**Supplementary Appendix**

**Table A1. Question Wording 2011 CCES & CCES Module**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Question Wording | Short Title | Coding |
| Which of these pictures best represents your relationship with the following group: Military Veterans? (see Figure 1) | Military Fusion | 5=fused; 1/4=non-fused |
| Which of these pictures best represents your relationship with the following group: The Tea Party? | Tea Party Fusion | 5=fused; 1/4=non-fused |
| Which of these pictures best represents your relationship with the following group: Religious Group? | Religious Fusion | 5=fused; 1/4=non-fused |
| Which of these pictures best represents your relationship with the following group: Unions? | Union Fusion | 5=fused; 1/4=non-fused |
| Do you think it was a mistake to invade Iraq? | Iraq mistake | 1= not a mistake; 0= otherwise |
| Do you think it was a mistake to invade Afghanistan? | Afghanistan mistake | 1= not a mistake; 0= otherwise |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to ensure the supply of oil? | Ensure Oil | 1=yes; 0= no |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to destroy a terrorist camp? | Destroy Camp | 1=yes; 0= no |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to protect American allies under attack by foreign nations? | Protect US Allies | 1=yes; 0= no |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to stop a civil war or genocide? | Intervene | 1=yes; 0= no |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to assist the spread of democracy? | Spread Dem | 1=yes; 0= no |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to Help the United Nations uphold international law? | Uphold Int’l Law | 1=yes; 0= no |
| Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to \_\_\_\_\_?  Answer = none of the above | No Aid | 1=yes; 0= no |
| I would like whether you or someone in my immediate family is currently serving or has ever served in the U.S. military. Immediate family is defined as my parents, siblings, spouse and children. | Military Service; Family Served | 1= veteran or currently serving, 0= otherwise;  1= family serving/served, 0= otherwise; |
| Thinking about politics these day, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? | Ideology | 1=very liberal, 2=liberal, 3=moderate, 4=conservative, 5=very conservative |
| Combined questions, including: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a…? | Dem; Rep | 1=Democrat; 1=Republican collapsed from 7-point scale |
| What racial or ethnic group best describes you? | Black | 1=Black or African American, 0=all other respondents |
| Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent? | Hispanic | 1=Hispanic, 0=not Hispanic |
| In what year were you born? | Age | In years |
| Are you male or female? | Gender | 1=Female, 0=Male |
| What is the highest level of education you have completed? | Education | 1=No HS, 2=HS, 3=some college, 4=2-year degree, 5=4-year degree 6=postgraduate |
| Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income? | Income | 1=<$10,000, 2=$10,000-19,999, 3=$20,000-29,999, 4=$30,000-$39,999, 5=$40,000-$49,999, 6=$50,000-$59,999, 7=$60,000-$69,999, 8=$70,000-$79,999, 9=$80,000-$99,999, 10=$100,000-$119,000, 11=$120,000-$149,999, 12=$150,000-$199,999, 13=$200,000-$249,999, 14=$250,000-$349,999, 15=$350,000-$499,999, 16=$500,000 or more |
| Region | South | 1=South, 0=other region |

**Table A2. Who is Psychologically Attached to Military Veterans?**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Military | 1.46\*\* |
| Service | (0.33) |
|  |  |
| Family | 0.65\*\* |
| Served | (0.25) |
|  |  |
| Ideology | 0.76 |
|  | (0.51) |
|  |  |
| Democrat | -0.23 |
|  | (0.37) |
|  |  |
| Republican | -0.20 |
|  | (0.35) |
|  |  |
| Age | 2.82\*\* |
|  | (0.53) |
|  |  |
| Education | -0.87\* |
|  | (0.40) |
|  |  |
| Income | -0.31 |
|  | (0.54) |
|  |  |
| Black | -0.14 |
|  | (0.45) |
|  |  |
| Hispanic | -0.60 |
|  | (0.52) |
|  |  |
| South | 0.06 |
|  | (0.23) |
|  |  |
| \_cons | -2.51\*\* |
|  | (0.61) |
| N | 900 |
| Pseudo R2  AIC | .19  859.76 |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

Table A3 shows the correlation coefficients for all of the main variables within the models. It is key to point out that neither party identification (*r =* .10), nor ideology (*r =* .14) correlate strongly with military fusion.

