

Supplemental Appendices for Daniel Druckman and Lynn Wagner, “Justice Matters: Peace Negotiations, Stable Agreements, and Durable Peace,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

Supplemental Appendix 1

Civil War Peace Agreement Variables Organized by Conflict Stage

Study	Stage	Antecedent	Negotiation Process	Negotiated Outcome	Post-Settlement Consequences
Walter 2002		Battle deaths; Duration of conflict; Rebels’ goals; Parties’ territorial goals; Military stalemate	Mediation*	Third-party guarantees and power-sharing pacts (credible commitments)	Third-party security guarantees enhance demobilization process Power-sharing guarantees in first postwar government enhance PA implementation
Fortna 2008				Ceasefire agreement is reached with or without peacekeeping provisions	Cases with peacekeeping are 75-85% less likely to slide back into civil war (measured based on duration of absence of war).
Hartzell and Hoddie 2008				Provisions to share or divide state power across economic, military, political, and territorial dimensions	Greatest potential for enduring peace if agreement requires former adversaries to share or divide authority across as many dimensions of state power as possible.
Toft 2009				Military victory, not negotiations that conclude with an outcome, especially victory by rebels, lends itself to a more durable peace.	Where the security sector (military and police) remains robust, stability and democracy are likely to follow.
Mattes and Savun 2009				Fear-reducing provisions such as third-party guarantees and power-sharing; cost-increasing provisions such as the separation of forces	Cost-increasing provisions reduce the chance of civil war recurrence. Political power-sharing is the most promising fear-reducing provision
Joshi and Quinn 2015; Joshi et al 2015		Length and intensity of civil war; Source of conflict – territory or government policies; infant mortality; GDP per capita; Population size; Democratic government.	Mediation*	Number of reforms and number of policy domains across which peace agreement provisions fall	When agreements contain provisions across a greater number of policy areas, the conflict actors are less likely to pursue another agreement and armed conflict is more likely to not return (measured five years after agreement)
Druckman and Wagner – current study		Conflict environment – external (disposable resources, hostile neighboring states, and major power involvement) and internal (months of violence, average number of deaths per	PJ measured based on transparency, fair play and fair treatment, fair representation, and voluntary agreement.	DJ measured based on equality, proportionality, compensation and need. Type of agreement	SA assessed based on absence of violence (measured five years after agreement) DP assessed based on extent of reconciliation, security and governance institutions, and economic growth (measured eight years after agreement)

	month, and number of internally displaced persons). Region Decade	News coverage Length of negotiation Mediation		
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* These studies consider whether mediation occurred. They did not analyze mediation as part of the negotiation dynamics.

Supplemental Appendix 2

Peace Agreements

Country	Date Signed	Peace Agreement	Comprehensive or Partial?	PKO?
Sri Lanka	July 26, 1957	Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact	Partial	
Cyprus	March 4, 1964	Security Council Resolution 196: The Cyprus Question	Partial	Yes
Nagaland – India	November 11, 1975	Shillong Agreement between the Government of India and the Underground Nagas	Partial	
Namibia	July 12, 1978	Western Contact Group (WCG) Settlement Proposal	Partial	Yes
Mozambique	October 3, 1984	Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict	Partial	
Uganda	December 17, 1985	Uganda Peace Talks Agreement for the Restoration of Peace to the Sovereign State of the Republic of Uganda	Comprehensive	
Colombia	March 2, 1986	Acuerdo de Prolongacion de la Tregua	Partial	
Philippines	January 4, 1987	Jeddah Accord	Partial	
Nicaragua	March 23, 1988	Acuerdo de Sapoá	Partial	
Tripura - India	August 12, 1988	Memorandum of Understanding with the Tripura National Volunteers	Comprehensive	
Angola	June 22, 1989	Gbadolite Declaration on Angola	Comprehensive	Yes
Lebanon	October 22, 1989	Ta'if Accords	Comprehensive	Yes
Papua New Guinea	March 1, 1990	Agreement to end hostilities on Bougainville	Partial	
Yemen	April 22, 1990	Agreement Establishing a Union between the State of the Yemen Arab Republic and the State of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	Partial	
Liberia	February 13, 1991	Lomé Agreement	Partial	Yes
Slovenia	July 12, 1991	Brioni Agreement	Partial	
Cambodia	October 23, 1991	Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict	Comprehensive	Yes
El Salvador	January 16, 1992	Chapultepec Peace Agreement	Comprehensive	Yes
Mali	April 11, 1992	National Pact	Comprehensive	
Mozambique	October 4, 1992	General Peace Agreement for Mozambique	Comprehensive	Yes
Haiti	July 3, 1993	Governor's Island Agreement	Partial	Yes
Rwanda	August 4, 1993	Arusha Accord	Comprehensive	Yes
South Africa	November 17, 1993	Interim Constitution Accord	Comprehensive	Yes
Niger	April 15, 1995	Agreement establishing permanent peace between the government of Niger and ORA	Comprehensive	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	November 21, 1995	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Comprehensive	Yes
Philippines	September 2, 1996	Mindanao Final Agreement	Comprehensive	
Guatemala	December 29, 1996	Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace	Comprehensive	Yes
Tajikistan	June 27, 1997	General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	Comprehensive	Yes
Bangladesh	December 2, 1997	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord CHT	Comprehensive	

