Appendix A (For Online Publication Only)

Note: Appendix B, which includes a full listing of the partisan electoral intervention cases and a codebook for the dataset, is in a separate file.

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Part 1: Additional definitions and descriptions of variables

1.1 Definition of an Intervenable/Competitive election

I define an intervenable/competitive election, or the universe of cases in which electoral interventions can potentially occur, as one that receives 7 out of 7 on the 2010 DPI's (Database of Political Institutions) executive electoral competiveness index (Beck et.al 2001) with a small modification. [1] For an election to get that score, multiple parties (in parliamentary systems) won seats in the election and the largest party received less than 75% of the vote, or, in presidential or semi- presidential systems, multiple candidates ran and the winning candidate won less than 75% of the votes.[2] Although rarely used in IR, this is a frequently used measure in Comparative Politics (for examples see Brownlee 2009; He 2007; Triesman 2007).

Following this criterion and extending the coverage of this index back to 1946 using Nohlen's and colleagues (1999, 2001, 2005, 2010) on elections around the world, 937 national level executive elections with a population of above 100,000 have been found. These elections come from 148 different countries. Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Greece and Japan have the most competitive elections in this dataset (between 22 and 18) while another 23 countries have only one competitive election.

As with other important concepts, other definitions (or operationalizations) of competitive elections exist in the comparative politics literature besides that of the DPI. These alternative definitions may have significant utility in investigating other important phenomenon (for studies in comparative politics on other phenomenon which use different criteria for electoral competitiveness see for example Rosseler and Howard 2009:110-111; Gandhi and Reuter 2013:146-147). The definition used here was chosen, aside of its widespread use, because it was judged by the author to be as close a reflection as possible of the information available to a would-be intervener about the competiveness of an upcoming election in a would-be target.

[1] Such elections can occur of course even in many regimes which are far from being democracies if not largely authoritarian such as the Philippines under Marcos (after the imposition of martial law), Yugoslavia under Milosevic or Argentina under Peron. As a result, even elections in such "Competitive Authoritarian" regimes, so long as they are expected to be overall competitive (even if the playing field is significantly tilted in favor of one of the sides), can be and often are tempting targets for interveners. Accordingly, no criteria for the country's level of democracy, beyond the election's competiveness, are used in order to exclude or include particular elections.

[2] Elections to Constitutional Assemblies, if one of their explicit purposes is to select an executive, are included as are partial/ supplementary elections in parliamentary systems so long as the number of seats contested in them is at least 10% of the total (i.e. usually enough to potentially affect the parliamentary majority of the executive).

Based upon research in other studies into cases in which an electoral intervention was seriously considered, the DPI's criteria was also seen by the author as reflecting the process and major criteria by which decision-makers in the would be intervener usually judges whether an election is intervenable or not.

Of course, it is possible in theory that an intervened election became competitive only because of the partisan intervention. However given that, with four exceptions, the incumbent vote share in all of the intervened elections is 10% or more below the 75% cutoff (or a much larger margin than any effects by an electoral intervention is expected to have) this is highly unlikely to have usually been the case. Likewise, in the very few cases in which such an intervention had occurred in a non-competitive election (according to the DPI's definition), the non-competitiveness of the election was usually due to a last moment, unexpected shift in its competitiveness (such as a last moment mass boycott of the election by the opposition parties/candidates etc.).

1.2 Definition of an Incumbent and Challenger

In this and other variables where this distinction is used, an incumbent is defined as the party and/or candidate which held the highest elected executive position (President in Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems, Prime Minister in Parliamentary systems) in the period preceding the elections and/or received the endorsement or backing of the holder of the highest executive position during that period. [3] A challenger is a party and/or candidate which does not fall under these criteria.

In countries in which it is common to install a neutral non-partisan caretaker government in the runup to the elections (as in Greece or post-1996 Bangladesh), I code the party of the last pre-caretaker executive as the incumbent.

[3]As some researchers on the economic vote have noted, while voters can also hold (in multiparty parliamentary systems) other coalition partners accountable for the executive's performance, the evidence seem to show that, in most cases, the party/candidate which holds the top executive position prior to the election receives nearly all of the credit and/or blame for the executive's performance (Duch and Stevenson 2008:59).

1.3 Definition of a founding election

One should note that I code founding elections here somewhat differently than some other scholars do (see for example O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986[4]). In the wider work for which this dataset has been constructed and utilized, the focus was on whether the aided candidate/party are likely to have recent experience with campaigning in a competitive election in their country. Accordingly, in order to be coded as a founding election, in the previous six years there had to be no competitive, national level executive election in that country. The six year time range was chosen because it is the longest gap that modern democracies (with one past exception) permit between executive national level elections.[5] For longer periods the experience gained to the local politicians from a previous competitive election is expected to degrade to the point of being of little value.

For periods shorter than six years, the experience gained by the local politicians from a recent election is unlikely to become useless simply because there was a short, non-constitutional "interruption". Indeed, when such a relatively short interruption ends, the subsequent election usually has the same pre-interruption politicians and parties reentering politics and contesting the elections. Likewise, the fact that the previous competitive national level election was done prior to independence (or while under foreign military occupation) should not reduce the value of the experience acquired from it for the participating politicians for the purposes of campaigning.

Accordingly, except in cases in which the data indicated that all or most of the preinterruption politicians and parties were exiled, executed and/or banned from running in the post-interruption elections (as was the case of Turkey in the 1981 elections or in Argentina in the 1963 elections), I don't code the second of two competitive elections with less than a six year gap as a founding election even if there was a successful coup (or autocoup) in the interim or the first of these competitive elections was done prior to independence.

[4] These scholars define a founding election as the first competitive multiparty election following a period of authoritarian rule (regardless of its length).

[5] Some fully democratic countries with presidential systems (post 1987 South Korea, Chile before 1973 and after 1989) have an executive election only once every six years. Likewise, some parliamentary systems have a maximum term of five years (the U.K). In practice, while coding this variable for countries where there were non-constitutional interruptions etc. there were no more than 3-4 cases in which the coding would have differed if a four year range was chosen instead. For the one exception to this rule, France between 1958 and 2002, I code the relevant presidential elections as non-founding.

