Table A 1: Data matrix for STRCMA – most recent (national and comparative sources)

Country	L	Arbitration A			Score L & A	Mediation M			Conciliation C			Capabilities CA					Score M, C, CA	Qualitative calibration
	Link	Co	Vo	Bi	Fuzzy calibration	Co	Vo	Bi	Co	Vo	Bi	Notice	Exten	Cool	New	Aims	Fuzzy calibration	Fuzzy-score CMA
DE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0.16	0.16
AT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.32	0.32
CH	0	0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0.64	0.64
NL	0	0	0	0.2	0.2	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.16	0.2
BE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.8	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.68	0.68
LU	0	0	0.6	0	0.6	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.68	0.68
FR	0	0	0.4	0	0.4	0	0.4	0.4	0	0.2	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0.32	0.4
IT	0	0	0.6	0	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.68	0.68
EL	0	0.8	0	0	0.8	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.36	0.8
PT	0	0.8	0.6	0	0.8	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.64	0.8
ES	0	0	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.64	1
GB	0	0	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.2	0.2	0	0.2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0.16	0.2
IE	0	0	0.4	0	0.4	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.32	0.4
SE	0	0	0	0	0	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.76	0.76
DK	1	0	0	0	1	0.8	0.4	0	0.6	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.8	1
FI	0	0	0	0	0	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.72	0.72
NO	0	1	0	0	1	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.72	1

Co = Compulsory Statutory; Vo = Voluntary Statutory; Bi = Bilateral arrangements (typically voluntary by default as agreement on arrangement can be broken) – bargaining coverage considered; Notice = Notice obligation before industrial action; Exten = Extension of period for mediation and conciliation

before industrial action; Cool = Cool-down period; New = New mediation/conciliation during industrial action; Aims = Independent aims for mediation/arbitration or based on aims of parties; L = linkage of different bargaining areas into a single decision.

Calibration of CMA provisions is based on six-level fuzzy scores. Cell indicates max fuzzy score for CMA provisions – qualitative judgment of scores based on existence of arbitration, mediation and conciliation and their capabilities based on country analysis/reports (see sources).

Fuzzy-set score is found by the union of scores for arbitration (L+A) OR mediation/conciliation with capabilities (M+C). This way the strongest link prevails in the score. Finally, the qualitative calibration adjusts for 'dead letter' institutions and the actual practice of CMA based on qualitative national resources.

Sources for CMA calibration: Comparative overview: (EIRO, 2006; Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003; Jacobs, 1993b). National sources: Germany (Dribbush and Stettes, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Zachert, 2003), Austria (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Marhold, 2003; Strohmer, 2006), Switzerland (Jacobs, 1993a; Fluder and Hotz-Hart, 1998), Netherlands (de Roo, 2003b; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; van het Kaar, 2006), Belgium (Chaidron, 2006; Delattre, 2003; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), Luxembourg (de Roo, 2003a; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), France (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jeammaud, 2003; Pernot and Vincent, 2006), Italy (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Grandi, 2003; Senatori, 2006), Greece (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Karkioulafis, 2006; Yannakourou and Koukoules, 2003), Portugal (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Monteiro Fernandes, 2003), Spain (Amorós, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Rodríguez Fernández, 2003), Great Britain (Dickens, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kilpatrick, 2003), Ireland (Dobbins, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kerr, 2003), Sweden (Berg, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Eriksson, 2003; Stokke, 2002), Denmark (Due et al., 1993; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jørgensen, 2006; Kristiansen, 2003), Finland (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kuusisto, 2006; Salonius, 2003) and Norway (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Stokke, 1998; Stokke, 2002; Stokke, 2006).

