, 1999-2009 (H1)

	Model 1: Government sexual violence	Model 2: Government sexual violence	Model 3: Rebel sexual violence	Model 4: Rebel sexual violence
Reports of SEA	1.425 (1.636)	-0.150 (1.188)	-3.504* (1.449)	-3.835* (1.557)
UN troops _{t-1}	-0.0200 (0.209)	0.0148 (0.200)	-0.173 (0.125)	0.0321 (0.0976)
UN police _{t-1}	-0.446 (0.761)	0.327 (0.666)	-7.525+ (4.316)	-76.21* (34.14)
No PoC Mandate _{t-1}	0.866 (1.476)	0.0964 (1.530)	-3.742* (1.314)	-8.071* (2.536)
UN troops*No PoC mandate	-1.609 (1.397)		1.535* (0.513)	
UN police*No PoC mandate		0 (.)		76.80* (35.17)
Free media	0 (.)	0 (.)	-2.100 (2.678)	-3.266 (4.450)
Gender inequality	-0.101 (0.630)	-0.0162 (0.537)	0.311 (0.508)	0.231 (0.338)
Post UNSCR1325	0.982 (1.633)	0.144 (2.428)	-2.280 (1.686)	-3.906* (1.903)
Mission duration	0.157 (0.186)	0.113 (0.0978)	0.294 (0.193)	0.170 (0.230)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	-0.00609 (0.152)	0.0416 (0.181)	0.0793 (0.164)	0.0268 (0.140)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.354** (0.0994)	0.244* (0.105)	0.360* (0.182)	0.667+ (0.381)
Population	0.517 (0.326)	-0.0964 (0.246)	-1.895* (0.646)	-1.339* (0.536)
Democracy	-0.316 (3.689)	-0.231 (3.320)	-0.791 (5.472)	5.507 (7.605)
Rebel strength	0.0202 (0.726)	0.540 (0.689)	0.977 (0.609)	-0.850 (0.588)
Sexual violence _{t-1}	0.644 (0.537)	1.115* (0.509)	2.073* (0.790)	2.866* (1.440)
Constant	-13.04* (5.762)	-3.539 (5.366)	26.90** (7.587)	24.59* (10.26)
Observations	72	67	246	246

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

When testing hypothesis 2, and controlling for SEA by peacekeepers, the results change a bit. For government sexual violence, only the effect of troops remains significant. For rebel groups, it is instead only the effect of police which is now significant. While these results are not completely consistent with the ones we report in the paper, they do not alter the conclusions dramatically. Keeping in mind the significant reduction in the number of observations, these findings should thus mainly be considered as complementary to the one reported in the paper.

Table A9: Control for sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, 1999-2009 (H2)

	Model 1: Government sexual violence	Model 2: Government sexual violence	Model 3: Rebel sexual violence	Model 4: Rebel sexual violence
Reports of SEA	0.176 (1.297)	-0.0701 (1.257)	-6.025 (5.279)	-9.401* (4.586)
UN troops _{t-1}	-0.627 ⁺ (0.345)	0.00214 (0.207)	1.227 (0.851)	1.723* (0.607)
UN police _{t-1}	0.0823 (0.617)	-15.35 (20.65)	-76.85* (24.59)	-94.83* (34.87)
Weak control _{t-1}	-1.410 (1.318)	0.0588 (1.222)	-42.83* (15.92)	-76.01** (19.66)
UN troops*Weak control	0.617* (0.311)		-0.661 (0.477)	
UN police*Weak control		15.47 (20.67)		-318.4** (94.14)
No PoC Mandate _{t-1}	-0.451 (1.589)	-0.221 (1.802)	-11.88** (0.858)	-27.60** (5.984)
Free media	0 (.)	0 (.)	6.715 (4.994)	4.475 (8.565)
Gender inequality	0.128 (0.544)	-0.0460 (0.659)	9.211* (3.426)	18.41** (5.275)
Post UNSCR1325	1.202 (1.564)	1.005 (1.687)	-8.347** (2.019)	-17.14** (4.020)
Mission duration	0.0602 (0.0973)	0.0426 (0.112)	-0.950* (0.411)	-3.188* (0.972)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	0.000217 (0.165)	0.0280 (0.174)	-0.422** (0.127)	-0.450 (0.617)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.339* (0.119)	0.262* (0.106)	0.494 (0.315)	0.572 (0.559)
Population	0.0618 (0.352)	0.0123 (0.351)	-23.18* (8.699)	-39.45** (9.672)
Democracy	1.418 (3.853)	1.118 (3.892)	-22.74* (10.57)	31.73 (27.34)
Rebel strength	0.316 (0.771)	0.392 (0.774)	-13.01* (5.130)	-25.84* (8.275)
Sexual violence _{t-1}	1.123* (0.534)	1.254* (0.519)	2.324* (1.029)	3.765* (1.883)
Constant	-6.299 (5.890)	-5.758 (6.693)	400.2* (143.9)	668.5** (157.9)
Observations	72	72	243	243

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

In the following two tables we restrict the sample to peacekeeping operations only. This addresses two potential concerns. First, peacekeeping data is less likely to be underreported in cases where the international community has a strong presence, like a peacekeeping operation. This should be especially true for the higher levels reported sexual violence that we base our analysis on. By estimating the models on a peacekeeping-only sample, we thus reduce the potential problem of bias in the comparison category of no peacekeeping (but also restricting the analysis to compare the impact of size, rather than compare size also to no peacekeepers). Second, with the reduced sample we also reduce the potential problem of selection bias. The findings in our restricted sample are in line with the overall findings.