Somali warlords	December 22, 1997	The Cairo Declaration on Somalia	Partial	
United Kingdom	April 10, 1998	Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement	Comprehensive	
Guinea-Bissau	November 1, 1998	Abuja Peace Agreement	Comprehensive	Yes
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	May 5, 1999	Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor	Comprehensive	Yes
Kosovo	June 3, 1999	Kosovo Peace Agreement	Partial	Yes
Sierra Leone	July 7, 1999	Lome Peace Agreement	Comprehensive	Yes
Congo	December 29, 1999	Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo	Comprehensive	
Burundi	August 28, 2000	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	Comprehensive	Yes
Djibouti	May 12, 2001	Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord	Comprehensive	
Philippines	June 22, 2001	Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	Partial	
Macedonia	August 13, 2001	Ohrid Agreement	Comprehensive	
Papua New Guinea	August 30, 2001	Bougainville Peace Agreement	Comprehensive	Yes
Colombia	January 20, 2002	Los Pozos Accord	Partial	
Angola	April 4, 2002	Luena Memorandum of Understanding	Comprehensive	
DR Congo	April 19, 2002	Political Agreement on consensual management of the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Partial	Yes
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	January 25, 2003	Linah-Marcoussis Peace Accords	Partial	Yes
Liberia	August 18, 2003	Accra Peace Agreement	Comprehensive	Yes
Sudan	January 9, 2005	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Comprehensive	Yes
Senegal	December 30, 2004	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC	Comprehensive	
Indonesia	August 15, 2005	MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement	Comprehensive	
Somali Government (TFG)/ARS	August 19, 2008	Djibouti Agreement	Partial	Yes

