

Cognitive Shortcuts and Public Support for Intervention — Online Appendix

The below tables describe the dataset on interventions and offer results of the alternative models reported in the paper. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics. Table A2 lists the sites named in the intervention survey items.

Tables A3-A9 present results of tests of support for military intervention in different subsets of the population: the post-9/11 period only (572 observations), countries with at least five observations only (1,060 observations), questions that did not pertain to Iraq (626 observations), questions asked before 9/11 that did not pertain either to Iraq or to Afghanistan (324 observations), questions asked before versus after the diffusion of the internet to the public (894 observations), contrasting models focused on historical eras and the availability heuristic (1080 observations), and questions not posed *after* an intervention had begun (904 observations). These alternative models increase confidence that the main effects reported in the article are not skewed by one historical period, infrequent polling questions, Iraq-related data, or the inclusion of survey questions during the first month of intervention.

The complete dataset begins from 1946 and includes an additional 17 observations from 1946-1980. The small size of this earlier historical sample limits the ability to draw conclusions on that era with confidence. Therefore, I omitted these observations from the present analysis. Inclusion of those data does not alter the substance of the results. Table A10 includes results from the full sample of 1,097 observations.

The distribution of observations made OLS appropriate, but the dependent variable was implicitly bounded: aggregate public opinion scores range from a minimum of 0% (0) and a maximum of 100% (1). To test whether methods geared toward a bounded dependent variable would produce substantively different results, I ran the full model through a fractional probit test, a fractional logit test, and a beta regression test. Tables A11-A13 provide the results.

Findings from the non-OLS models substantively matched the results in the main model reported in the paper. For example, after re-scaling the marginal effects of the non-OLS models for

comparability, the marginal effect of foreign policy restraint (FPR) on aggregate support for intervention is 9.396 ($p=0.000$) in fractional probit, 9.482 ($p=0.000$) in fractional logit, and 9.370 ($p=0.000$) in beta regression, compared to 9.328 ($p=0.000$) in OLS. In short, OLS estimates match other models and prove slightly more conservative.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Sample Size	1,080	1,076.376	661.306	352	17,872
Support for intervention	1,080	54.588	17.654	9	94
IPC	1,080	0.436	0.496	0	1
FPR	1,080	0.428	0.495	0	1
Humanitarian intervention	1,080	0.072	0.259	0	1
Peacekeeping	1,080	0.064	0.245	0	1
Presidential cues	1,080	0.080	0.271	0	1
Rally effect	1,080	0.163	0.370	0	1
11/10/89 - 9/11/01	1,080	0.394	0.489	0	1
9/12/01 - 12/31/16	1,080	0.530	0.499	0	1
Saddam Hussein	1,080	0.202	0.402	0	1
Iraq (pre-9/11)	1,080	0.169	0.375	0	1
Iraq (post-9/11)	1,080	0.249	0.433	0	1
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)	1,080	0.007	0.086	0	1
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)	1,080	0.037	0.189	0	1
ISIS	1,080	0.052	0.222	0	1
Multilateral	1,080	0.203	0.402	0	1
UN support	1,080	0.053	0.224	0	1
Ground missions	1,080	0.443	0.497	0	1
Air missions	1,080	0.194	0.396	0	1
Naval/training/generic missions	1,080	0.354	0.478	0	1
Special Forces missions	1,080	0.009	0.096	0	1
US military casualties	1,080	0.038	0.191	0	1
Civilian casualties	1,080	0.011	0.105	0	1

Table A2: Public Support for Military Intervention (all countries, 1946-2016)

Country	Dates of Survey Coverage	N	Favor (%)
Afghanistan	2001	48	75.8
Afghanistan and Sudan	1998	6	73.0
Bosnia	1992-1994	95	46.5
Burundi	1995-1996	2	59.5
Colombia	1989-2004	8	55.0
DPR Korea	1993-2014	32	39.5
Egypt and Israel	1981	1	46.0
El Salvador	1981-1985	19	29.1
Grenada	1983	11	58.9
Haiti	1993-2004	37	37.1
Honduras	1983-1988	5	33.4
Iran	1987-2015	54	50.1
Iraq	1990-2014	395	62.3
Iraq and Syria	2014-2016	62	50.0
Israel	1993-2014	20	44.2
Israel and Lebanon	2006	2	48.0
Korea	1995	1	68.0
Kosovo	1999	49	49.8
Kuwait	1990-1993	27	60.7
Lebanon	1982-2007	16	41.44
Liberia	2003	9	50.0
Libya	1981-2011	32	46.5
Mexico	1983	1	66.0
Nicaragua	1983-1987	8	28.9
Panama	1988-1990	8	55.8
Philippines	2002	2	74.0
Poland	1981	1	25.0
Russia	2014	1	13.0
Rwanda	1994	3	47.3
Saudi Arabia	1986-1998	32	68.8
Serbia	1999	22	55.7
Somalia	1992-2002	12	68.5