**Table A3. Correlation Coefficients for Main Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| 1 | Military Fusion | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | Family served | .18\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | Military Service | 0.33\* | -.03 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | Ideology | .14\* | .05 | .13\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Democrat | -0.07 | -.03 | -.12\* | -.56\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | Republican | .12\* | .04 | .14\* | .56\* | -.78\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | Black | -.06 | -.04 | -.05 | -.07 | .29\* | -.25\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8 | Hispanic | -.09\* | -.06 | -.08 | -.02 | .08 | -.04 | -.1\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | Age | .34\* | .23\* | .19\* | .12\* | .02 | .07 | -.04 | -.13\* | 1 |  |  |  |
| 10 | Gender | -.06 | .15\* | -.37\* | -.15\* | .15\* | -.17\* | .15\* | -.01 | .02 | 1 |  |  |
| 11 | Education | -.06 | -.02 | .08\* | -.08 | -.04 | .1\* | -.15 | -.06 | -.03 | -.3 | 1 |  |
| 12 | Income | .03 | .09\* | .11\* | .09\* | -.11 | .21\* | -.15\* | -.05 | .12 | -.2\* | .43\* | 1 |
|  | N | 992 | 1000 | 1000 | 919 | 969 | 969 | 996 | 996 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |  |

Note: \* p <.01

To further investigate the substantive effect of our main models, an anonymous reviewer recommended that we report the difference of the main effects among liberals and conservatives. An ideology dummy variable was created, dropping individuals who responded with “moderate,” thus focusing on individuals identifying as either liberal or conservative. Figure A2 shows the differences among fused and non-fused individuals across the four main dependent variables among conservatives and liberals. In general, conservatives are more willing to send troops to these military interventions (and less likely to think the Iraq war was a mistake). The interaction models in Table A4 show that the only significant interaction is in Model 3, or support for sending troops to destroy a terrorist camp. Here, while fused liberals increase their support (in comparison to non-fused individuals), fused conservatives decrease their support. However, conservative individuals are still overall more likely to send troops to destroy a terrorist camp. While these interactions demonstrate that liberals are typically less likely to want to send troops into military conflicts, they also show that being fused to military veterans yields distinct attitudes. Those fused, compared to non-fused are much more willing to send troops into conflict or to support the reputation of the military.

**Figure A1. Predicted Probabilities of Military Interventions for Fused and Non-Fused Respondents Among Liberals and Conservatives**



**Table A4. Interaction between Identity Fusion and Ideology for Main Military Interventions**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|  | **Iraq Mistake** | **Ensure**  **Oil** | **Destroy**  **Camp** | **Protect Ally** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Military Fusion | -0.85 | 1.33\* | 0.95\* | 0.35 |
|  | (0.58) | (0.66) | (0.47) | (0.55) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Conservative | -1.33\* | 1.93\*\* | 1.30\*\* | 1.20\* |
| Dummy | (0.61) | (0.56) | (0.50) | (0.55) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Fusion X Con. | 0.14 | -0.84 | -1.39\* | -0.09 |
| Dummy | (0.67) | (0.70) | (0.63) | (0.71) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Family | -0.10 | 0.19 | 0.41 | 0.15 |
| Served | (0.34) | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.29) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Military | -0.71\* | 0.74\* | 0.46 | -0.12 |
| Service | (0.35) | (0.36) | (0.42) | (0.41) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | -0.05 | 1.32\* | 0.81 | 0.40 |
|  | (0.73) | (0.65) | (0.72) | (0.84) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | -1.41\* | 1.48\*\* | 1.11 | 0.75 |
|  | (0.56) | (0.53) | (0.65) | (0.74) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.28 | 0.04 | -0.10 | -0.19 |
|  | (0.79) | (0.60) | (0.54) | (0.52) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | 0.30 | -1.24\* | -0.06 | -1.13\* |
|  | (0.59) | (0.58) | (0.42) | (0.50) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.45 | -0.87 | 0.02 | -2.45\*\* |
|  | (0.75) | (0.69) | (0.68) | (0.65) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | -0.09 | -0.00 | -0.24 | -0.45 |
|  | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.34) | (0.30) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.13 | 1.11\* | 0.37 | 0.98 |
|  | (0.63) | (0.51) | (0.57) | (0.64) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | -0.08 | -0.26 | 1.42 | -0.57 |
|  | (0.88) | (0.70) | (0.76) | (0.79) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| South | 0.36 | 0.10 | 0.44 | 0.19 |
|  | (0.30) | (0.28) | (0.27) | (0.34) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 2.12\* | -4.50\*\* | -1.79\* | 0.99 |
|  | (0.89) | (0.86) | (0.84) | (0.91) |
| *N* | 631 | 631 | 631 | 631 |
| Pseudo R2  AIC | .245  509.81 | .157  468.38 | .128  514.29 | .123  451.63 |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

While we are unable to account for whether identity fusion is a proxy or an outgrowth of excessive nationalism, this next test looks to see whether the fusion to a group in general causes specific attitudes on foreign interventions. We do not expect that fusion to other groups, such as the Tea Party or religious groups to have coherent attitudes towards these interventions. Table A5 shows the results of our models for individuals who are fused to the Tea Party and Table A6 shows the results for fusion to a religious group and Table A7 for fusion to unions. Individuals are similarly fused if they select the fifth category on the Swann et al. (2009) pictorial scale, but in regards to these respective groups. We are limited to these three groups as they are the only other fused groups within the survey.