Notes on the calibration:

Fuzzy-set score is found by the union of scores for arbitration (L+A) OR mediation/conciliation with capabilities (M, C and CA). This way the strongest link prevails in the score. Arbitration is the stronger form and should give high membership score in Strong CMA, i.e. above 0.5. However, voluntary arbitration is just above 0.5 as parties can always decline. Mediation is stronger than conciliation due to the possibility of proposed settlement by mediator. Compulsory mediation is a strong intervention 0.8 as it will force parties to consider a settlement beyond their immediate control. Voluntary mediation is however weak (0.4) as parties can turn it down. Conciliation is the weaker form but when it's compulsory it is still a member of strong CMA (0.6). Depending on capabilities, this can change upwards or downwards.

The capabilities to require notice, extend, cool down, new mediation round and when it is biased should increase set-membership but only with a maximum of 0.2 and a minimum of 0. M, C, CA is found as the average of MIN of M and C (weight 4/5) + Capabilities (weight 1/5).

Table A 2: Data matrix for LGOVCAP – averages for two decades preceding and following important CMA-reform (Visser, 2015)

Country	CENT (average)	Cfveto (average)	Unveto (average)	Centralisation score	Wcoord (average)	fscentralisa	fswcoord	Fuzzy-score LGOVCAP
DE	0.433	0	2	0.46	3.6	0.81	0.16	0.59
AT	0.964	2	2	0.98	5	0	0.02	0.01
CH	0.329	0	1.6	0.35	3.57	0.92	0.17	0.67
NL	0.539	1.2	2	0.63	3.88	0.4	0.11	0.3
BE	0.494	1	1	0.50	4	0.74	0.1	0.53
LU	0.337	1	1	0.39	2	0.89	0.82	0.87
FR	0.227	0	0	0.15	2.15	0.99	0.74	0.91
IT	0.358	0.85	0.85	0.38	2.9	0.9	0.35	0.72
EL	0.331	0	0	0.22	4	0.98	0.1	0.69
PT	0.306	0	0	0.20	3.2	0.98	0.26	0.74
ES	0.3	1	0	0.28	2.65	0.96	0.44	0.79
GB	0.372	0	0	0.25	3.15	0.97	0.27	0.74
IE	0.5	0.65	0	0.39	4.8	0.89	0.03	0.6
SE	0.517	1.65	2	0.65	3.8	0.32	0.12	0.25
DK	0.6	0	0	0.40	5	0.88	0.02	0.59
FI	0.427	1	1	0.45	4.3	0.82	0.06	0.57
NO	0.649	2	2	0.77	4.8	0.08	0.03	0.06
						Thresholds: 0.3; 0.6; 0.8	Thresholds: 1.5; 2.5; 4.5	fscentralisa/fswcoord: 2/3

CENT: Summary measure of centralisation of wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple levels (derived from Iversen's centralisation index). (0–1) = given by $\sqrt{[(\text{Cfauthority}*\text{DEME}*\text{Hcf}) + (\text{Affauthority}*\text{DEMI}*\text{Haff})]}$, weighting the degree of authority or vertical coordination in the union movement with the degree of external and internal unity, and union concentration or horizontal coordination, taking into account multiple levels at which bargaining can take place and assuming a non-zero division of union authority over different levels (Visser, 2011a). Taking the square root serves to magnify the differences at the low end of this scale (cf. Iversen, 1999: 53).

Weighted with Cfveto (confederate veto on strike decisions) and Unveto (federate veto on strike decisions at company level). Weight in Centralisation score: CENT = 2/3, Cfveto+Unveto: 1/3.

Wcoord: 5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central organisations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling. 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organisations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers' associations set pattern for the entire economy. 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organisations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining. 2 = mixed or alternating industry- and firm-level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements. 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level (Visser, 2011a).

Fuzzy scores for each measure are calibrated using thresholds: [0.8; 0.6; 0.3] for Centralisation and [4.5; 2.5; 1.5] for Wcoord. Composite score 'fscentralisa/fswcoord' is calculated with a 2/3 weight to fscentralisation.