Sudan	2002-2010	9	57.2
Syria	1994-2014	44	38.3
Timor-Leste	1999	2	52.5
Ukraine	2014	4	19.0
Total		1080	49.8

Table A3: Support for Military Intervention (Post-9/11 only)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	-0.797 (2.886)				11.96** (3.870)
Humanitarian intervention	-12.25* (6.772)				9.590 (5.571)
Peacekeeping	-2.147 (5.118)				17.78*** (3.905)
Presidential cues		2.136 (2.572)			-4.584* (2.414)
Rally effect		8.331 (7.198)			10.05*** (2.472)
Saddam Hussein				4.831*** (1.054)	6.358*** (1.026)
Iraq (post-9/11)				14.91*** (3.027)	23.19*** (3.087)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				38.30*** (3.169)	38.80*** (2.483)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				32.06*** (2.739)	33.95*** (2.210)
ISIS				12.64** (3.646)	8.774** (3.386)
Multilateral	-0.221 (3.739)	-2.454 (3.643)	-2.266 (3.792)	1.946 (2.749)	0.475 (1.998)
UN support	10.29 (6.494)	10.55 (6.767)	9.904 (7.214)	14.14** (4.748)	14.94** (4.924)
Air missions	7.517** (3.528)	3.738 (2.851)	5.171 (3.176)	7.277** (2.515)	5.183 (2.984)
Naval/training/generic missions	12.53*** (2.850)	12.17*** (2.090)	13.10*** (2.651)	9.413*** (2.212)	7.424*** (1.343)
Special Forces missions	24.80*** (5.601)	25.88*** (4.942)	25.37*** (4.826)	15.93*** (1.508)	15.11*** (0.921)
US military casualties	-8.422* (4.743)	-7.773* (4.364)	-8.765 (5.123)	-13.29* (7.361)	-11.30 (7.036)
Civilian casualties	-3.171 (7.535)	-1.634 (8.829)	-2.635 (7.747)	-8.316*** (1.347)	-6.241*** (1.518)
Constant	50.38*** (4.631)	49.22*** (3.833)	49.73*** (3.813)	38.21*** (3.083)	28.80*** (3.675)
<i>N</i>	572	572	572	572	572
adjusted R ²	0.169	0.176	0.155	0.474	0.556

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A4: Support for Military Intervention (Countries with 5 or more observations only)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	3.618 (3.900)				9.435*** (2.391)
Humanitarian intervention	-2.242 (5.633)				9.831** (3.210)
Peacekeeping	2.587 (5.309)				13.20** (3.568)
Presidential cues		-1.521 (2.105)			-2.752 (2.066)
Rally effect		11.60** (3.566)			13.12*** (1.904)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			10.66* (6.088)	3.494 (5.746)	1.257 (4.263)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			11.08* (6.182)	-0.616 (5.702)	-2.825 (3.996)
Saddam Hussein				2.497* (1.351)	6.150*** (0.693)
Iraq (pre-9/11)				14.80** (4.275)	13.26*** (2.725)
Iraq (post-9/11)				16.98*** (3.092)	22.06*** (2.610)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				37.66*** (3.219)	37.00*** (2.436)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				32.81*** (2.926)	32.61*** (2.348)
ISIS				12.25** (3.827)	9.141** (3.389)
Multilateral	-0.255 (2.091)	0.0369 (2.565)	-0.381 (2.512)	3.823* (2.154)	2.846 (2.023)
UN support	7.247** (3.456)	7.741** (3.166)	6.382* (3.638)	9.794** (3.594)	9.786*** (2.505)
Air missions	6.649* (3.462)	6.149** (2.538)	6.547* (3.178)	6.701** (2.224)	3.715* (1.880)
Naval/training/generic missions	13.21*** (2.101)	13.41*** (1.607)	12.50*** (1.911)	8.173*** (1.955)	7.291*** (1.237)
Special Forces missions	27.62*** (5.429)	28.34*** (4.778)	25.05*** (4.566)	15.61*** (1.363)	15.00*** (0.756)
US military casualties	-11.56** (3.369)	-10.63** (2.887)	-12.30** (3.356)	-16.34*** (4.303)	-14.88** (4.334)
Civilian casualties	-2.720 (7.646)	-1.849 (8.015)	-3.926 (7.255)	-10.95*** (1.568)	-7.352*** (1.798)
Constant	47.12*** (4.816)	46.76*** (3.485)	38.97*** (4.783)	39.29*** (4.648)	33.33*** (3.335)
<i>N</i>	1060	1060	1060	1060	1060
adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.152	0.198	0.166	0.392	0.499