In looking at the fusion variable (Tea Party fusion, Religious Fusion, Union fusion), for Tables A5-A7, group attachment alone does not consistently predict attitudes towards foreign interventions. Rather, fusion to military veteran, in particular, due to the nature of the group, results in specific attitudes towards foreign interventions. Those fused to the military have a psychological attachment to the military and thus look out for the group, whether that is in terms of a physical threat or a psychological threat to that group.

As another test to show that identity fusion to military veterans is distinct from nationalism, we added a model which incorporates both fusion to military veterans and fusion to the Tea Party. The rationale here is that fusion to the Tea Party better reaches ethnocentrism than military veterans. The results show that fusion the military veterans remains a significant predictor in a majority of the military interventions that threaten the group, even after controlling for Tea Party fusion and a host of demographic and political controls (Table A8). Protecting an ally remains significant, but at the p<.1 level; all other models remain significant at p<.05.

**Table A5. Fusion to the Tea Party and Attitudes towards Foreign Interventions**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  | **Iraq Mistake** | **Ensure**  **Oil** | **Destroy**  **Camp** | **Protect Ally** | **Intervene** | **Spread Dem.** | **Uphold Int’l law** | **No Aid** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tea Party | -1.23\* | -0.13 | -0.37 | 1.01\* | 0.20 | -0.34 | -0.37 | -0.55 |
| Fusion | (0.53) | (0.34) | (0.45) | (0.49) | (0.39) | (0.46) | (0.41) | (0.80) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family | -0.03 | 0.10 | 0.38 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.26 |
| Served | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.24) | (0.44) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Military | -0.62\* | 0.60\* | 0.65 | -0.08 | 0.00 | 0.21 | -0.26 | 0.21 |
| Service | (0.29) | (0.30) | (0.34) | (0.39) | (0.29) | (0.33) | (0.28) | (0.68) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideology | -0.43\* | 0.35\* | 0.44\*\* | 0.50\*\* | -0.20 | 0.27 | -0.43\*\* | -0.14 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.13) | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.41 | 0.21 | 0.85\* | 0.75 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.71 | -0.67 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.46) | (0.38) | (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.58) | (0.38) | (0.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | -1.11\* | 0.78 | 1.08\*\* | 0.52 | -0.02 | 0.55 | -0.15 | -0.83 |
|  | (0.44) | (0.44) | (0.39) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.60) | (0.38) | (0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.44 | 0.24 | -0.51 | -1.29\*\* | -0.23 | 0.68 | -0.64 | 1.64\*\* |
|  | (0.46) | (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.36) | (0.37) | (0.44) | (0.39) | (0.49) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | 0.55 | -0.69 | -0.34 | -0.85 | -0.56 | 0.43 | 0.19 | 0.58 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.57) | (0.37) | (0.46) | (0.40) | (0.65) | (0.49) | (0.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.50 | -0.17 | -0.36 | -1.72\*\* | -1.19\* | -0.69 | -1.40\*\* | 0.19 |
|  | (0.61) | (0.51) | (0.54) | (0.52) | (0.49) | (0.58) | (0.51) | (0.73) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | -0.13 | -0.11 | -0.28 | -0.76\*\* | -0.39 | 0.01 | -0.39 | 1.56\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.27) | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.22) | (0.29) | (0.25) | (0.51) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.11 | 0.40 | 0.93 | 1.03\* | 0.68 | -0.12 | 0.73 | -2.77\*\* |
|  | (0.44) | (0.40) | (0.50) | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.55) | (0.41) | (0.82) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.60 | -0.78 | 0.85 | 0.07 | 0.45 | -0.83 | -0.54 | 0.22 |
|  | (0.60) | (0.55) | (0.65) | (0.58) | (0.54) | (0.71) | (0.55) | (0.93) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South | 0.27 | 0.15 | 0.22 | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.23 | 0.06 | -0.56 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.41) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.88\* | -2.67\*\* | -1.83\* | 0.46 | 0.61 | -2.60\*\* | 2.15\*\* | -3.55\*\* |
|  | (0.87) | (0.85) | (0.74) | (0.78) | (0.74) | (0.89) | (0.73) | (1.20) |
| *N* | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 |
| Pseudo R2  AIC | .19  925.01 | .07  864.33 | .11  921.42 | .12  814.52 | .05  1064.88 | .04  704.34 | .12  1014.34 | .2  352.94 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