1.4 Definition of overt and covert electoral interventions

As noted in the article, to be coded as a covert intervention all of the significant acts done in order to help a particular party/candidate must have been either a secret and/or that the connection between those acts and the election was not known to the average voter in the target at least until after the election day (if they ever become known).[6] To be coded as an overt intervention at least some of the significant acts done in order to aid a particular candidate/party must have been known before the election by the average voter in the target to have been performed in order to help or hinder a particular candidate/party in the elections.

1.5 Definition of the Main subcategories of electoral intervention tools

As noted in the main text, a wide variety of costly methods were used by the great powers in order to help the preferred side during the conduct of partisan electoral interventions. Nevertheless the vast majority of the methods known to have been used by the U.S. and USSR/Russia as part of the electoral interventions can be categorized under the following six subtypes:

1. **Campaign Funding:** Providing campaign funding to the favored side. Such funding can be given either directly or indirectly (such as 'independent' organizations bringing likely voters of preferred side to the polls on election day etc.). Examples of direct funding to preferred candidate/parties include the provision of cash (such as in bags /suitcases full of money etc.), in kind material aid (office equipment, newsprint for party newspaper/leaflets, vehicles for the parties' campaign etc.), or via a 'padded' contract with a firm affiliated with that party.
2. **Campaigning Assistance**: Increasing the capabilities/effectiveness of the assisted side's election campaign through the provision of non-monetary/non-material assistance to the election campaign. Examples include training locals (of the preferred side only) in advanced campaigning, party organization, and get out the vote (GOTV) techniques, designing (for the preferred side only) of campaigning materials, sending campaigning experts to provide on-

[6] To examine whether a certain known intervention was overt I examined preelection mass media descriptions of these acts (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these acts are described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention then it is assumed that the average voter knew about this intervention. Given that overt interventions are designed to affect public opinion in the target, there was rarely any ambiguity in this regard in practice as to the main components of these interventions.

the-spot assistance to the preferred sides campaign in messaging, strategy, polling analysis etc.[7]

3. **Dirty Tricks**: The intervention included acts which were designed to directly harm one or more candidate(s) or parties competing against the preferred candidate/party. Examples of such acts include: the dissemination of scandalous exposes/disinformation on the rival candidate/parties, physically harming/disabling rival candidates, damaging/destroying a rival's offices or campaigning materials, breaking in/spying on rival's campaign activities and plans, disruption of rival's fundraising efforts by threatening would be donors, encouraging the breakup of the rival sides political coalition/party in the run up to the election/bribing some rival candidates to leave/stay in the race etc..[8]
4. **Threats or Promises**: Public and specific threats or promises by an official representative of intervening country to provide or take away a thing of value to the target/ significantly harm it in the future.
5. **Giving/ Taking Aid**: Giving: Sudden new provision of foreign aid or a significant increase in existing aid and/or other forms of material or economic assistance (such as loans/improved loan conditions/loan guarantees, trade treaties/preferred trading conditions etc.) either directly or indirectly via a multilateral IO heavily funded by the intervener.[9] Taking: the withdrawal of part or whole of aid, preferred trading conditions, loan guarantees etc..
6. **Other Concessions**: The intervention included the provision of a costly benefit by the intervener to the target which was non-economic/material in its nature/main value. Some examples include the evacuation of a military base, supporting a highly contentious claim by the target for a particular piece of disputed territory, release of POWs or war criminals, or signing/revising an alliance treaty with the target.

[7] The direct provision of expert campaigning advice by officials of the intervener's government officials is also included.
[8] It also includes assistance to the preferred side (usually an incumbent) in conducting voter fraud such as 'creating' fake voters or manipulating voter rolls.
[9] The provision (or increased provision) of various kinds of food aid, usually categorized and seen as a form of economic aid, is included here.

Part. 2: Notes on the Definition & Operationalization of Partisan Electoral Interventions

2.1 Notes on the Definition & Operationalization

This section further discusses the logic under which certain types of acts were or were not coded as an electoral intervention as well as some clarifications on why electoral interventions were defined and operationalized in the manner chosen here. As noted in the main text, an electoral intervention is defined in this study as a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner which they believe will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener(s) or the intervened country.

This definition excludes activities which are unintentional interventions- i.e. various acts by decision-makers in one country done with little to no regard towards an upcoming elections in another country which may have, nevertheless, influenced those elections. Likewise excluded are acts done "automatically" by other countries' bureaucracies etc. (say, regulations on visa requirements, tariff definitions, etc.) which coincidentally coincided with another country's election affecting it (unless of course significant evidence exists that decision makers manipulated such an usually automatic decision for this purpose).[10]

In a world in which significant interconnections of various kinds exist (and long existed) between many countries, each with its own decision-makers and bureaucracy which create and execute policies on their own schedules with little regard to the scheduled events in the rest of the world, the number of significant unintentional interventions which may have occurred is nearly endless and therefore of limited interest. Furthermore, the intention by the decision-makers in the intervener to intervene in a particular foreign event and/or through the use of a certain policy tool is a central component of the definition of intervention in virtually all studies of other types of interventions (interventions in civil war, FIRCs, humanitarian interventions etc.) known to the author.[11]

[10] Likewise, for a particular action to be coded as an electoral intervention at least part of the intervention had to occur within twelve months of the election date.

