Appendix A. Coding of Religious Tradition

As is fairly commonplace, the Pew APT Wave 20 does not offer a full battery of denominations (as in the American National Election Studies and General Social Survey). Rather, respondents were asked a truncated question that presented most major traditions, with the following options:

Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Atheist (do not believe in God), Agnostic (not sure if there is a God), Something else (SPECIFY), Nothing in particular, (VOL) Christian, (VOL) Unitarian (Universalist),
(VOL) Don't know/Refused.

In order to separate Protestants into groups that approximate the standard religious tradition battery, the following procedure was used. This procedure follows the same basic theory as coding schemes used by Layman (2001) and Layman and Green (2005).

1. Those who specified that they were generic Christians were recoded as Protestants. Atheists, Agnostics, and Nothing in Particular were recoded into Unaffiliated. Traditions that were too small to engage in reliable analysis were recoded as missing, including Mormons, Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Unitarian Universalists, Something Else, and Don't Know/Refused.

2. Protestants who were African American were recoded into a new Black Protestant variable.

3. Protestants who responded "yes" to the question, "Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?" were recoded as evangelical Protestants.[1] Those who responded "no" and who were not Black were recoded as Mainline Protestants.

[1] Within the social scientific study of religion, scholars have used numerous schemes to identify evangelicals (Hackett and Lindsay 2008). While religious tradition may be the preferred method of identifying evangelicals, self-identification is also widely used by both scholars and pollsters such as Gallup and the Pew Research Center. Lewis and De Bernardo (2010) find that evangelical self-identification is useful for predicting a variety of political attitudes.

Appendix B. Expanded Bivariate Tables in Reference to Table 4

Table 4 from the main text provides a bivariate assessment of polarization using cell percentages. Table 4 in the main text does not include row and column percentages in order to save space and preserve clarity. Nevertheless, the text makes reference to the row and column percentages. Appendix Tables B1-B3 provide the full percentages for interested readers. The findings here have no bearing on the results.

Table B1. Evaluating Polarization on Whether Businesses Should be Able to Refuse to Provide Birth Control for Religious Reasons

	Liberal Frame				
Conservative Frame	A lot	Some	Not much	Not at all	Total
A lot	6.42%	1.33%	2.91%	9.58%	20.24%
	31.73	6.55	14.36	47.36	100.00
	15.84	5.68	18.74	46.51	20.24
Some	1.79	13.24	3.46	1.06	19.55
	9.18	67.71	17.68	5.44	100.00
	4.43	56.7	22.29	5.16	19.55
Not much	3.76	6.46	7.86	0.75	18.83
	19.98	34.31	41.74	3.96	100.00
	9.28	27.68	50.7	3.62	18.83
Not at all	28.56	2.32	1.28	9.21	41.38
	69.03	5.61	3.1	22.26	100.00
	70.45	9.94	8.27	44.71	41.38
Total	40.54	23.35	15.51	20.61	100.00
	40.54	23.35	15.51	20.61	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Weighted 2016 Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20). Percentages are cell, row, column. N=4,481. X^2=2,921.27***.

Table B2. Evaluating Polarization on Whether Businesses Should be Able to Refuse to Serve Lesbian and Gay People for Religious Reasons

	Liberal Frame				
Conservative Frame	A lot	Some	Not much	Not at all	Total
A lot	3.53%	2.35%	4.54%	19.22%	29.64%
	11.91	7.94	15.32	64.83	100.00
	10.82	10.55	25.35	70.78	29.64
Some	1.45	11.38	6.3	1.04	20.16
	7.17	56.45	31.22	5.16	100.00
	4.43	50.97	35.16	3.83	20.16
Not much	4.4	5.72	6.06	0.49	16.68
	26.4	34.27	36.36	2.96	100.00
	13.5	25.6	33.87	1.82	16.68
Not at all	23.24	2.88	1.01	6.4	33.52
	69.32	8.58	3	19.09	100.00
	71.25	12.88	5.62	23.57	33.52
Total	32.61	22.33	17.91	27.15	100.00
	32.61	22.33	17.91	27.15	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Weighted 2016 Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20). Percentages are cell, row, column. N=4,480. X^2=3,227.22***.