**Table A6. Fusion to Religious Groups and Attitudes towards Foreign Interventions**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  | **Iraq Mistake** | **Ensure**  **Oil** | **Destroy**  **Camp** | **Protect Ally** | **Intervene** | **Spread Dem.** | **Uphold Int’l law** | **No Aid** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Religion | -0.03 | 0.59\* | 0.08 | -0.09 | -0.34 | 0.16 | -0.01 | -0.35 |
| Fusion | (0.29) | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.22) | (0.39) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family | -0.05 | 0.12 | 0.39 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.21 |
| Served | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.24) | (0.44) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Military | -0.77\* | 0.54 | 0.59 | -0.02 | 0.05 | 0.14 | -0.31 | 0.22 |
| Service | (0.31) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.38) | (0.30) | (0.34) | (0.28) | (0.68) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideology | -0.47\*\* | 0.32\* | 0.47\*\* | 0.55\*\* | -0.18 | 0.27 | -0.44\*\* | -0.22 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.34) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.33 | 0.05 | 0.84\* | 0.83\* | 0.39 | 0.25 | 0.70 | -0.70 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.40) | (0.40) | (0.58) | (0.38) | (0.62) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | -1.21\*\* | 0.59 | 1.03\*\* | 0.60 | 0.08 | 0.48 | -0.17 | -0.96 |
|  | (0.45) | (0.43) | (0.39) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.60) | (0.38) | (0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.39 | 0.25 | -0.52 | -1.27\*\* | -0.24 | 0.70 | -0.64 | 1.65\*\* |
|  | (0.47) | (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.37) | (0.38) | (0.44) | (0.39) | (0.51) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | 0.52 | -0.56 | -0.35 | -0.83 | -0.67 | 0.45 | 0.22 | 0.54 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.56) | (0.37) | (0.46) | (0.40) | (0.65) | (0.49) | (0.60) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.57 | -0.31 | -0.35 | -1.72\*\* | -1.09\* | -0.68 | -1.39\*\* | 0.34 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.51) | (0.54) | (0.52) | (0.50) | (0.58) | (0.51) | (0.75) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | -0.21 | -0.10 | -0.26 | -0.71\*\* | -0.36 | -0.00 | -0.39 | 1.41\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.28) | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.25) | (0.50) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.37 | 0.22 | 0.88 | 0.90\* | 0.69 | -0.16 | 0.76 | -2.16\*\* |
|  | (0.45) | (0.41) | (0.49) | (0.45) | (0.39) | (0.55) | (0.41) | (0.72) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.44 | -0.65 | 0.92 | 0.20 | 0.51 | -0.80 | -0.56 | -0.30 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.55) | (0.65) | (0.58) | (0.54) | (0.72) | (0.55) | (0.87) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.07 | -0.02 | 0.21 | 0.04 | -0.50 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.23) | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.40) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 2.06\* | -2.51\*\* | -1.93\*\* | 0.28 | 0.50 | -2.58\*\* | 2.17\*\* | -3.10\*\* |
|  | (0.87) | (0.83) | (0.72) | (0.77) | (0.74) | (0.89) | (0.73) | (1.07) |
| *N* | 901 | 901 | 901 | 901 | 901 | 901 | 901 | 901 |
| Pseudo. *R*2  AIC | .18  938.47 | .08  857.59 | .11  918.25 | .11  818.23 | .05  1064.38 | .03  704.48 | .12  1016.94 | .19  342.68 |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