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A5: Support for Military Intervention (excluding Iraq and Iraq-related items)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	7.987*				10.83**
	(3.980)				(3.172)
Humanitarian intervention	5.850				11.89***
	(5.226)				(3.148)
Peacekeeping	9.796*				13.96**
	(4.824)				(3.925)
Presidential cues		-4.110			-1.774
		(2.835)			(2.884)
Rally effect		14.89***			12.90***
		(3.618)			(2.678)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			3.736	2.914	0.661
			(5.897)	(5.783)	(4.536)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			5.834	-1.688	-3.898
			(6.724)	(5.618)	(4.082)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				37.60***	37.10***
				(3.147)	(2.541)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				33.25***	34.19***
				(2.876)	(2.341)
ISIS				13.18**	8.838**
				(3.815)	(3.571)
Multilateral	1.703	3.595	3.177	4.899*	2.813
	(2.652)	(2.649)	(3.139)	(2.534)	(2.768)
UN support	8.174*	9.848**	9.254*	11.21**	9.637**
	(4.058)	(4.438)	(5.164)	(4.448)	(3.322)
Air missions	5.203*	4.987**	6.432**	6.793**	2.655
	(2.653)	(1.933)	(2.354)	(2.473)	(2.342)
Naval/training/generic missions	11.78**	8.993***	11.41**	10.58**	7.428**
	(3.966)	(2.393)	(3.349)	(2.983)	(2.395)
Special Forces missions	43.42***	48.68***	45.07***	19.36***	15.62***
	(1.990)	(2.881)	(4.460)	(1.958)	(2.567)
US military casualties	-17.55***	-15.57***	-16.95***	-24.31**	-24.86***
	(3.648)	(3.028)	(3.976)	(7.377)	(5.315)
Civilian casualties	19.68***	23.15***	17.86**	-7.158**	-2.092
	(4.414)	(3.147)	(5.183)	(2.877)	(3.206)
Constant	38.60***	41.32***	39.10***	39.07***	33.26***
	(4.764)	(2.881)	(4.618)	(4.567)	(3.538)
<i>N</i>	626	626	626	626	626
adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.147	0.208	0.119	0.322	0.451

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A6: Support for Military Intervention (excluding Iraq and Iraq-related items, Afghanistan and Afghanistan-related items, before 9/11)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	5.680 (4.333)				6.303** (2.934)
Humanitarian intervention	10.24** (3.770)				11.67*** (2.646)
Peacekeeping	9.695 (6.226)				9.108 (5.809)
Presidential cues		-3.854 (3.171)			-3.030 (3.367)
Rally effect		16.16*** (3.917)			16.51*** (3.808)
Multilateral	4.713 (3.614)	7.302** (2.111)	5.889* (2.965)	5.889* (2.965)	6.287** (2.707)
UN support	10.30** (4.929)	13.45** (4.520)	12.78** (5.057)	12.78** (5.057)	11.16** (4.635)
Air missions	5.570** (2.563)	7.067** (3.136)	7.931** (3.346)	7.931** (3.346)	4.109* (2.172)
Naval/training/generic missions	8.723* (4.577)	6.729* (3.723)	8.079 (5.005)	8.079 (5.005)	7.250** (3.478)
US military casualties	-18.12*** (4.581)	-15.70*** (4.123)	-16.18*** (4.283)	-16.18*** (4.283)	-17.57*** (4.668)
Constant	37.22*** (4.125)	37.50*** (2.913)	40.68*** (3.167)	40.68*** (3.167)	33.59*** (2.927)
<i>N</i>	324	324	324	324	324
adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.185	0.293	0.145	0.145	0.342

