Appendix A: Country selection

Country	Type of Democracy	Populist Party	Orientation	Period
Austria	Consensus	FPÖ	Right-wing	1949-now[a]
		BZÖ	Right-wing	2006-2013
		TS	Right-wing	2013-2017
		Liste Pilz	Left-wing	2017-now
Belgium	Consensus	VB	Right-wing	1978-now
		FN	Right-wing	1991-2010
		PvdA/PTB	Left-wing	2014-now
Denmark	Unitary	FrP	Right-wing	1973-2001
		DFp	Right-wing	1998-now
		FK	Left-wing	1987-1988
Finland	Unitary	PS	Right-wing	1966-now
France	Majoritarian	FN	Right-wing	1986-1993; 1997-2002; 2012-now
Germany	Consensus	DL	Left-wing	1991-now
		AfD	Right-wing	2017-now
Greece	Majoritarian	SYRIZA	Left-wing	2004-now
		LAOS	Right-wing	2007-2012
		ANEL	Right-wing	2012-now
Iceland	Unitary	-		
Ireland	Unitary	SF	Left-wing	1957-1961; 1997-now
		AAA-PBP	Left-wing	2016-now
Italy	Unitary	M5S	Centrist	2013-now
		FI	Right-wing	1994-now
		LN	Right-wing	1992-now
Luxembourg	Unitary	ADR	Right-wing	1989-now
Malta	Majoritarian	-		
Netherlands	Consensus	CP	Right-wing	1982-1986
		CD	Right-wing	1989-1998
		SP	Left-wing	1994-now
		LN	Centrist	2002-2003
		LPF	Right-wing	2002-2006
		PVV	Right-wing	2006-now
		FvD	Right-wing	2017-now
Norway	Unitary	FrP	Right-wing	1973-1977; 1981-now
Portugal	Unitary	-		
Spain	Federal	Podemos	Left-wing	2015-now
Sweden	Unitary	ND	Right-wing	1991-1994
		SD	Right-wing	2010-now
Switzerland	Consensus	APS/FPS	Right-wing	1991-1999
		SVP	Right-wing	1971-now [a]
		LdT	Right-wing	1991-now
United Kingdom	Majoritarian	UKIP	Right-wing	2015-2017
		SF [b]	Left-wing	1955-1959; 1983-1987; 1997-now

Adapted from Otjes and Louwerse (2015) and Lijphart (1999) with recent additions

[a] Not right-wing populist the entire period

[b] Absentionist

Appendix B: Alternative Model Specifications

The specific choice of indicators for our two dimensions leaves some room for debate, as with most scaling exercises. The Scrutiny dimension includes an indicator of parliamentary voting on government bills. Some observers might object that this is not truly a form of parliamentary activity comparable to asking written or oral questions. While we disagree with such a view, we re-ran the analysis without this indicator (see Table B1). The results are similar to the model presented in Table 4, but, importantly, the coefficient for Populism slightly decreases in size, while its standard error increases, resulting in a lower level of significance ($p = .07$).

The Policy-Making dimension contains the number of initiatives as one of its components. This variable correlates relatively weakly with the other two variables included in this dimension. If we exclude Initiatives Cronbach's alpha increases from 0.63 to 0.82. When using this alternative dimension, we find a similar effect of populism on policy-making (see Table A1) as in the main analysis. The effect of populism remains negative and significant ($p < .001$).

The Policy-Making dimension also contains the number of Motions as a component. One could argue that this is a relatively 'inexpensive' tool compared to initiating a bill or proposing an amendment. Therefore, populist parties might introduce many motions but do not really use any of the more time-consuming instruments. If we exclude Motions from the 'Policy-Making' scale, we find an effect of Populism (b = -0.80) is comparable in size to the original model (b = -0.66) and remains statistically significant ($p < .01$). The effect of populism is not weakened by the inclusion of motions in the policy-making dimension.

Table B1: Alternative Regression Models of Opposition Activity

	Scrutiny without Voting	**Policy-Making without Initiatives**	**Policy-Making without Motions**
Intercept	1.71	4.25***	3.26***
	(1.28)	(0.51)	(0.49)
Populism	0.31	-0.72***	-0.80**
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Party Size (log)	-0.81	-1.22***	-0.26
	(0.43)	(0.33)	(0.42)
Government History	0.73	-0.53	-0.69
	(1.34)	(0.99)	(1.06)
L-R Distance to Government	0.49*	-0.08	-0.23
	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.21)
Trend	0.16**	0.27***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R^2	0.39	0.64	0.37
Adj. R^2	0.31	0.59	0.29
Num. obs.	42	42	42

Ordinary Least Squares Regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05