**Table A7. Fusion to Unions and Attitudes towards Foreign Interventions**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  | **Iraq Mistake** | **Ensure**  **Oil** | **Destroy**  **Camp** | **Protect Ally** | **Intervene** | **Spread Dem.** | **Uphold Int’l law** | **No Aid** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union | 1.16 | -0.21 | 0.45 | 0.03 | 0.20 | -0.01 | -0.36 | -0.28 |
| Fusion | (0.62) | (0.60) | (0.43) | (0.47) | (0.44) | (0.74) | (0.44) | (0.81) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.38 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.28 |
| Served | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.24) | (0.43) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Military | -0.66\* | 0.57 | 0.63 | -0.04 | 0.04 | 0.17 | -0.34 | 0.17 |
| Service | (0.31) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.38) | (0.30) | (0.33) | (0.28) | (0.64) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideology | -0.46\* | 0.33\* | 0.44\*\* | 0.54\*\* | -0.20 | 0.25 | -0.45\*\* | -0.15 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.37) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.78\* | 0.80\* | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.75\* | -0.65 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.47) | (0.38) | (0.39) | (0.40) | (0.59) | (0.38) | (0.59) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | -1.25\*\* | 0.78 | 1.02\*\* | 0.55 | 0.01 | 0.53 | -0.15 | -0.88 |
|  | (0.43) | (0.43) | (0.38) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.60) | (0.38) | (0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.46 | 0.25 | -0.54 | -1.25\*\* | -0.24 | 0.71 | -0.62 | 1.64\*\* |
|  | (0.49) | (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.37) | (0.37) | (0.44) | (0.39) | (0.53) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | 0.65 | -0.68 | -0.31 | -0.87 | -0.56 | 0.46 | 0.21 | 0.59 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.56) | (0.38) | (0.46) | (0.40) | (0.65) | (0.49) | (0.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.42 | -0.16 | -0.41 | -1.70\*\* | -1.22\* | -0.70 | -1.36\*\* | 0.19 |
|  | (0.60) | (0.52) | (0.53) | (0.53) | (0.50) | (0.61) | (0.51) | (0.71) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | -0.06 | -0.11 | -0.25 | -0.77\*\* | -0.36 | -0.02 | -0.45 | 1.51\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.27) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.25) | (0.47) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.45 | 0.33 | 1.08\* | 1.03\* | 0.68 | -0.09 | 0.69 | -2.79\*\* |
|  | (0.46) | (0.42) | (0.50) | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.51) | (0.41) | (0.82) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.39 | -0.66 | 0.71 | 0.08 | 0.47 | -0.83 | -0.52 | 0.21 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.56) | (0.64) | (0.58) | (0.54) | (0.65) | (0.55) | (0.95) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South | 0.30 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.22 | 0.03 | -0.59 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.29) | (0.23) | (0.40) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.72\* | -2.56\*\* | -1.91\* | 0.37 | 0.56 | -2.53\*\* | 2.29\*\* | -3.44\*\* |
|  | (0.82) | (0.82) | (0.75) | (0.81) | (0.74) | (0.89) | (0.72) | (1.26) |
| *N* | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 | 902 |
| Pseudo R2  AIC | .188  927.61 | .067  867.85 | .107  923.48 | .113  823.13 | .047  1068.21 | .035  702.87 | .121  1014.81 | .2  419.7 |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