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention. Some variables were dropped due to multicollinearity. Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A7: Historical Era versus Availability Heuristic

	(1)	(2)
FPR	2.317 (3.311)	9.227*** (2.175)
Humanitarian intervention	-3.128 (5.398)	9.676** (3.329)
Peacekeeping	1.743 (4.774)	12.31*** (3.176)
Presidential cues	-0.786 (1.946)	-2.300 (2.045)
Rally effect	12.79*** (3.308)	13.51*** (1.980)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01	11.51** (5.242)	
9/12/01 - 12/31/16	12.99** (5.618)	
Saddam Hussein		6.363*** (0.546)
Iraq (pre-9/11)		15.24*** (1.663)
Iraq (post-9/11)		19.87*** (1.799)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)		34.65*** (1.362)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)		30.56*** (1.783)
ISIS		7.045** (2.232)
Saddam Hussein		6.363*** (0.546)
Multilateral	-0.586 (2.269)	3.085* (1.780)
UN support	7.560** (2.970)	11.11*** (2.144)
Air missions	5.144 (3.096)	3.650** (1.764)
Naval/training/generic missions	12.06*** (1.799)	6.841*** (0.994)
Special Forces missions	26.97*** (5.910)	14.79*** (0.650)
US military casualties	-10.95*** (3.016)	-14.58** (4.127)
Civilian casualties	-2.043 (8.465)	-7.141*** (1.848)
Constant	34.91*** (3.892)	32.72*** (2.274)
<i>N</i>	1080	1080
adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.238	0.490

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A8: Before and After the Diffusion of the Internet to the Public (August 6, 1991)

	(1) Before	(2) After
FPR	4.920 (3.615)	6.391* (3.164)
Humanitarian intervention	1.179 (2.623)	1.722 (6.239)
Peacekeeping	-2.632 (4.873)	5.909 (5.048)
Presidential cues	-3.265 (3.127)	-1.844 (2.048)
Rally effect	20.31*** (2.911)	13.05** (3.604)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01	16.25** (3.980)	-2.794 (3.336)
Saddam Hussein	-4.018 (2.879)	15.72** (4.914)
Multilateral	4.617* (2.209)	2.136 (2.434)
UN support	-10.01** (3.252)	11.70*** (3.109)
Air missions	0.621 (6.069)	5.714 (3.433)
Naval/training/generic missions	13.29** (3.440)	8.693*** (1.560)
Special Forces missions	0 (.)	18.37*** (3.358)
US military casualties	-11.08** (4.657)	-8.274* (4.253)
Civilian casualties	0 (.)	3.164 (7.293)
Constant	32.27*** (3.529)	41.94*** (5.200)
<i>N</i>	186	894
adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.500	0.289

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention. Some variables were dropped due to multicollinearity.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A10: Predictors of Support for Military Intervention (1946-2016)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	3.846 (3.883)				9.378*** (2.338)
Humanitarian intervention	-1.716 (5.605)				9.877** (3.096)
Peacekeeping	3.205 (5.117)				12.90*** (3.316)
Presidential cues		-1.021 (2.077)			-2.319 (2.099)
Rally effect		12.17** (3.511)			13.63*** (1.848)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			11.16** (5.352)	4.410 (5.001)	1.958 (3.706)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			11.33** (5.505)	-0.0279 (5.042)	-2.411 (3.525)
Saddam Hussein				2.464* (1.318)	6.163*** (0.682)
Iraq (pre-9/11)				14.69** (4.150)	13.17*** (2.608)
Iraq (post-9/11)				17.16*** (2.973)	22.31*** (2.501)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				38.04*** (3.048)	37.24*** (2.342)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				32.95*** (2.835)	32.71*** (2.288)
ISIS				12.41** (3.700)	9.400** (3.340)
Multilateral	-0.437 (2.017)	0.0732 (2.519)	-0.691 (2.415)	3.495* (2.053)	2.587 (1.928)
UN support	6.827** (2.982)	7.190** (2.841)	6.493** (3.130)	10.03** (3.074)	9.764*** (2.340)
Air missions	6.615* (3.403)	6.147** (2.480)	6.342** (3.108)	6.385** (2.195)	3.618* (1.803)
Naval/training/generic missions	13.57*** (2.063)	13.76*** (1.599)	12.47*** (1.841)	8.080*** (1.892)	7.328*** (1.227)
Special Forces missions	28.21*** (5.370)	28.96*** (4.746)	25.22*** (4.521)	15.52*** (1.321)	15.05*** (0.773)
US military casualties	-11.23** (3.306)	-10.24*** (2.815)	-12.21*** (3.317)	-16.40*** (4.276)	-14.82** (4.283)
Civilian casualties	-2.479 (7.642)	-1.596 (7.984)	-3.738 (7.328)	-10.93*** (1.606)	-7.252*** (1.876)
Constant	46.50*** (4.771)	46.14*** (3.440)	38.55*** (3.984)	38.65*** (3.858)	32.63*** (2.689)
<i>N</i>	1097	1097	1097	1097	1097
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.151	0.201	0.171	0.388	0.500