Table B3. Public Opinion on Whether States Should Pass Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills

	Liberal Frame				
Conservative Frame	A lot	Some	Not much	Not at all	Total
A lot	3.58	1.96	3.76	21.21	30.51
	11.72	6.43	12.33	69.52	100.00
	14.06	8.23	20.66	65.19	30.51
Some	1.28	11.77	5.65	2.1	20.81
	6.16	56.57	27.17	10.11	100.00
	5.04	49.4	31.06	6.47	20.81
Not much	3.92	7.08	7.84	0.44	19.28
	20.31	36.75	40.65	2.29	100.00
	15.39	29.73	43.04	1.36	19.28
Not at all	16.66	3.01	0.95	8.78	29.41
	56.67	10.24	3.24	29.86	100.00
	65.51	12.63	5.24	26.99	29.41
Total	25.44	23.83	18.2	32.53	100.00
	25.44	23.83	18.2	32.53	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Weighted 2016 Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20). Percentages are cell, row, column. N=4,463. X^2=2,928.37***.

Appendix C. The Effect of Religious Tradition, Religious Commitment, and Party on Attitudes Towards Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights

As noted in the text, another way of testing whether religious liberty and transgender rights are new fronts in the culture war is examining the impact of religious tradition, religious commitment, and party on final issue attitudes (rather than polarization, as tested in the main manuscript) on these issues. This Appendix carries out those tests.

In order to assess the impact of religious tradition and religious commitment on attitudes towards the "new culture wars" issues, I use a series of logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of the respondent's position on each issue. I include a variety of control variables, including party (a 3-category measure), ideology (5-category), gender (a dummy variable for females, with males as the comparison category), age (4-category), education, income, southern residence (with residence in other regions as the comparison category), race (Black, Hispanic, Mixed race/other, with whites as the comparison category), whether the respondent personally knows anyone who is gay or lesbian, and whether the respondent personally knows anyone who is transgender. Finally, I include measures of religious tradition (dummy variables for mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and the unaffiliated, with evangelical Protestants as the comparison category), religious attendance (a six category measure ranging from never to more than once a week), and a set of interaction terms between religious commitment and church attendance. This means that the coefficient for church attendance represents the effect of church attendance among evangelicals, and the interaction terms represent the difference in the impact of church attendance among each of the remaining traditions in comparison to evangelicals. The results of this analysis are shown in Table C3. Because logistic regression and interaction terms make the substantive size of the

coefficients difficult to interpret, I discuss the results in terms of the predicted probability of the respondent taking the conservative position on each policy issue.[i]

Figure C1 shows the impact of religious tradition on attitudes toward each policy (with 85% confidence intervals).[ii] In order to generate the figure, I fixed each religious tradition at its mean level of attendance in the dataset and kept each respondent's individual values on all other variables. Beginning with the item about birth control, it is clear that the mean for evangelicals (.41) is significantly (at least $p<.05$) more conservative than the means for mainline Protestants (.29), Catholics (.34), Jews (.31), and the unaffiliated (.23). The tradition-based gap is even wider on the item about serving LGBT people: the mean for evangelicals (.66) is significantly more conservative (at least $p<.05$) than the mean for mainline Protestants (.50), Catholics (.45), Jews (.40), and the unaffiliated (.41). The same basic trend is also apparent on the item about transgender rights: the mean for evangelicals (.57) is significantly more conservative (at least $p<.05$) compared to mainline Protestants (.42), Black Protestants (.43), Catholics (.45), Jews (.29), and the unaffiliated (.32). The gaps between evangelicals and the unaffiliated are .17 for the birth control item, .25 for the item about serving LGBT people, and .25 for the item about anti-transgender bathroom bills. Therefore, controlling for other factors, the religion gap is approximately 1/5 to 1/4 of the total scale length on these items.

Figure C2 shows the impact of church attendance on attitudes towards religious liberty and transgender rights for each religious tradition.[iii] Beginning with the item about requiring businesses to provide birth control, the strongest effects were observed among evangelicals and Catholics, for whom moving from the lowest level of religious commitment to the highest results in increases of .23 and .20, respectively, in the probability of taking the conservative position ($p<.05$ for both). The estimated effect among Jews was also substantively large (.26), however it

does not achieve statistical significance due to the large confidence intervals for the Jewish tradition. In contrast, the estimated effects of religious commitment were small and not statistically significant among Black Protestants (.12) and the unaffiliated (.04).

Turning to the question about whether businesses should be required to serve lesbian and gay people, we again see contextual effects for church attendance among certain traditions. Among evangelicals, moving from the lowest level of religious commitment to the highest results in about a .52 increase in the probability of taking the conservative position ($p<.05$). The effect of attendance is also statistically significant for Catholics (.18, $p<.05$). Among mainline Protestants (-.05), Jews (-.01), and the unaffiliated (.01), church attendance did not have a statistically significant effect.