**Table A8. Military Interventions with Military Fusion and Tea Party Fusion**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|  | Iraq  Mistake | Afghanistan  Mistake | Ensure  Oil | Destroy  Camp | Protect  Ally | Intervene | Spread  Dem. | Uphold Int’l  law | No Aid | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Military | -0.62\*\* | -0.30 | 0.66\* | 0.75\*\* | 0.56 | 0.40 | 0.63\* | -0.13 | -0.88 | |
| Fusion | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.27) | (0.27) | (0.29) | (0.24) | (0.30) | (0.26) | (0.49) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Tea Party | -1.05 | -0.43 | -0.39 | -0.63 | 0.89 | 0.05 | -0.59 | -0.34 | -0.45 | |
| Fusion | (0.55) | (0.46) | (0.37) | (0.44) | (0.53) | (0.38) | (0.47) | (0.41) | (0.90) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Family | 0.01 | -0.34 | 0.09 | 0.36 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.07 | -0.02 | 0.25 | |
| Served | (0.26) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.22) | (0.31) | (0.24) | (0.42) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Military | -0.49 | -0.67\* | 0.45 | 0.44 | -0.26 | -0.09 | 0.05 | -0.20 | 0.47 | |
| Service | (0.30) | (0.33) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.40) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.29) | (0.67) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Ideology | -1.77\* | -1.20\* | 1.47\* | 1.76\*\* | 1.99\*\* | -0.81 | 1.14 | -1.71\*\* | -0.51 | |
|  | (0.75) | (0.61) | (0.59) | (0.59) | (0.67) | (0.51) | (0.66) | (0.54) | (1.37) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Democrat | 0.26 | -0.51 | 0.49 | 1.03\*\* | 0.86\* | 0.49 | 0.66 | 0.64 | -0.80 | |
|  | (0.49) | (0.40) | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.66) | (0.39) | (0.59) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Republican | -1.26\*\* | -0.89\* | 1.04\* | 1.25\*\* | 0.62 | 0.09 | 0.89 | -0.22 | -0.98 | |
|  | (0.46) | (0.40) | (0.44) | (0.40) | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.68) | (0.38) | (0.54) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Black | -0.49 | -0.04 | 0.24 | -0.51 | -1.31\*\* | -0.25 | 0.68 | -0.65 | 1.66\*\* | |
|  | (0.47) | (0.38) | (0.41) | (0.37) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.45) | (0.39) | (0.47) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Hispanic | 0.49 | 0.26 | -0.62 | -0.29 | -0.83 | -0.53 | 0.50 | 0.17 | 0.56 | |
|  | (0.47) | (0.39) | (0.57) | (0.38) | (0.45) | (0.40) | (0.66) | (0.49) | (0.59) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Age | 0.88 | 1.48\*\* | -0.57 | -0.75 | -2.03\*\* | -1.45\*\* | -1.11 | -1.35\*\* | 0.78 | |
|  | (0.62) | (0.57) | (0.54) | (0.55) | (0.54) | (0.50) | (0.60) | (0.52) | (0.79) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Gender | -0.11 | -0.03 | -0.18 | -0.37 | -0.84\*\* | -0.42 | -0.09 | -0.35 | 1.69\*\* | |
|  | (0.27) | (0.24) | (0.28) | (0.26) | (0.28) | (0.23) | (0.30) | (0.25) | (0.50) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Education | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.54 | 1.09\* | 1.16\* | 0.76 | -0.00 | 0.68 | -3.01\*\* | |
|  | (0.45) | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.49) | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.57) | (0.41) | (0.84) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Income | 0.54 | -1.03 | -0.80 | 0.93 | 0.07 | 0.49 | -0.84 | -0.53 | 0.16 | |
|  | (0.62) | (0.54) | (0.56) | (0.63) | (0.58) | (0.55) | (0.75) | (0.55) | (0.93) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| South | 0.27 | -0.39 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.14 | -0.03 | 0.24 | 0.05 | -0.60 | |
|  | (0.26) | (0.24) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.39) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| \_cons | 1.53\* | 1.04 | -2.77\*\* | -1.91\*\* | 0.10 | -0.13 | -2.76\*\* | 1.40\* | -2.02\* | |
|  | (0.70) | (0.54) | (0.65) | (0.55) | (0.58) | (0.59) | (0.76) | (0.54) | (0.85) | |
| *N* | 895 | 892 | 895 | 895 | 895 | 895 | 895 | 895 | 895 | |
| Pseudo *R*2  AIC | .199  908.34 | .081  1011.12 | .083  843 | .124  899.98 | .129  802.12 | .055  1051.44 | .048  686.1 | .121  1008.83 | .216  347.28 | |

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

Three additional robustness test were performed. Here we looked to break up some of the key components of our model to test the strength of our identity fusion measure. In the first test, we look to see whether our results hold for individuals who identify as fused to military veterans, but are not themselves objectively members of the military. The second test looks to see whether there are any significant differences between non-fused and fused peopled who both have veteran family members. The third test looks to see whether our results hold when we eliminate identity fusion and only use family service to predict our main dependent variables.

The results for the first test can be seen in Table A9. Here, the analysis was restricted to individuals who were not members of the military. While the results do not perfectly mirror the results of our main model (Tables 1 & 2) those non-military members who are similarly fused to military veterans are still less likely to think the Iraq war was a mistake (Table A9, Model 1), more likely to protect an ally under attack (Table A9, Model 3) and more likely to send troops to ensure the supply oil (Table A9, Model 4). There were, however, two military interventions that the non-military fused members differed on compared to the entire sample. Here, military fusion no longer predicts sending troops to ensure the supply of oil, but it does predict increased support for sending troops to spread democracy.