Table A 3: Data matrix for STRUN – averages for two decades preceding and following important CMA-reform (Visser, 2016)

Country	Bargaining coverage	Union density	Calibration of Bargaining coverage	Calibration of Union density	Fuzzy-score STRUN
DE	80	33.78	0.89	0.28	0.74
AT	95	64	0.97	0.97	0.97
CH	46.78	21.91	0.35	0.06	0.28
NL	76.62	26.51	0.86	0.12	0.68
BE	80	38.53	0.89	0.45	0.78
LU	60	43.67	0.61	0.63	0.62
FR	75.2	17.05	0.85	0.03	0.65
IT	78.5	36.37	0.88	0.37	0.75
EL	85	34.31	0.93	0.3	0.77
PT	73.87	37.62	0.83	0.41	0.73
ES	85.29	15.14	0.93	0.02	0.7
GB	40.59	32.45	0.25	0.24	0.25
IE	30.5	31.14	0.14	0.21	0.16
SE	89	78.7	0.95	1	0.96
DK	67.5	57.56	0.74	0.93	0.79
FI	76.75	70.68	0.87	0.99	0.9
NO	65	59.52	0.7	0.95	0.76
			Thresholds: 90; 55; 15	Thresholds: 60; 40; 20	Weight coverage 3/4 Weight density 1/4

AdjCov: Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, adjusted (0–100) = employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in employment) (Visser, 2011a).

CovPriv: Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, private or market sector (0–100) = employees in the private or market sector covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment in the private or market sector (Visser, 2011a).

Thresholds for fscov: [90; 55; 15]. UD: Union Density rate, net union membership as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment (Visser, 2011a).

UDpriv: Union Density rate, net union membership as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in private employment (where available) (Visser, 2011a). Calibration of 'fsdensity' using thresholds: [60; 40; 20]. Weight coverage vs. density: 3/4 vs. 1/4

Table A 4: Data matrix for LREGIND – most recent (national and comparative sources)

Country	bloc-kade	boy-cott	go slow	work to rule	pick-eting	poli-tical	sympathy	warning	Immunity system	Actions composite score	Peace	<10 days = 1	Ballot	Procedural rules score	Fuzzy-score REGIND
DE	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.5	1	-	0.44	1	0	1	0.67	0.61
AT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	1	1.5	0	0	0.5	0.63
CH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	1	2	0	0	0.67	0.75
NL	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	-	0.5	1	0	1	0.67	0.63
BE	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	1	0	-	0.69	0	0	0	0	0.17
LU	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	-	0.63	1	0	0	0.33	0.41
FR	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	-	0.88	0	0	0	0	0.22
IT	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.5	0	-	0.69	0.5	0	0	0.17	0.30
EL	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	-	0.63	0	0	0	0	0.16
PT	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	-	0.5	0	0.8	0	0.27	0.33
ES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	-	0.94	0	0.8	0	0.27	0.43
GB	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.67	0	1	1	0.67	0.67
IE	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0.44	0	0.8	1	0.6	0.56
SE	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	-	0.38	0.6	0.8	0	0.47	0.44
DK	1	1	0	0	1	0.5	1	0	-	0.44	0.8	1	1	0.93	0.81
FI	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	-	0.38	1	1	0	0.67	0.59
NO	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	-	0.25	1	0.8	1	0.93	0.76
															Weight procedural rules score: 3/4

Note high score = restrictive. 'Action composite score': unweighted average. 'Procedural rules score': unweighted average. 'fsregulaction': weighted average score of 'action composite score' and 'procedural rules score'. 'Procedural rules score': weight 3/4.