Supplemental Appendix 3

Variables, Coding Procedures, Case Examples and Reliabilities

Variables	Coding Process	Reliability
Procedural Justice (PJ)	<p>Primary and secondary accounts of the negotiations were evaluated to identify instances in which four procedural justice elements played a role in the negotiations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparency • Fair Representation • Fair Treatment, Fair Play • Voluntary Agreement <p>If any of these PJ variables played a partially or fully “satisfied” role in the negotiation process, the variable was assessed for whether it had a “highly significant,” “important” or “marginal” influence on the process. Satisfied variables were those instances in which the justice component had a positive influence on the talks.</p> <p>Highly significant instances of PJ were assigned “3,” important instances of PJ were assigned “2,” and marginal instances of PJ were assigned “1.”</p> <p>For each of the four PJ variables, we add the relevant scores and develop an average for that PJ variable. We add these average per-PJ-variable scores to develop a “PJ sat” index.</p> <p>Case example: Burundi 2000¹</p> <p>Fair Representation: A concerted effort was made for these talks to be fully inclusive. “Nyerere insisted that instead of talking only to UPRONA and FRODEBU [warring parties], all political parties, however small, should be involved” (Bentley & Southall 2005:63). Mandela tried to bring in all factions, and even though he was not completely successful, the “very fact that he did make considerable efforts to include them was extremely important in enhancing the legitimacy of the subsequent Accord” (Bentley & Southall 2005, 73-74).² In the end, the Arusha Agreement was signed by 13 of the 19 delegations. Coded as <i>partially satisfied/important</i></p> <p>Fair Play: Nyerere “was conscientious in listening to all the different parties at the talks, consistently sought compromises” (Bentley & Southall 2005, 68); Mandela’s “even-handedness and hands-on approach” earned him the “reputation of being a tough, but fair, negotiator from the beginning of the involvement” (Bentley & Southall 2005, 72). Coded as <i>partially satisfied/Important</i></p> <p>Voluntary Agreement: “Mandela borrowed directly from the South African negotiation process by utilizing the notion of ‘sufficient consensus’...as a necessary device for making progress” (Bentley & Southall 2005, 76). Coded as <i>partially satisfied/Important</i></p> <p>Transparency: “In a diplomatic context, this was a huge gamble as there was no guarantee that all parties would sign the agreement. Many Burundian leaders were uncertain about what they were signing [just hours before the final signing ceremony]. But nobody says ‘no’ to Mandela and no one was going to tell him that Burundi did not want the agreement.” (Bushoff et al 2010:17).³ Coded as <i>not satisfied</i></p>	<p>A second coder reviewed the procedural data for 19 randomly selected cases and developed independent coding assessments. Their assessments matched 87.8% of the primary coder’s assessments.</p> <p>The calibration procedure concluded with a discussion about the codes for which their assessments differed, and adjustments to the coding based on the discussion.</p>
Distributive Justice (DJ)	<p>Each article of the negotiated peace agreement was assessed for whether it represents one or more of four DJ principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equality 	<p>A second coder reviewed the peace agreements for a set of randomly selected cases to calibrate the</p>

¹ For many other examples, see the coding sheets for each variable on all cases, available from the authors. The coding decisions made and the sources used for each case are also available from the authors.

² Bentley, K.A. and Southall, R. (2005). *An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council.

³ Boshoff, H., Vrey, W. and Rautenbach, G. (2010). *The Burundi peace process: from civil war to conditional peace*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportionality (Equity) • Compensatory Justice • Need <p>Taking into account all articles that represented each DJ principle, the coder assessed whether each DJ principle was:</p> <p>1.5 (highly significant);</p> <p>1.25 (between highly significant and important);</p> <p>1 (important);</p> <p>.75 (between important and marginal); or</p> <p>.5 (marginal).</p> <p>The intervals between the highly significant, important and marginal codes are proportional to the intervals between the codes for the comparable PJ measures. However, our practice coding with the DJ measure suggested that we could make finer distinctions. Thus, two additional categories were added to the coding scheme.</p> <p>The final DJ score is an aggregate value of the four DJ principles. It ranges from 0 (no principle is mentioned in the agreement) to 8 (each principle is highly significant).</p> <p>Case example: From the Uganda Peace Talks Agreement for the Restoration of Peace to the Sovereign State of the Republic of Uganda, December 1985</p> <p>Equality: The new national army shall be broad based and representative of the country as a whole; Representatives from national conference to be drawn from all districts as well as all national institutions, political parties, religious groups and the military council. Coded as <i>highly significant</i></p> <p>Proportionality: A military council will be composed of representatives of the combatant forces and the head of state as follows: (a) head of state/chairman, military council 1 seat (b) Uganda national liberation army (MNLA) 7 (c) national resistance army (NRA) 7 seats (d) Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) 1 (e) Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU) 2 seats (f) former Uganda national army (FUNA) 1 seat (g) Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) 1 seat; new national force, composed of soldiers from all the combatant forces nominated by the respective combatant forces in the following numbers: UNLA 3,700 soldiers NRA 3,580 soldiers FEDEMU UFM FUNA 1,200 soldiers resulting in a UNRF total of 8,480 soldiers; The military council shall ensure a balance between the combatant forces represented on the military council existing immediately prior to the signing of the agreement and the national resistance movement in the distribution of responsibilities in the ministry of defense and the armed forces. Coded as <i>highly significant</i></p> <p>Need: As a matter of priority, a program for resettlement of those men and women back into civilian life. Coded <i>between important and marginal</i>.</p> <p>Compensatory Justice: Establishment and formulation of the terms of reference of a commission of inquiry into violation of human rights in Uganda since independence. Coded as <i>marginal</i></p>	<p>coding. Inter-coder agreement on determining which, if any, DJ principle an article in the peace agreement represented was 84.8%.</p> <p>The calibration procedure concluded with a discussion about differences in assessments and adjustments to the coding based on the discussion.</p>
Stable Agreement (SA)	<p>SA is assessed, drawing from the UCDP⁴ dataset regarding whether the peace agreement remained in force for 5 years after the agreement was reached and whether the conflict was active at the 5-year mark. Based on these data, the variable was coded on a three-point scale:</p> <p>1 = failure;</p> <p>2 = partial success; and</p> <p>3 = success.</p> <p>Case examples: Sierra Leone 1999 Lome Peace Agreement; agreement lasted less than one year, violence resumed within five years (UCDP). Coded as a <i>failure</i></p> <p>Congo 1999 Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo; some ceasefire violations and low-intensity clashes but peace agreement did not end. Coded as a <i>partial success</i></p>	<p>A second coder reviewed the data and made independent assessments for the violence (1) index assessment. The two coders' assessments differed on two cases, for a 96% rate of agreement.</p>