[11] Some studies assume it to be such an obvious component of their intervention type of interest (i.e. the U.S. military wouldn't, say, invade another country and depose its leader unless ordered to do so by the president) that

This definition also exclude acts which were done at a given timing or in a given form in order to use the possible window of opportunity that such an election in another country may have created (for instance through distracting the decision-makers in that other country) but that weren't done in order to influence the results of those elections. For example, the 1956 Suez crisis (or Sinai War) was clearly timed by the three attacking countries (the U.K, Israel, and France) to begin during the run-up to the 1956 U.S elections in order to lower the chances that the U.S would attempt to halt it (Kyle 2003:317,324-325). However, given that all of the available evidence suggests that none of the attacking countries launched this war in order to, directly or indirectly, affect the results of the 1956 U.S. election, this case wouldn't count as an electoral intervention- even if it may have, unintentionally, affected the final results.[12]

Also excluded from being counted as an electoral intervention are the very rare cases, such as the U.S. in the 1984 Nicaraguan elections (Blum 2005:229) or Russia in the May 2014 Ukrainian election,[13] in which the great power is trying to actively disrupt an election in another country. In such cases the intervener is trying to harm the political system as a whole and/or deprive it of legitimacy- not to affect the election's results. In other words, these cases are more akin to acts of warfare against the target hatched at a convenient opportunity (with the election coincidentally found to be creating such a moment) rather than attempts to manipulate the identity of those in power using the elections as a tool for that purpose.

Likewise, to be coded as an intervention under this definition there also had to be some kind of concrete action on the side of the would-be intervener in regard to the election in question beyond what was already planned anyway due to other, unrelated reasons.[14] Defining

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they don't even note this issue and/or just use an off –the-shelf dataset of the intervention type of interest that utilizes, in some form, a component of decision-makers' intent for coding this phenomenon.

[12] Likewise acts done for the purpose of extracting various domestic and/or foreign policy concessions out of a certain government, without any desire to bring about its defeat in an upcoming election, are also not coded as an electoral intervention. These kinds of activities are simply acts of conventional coercion which coincidentally happened to occur in a run-up to an election in the target rather than a partisan electoral intervention. In practice, given the potential for 'misunderstandings' in this regard, great powers who do not want to do an electoral intervention usually tend to avoid doing such coercive acts in the run-up to an election in the target and will wait until the elections have been concluded.

[13] Some observers of the recent events in Ukraine believe that this may have been one of the goals of Putin's intervention following the overthrow of Yanukovich in February 2014. See "Ukraine Poised for Uncertain Elections" *Council on Foreign Relations* May 19, 2014.

[14] If the intervener had a wider foreign policy agenda in regard to that country (i.e. besides removing/maintaining a given leader/party), it had to be doing some additional activities beyond those already enacted or already planned to be enacted under this general policy.

‘doing nothing’ as to a particular election as intervention on the side of the great power would lead, among other things, to rather ludicrous coding decisions. For example, it could lead to a coding of every election in which a somewhat unfriendly candidate to a particular great power ran but the great power did not intervene against it as the great power actually intervening in that candidate’s favor.

This definition also excludes intervention conducted only in the immediate aftermath of an election (disputed or not) in another country. Post-election interventions, instead of trying to affect the decision by the electorate at the ballot box (as in electoral intervention) attempt to manipulate the post-election situation resulting from this decision by the voters (and/or efforts by the incumbent to negate the voters’ decision). Accordingly, post-election interventions by a great power are an altogether different phenomena then the one discussed here. For example, unlike electoral interventions they are quite frequently an impromptu, unplanned activity by the great power, the result of an unexpected instability in another country due to post-election protests, ‘surprise’ election results, etc.[15] As a result of these theoretical and empirical differences such interventions are excluded.

Some may wonder whether purely neutral tools couldn’t also be used, on their own, for blatant partisan purposes. In other words, in theory an intervener may be able to solely use in some situations a seemingly fully neutral intervention as a way to get rid of an ‘undesired’ leader. For example, an intervener could pressure an unpopular authoritarian or a quasi-authoritarian incumbent to hold a competitive election (where none had been held before) or send election observers to an upcoming election (in countries with serious past records of election fraud) so as to reduce her ability to commit fraud. Enabling the opposition to compete and/or leveling the playing field only through such neutral measures could accordingly be sufficient to enable the opposition to remove the unwanted unpopular leader without any need for any ‘partisan’ measures on the side of the intervener.

[15] Of course in a few cases a post-election intervention followed a (pre-election) electoral intervention by the same great power- such as Pres. Nixon’s infamous track 1 and track 2 efforts in the immediate aftermath of the 1970 Chilean election and the failed U.S. attempt to prevent Allende’s victory in this election (Gustafson 2007). However, that fact doesn’t mean that post-electoral interventions are the same theoretical phenomena as a partisan electoral intervention- in the same manner that the fact say that state building operations sometimes follow a regime change operation by the same great power does not mean that the these two types of interventions are identical in their nature.

In practice, however, when states do such neutral acts, affecting who is in power in another country in the short/medium term is not one of their goals. For example, in the famous case of the Philippines in 1986 the evidence indicates, some later claims notwithstanding, that the U.S., in quietly pressuring Marcos to conduct a free election, had no desire to see Ferdinand Marcos lose power as a result. Indeed, Reagan liked Marcos and apparently believed that Marcos would win such a competitive election. That would, in turn, strengthen the Marcos regime's overall legitimacy while reducing domestic criticism within the U.S. as to the Reagan administration's foreign policy towards the Philippines. The Reagan administration's shift to trying to force Marcos to surrender power came only in the post-election period and was largely due to the entirely domestic in nature post-election mass street demonstrations (Bonner 1987)- a very different phenomenon then that which is studied here.[16] Research on other cases where the U.S. and other democratic countries pressured incumbents in both the pre- and post-Cold War era to hold competitive (or more competitive) elections have likewise found little to no evidence of such partisan motives being involved (Brown 2001; Brown 2005; Kim & Biak 2011: chp 2)). Likewise, most research on election observation notes the usually neutral goals of the providers of election observation (Hyde 2011).[17]

Secondly, there is also a major difference in the level of politics involved within the intervener. Neutral interventions, especially in the post-Cold War era, are usually "low politics" decided at relatively low levels of the U.S. government or even done nearly automatically in certain situations. In contrast, the evidence available from cases of such interventions indicates that partisan electoral interventions are "high politics" with decisions whether to conduct them or not being made at senior U.S. government decision-making levels (Secretary of State, President, NSC council, etc.).