Sources for calibration of regulation of engaging in industrial action: Comparative overview: (Warneck, 2007). National sources: Germany (Dribbush and Stettes, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Zachert, 2003), Austria (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Marhold, 2003; Strohmer, 2006), Switzerland (Jacobs, 1993a; Fluder and Hotz-Hart, 1998), Netherlands (de Roo, 2003b; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; van het Kaar, 2006), Belgium (Chaidron, 2006; Delattre, 2003; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), Luxembourg (de Roo, 2003a; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), France (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jeammaud, 2003; Pernot and Vincent, 2006), Italy (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Grandi, 2003; Senatori, 2006), Greece (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Karkioulafis, 2006; Yannakourou and Koukoules, 2003), Portugal (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Monteiro Fernandes, 2003), Spain (Amorós, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Rodríguez Fernández, 2003), Great Britain (Dickens, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kilpatrick, 2003), Ireland (Dobbins, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kerr, 2003), Sweden (Berg, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Eriksson, 2003; Stokke, 2002), Denmark (Due et al., 1993; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jørgensen, 2006; Kristiansen, 2003), Finland (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kuusisto, 2006; Salonius, 2003) and Norway (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Stokke, 1998; Stokke, 2002; Stokke, 2006).

Table A 5: Data matrix for CIVCOURT – most recent (national and comparative sources)

	No specialised labour court	No lay judges	Fuzzy score
DE	0.2	0.2	0
AT	1	0.2	0.8
CH	0.4	0.2	0.2
NL	1	0	1
BE	0.6	0.2	0.4
LU	0.2	0	0.2
FR	0.2	0.2	0
IT	0.6	0	0.6
EL	1	0	1
PT	0.8	0	0.8
ES	0.6	0	0.6
GB	0.2	0.2	0
IE	0.2	0.2	0
SE	0.2	0.2	0
DK	0.2	0.2	0
FI	0.2	0.2	0
NO	0.2	0.2	0

Calibration: 1 = no specialised court; 0.6 = Integrated; 0 = Yes, specialised

Judges: 0.2 = Lay judges; 0 = No lay judge (added to the court score)

Sources for calibration of court system: Sources for CMA calibration: Comparative overview: (EIRO, 2013; EALCJ, 2013). National sources: Germany (Dribbush and Stettes, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Zachert, 2003), Austria (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Marhold, 2003; Strohmer, 2006), Switzerland (Jacobs, 1993a; Fluder and Hotz-Hart, 1998), Netherlands (de Roo, 2003b; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; van het Kaar, 2006), Belgium (Chaidron, 2006;

Delattre, 2003; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), Luxembourg (de Roo, 2003a; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), France (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jeammaud, 2003; Pernot and Vincent, 2006), Italy (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Grandi, 2003; Senatori, 2006), Greece (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Karkioulafis, 2006; Yannakourou and Koukoules, 2003), Portugal (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Monteiro Fernandes, 2003), Spain (Amorós, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Rodríguez Fernández, 2003), Great Britain (Dickens, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kilpatrick, 2003), Ireland (Dobbins, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kerr, 2003), Sweden (Berg, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Eriksson, 2003; Stokke, 2002), Denmark (Due et al., 1993; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jørgensen, 2006; Kristiansen, 2003), Finland (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kuusisto, 2006; Salonius, 2003) and Norway (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Stokke, 1998; Stokke, 2002; Stokke, 2006).

Table A 6: Decade for Most Recent Reforms and Data Used

	Decade for Most Recent Reform	**Data Used for LGOVCAP & STRUN**
DE	1950s	1960s
AT	1970s	1960s-1970s
CH	N/A (Bilateral Agreements)	1960s-2010s
NL	N/A (Bilateral Agreements)	1960s-2010s
BE	1960s	1960s
LU	1960s	1990s (closest decade with data)
FR	1980s	1970s-1980s
IT	1990s/2000s	1990s-2000s
EL	1990s	1980s-1990s
PT	1990s	1980s-1990s
ES	1990s	1980s-1990s
GB	1980s-1990s	1980s-1990s
IE	1990s/2000s (dating back to 1940s)	1990s-2000s
SE	2000s (dating back to 1930s)	1990s-2000s
DK	1930s (dating back 1910s)	1960s (closest decade with data)
FI	1990s (dating back to 1960s)	1980s-1990s
NO	1910s	1960s (closest decade with data)