⁴ Forty-two of the cases are included in the UCDP data set. For the remaining eight cases, a research assistant reviewed case data and assessed this variable.

	Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace: ceasefire held, agreement did not end and violence did not resume within five years (UCDP). Coded as a <i>success</i>	
<i>Durable Peace (DP)</i>	<p>This variable consists of 16 components within the following four DP areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation (4 components) • Security Institutions (5 components) • Governance Institutions (4 components) • Economic Stability (3 components) <p>Using data from the Peace Accords Matrix (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2013) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2013), among other sources, the main coder assessed the cases for each of the 16 components according to the following 4-point scale:</p> <p>4 (very successful); 3 (mostly successful); 2 (moderately successful); or 1 (failure).</p> <p>After coding each component, an average score for each DP area was calculated by averaging the scores for each DP component, to create a single code for each DP component, and then adding those codes to create an overall DP score for each case.</p> <p>We also assess DP according to whether the four components were “successes” (scored 3-4) or “failures” (scored 1-2) (called DP counts). This DP measure adds up the number of component elements that were “successes.”</p> <p>Case example: Indonesia 2005 MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement</p> <p>Reconciliation: Although no truth and reconciliation process was established formally, amnesty was announced. No reparations program was established, however, although an autonomy plan was implemented in 2006 and a joint council was created. Scaled as 2.33.</p> <p>Security institutions: Police and military demobilization took place; from 2006-2013 there were no reported ceasefire violations. Scaled as 4.</p> <p>Governance institutions: Laws were passed for the establishment of local political parties. An autonomy bill gives Aceh its own executive, legislative and judiciary; judicial reform in PA, which was implemented in 2006. Elections took place in December in 2006. The government ratifies UN human rights treaties. Scaled as 3.75.</p> <p>Economic stability: International support is provided from the EU and from the International Organization for Migration for police training and reform program. Aceh was granted greater control over its economy, resources, and revenues. Scaled as 4.</p>	<p>The DP calibration procedure included eight cases used in this 50 case study as well as eight cases from a related, 16-case examination. A second coder reviewed the case material and recorded independent determinations for each DP component for all 16 cases.</p> <p>The primary and second coder’s assessments matched on 86% of the DP components. Of the components where there was disagreement, almost all of the differences were only one point on the four point scale: the coder’s assessments differed by two points on only 1% of the components.</p>

Supplemental Appendix 4

Correlation Matrix

	DP	Recon	SA	PJ	DJ	PJ + DJ
DP		.81***	.55***	.48***	.42**	.56***
Recon			.42**	.43**	.42**	.55***
SA				.05	.25	.13
PJ					.35*	.95***
DJ						.64***

*** $P < .001$

** $p < .01$

* $p < .05$