Table A10: Limiting sample to ongoing peacekeeping operations (H1)

	Model 1: Government sexual violence	Model 2: Government sexual violence	Model 3: Rebel sexual violence	Model 4: Rebel sexual violence
UN troops _{t-1}	0.0387 (0.177)	-0.0493 (0.116)	-0.126 (0.189)	0.0153 (0.0545)
UN police _{t-1}	-0.263 (0.580)	0.151 (0.419)	0.301 (0.748)	-53.67* (20.02)
No PoC Mandate _{t-1}	0.316 (1.719)	-1.034 (0.903)	-2.874+ (1.668)	-6.778** (1.222)
UN troops*No PoC mandate	-0.732 (0.514)		0.152 (0.192)	
UN police*No PoC mandate		-1.854 (3.528)		54.33* (20.22)
Free media	-6.660** (1.347)	-6.758** (1.643)	-1.462 (1.529)	-2.079 (1.517)
Gender inequality	-0.0944 (0.252)	-0.0511 (0.285)	-0.180 (0.346)	-0.381 (0.403)
Post UNSCR1325	-0.160 (0.698)	-0.579 (0.849)	-0.882 (1.223)	-1.385 (1.100)
Mission duration	-0.00706 (0.126)	-0.0243 (0.108)	0.228** (0.0491)	0.202* (0.0628)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	0.137 (0.135)	0.194 (0.130)	0.152* (0.0670)	0.0776 (0.118)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.210* (0.0897)	0.100 (0.0700)	0.376* (0.142)	0.647* (0.198)
Population	0.993** (0.278)	0.945** (0.287)	-0.599 (0.373)	-0.728* (0.314)
Democracy	1.343 (1.867)	2.733 (2.113)	-1.181 (3.274)	-0.890 (3.794)
Rebel strength	0.397 (0.383)	0.280 (0.273)	0.299 (0.549)	-0.594 (0.508)
Sexual violence _{t-1}	0.988* (0.396)	0.960* (0.304)	1.173** (0.312)	1.290* (0.641)
Constant	-20.95** (5.611)	-19.41** (5.439)	6.987 (6.144)	15.82* (5.710)
Observations	373	373	635	635

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

Table A11: Limiting sample to ongoing peacekeeping operations (H2)

	Model 1: Government sexual violence	Model 2: Government sexual violence	Model 3: Rebel sexual violence	Model 4: Rebel sexual violence
UN troops _{t-1}	-0.832* (0.308)	-0.0793 (0.140)	-0.476* (0.158)	-0.0450 (0.103)
UN police _{t-1}	-0.0974 (0.567)	-39.24* (17.07)	0.246 (0.576)	-2.814 (2.380)
Weak control _{t-1}	-2.248* (0.879)	-1.192 (1.021)	-2.735* (1.041)	-1.782+ (1.018)
UN troops*Weak control	0.785* (0.273)		0.562** (0.146)	
UN police*Weak control		39.30* (17.20)		3.560 (2.379)
No PoC Mandate _{t-1}	-1.563 (1.278)	-1.893 (1.303)	-3.357* (1.677)	-2.960* (1.310)
Free media	-8.281** (2.024)	-6.616* (2.334)	-1.936 (1.476)	-1.563 (1.554)
Gender inequality	0.232 (0.258)	0.176 (0.267)	-0.0687 (0.278)	-0.0809 (0.274)
Post UNSCR1325	-0.304 (0.712)	-0.708 (0.868)	-2.175 (1.665)	-1.189 (1.296)
Mission duration	0.00373 (0.0968)	-0.0174 (0.101)	0.237* (0.0862)	0.237** (0.0527)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	0.237 (0.166)	0.225 (0.169)	0.0564 (0.166)	0.123 (0.114)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.203* (0.0759)	0.148* (0.0749)	0.476** (0.140)	0.425* (0.134)
Population	0.913* (0.295)	0.661+ (0.347)	-0.269 (0.513)	-0.872 (0.586)
Democracy	4.065 (2.523)	4.368+ (2.654)	0.470 (2.587)	-0.333 (2.837)
Rebel strength	0.244 (0.280)	0.234 (0.288)	0.175 (0.533)	-0.0848 (0.706)
Sexual violence _{t-1}	0.991* (0.399)	1.129* (0.374)	1.192** (0.283)	1.058** (0.277)
Constant	-19.25** (5.336)	-15.05* (5.957)	3.247 (7.815)	12.74 (11.08)
Observations	373	373	579	579

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

In the next two tables we include lagged versions of sexual violence by both sides in the conflict. Hence, in all models, both sexual violence by the government and by the rebels are included. Consistently throughout the models, only the lag of sexual violence by one's own side has a positive and significant effect. Sexual violence by the opponent does not have a significant effect in any of the models. Including the additional variable does not alter our main findings.