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A9: Support for Military Intervention (excluding questions asked after intervention has begun)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	1.770 (3.705)				10.09*** (1.833)
Humanitarian intervention	-1.092 (5.338)				11.61*** (2.838)
Peacekeeping	5.057 (5.457)				16.66*** (3.024)
Presidential cues		-3.480 (2.323)			-5.814** (2.551)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			14.00** (4.403)	7.409* (3.896)	2.212 (3.322)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			16.02** (4.714)	5.114 (4.155)	-1.316 (3.468)
Saddam Hussein				5.308*** (0.836)	7.604*** (0.732)
Iraq (pre-9/11)				13.40*** (2.960)	12.95*** (2.744)
Iraq (post-9/11)				15.10*** (3.376)	21.35*** (3.094)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				35.31*** (3.566)	38.32*** (3.181)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				27.72*** (3.390)	32.40*** (3.158)
ISIS				11.54** (3.953)	10.17** (3.818)
Multilateral	-0.113 (2.867)	0.657 (3.514)	0.395 (3.336)	5.073** (2.439)	3.642 (2.400)
UN support	6.903** (3.193)	7.800** (3.187)	7.029** (3.382)	10.02** (3.408)	9.627*** (2.599)
Air missions	5.869** (2.825)	5.546** (2.431)	4.794 (2.849)	5.743** (1.782)	4.018** (1.555)
Naval/training/generic missions	15.20*** (1.853)	14.92*** (1.610)	13.63*** (1.621)	8.747*** (1.856)	8.648*** (1.689)
Special Forces missions	29.98*** (6.319)	29.01*** (4.878)	26.69*** (4.969)	16.26*** (1.679)	15.45*** (0.996)
US military casualties	-9.761** (3.024)	- (2.889)	-10.56** (2.957)	-13.94*** (3.688)	-13.49** (4.045)
Civilian casualties	-1.985 (8.148)	-2.517 (7.493)	-3.290 (7.467)	-8.692*** (1.900)	-7.516*** (1.042)
Constant	44.95*** (5.547)	46.09*** (3.670)	32.39*** (2.941)	32.58*** (2.849)	30.66*** (2.639)
<i>N</i>	904	904	904	904	904
adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.184	0.182	0.227	0.425	0.488

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A11: Predictors of Support for Military Intervention (Fractional Probit)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	0.0844 (0.0971)				0.250*** (0.0616)
Humanitarian intervention	-0.0607 (0.140)				0.260** (0.0804)
Peacekeeping	0.0669 (0.130)				0.344*** (0.0868)
Presidential cues		-0.0390 (0.0535)			-0.0738 (0.0535)
Rally effect		0.308*** (0.0930)			0.360*** (0.0513)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			0.263* (0.151)	0.0823 (0.141)	0.0297 (0.104)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			0.269* (0.154)	-0.0269 (0.140)	-0.0815 (0.0976)
Saddam Hussein				0.0642* (0.0350)	0.160*** (0.0180)
Iraq (pre-9/11)				0.381*** (0.107)	0.344*** (0.0676)
Iraq (post-9/11)				0.441*** (0.0765)	0.583*** (0.0671)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				1.065*** (0.0780)	1.069*** (0.0620)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				0.897*** (0.0730)	0.918*** (0.0623)
ISIS				0.318*** (0.0942)	0.243*** (0.0860)
Multilateral	-0.0143 (0.0522)	-0.00440 (0.0639)	-0.0165 (0.0620)	0.0941* (0.0533)	0.0706 (0.0507)
UN support	0.197** (0.0820)	0.209** (0.0734)	0.175** (0.0866)	0.278*** (0.0839)	0.271*** (0.0625)
Air missions	0.172** (0.0861)	0.155** (0.0633)	0.165** (0.0791)	0.170** (0.0562)	0.0970** (0.0476)
Naval/training/generic missions	0.338*** (0.0517)	0.342*** (0.0407)	0.319*** (0.0464)	0.211*** (0.0490)	0.193*** (0.0322)
Special Forces missions	0.744*** (0.146)	0.764*** (0.129)	0.682*** (0.122)	0.434*** (0.0430)	0.420*** (0.0269)
US military casualties	-0.292*** (0.0842)	-0.268*** (0.0728)	-0.311*** (0.0845)	-0.433*** (0.120)	-0.393** (0.120)
Civilian casualties	-0.0684 (0.196)	-0.0443 (0.204)	-0.0963 (0.186)	-0.290*** (0.0316)	-0.203*** (0.0299)
Constant	-0.0741 (0.119)	-0.0868 (0.0855)	-0.273** (0.119)	-0.268** (0.115)	-0.439*** (0.0832)
<i>N</i>	1080	1080	1080	1080	1080