**Table A9. Logistic Regression Models of Military Interventions, Restricted to Non-military Members**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  | **Iraq Mistake** | **Ensure**  **Oil** | **Destroy**  **Camp** | **Protect Ally** | **Intervene** | **Spread Dem.** | **Uphold Int’l law** | **No Aid** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Military | -0.69\*\* | 0.55 | 0.60\* | 0.64\* | 0.44 | 0.83\* | -0.30 | -0.71 |
| Fusion | (0.26) | (0.31) | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.27) | (0.34) | (0.29) | (0.53) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family | -0.16 | -0.09 | 0.35 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.14 | -0.10 | 0.09 |
| Served | (0.30) | (0.29) | (0.29) | (0.28) | (0.25) | (0.37) | (0.27) | (0.43) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.50 | 0.01 | -0.49 | -1.45\*\* | -0.25 | 0.63 | -0.72 | 1.47\*\* |
|  | (0.55) | (0.46) | (0.40) | (0.40) | (0.41) | (0.49) | (0.43) | (0.51) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | 0.52 | -0.71 | -0.37 | -0.90 | -0.72 | 0.25 | 0.06 | 0.40 |
|  | (0.50) | (0.61) | (0.40) | (0.47) | (0.41) | (0.81) | (0.49) | (0.60) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.52 | 0.34 | 1.16\*\* | 1.10\* | 0.39 | 0.70 | 0.83 | -0.86 |
|  | (0.53) | (0.52) | (0.42) | (0.44) | (0.45) | (0.69) | (0.43) | (0.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | -0.94 | 0.80 | 1.33\*\* | 0.76 | 0.08 | 0.67 | 0.06 | -1.13\* |
|  | (0.50) | (0.49) | (0.43) | (0.45) | (0.47) | (0.73) | (0.42) | (0.55) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideology | -1.51 | 1.24 | 1.83\*\* | 1.90\*\* | -1.00 | 1.42 | -1.79\*\* | -0.44 |
|  | (0.80) | (0.64) | (0.62) | (0.73) | (0.55) | (0.74) | (0.57) | (1.39) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 1.12 | -0.32 | -0.38 | -2.13\*\* | -1.51\*\* | -1.89\*\* | -1.03 | 0.41 |
|  | (0.69) | (0.64) | (0.60) | (0.60) | (0.57) | (0.73) | (0.57) | (0.86) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | -0.14 | -0.19 | -0.36 | -0.85\*\* | -0.43 | -0.09 | -0.31 | 1.93\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.30) | (0.27) | (0.30) | (0.24) | (0.33) | (0.26) | (0.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.07 | 0.47 | 1.17\* | 1.11\* | 0.76 | 0.25 | 0.36 | -2.79\*\* |
|  | (0.52) | (0.48) | (0.53) | (0.47) | (0.43) | (0.67) | (0.44) | (0.84) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.62 | -1.28 | 0.62 | 0.35 | 0.90 | -1.02 | -0.52 | 0.31 |
|  | (0.74) | (0.66) | (0.67) | (0.64) | (0.61) | (0.92) | (0.59) | (0.97) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South | 0.09 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.10 | -0.07 | 0.34 | 0.10 | -0.74 |
|  | (0.27) | (0.26) | (0.27) | (0.27) | (0.25) | (0.34) | (0.25) | (0.42) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.17 | -2.22\*\* | -2.09\*\* | 0.03 | -0.08 | -2.77\*\* | 1.32\* | -2.00\* |
|  | (0.71) | (0.69) | (0.59) | (0.62) | (0.66) | (0.82) | (0.58) | (0.85) |
| *N* | 736 | 736 | 736 | 736 | 736 | 736 | 736 | 736 |
| adj. *R*2  AIC | .147  782.45 | .055  673.03 | .107  785.7 | .132  678.01 | .067  858.21 | .062  550.97 | .105  848.98 | .196  314.55 |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

To accomplish the second robustness test, to see whether there are any significant differences between non-fused and fused peopled who both have veteran family members, two methods were implemented. First, logistic regression was run to see if there were any noticeable differences in the demographics predicting fused individuals with veteran family members (Figure A3) compared to non-fused individuals with family members (Figure A2). For this test, two dummy variables were created signifying whether an individual had veteran family members and additionally, whether they were fused or not. Below are two coefficient plots, showing the main demographic predictors of these two dummy variables. The only notable differences between those non-fused individuals with veteran family members (n=353) and those fused individuals with veteran family members (n=252), is that the for later category, age seems to be a significant predictor. Additionally, women are more likely to be non-fused individuals w/veteran family members. We do not read too much into these differences and find that for the most part, they are not significantly different from one another. As a second test, or perhaps a clearer test, a logistic regression was run predicting military fusion, but only among a subset of the sample, or those with veteran family members (Table A10). Here again, we see that age is the only significant predictor. We conclude that beyond age and to some extent gender, there are no significant differences between non-fused and fused individuals with veteran family members.