Furthermore, while collecting the data for this dataset of electoral interventions, it became clear that when states do want to remove a particular leader/party from power they don't seem, in practice, to limit themselves to using such usually neutral means. In other words, a more 'level playing field' isn't seen as sufficient to reliably guarantee the "preferred" results for the preferred side. Indeed, in the few cases in which an intervener also used, for example, election

[16] The call by this post-election stage by the U.S. government for a new election was of course proforma in nature.
[17] Likewise the exact ability, if any, of election monitoring to reduce election fraud is still hotly debated within the academic literature on this topic (Kelly 2008: 222-223,249; Hyde 2011:chp4).

observation for this purpose (such as in the 1953 Philippine elections or the 1998 Slovakian election) this 'neutral' measure was only one component of an intervention which also included multiple clearly partisan measures (i.e. covert funding to the preferred side) as well (authors dataset).

Further notes on the operationalization:

1. Acts done by private citizens of a great power on their own volition, such as American campaign consultants hired for pay by a candidate/party in another country to give it campaigning advice etc., were excluded.[18]

2. Electoral interventions done by non-state actors (NGOs, transnational terrorist groups, IOs, global media conglomerates etc.) were usually excluded as well. The main exception was if such non-state actors were directly controlled by an intervening great power (via funding, etc.) or clear evidence exists that their intervention was done at the request of, or due to the pressure exerted by, such an intervening state.

Accordingly, for example, the IRI (International Republican Institute) and the NDI (National Democratic Institute) are NGOs who get virtually all of their funding via the U.S. government via the National Endowment for Democracy (the NED) as well as frequently following secret directives from it in regard to many of their operations (see for example Smith 2013). Accordingly, acts by these NGOs which would otherwise fit the definition of a partisan electoral intervention are coded here as U.S. interventions- unless the acts in question are fully and openly repudiated by U.S. government officials prior to the elections (in a manner similar to point 3 below). In contrast, similar activities done by, for example, the Soros foundation, which (Russian and Syrian conspiracy theories aside) gets virtually all of its funding and directives from private individuals (George Soros), are not coded as electoral interventions.

3. The few cases in which acts that would usually be coded as overt electoral interventions (say a threat to cut off aid by the U.S. ambassador) but which were later (but prior to election day) fully repudiated by a higher level official of the great power were excluded. In such cases the

[18] Likewise acts done by politicians in the intervening country who are members of the political opposition at that given point in time or politicians from various subnational levels are excluded unless clear evidence exists that these acts are done on behalf of (or in cooperation with) the executive.

acts in question were usually completely unintended by the top decision-makers in the great power. Therefore, it fails of course the first criteria.

4. Acts which would usually have been coded as an electoral intervention but the evidence available indicates that they were, in practice, acts of outright coercion by the aided side towards the 'intervener' were excluded. Examples of acts which lead to the exclusion of such cases include, for example, outright threats by the local leader not to let the great power use bases that it has in its country or to immediately leave an alliance if the great power doesn't help the local leader. The few rare situations where acts of this type had occurred are, in reality, cases of successful coercion on the side of a government/faction in the target rather than an intervention by the great power in the domestic politics of that country.

5. At least some of the acts in question had to occur within twelve months of the expected election day in the target in order for them to be counted as an intervention. Earlier acts are assumed to have other goals (generic country/regime support etc.) and/or that the intervener changed his mind in this regard.[19]

6. Planned electoral interventions that never occurred in practice because the would-be intervened election did not take place for various reasons (such as a domestic coup) were excluded.

7. Evidence from secret U.S. government/CIA sources/agents in regard to covert electoral activities by the KGB wasn't sufficient for coding a Soviet intervention unless some evidence was also available from reliable Soviet/Russian sources that such a Soviet/Russian intervention had indeed occurred.

8. As for coding particular features of a confirmed electoral intervention: to examine whether a certain known intervention was overt, I examined the preelection mass media descriptions of these acts (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these acts were described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention, then it is

[19] Likewise in some cases parties received regular yearly funding (or subsidies) to enable various regular (non-electoral) day to day party operations etc.. Such funding, if occurring 'as usual' during an election year, wasn't counted as an electoral intervention unless clear evidence existed that at least part of the funding of that year (usually involving an increase in funding) was given by the great power in order to explicitly aid the party in the upcoming elections.

assumed that the average voter knew about this intervention. Given that overt interventions are designed to affect public opinion in the target there was rarely any ambiguity in this regard in practice as to the main components of these interventions. The identification of the electoral intervention as being on the side of the incumbent or the challenger or in a founding or later election was done using the DPI data coding for those supported actors or elections.

As noted in the main text, some electoral interventions included both a covert and an overt component (say a public threat/ promise as well as covert campaign aid). To code such cases, I carefully examined all overt interventions with more than one known component. In those cases I examined preelection mass media descriptions of these additional components (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these additional acts are not described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention, then it is assumed that those components were not known (or were not meant to be known) to the target's public. As an additional check, I also examined in this regard, where available, any archival or secondary sources as to the way these additional components were designed to be executed by the intervener and/or the domestic actor. In practice, I found that if one of the components of an intervention was clearly overt that usually leads the media (and the target's public) to very carefully examine all other recent preelection acts by the relevant great power for evidence of any other acts designed to help one of the sides contesting that election. Accordingly, when the intervener (and/or the local actor) wanted to keep a certain component of the otherwise overt intervention a secret from the target's general public, they made sure to do it in an obviously covert manner (such as by utilizing the intervener's intelligence agencies) leaving little ambiguity in this regard. That usually enabled the intervener to hide such covert components from the voters in the target prior to the elections- although (as in fully covert interventions) it was usually unable/unwilling to hide it from later investigations/scholars etc. in the years following the intervened elections.

2.2 Definition of costs and potential costs

In each of the methods of intervention noted in the main text[20], cost isn't defined by some kind of threshold or cutoff point. Instead it is defined as either existing or not existing given the features of that particular act. For example, the provision of campaign funding involves the transfer of resources (money) from the intervener to the assisted side. Therefore such acts are defined as costly regardless of the exact amount provided by the intervener for this purpose.