Table A12: Accounting for sexual violence by the opponent (H1)

	Model 1: Government sexual violence	Model 2: Government sexual violence	Model 3: Rebel sexual violence	Model 4: Rebel sexual violence
UN troops _{t-1}	0.0973 (0.141)	0.0277 (0.0999)	-0.0774 (0.100)	0.00712 (0.0368)
UN police _{t-1}	0.216 (0.434)	0.555 (0.374)	0.446 (0.404)	-25.04** (6.669)
No PoC Mandate _{t-1}	0.310 (1.227)	-0.237 (0.861)	-0.828 (0.965)	-2.178** (0.421)
UN troops*No PoC mandate	-0.428 (0.388)		0.0735 (0.108)	
UN police*No PoC mandate		-3.515 (5.389)		25.68** (6.660)
Free media	-0.264 (0.403)	-0.261 (0.403)	-0.162 (0.283)	-0.166 (0.294)
Gender inequality	0.243* (0.0933)	0.238* (0.0916)	0.299* (0.136)	0.290+ (0.149)
Post UNSCR1325	0.614* (0.292)	0.573* (0.285)	0.136 (0.307)	0.0639 (0.293)
Mission duration	-0.00133 (0.0523)	-0.0174 (0.0466)	0.00970 (0.0771)	-0.00154 (0.0802)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	0.177* (0.0636)	0.185* (0.0631)	0.0249 (0.0605)	0.0222 (0.0674)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.248** (0.0478)	0.236** (0.0500)	0.419** (0.0484)	0.440** (0.0548)
Population	0.113 (0.155)	0.105 (0.155)	-0.572** (0.126)	-0.619** (0.142)
Democracy	-0.575 (1.216)	-0.385 (1.181)	-0.292 (1.025)	-0.0783 (1.187)
Rebel strength	-0.0741 (0.280)	-0.119 (0.241)	-0.0780 (0.195)	-0.171 (0.225)
Sexual violence by gov _{t-1}	0.808** (0.195)	0.800** (0.191)	-0.0579 (0.140)	0.0911 (0.169)
Sexual violence by reb _{t-1}	0.204 (0.239)	0.232 (0.228)	1.120** (0.168)	1.025** (0.185)
Constant	-8.270* (3.686)	-7.550* (3.463)	3.749 (2.914)	6.009* (3.034)
Observations	1262	1262	1980	1980

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

Table A13: Accounting for sexual violence by the opponent (H2)

	Model 1: Government sexual violence	Model 2: Government sexual violence	Model 3: Rebel sexual violence	Model 4: Rebel sexual violence
UN troops _{t-1}	-0.370 ⁺ (0.212)	0.0270 (0.0973)	-0.269* (0.106)	-0.0292 (0.0615)
UN police _{t-1}	0.0372 (0.330)	-35.72* (12.45)	0.365 (0.413)	-1.566 (1.625)
Weak control _{t-1}	-0.630 ⁺ (0.339)	-0.618 ⁺ (0.355)	-1.432** (0.349)	-1.237** (0.334)
UN troops*Weak control	0.416* (0.210)		0.308* (0.105)	
UN police*Weak control		35.81* (12.31)		2.280 (1.560)
No PoC Mandate _{t-1}	-0.789 (0.777)	-1.124 (0.809)	-0.595 (0.920)	-0.757 (0.755)
Free media	-0.362 (0.455)	-0.339 (0.439)	-0.475* (0.238)	-0.415 ⁺ (0.230)
Gender inequality	0.251* (0.0893)	0.237* (0.0886)	0.257* (0.106)	0.258* (0.106)
Post UNSCR1325	0.606* (0.297)	0.519 ⁺ (0.286)	0.0115 (0.409)	0.0973 (0.371)
Mission duration	-0.0135 (0.0427)	-0.0259 (0.0445)	0.0375 (0.0700)	0.0225 (0.0684)
Battle deaths _{t-1}	0.203* (0.0678)	0.209* (0.0686)	0.0128 (0.0820)	0.0396 (0.0707)
One-sided violence _{t-1}	0.262** (0.0449)	0.259** (0.0451)	0.456** (0.0396)	0.443** (0.0410)
Population	0.0723 (0.155)	0.0431 (0.158)	-0.662** (0.154)	-0.763** (0.157)
Democracy	-0.571 (1.211)	-0.384 (1.206)	-0.744 (1.306)	-0.455 (1.348)
Rebel strength	-0.143 (0.235)	-0.146 (0.240)	-0.133 (0.172)	-0.208 (0.195)
Sexual violence by gov _{t-1}	0.814** (0.203)	0.841** (0.198)	0.114 (0.154)	0.0158 (0.149)
Sexual violence by reb _{t-1}	0.197 (0.236)	0.214 (0.236)	0.975** (0.183)	1.012** (0.170)
Constant	-6.171 ⁺ (3.588)	-5.361 (3.669)	6.313* (3.104)	8.001* (3.244)
Observations	1262	1262	1819	1819

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.001$

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