**Figure A2. Logistic Regression Coefficient Plot of Non-Fused Individuals with Veteran Family Members**



**Figure A3. Logistic Regression Coefficient Plot of Fused Individuals with Veteran Family Members**



**Table A10. Logistic Regression of Demographics Predicting Military Fusion - Among Individuals with Veteran Family Members**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | Military Fusion |
|  |  |
| Democrat | -0.82 |
|  | (0.48) |
|  |  |
| Republican | -0.83 |
|  | (0.48) |
|  |  |
| Ideology | 1.28 |
|  | (0.72) |
|  |  |
| Black | -0.31 |
|  | (0.49) |
|  |  |
| Hispanic | -1.21 |
|  | (0.74) |
|  |  |
| Age | 3.36\*\* |
|  | (0.64) |
|  |  |
| Gender | -0.35 |
|  | (0.25) |
|  |  |
| Education | -0.86 |
|  | (0.47) |
|  |  |
| Income | 0.67 |
|  | (0.63) |
|  |  |
| South | 0.22 |
|  | (0.28) |
|  |  |
| \_cons | -1.61\* |
|  | (0.75) |
| *N* | 558 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | .134 |

Source 2011 CCES

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

Lastly, we looked to see whether having a family member who served in the military predicts the main military interventions. Here, we have taken out the identity fusion variable and find that having physical proximity, through family membership in the military, is not enough to have strong attitudes on military interventions.

In conclusion, we find that these three robustness checks support our theory. Starting with the third test, it shows that having family members who have served is not a strong predictor of support for or against military interventions. The second test (Figures A2, A3 and Table A10), shows that the only major difference between fused and non-fused individuals with family veterans is age. This is not all surprising as we found earlier that fused individuals were significantly older than non-fused individuals (see Figure 2). Lastly, when we restrict the test to individuals who are fused, but not objectively members of the military (Table A11) our results largely hold. This is in some sense, an extremely difficult test to pass as we would expect objective members to be a main component of the fused individuals. However, it shows that even those who are not an objective member of the military still hold largely similar attitudes as the entire sample of fused individuals.

**Table A11. Logistic Regression Models of Military Interventions, Excluding Identity Fusion**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  | **Iraq Mistake** | **Ensure**  **Oil** | **Destroy**  **Camp** | **Protect Ally** | **Intervene** | **Spread Dem.** | **Uphold Int’l law** | **No Aid** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family | -0.02 | 0.08 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.05 | -0.00 | 0.26 |
| Service | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.24) | (0.43) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideology | -1.81\* | 1.37\* | 1.81\*\* | 2.06\*\* | -0.78 | 1.07 | -1.80\*\* | -0.45 |
|  | (0.71) | (0.57) | (0.57) | (0.67) | (0.50) | (0.62) | (0.53) | (1.33) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.35 | 0.16 | 0.83\* | 0.80\* | 0.35 | 0.28 | 0.71 | -0.68 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.45) | (0.39) | (0.40) | (0.39) | (0.58) | (0.38) | (0.60) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | -1.21\*\* | 0.78 | 1.04\*\* | 0.56 | 0.01 | 0.53 | -0.17 | -0.88 |
|  | (0.43) | (0.43) | (0.39) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.60) | (0.38) | (0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.44 | 0.28 | -0.48 | -1.26\*\* | -0.23 | 0.71 | -0.65 | 1.64\*\* |
|  | (0.46) | (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.37) | (0.37) | (0.44) | (0.39) | (0.50) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | 0.56 | -0.75 | -0.40 | -0.80 | -0.61 | 0.41 | 0.24 | 0.50 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.57) | (0.37) | (0.46) | (0.40) | (0.65) | (0.49) | (0.57) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.28 | 0.10 | -0.15 | -1.74\*\* | -1.16\* | -0.61 | -1.52\*\* | 0.23 |
|  | (0.62) | (0.49) | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.49) | (0.60) | (0.49) | (0.73) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | 0.06 | -0.28 | -0.46\* | -0.76\*\* | -0.38 | -0.06 | -0.32 | 1.51\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.21) | (0.27) | (0.23) | (0.52) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.16 | 0.42 | 1.05\* | 0.99\* | 0.65 | -0.08 | 0.72 | -2.67\*\* |
|  | (0.45) | (0.39) | (0.51) | (0.47) | (0.39) | (0.55) | (0.41) | (0.81) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.64 | -0.75 | 0.72 | 0.07 | 0.49 | -0.86 | -0.53 | 0.13 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.54) | (0.67) | (0.58) | (0.54) | (0.71) | (0.55) | (0.92) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 0.04 | -0.59 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.41) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.20 | -2.30\*\* | -1.58\*\* | 0.20 | -0.00 | -2.30\*\* | 1.32\* | -2.15\* |
|  | (0.63) | (0.62) | (0.54) | (0.57) | (0.56) | (0.71) | (0.53) | (0.86) |
| *N* | 907 | 907 | 907 | 907 | 907 | 907 | 907 | 907 |
| adj. *R*2  AIC | .162  955.12 | .059  873.56 | .10  930.07 | .111  823.65 | .046  1068.77 | .033  702.93 | .119  1016.38 | .195  350.95 |

Note: Values are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All values scale from 0-1. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01