The costs of an intervention can be either actual/immediate (as in the campaign funding example) or potential (see page 3 in main text). For potential costs the question is whether a particular act contains or does not contain future costs to the intervener under the desired or plausible post-election outcomes in one of the following four ways. The first way is that the public promises made before an election by the intervener may be conditional on the election results. For example, a major component of the intervention may be a declaration by the intervener before the election that if the target's public votes for candidate X it will increase, after the election, foreign aid to that country by amount Y. In those cases the cost is not upfront and may not accrue in case of a defeat of the favored side to the intervener - although if the desired result occurs, then the intervener will need to 'pay up' unless they want to politically undermine the side that they supported in that elections and make it (and the targets' public) more hostile to it.

The second manner is that the cost of a certain method of intervention depends on the target's future behavior. For example, if the intervener gives a loan to the target as part of an electoral intervention, the target may eventually pay it back in full- with no overall costs to the intervener as a result. However, if the target does not pay it back in part or in full for some reason (a not uncommon occurrence in the post-WW2 era), then the money loaned is effectively lost to the intervener.

Thirdly, in regard to costs resulting from the potential damage to the relationship noted in the main text, they are defined here as the possible results of acts done as part of the electoral intervention that would, in non-electoral contexts, be understood as forms of coercive diplomacy or economic coercion. Leaders of states and/or publics do not like being coerced- a widely

[20] See also section 1.5 in this appendix

known fact. As a result, the doing of such coercive acts by the intervener towards the target as part of an electoral intervention creates a serious chance of significant medium- and long- term damage to the relations between the intervener and the target- especially if the intervention fails or the 'undesired' side wins a subsequent election. Even if the target is unable to retaliate militarily, it can do various acts that are quite costly to the intervener such as end/weaken any existing military alliance, kick out/make it harder for the intervener to use its bases in the target, reduce its cooperation in regards to terrorism, etc. (for this logic as to such acts in the non-electoral sphere see for example Trager 2010; Drezner 1999:270). Indeed, if the intervener cares enough about a certain country to seriously consider intervening in it then it clearly cares about the quality of the relations between it and the target and would see future bad relations (and the possible results of such bad relations) as a cost to it.

Fourthly, in regard to the reputational costs, their possible existence is determined in a manner similar to the one utilized by most of the research on reputation (Sartori 2005;Press 2005): if the intervener makes a threat or a promise before the election and then fails to follow through on it afterwards (if relevant), its reputation for honesty and/or resolve will be damaged. There is a sharp disagreement within the scholarship on reputation on how much it actually matters in practice. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among scholars which study reputation that decision-makers believe that such reputational costs exist and that accruing them can be quite harmful to their country (Mercer 1996; Sartori 2005; Press 2005; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Accordingly decision-makers usually see making various public threats or promises towards the target as something which carries significant potential costs if the post-election situation will require them to follow through on them but they renege.

2.3. Examples of coding in select Hard/ Borderline cases

To illustrate how the definition and operationalization described in the main text were applied in practice, enclosed are four further 'hard' cases in which this coding was done and the decision-making process that led to a particular coding.

A. The 1976 Jamaican election:

The then Jamaican PM Michael Manley repeatedly claimed before and after this election that the U.S. was doing a partisan electoral intervention against him utilizing various covert methods- such as covertly funding the opposition's election campaign and secretly encouraging anti-government strikes, demonstrations, and violence. U.S.-Jamaica relations were indeed quite strained in 1975 and 1976 due to Manley's foreign and domestic policies during this period (such as Manley's support of Cuba's military intervention in Angola). However, Manley never provided concrete evidence for these claims either before or after these elections (which he eventually won) beyond descriptions of some negative articles written about him and Jamaica in the (private) U.S. media in the pre-election period. Even if the Ford administration was secretly behind the largely negative coverage of Jamaica in the American media during these years (a claim for which no evidence exists), that would not be sufficient to code that act as an electoral intervention (see Table I in the main paper).

Some later biographers of Manley and scholars of Jamaican politics concurred with Manley's claims either in part or in whole as to the occurrence of such a covert U.S. intervention against him in this election (see for example Kaufman 1985:118-121; Stephens & Stephens 1986:134-137; Levi 1990: 167-169). However, a careful reading of their studies indicated that they had no clear evidence of the types required for these assertions (testimony of a CIA agent, official U.S. documents, etc.). The strongest bit of evidence provided by these scholars for such an intervention is the refusal of U.S. State Department and Foreign Service officials from a later administration (Carter), when anonymously interviewed by these authors, to outright deny that such an intervention occurred under the previous administration. The scholars which noted this are themselves forced to admit that this bit of evidence is not very strong (Stephens & Stephens 1986: 134-136). Former CIA agent Philip Agee also thought that such an American intervention had occurred- but he left the CIA eight years beforehand. Accordingly, the evidence Agee provided for this belief consisted largely of noting some possible similarities between events in Jamaica in the run up to this election and some past CIA interventions of various kinds.

Some contemporary journalists agreed with Manley's claims but were also unable to provide clear evidence for such an intervention. For example, two American journalists claimed in an article they published in December 1977 that such a U.S. electoral intervention which

included, among other things, three unsuccessful assassination attempts of PM Manley, had indeed occurred. The evidence for this claim was based on supposedly anonymous CIA sources. However, Newsday (the main author's, Volkman, then place of employment) apparently found this article too thinly sourced and refused to publish it, forcing the authors to instead publish this article in a pornographic magazine (Penthouse).[21] Not surprisingly, it is rarely cited in later Intelligence Studies research.