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A12: Predictors of Support for Military Intervention (Fractional Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	0.136 (0.156)				0.409*** (0.101)
Humanitarian intervention	-0.0965 (0.224)				0.428*** (0.128)
Peacekeeping	0.108 (0.209)				0.558*** (0.140)
Presidential cues		-0.0643 (0.0860)			-0.119 (0.0877)
Rally effect		0.500*** (0.150)			0.585*** (0.0860)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			0.422* (0.242)	0.130 (0.227)	0.0456 (0.167)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			0.430* (0.247)	-0.0447 (0.225)	-0.133 (0.157)
Saddam Hussein				0.103* (0.0562)	0.263*** (0.0289)
Iraq (pre-9/11)				0.614*** (0.174)	0.553*** (0.109)
Iraq (post-9/11)				0.708*** (0.123)	0.939*** (0.108)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				1.752*** (0.125)	1.771*** (0.100)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				1.447*** (0.117)	1.494*** (0.103)
ISIS				0.510*** (0.151)	0.389*** (0.139)
Multilateral	-0.0234 (0.0839)	-0.00746 (0.103)	-0.0270 (0.0996)	0.153* (0.0866)	0.117 (0.0821)
UN support	0.316** (0.133)	0.335** (0.119)	0.280** (0.139)	0.449** (0.136)	0.437*** (0.101)
Air missions	0.275** (0.138)	0.247** (0.101)	0.263** (0.127)	0.273** (0.0902)	0.154** (0.0766)
Naval/training/generic missions	0.541*** (0.0830)	0.551*** (0.0653)	0.511*** (0.0743)	0.341*** (0.0791)	0.312*** (0.0523)
Special Forces missions	1.210*** (0.236)	1.243*** (0.211)	1.111*** (0.200)	0.712*** (0.0716)	0.686*** (0.0449)
US military casualties	-0.469*** (0.136)	-0.432*** (0.117)	-0.500*** (0.136)	-0.698*** (0.198)	-0.636** (0.200)
Civilian casualties	-0.112 (0.317)	-0.0731 (0.331)	-0.156 (0.303)	-0.474*** (0.0519)	-0.333*** (0.0446)
Constant	-0.119 (0.190)	-0.140 (0.137)	-0.437** (0.191)	-0.429** (0.184)	-0.710*** (0.134)
<i>N</i>	1080	1080	1080	1080	1080