Table A 7: Thresholds for calibration

Outcome	Fully out of set	Neither in nor out	Fully in	Calibration Procedure
Strong CMA (STRCMA)	If no CMA exist at all.	If countries have voluntary mediation together with medium strong capabilities	If countries have compulsory arbitration or non-voluntary mediation with maximum strong capabilities	*Qualitative assessment of formal procedures and capabilities for conciliation, mediation or arbitration*
Conditions	**Fully out of set**	**Neither in nor out**	**Fully in**	
Low Governance Capacity (LGOVCAP)	Wage coordination (scale from 1 to 5): 4.5 is considered fully out of the set of uncoordinated union movements Centralisation (scale from 0-1): 0.8 or over is considered fully out of the set of highly fragmented union movements. Veto powers included.	Wage coordination (scale from 1 to 5): 2.5 is considered neither in or out of the set of uncoordinated union movements Centralisation (scale from 0-1): 0.6 is considered neither in or out of the set of fragmented union movements. Veto powers included. Full fuzziness is determined by a gap in the countries' scores (as proposed by Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 37)	Wage coordination (scale from 1 to 5): Under 1.5 is considered fully in the set of uncoordinated union movements Centralisation (scale from 0-1): Under 0.3 is considered fully in the set of fragmented union movements. Veto powers included.	*Based on weighted average centralisation of trade union movement and degree of wage coordination* *Direct method of calibration using the three qualitative anchors and then a weighted average of these two fuzzy-set scores.* *Centralization is closest to Elvander's hypothesis, so I weigh centralization 2/3 and wage coordination 1/3 since centralization is measured with ascending formal hierarchical powers, whereas coordination is based on bargaining practices. Elvander focused on structure and governance, so I also consider whether higher levels have veto power over lower level decisions, e.g. to go on strike.*
Strong Unions (STRUN)	15 % coverage based on the distribution of coverage among countries. Below this point, only a few pockets of the economy are covered and the most important ones – e.g. manufacturing –	55 % coverage is the 0.5 threshold for bargaining coverage which is the middle point between one of the largest gaps in the distribution (between	90 % coverage based on distribution of coverage among countries. Above this point unions control the regulatory process for the labour market and only certain smaller	*Based on union density and bargaining coverage* *Direct method of calibration using the three qualitative anchors and then weighted average of the fuzzy-set scores.* *The key issue for unions is bargaining coverage and I weigh this ¾ as compared to union density at ¼. With bargaining coverage, unions can 'punch above their*

	will not be covered fully, even in the hypothetical event that all of manufacturing was covered. 20 % density based on the distribution of density in Europe. Under this point, unions without statutory help will be too weak to have any real impact, e.g. UK.	Ireland 49.9 % and Luxembourg 59.4 %). 40 % union density is the 0.5 threshold for union density. Distribution of union members will in the case of 40 % density become piecemeal in some industries, thus making the overall union movement weak. This threshold is consistent with empirical studies of collective bargaining (e.g. Crouch, 1993; Traxler, 2004.	pockets that are less relevant are left out. 60 % union density in a country constitutes a very strong union movement in which the union can comfortably claim to be representative of the labour market across industries.	*weight' and can do so for many years despite lack of members.*
Lax Regulation of Industrial Action (LREGIND)	If procedural restrictions are all absent and all types of actions are allowed.	If procedural rules are weak but many types of actions are allowed. Or if procedural rules are medium strong by most types are disallowed	If procedural restrictions are all present and all types of action are disallowed.	*Qualitative assessment of formal regulation of different types of procedural restrictions on industrial action and on different types of actions (blockade; boycott; go slow; work to rule; picketing; political; sympathy; warning)*
Normal Civil Court System in Labour Matters (CIVCOURT)	If specialised labour court with lay judges	If integrated court system with no clear appointment of judges	If normal civil court without lay judges	*Qualitative assessment of prevalence of different court systems and presence of lay judges*

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