Accordingly, as a result of lack of sufficient evidence of the types required (see the section on data collection process in the main text), this case was coded as a case of non-intervention by the U.S. This conclusion was further buttressed by a subsequent visit to the Ford Presidential Library. For example in one declassified memorandum Kissinger requested that President Ford approve a small PL-480 loan to Jamaica before the elections in order to squelch rumors that a U.S. electoral intervention is underway there– rumors which he describes to Ford as "erroneous".[22]

B. The 1961 Turkish Election:

In July 1960, a senior member of the temporary military junta, which ended Turkey's first experiment with democracy a few months beforehand, met with the U.S. ambassador to Turkey. During this meeting it secretly requested a significant increase in U.S. foreign aid to Turkey in order to assist the junta in the upcoming general election, an election that it was planning to hold in the following year. The U.S. government rejected this Turkish request and refused to intervene in this election. In January 1961 senior members of the junta secretly made a repeat request for more U.S. foreign aid, this time also including a lightly disguised threat to cut the Turkish military by 35-40% if this request was not granted- in an era in which the Turkish military was a vital component of NATO's defense posture in case of a 'hot war' with the USSR. The U.S. government relented shortly afterwards and significantly increased its foreign aid to Turkey (by $43.6 million).[23]

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[21] Ernest Volkman and John Cummings 1977. "Murder As usual" *Penthouse*, December

[22] See Memorandum Kissinger to Ford "PL 480 Programs for Jamaica and Afghanistan" June 17, 1976; see also Memorandum Kissinger to Ford "PL-480 Program for Jamaica" August 26,1976; Memorandum Scowcroft to Ford "PL-480 Program for Jamaica" September 20, 1976; All in DDRS.

[23] See FRUS 1958-1960 10(2): Document 372; FRUS 1961-1963 16: Document 358; "Turkey Gets Defense Grant" *New York Times* January 17, 1961.

This American act was costly and done prior to the election. However given that the available evidence indicates that the U.S. government did this act as a result of coercion by the client rather than a desire to determine the election results in this case (condition 1), this act was not coded as an American intervention.

C. The 1958 Greek election (U.S.)

Contradictory evidence exists about whether a covert American electoral intervention occurred in this election. On the one hand, in a recent history of U.S-Greece relations a prominent diplomatic historian, who was involved in the assemblage of the FRUS volumes on Greece, Turkey and Cyprus of the 1960s (Miller 2009), claimed that no archival evidence for a covert U.S. electoral intervention in this election was found. That led Miller to dismiss various, evidence-free, later accusations by some Greek authors that such a U.S. intervention had occurred in this election.

On the other hand, significant contrary evidence from reputable sources, for such an U.S. electoral intervention in this election exists: 1. A declassified secret CIA history notes the authorization in March 1958 (two months before the elections) of a covert operation in Greece in which CIA covert funds were used- although the exact nature of this operation is not described in the text.[24]

2. A posthumous biography of the then chief of the CIA Athens station John Richardson written by his son, a respected journalist, claims that an American electoral intervention occurred in favor of the ERE and PM Karamenalis in this election (Richardson 2005:122-123,131). This claim was based upon interviews Richardson conducted with two former CIA agents (Lou DeSantis and Gordon Mason) who worked with his father and were deputy chiefs of the CIA Athens station during this period.

3. A posthumous biography of former CIA director William Colby written by a prominent intelligence studies scholar (Prados 2003:59) briefly notes, in his research on Colby's early CIA career in Italy, that the CIA secretly brought in CIA election experts from the recent

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[24] Jackson, Wayne. 1973. *Allen Welsh Dulles As Director of Central Intelligence: 26 February 1953- 29 November 1961*. CIA Internal Historical Studies (Declassified) vol 3: 97

successful covert intervention in a Greek election for its covert intervention in the 1958 Italian election (in which Colby was deeply involved).

Given that the preponderance of reliable sources of evidence nevertheless points towards a U.S. partisan electoral intervention in this election, and this evidence indicates an intervention that would fit the criteria for such an intervention (i.e. intentional and costly), this election was coded as one in which a covert U.S. intervention had occurred.

D. The 1960 Ecuadorian election

Philip Agee, a former CIA agent who was stationed in Ecuador in the early 1960s, describes in his memoirs a covert U.S. operation occurring in the legislative elections (occurring concurrently with the presidential elections- as is common in presidential systems) designed to assist a handful of candidates from multiple parties running for seats in the Ecuadorian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in their personal election campaigns (Agee 1975: 122-123, 125-127). However, a careful reading of Agee's memoirs indicates no covert U.S. involvement in the presidential election. Agee does later describe in depth a covert CIA campaign designed to force Ecuadorian president Jose Velasco to cut off ties with Cuba, a campaign which eventually helped lead to Valesco's resignation due to military and popular pressure. However this covert campaign seems to have begun in late 1960- a few months after Velasco's election to the presidency.

Furthermore, no evidence was found in the relevant FRUS volume for an American electoral intervention in the presidential race. Likewise the available declassified documents from CIA sources (from the Crest system terminal at the U.S. National Archives) indicate an overall positive attitude by the U.S. towards Valesco in the run-up to the election. For example, one CIA document claims that Valesco "is believed [to be] friendly to the United States".[25] Accordingly, given that the CIA covert acts described in the legislative election were not designed to determine the results of the concurrent presidential elections (i.e., the identity of the executive), this case was coded as a case of non-intervention by the U.S..

[25] Current Intelligence Weekly Summary June 9, 1960 from Crest

Part 3: Additional notes- descriptive statistics section

3.1 Definition of regions

North America: Canada, Mexico and the U.S.

Latin America: the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

The Middle East: the Arab world, including the Arab states which are in North Africa (Sudan, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt), and the non-Arab states usually included in this region (Iran, Israel, Turkey).

Europe: the whole continent including Cyprus, Iceland, Malta, Russia and the Caucuses. *Oceania:* Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific Island states (Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, etc.). *Asia*: Central Asia (including Afghanistan), East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia (including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea).

Sub-Saharan Africa: excludes the Arab parts of North Africa (see list above), includes Mauritius.

3.2 A Note on intervention formats

One interesting point to note in regard to the methods of partisan electoral interventions that are usually used is that electoral interventions seem to quite rarely include (when covert) physical harm towards particular candidates/parties or, when overt, symbolic or actual use of military force by the intervener (less than half a dozen cases at most). Even, for example, the infamous track 2 in the Chilean 1970 election occurred only *after* the elections was concluded. Although partisan electoral interventions are, of course, a severe, blatant and usually coercive violation of the non-intervention norm, it is instructive how frequently they nevertheless observe another democratic norm- that of non-violence.