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table A13: Predictors of Support for Military Intervention (Beta Regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
FPR	0.146 (0.144)				0.403*** (0.0970)
Humanitarian intervention	-0.0863 (0.213)				0.433*** (0.116)
Peacekeeping	0.118 (0.200)				0.561*** (0.138)
Presidential cues		-0.0714 (0.0905)			-0.117 (0.0949)
Rally effect		0.518*** (0.144)			0.576*** (0.0827)
11/10/89 - 9/11/01			0.427* (0.228)	0.157 (0.219)	0.0668 (0.160)
9/12/01 - 12/31/16			0.430* (0.234)	-0.0393 (0.218)	-0.129 (0.150)
Saddam Hussein				0.0755 (0.0551)	0.250*** (0.0290)
Iraq (pre-9/11)				0.609*** (0.169)	0.550*** (0.107)
Iraq (post-9/11)				0.714*** (0.124)	0.937*** (0.105)
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (post-9/11)				1.670*** (0.125)	1.697*** (0.0995)
Afghanistan only (post-9/11)				1.426*** (0.118)	1.458*** (0.0984)
ISIS				0.523*** (0.150)	0.406*** (0.140)
Multilateral	-0.0249 (0.0786)	-0.00737 (0.0990)	-0.0282 (0.0951)	0.145* (0.0867)	0.112 (0.0819)
UN support	0.306** (0.125)	0.329** (0.111)	0.269** (0.131)	0.437*** (0.130)	0.426*** (0.0963)
Air missions	0.274** (0.131)	0.245** (0.0949)	0.264** (0.122)	0.267** (0.0861)	0.147** (0.0705)
Naval/training/generic missions	0.534*** (0.0843)	0.547*** (0.0633)	0.502*** (0.0742)	0.336*** (0.0789)	0.309*** (0.0522)
Special Forces missions	1.100*** (0.209)	1.148*** (0.200)	1.005*** (0.181)	0.649*** (0.0609)	0.632*** (0.0379)
US military casualties	-0.462** (0.141)	-0.426*** (0.121)	-0.494*** (0.140)	-0.677*** (0.190)	-0.635** (0.205)
Civilian casualties	-0.0987 (0.300)	-0.0587 (0.321)	-0.142 (0.291)	-0.478*** (0.0508)	-0.324*** (0.0547)
Constant	-0.131 (0.183)	-0.150 (0.132)	-0.444** (0.175)	-0.447** (0.175)	-0.722*** (0.126)
Scale constant	2.124*** (0.172)	2.190*** (0.149)	2.138*** (0.187)	2.461*** (0.141)	2.667*** (0.110)
N	1080	1080	1080	1080	1080

Dependent variable: aggregate public support for military intervention.

Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Coding Rules

Use the following questions to code the dependent variable and independent variables. For dummy variables, code as 0 unless otherwise indicated.

1. Intervention support. What is the total percentage expressing approval for the intervention the item describes? Where appropriate, combine strong and moderate approval.
2. Location. In what country/countries does the intervention take place? Use ISO Alpha-2 codes.
3. Principal policy objective (PPO). What is the PPO of the described intervention? Code 1 in *one* of the following categories, based on the intervention objective described in the item: foreign policy restraint (FPR), humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, internal policy change (IPC).
4. Presidential cues. If the question text mentions the current president, code as 1. Mention of the president can be by name (Johnson, Reagan, etc.) or by phrase “the president,” “the administration,” etc. Generic mention of the “United States” does not qualify.
5. "Rally 'round the flag" effect. Has the president already ordered the intervention to commence? Code as 1 if the item refers to an intervention that has already begun.
6. Historical era. In what era is the intervention question posed? If 1/1/1946-11/9/1989, code 1 for “Cold War.” If 11/10/1989-9/11/2001, code 1 for “early post-Cold War.” If 9/12/2002-12/31/2016, code 1 for “Post-9/11.”
7. Saddam Hussein. Code as 1 if the item mentions Saddam Hussein after August 2, 1990.
8. Iraq. Code as 1 if the item describes intervening against Iraq between August 2, 1990 and April 19, 2003.
9. al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Code as 1 if the item mentions al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan subsequent to September 11, 2001.
10. Afghanistan. Code as 1 if the item describes intervening in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001.

11. ISIS. Code as 1 if the item mentions the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or ISIS, ISIL, or simply “Islamic State”) since August 2014.
12. United Nations approval. Does the item describe the intervention as carrying out a United Nations resolution? If so, code as 1.
13. Multilateral. Does the item mention other countries participating in the intervention? If so, code as 1.
14. Mission type. What kind of intervention (Ground, Air missions, etc.) does the item describe? Code 1 in *one* of the following categories, based on whether the item refers to Ground operations, Air missions operations, naval operations, special operations, training of local forces, or unspecified operations, e.g., generic “use of force.”
15. US military casualties. Does the item mention possible deaths of US service military personnel? Code as 1 if the item refers to US casualties in any form or gives specific numbers.
16. Civilian casualties. Does the item mention possible deaths of non-US civilians? If so, code “Civilian Casualties” as 1.