Furthermore, it is clear from the nature of virtually all of the electoral interventions in the dataset (i.e. who was aided, messages conveyed in many overt interventions) that, even if unsuccessful, it wasn't due to a 'desire' by the great power to fail in this regard. In other words, there is little to no evidence that electoral interventions are done with the purpose of harming or giving a 'kiss of death' to the aided side (even if, in some cases, that is indeed the unintended result).

3.3 Note on the democraticness of country and chances of intervention

As noted in the main text, no evidence exists that countries with fragile democratic institutions are more likely to be the targets of such interventions than 'full' democracies. Breaking down the analysis to specific interveners, the U.S. was somewhat more likely to intervene in non-democratic countries while the Soviet/Russians were more likely to intervene in more democratic countries. However this pattern becomes insignificant (at the 0.05 level) once one excludes the regions in which both powers intervened the most (i.e. Asia for the U.S. and Europe for USSR/Russia)- which suggests that this was largely due to the geopolitical interests of both powers in particular regions (which happened to be more or less democratic) rather than any underlying tendency by either great power to intervene in more or less democratic regimes.

Part 4: Limitations of the Berger et.al dataset

In a new American Economic Review article, Daniel Berger et.al (2013) try to measure the effect of political influence resulting from successful U.S. covert operations during the Cold War to remove/maintain leaders (both through covert coup/maintenance and covert electoral interventions) on subsequent trade relations. Unlike most research on the effects of covert interventions, this study uses a dataset which includes, together with (among other things) violent covert coups, also some successful cases of covert electoral interventions (by the U.S. and the USSR). This dataset however has significant limitations when it comes to analyzing partisan electoral interventions both in general and in comparison to the PEIG dataset introduced here in particular. This is due to four major reasons:

First this dataset doesn't provide users with the ability to differentiate between covert electoral interventions and covert coups or to exclude the latter category- despite the fact that covert coups are operations of a different magnitude and nature and therefore possibly differing effects.[26] For example, covert coups often lead to a full-blown violent 'regime change' while successful covert electoral interventions against the incumbent usually lead to peaceful transitions of power with the existing political institutions remaining intact. PEIG, in contrast, provides a completely separate dataset for electoral interventions.

Second, the exclusion of overt electoral interventions leads to some rather surprising coding decisions. For example Berger et.al code countries as being under the political influence of a superpower when a leader they supported through a covert electoral intervention came to power following the election. However, Finland (for example) isn't coded by Berger as falling under Soviet influence during any part of the Cold War because the Soviet electoral interventions which helped Finnish President Kekkonen come to power in 1956 and then remain in power were all overt. Naturally, analyses of the effects of electoral interventions may lead to biased inferences when one major subtype of electoral intervention (a third of all interventions occurring since WW2) is excluded. PEIG includes both covert and overt partisan electoral interventions.

[26] Berger et.al provide together with the dataset a brief appendix which occasionally provides, at best, a very terse description of the exact way by which the political influence began or ended.

Thirdly this dataset, unlike PEIG, doesn't provide any data on unsuccessful electoral interventions under Berger's definition of success (i.e., ones that didn't lead the supported candidate/party to come/remain in power). However even unsuccessful electoral interventions may have significant effects in various ways on the target. Furthermore, for the purpose of measuring many types of effects, the 'failed' electoral interventions may have great utility as a relevant reference group.

Fourthly, Berger et.al's dataset begins in 1946 and ends in 1989. In contrast PEIG includes also the first Post-Cold War decade, providing a longer time period for analysis of partisan electoral interventions as well as a better ability to examine whether particular findings are merely the result of a particular era.

Finally, Berger's dataset is missing some important cases of successful covert electoral interventions. For example, according to the author's comparison of PEIG and Berger et.al's dataset, the latter is missing at least eleven cases of covert electoral interventions which Berger would code as successes.[27]

Due to these limitations of the Berger et.al's dataset, I believe that PEIG provides a better and more reliable tool for analyzing partisan electoral interventions. [28]

[27]Likewise, the format in which Berger's dataset was made available, where interventions that successfully maintain already existing political influence are frequently left unnoted, makes it difficult to ascertain whether some covert electoral interventions were indeed identified and if they weren't, at least another dozen electoral interventions of this type may be missing as well.

[28] At an advanced stage of the construction of PEIG, two measures from the NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov 2012) for two types of overt foreign interventions in elections (public threats/promises and aid cutoffs) were brought to my attention. These two measures, unlike the dataset created here, are a mixture of neutral and partisan (overt only) preelection foreign interventions, activities by foreign powers which happened to coincide with a preelection period in the target, as well as of various kinds of post-election meddling. Even in regard to overt interventions many cases are missing given this criteria. These NELDA measures are, accordingly, far less useful for investigating partisan electoral interventions than the dataset created here and may lead to highly biased results. Nevertheless, given the potential relevance of some of the cases noted by these measures, I also carefully examined and cross checked all of the cases noted by it. Happily, all of the cases of partisan electoral interventions noted by these two NELDA measures that would fit under my operationalization for inclusion were also already included in the dataset.

Part 5: Descriptions of the variables used in the empirical comparison section

I define an intervenable/competitive election, or the universe of cases in which electoral interventions can potentially occur, as one that receives 7 out of 7 on the 2010 DPI's (Database of Political Institutions) executive electoral competiveness index (Beck et.al 2001) (see further description of this in section 1.1 of this appendix).

The dependent variable in the models estimated here, as is common in models of economic voting, is the vote share of the incumbent's party (in parliamentary systems) or of the incumbent's party's presidential candidate (in presidential and semi-presidential systems with direct elections). Nearly all of this data came from the edited volumes by Dieter Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2001, 2005, 2010) on elections around the world. These scholars, over the course of the last two decades, have painstakingly assembled data on national level election results from all independent states from at least 1946 to the present. The data on election results in different countries is standardized into one common format, making it an ideal source for cross-national comparisons.[29]

The main independent variable for model 1 is the partisan electoral intervention variable taken from PEIG (*Electoral Int.- PEIG*). In order to model the fact that electoral interventions can be done in order to help or to harm the incumbent this variable is constructed as trichotomous, coded as 1 if an intervention is for the incumbent, -1 if it is for a challenger, and 0 when no intervention occurs.

The main independent variable for model 2 is taken from Berger et.al (2013) (see description in part 4) also coded as a trictomous variable (*Political Influence*). A start of a period of political influence, if falling on an election year, is coded as an intervention for the challenger -1 (unless noted otherwise in Berger et.al dataset). Elections occurring during a period of influence are coded as an intervention in favor of the incumbent (1). Elections occurring in a period with no U.S. or Soviet political influence are coded as no intervention (0).[30]

[29] For a small number of parliamentary systems in which vote share was repeatedly missing, seat share was used instead. Cases in which the elections were clearly competitive but the results were invalidated before becoming fully available and/or the data sources indicate that election fraud was so massive so as to make the results completely unreliable, were excluded from the data.

[30] As noted in part 4 of this appendix the way that the Berger et.al dataset was provided does not enable separation of the partisan electoral interventions it identifies from other kinds of interventions.

The control variables used in both models are variables used as dependent variables in the Hellwig and Samuels (2007) model (Hence HS) which I then try to replicate here with the inclusion of the electoral intervention variable. Given that my time frame is longer than that of HS and the number of countries included is larger, in order to replicate their model I usually needed to use other reliable data sources with better data coverage.

The first variable is the previous vote share of the incumbent (*Previous vote*). This variable is included in order to control for past election outcomes. For this purpose, I use the same data sources and coding as for the incumbent vote share (see description).

The second variable is the real GDP per capita growth rate (*Growth*). This variable is HS's variable for the effect of the "economic vote" and one frequently used in cross-national research on this topic. Following HS, I use the previous year's growth rate for elections occurring during the first six months of the election year and the same year's economic growth rate for elections occurring during the second half of the election year. The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et.al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP per capita data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

The third variable is trade as a percentage of GDP in constant terms (*Trade Openness*). This variable is included as an indicator of the effects of economic globalization and used in the subsequent interaction term (see further description for the following interaction variable). The data for this variable is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (Openk) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I calculate this variable using Maddison's above-noted GDP data (Maddison 2003) and the Barbieri /COW trade dataset version 3 (Barbieri et al 2009) both adjusted to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

The fourth variable is an interaction between the economic growth rate and trade as a percentage of GDP (*Growth * Trade Openness*). HS argue that economic globalization reduces the effect of the "economic vote" and accordingly reduces the executive's accountability to the voters. This interaction replicates one of the main ways by which they try to test this argument, measuring the effects of economic globalization on political accountability.

The fifth variable is a dummy variable measuring whether a particular election is a presidential election (1) or not (0) (*Presidential Election*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible differences in vote share between presidential and parliamentary systems as well as a component of an interaction with growth rate (see next description). To code this variable the data was taken from a DPI measure (System) (Beck et.al 2001) and carefully rechecked. For pre-1975 coding I use Nohlen and Colleagues (1999, 2001, 2005, 2010).

The sixth variable is an interaction between the economic growth rate and presidential elections variables (*Growth*Presidential Election*). This variable is included in order to control for possible differences in the ways voters hold presidents accountable vs. prime ministers.

The seventh variable is whether a president is running for reelection in a presidential or Semi-Presidential system (*Re-election*) with 1 as yes and 0 as no. This variable is included in order to control for the incumbency advantage that sitting presidents usually have. To code this measure I use Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2001, 2005, 2010) data on elections.

The eighth variable is the effective number of parties or candidates contesting the election (*Effective num. of Parties*). This variable is included in order to control for the differences between political systems as well as possible reduced volatility in the incumbents vote in more fragmented party systems. Ignoring this factor may accordingly lead to a misestimate of the effect of other substantive factors on the incumbents vote share. Accordingly, in parliamentary systems, as well as Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems in which the president is elected by Parliament (such as Post-Apartheid South Africa), I use the effective number of parties while in Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems with direct presidential elections, I use the effective number of presidential candidates.

For most of this data I use Golder's (2005) effective number of parties measure (ENPP) and effective number of presidential candidates measure (ENPRES) obtained via the Quality of Government (QOG) dataset. Data that is missing in Golder's dataset (yet available) is usually calculated using data on election results from Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2001, 2005, 2010). This variable is then logged.

The ninth variable is the (logged) GDP per capita in thousands of 2005 constant U.S dollars (*GDP Per Capita Level*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible effects that a country's overall wealth may have on the vote share that incumbents usually get in

elections. The real GDP data is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars-rgdpl) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP per capita data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

Four other variables are regional dummies (*Africa, Asia, Central and E.Europe, L. America and Caribbean*) with the advanced industrial democracies (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand etc.) excluded and serving as a baseline.

All models analyzed here use the standard tool used in cross-national aggregate studies of the economic vote (Wilkin, Haller and Norpoth 1997; Samuels 2004; Benton 2005), as well as HS-OLS with PSCE (panel corrected) robust standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).

5.2. Additional model

Some may wonder whether the differences between the results found comparing PEIG to the Berger et.al dataset may be simply due to the different time frames that each measures includes (the Cold War in Berger et.al vs. the Cold War and the first decade of the post-Cold War era in PEIG). To check that possibility I rerun Model 2 of the main table utilizing only Cold War era data. As can be seen in the table below, the size of the effect becomes a bit smaller but is otherwise similar to that found in Table III.

Table 1 Effects on election results in affected countries- PEIG dataset (Cold War era only)

	(1) PEIG
Electoral Intervention	2.716* (1.385)
Previous vote	0.454** (0.0593)
Growth	0.352* (0.148)
Trade Openness	-2.692 (2.056)
Growth*Trade	-0.115

Openness	(0.180)
Presidential Election	-5.423^{+} (2.972)
Growth*Pres. Election	0.253 (0.233)
Re-election	8.928** (2.477)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-11.64** (2.243)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.727 (0.824)
Africa	3.642 (4.955)
Asia	-0.510 (2.952)
Central & E.Europe	-10.08* (3.987)
L.America & Caribbean	-0.279 (2.339)
Constant	26.18** (9.200)
Elections (N)	455
Countries	79
R-sqr	0.556

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

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