On the item about anti-transgender "bathroom bills," the strongest impact was again among evangelicals, where moving from the minimum to the maximum level of church attendance increases the probability of taking the anti-trans position by .38 ($p<.05$). We also see sizeable attendance effects among Black Protestants and Jews, although they are not statistically significant. In contrast, the effects of religious commitment were substantively small (and not statistically significant) among mainline Protestants (-.07) and the unaffiliated (.01).

The results of this analysis reinforce the literature's finding that the importance of religious commitment varies across traditions and issue contexts. For evangelicals, each of the three issues yields a significant attendance-based divide. For Catholics, an attendance gap is statistically significant for birth control and LGBT service denials, but not anti-transgender bathroom bills. Finally, for Jewish people, attendance led to a significant increase in the probability of supporting anti-transgender bathroom bills. In all other cases, the attendance divide was not large enough to generate a statistically significant effect.

Figure C3 shows the effect of partisanship on attitudes towards the three policies, along with 85% confidence intervals. For all three dependent variables, moving from Democrat to Republican increases the probability of taking the conservative position on each issue by approximately .24-.25 (this effect is significant at $p<.05$ in each case). Clearly, even after controlling for religion's influence, partisanship exerts large and statistically significant effects on public opinion on each of these three issues.

Table C3. Predicting Attitudes on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights

	Businesses/Birth Control	Businesses/Serve Lesbian and Gay People	States/Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills
Party ID	1.401***	1.196***	1.229***
	(0.178)	(0.153)	(0.167)
Ideology	1.347***	1.069***	1.115***
	(0.260)	(0.199)	(0.210)
Female	-0.550***	-0.567***	-0.637***
	(0.143)	(0.130)	(0.136)
Age	0.287	0.012	0.396#
	(0.220)	(0.199)	(0.209)
Income	-0.244	-0.010	0.011
	(0.256)	(0.235)	(0.247)
Education	0.303	0.229	-0.469*
	(0.194)	(0.180)	(0.184)
South	0.037	0.126	0.138
	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.143)
Black	-0.016	-0.407	0.295
	(0.607)	(0.415)	(0.385)
Hispanic	0.426	0.083	0.319
	(0.272)	(0.238)	(0.233)
Mixed/Other	-0.232	-0.608**	0.596*
	(0.292)	(0.228)	(0.237)
Know Gay/Lesbian	-0.535*	-0.141	0.417
	(0.250)	(0.223)	(0.255)
Know Transgender	0.167	-0.183	-0.246#
	(0.161)	(0.146)	(0.145)
Mainline Protestant	-0.316	1.165**	0.687
	(0.457)	(0.384)	(0.450)
Black Protestant	0.357	1.917**	0.456
	(0.860)	(0.690)	(0.727)
Catholic	-0.169	0.314	0.345
	(0.400)	(0.389)	(0.424)
Jewish	-0.302	0.443	-0.990
	(0.568)	(0.555)	(0.669)
Unaffiliated	-0.315	0.589#	0.003
	(0.326)	(0.316)	(0.345)
Church Attend.	1.298***	2.877***	1.989***
	(0.367)	(0.398)	(0.441)
Mainline X Attend	-0.405	-3.114***	-2.317**
	(0.771)	(0.652)	(0.749)
Black Prot. X Attend	-0.640	-2.804***	-0.746
	(0.771)	(0.754)	(0.862)
Catholic X Attend	-0.099	-1.937**	-1.272#
	(0.663)	(0.624)	(0.683)
Jewish X Attend	0.273	-2.905*	-0.132
	(1.150)	(1.210)	(1.121)
Unaffiliated X Attend	-1.003	-2.829***	-1.939*
	(1.002)	(0.838)	(0.812)
Constant	-2.260***	-1.756***	-2.062***

	(0.448)	(0.411)	(0.452)
Observations	4,010	4,005	3,961
Wald X^2	289.04***	354.97***	341.61***
Pseudo R^2	.2277	.2131	.2209

Source: Weighted 2016 Pew American Trends Panel (Wave 20). Coefficients are logistic regression. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; #=.10 (two-tailed tests).



Figure C1. The Influence of Religious Tradition on Attitudes Towards Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. Error bars represent 85% confidence intervals.



Figure C2. The Influence of Religious Attendance on the Probability of Taking the Conservative Position on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. 85% confidence intervals omitted for clarity, but are available in Appendix D.



Figure C3. The Influence of Party on the Probability of Taking the Conservative Position on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. Error bars represent 85% confidence interval.

Appendix D. Confidence Intervals for Figure C2

Figure C2 does not show confidence intervals in order to preserve the clarity of the graphs. In the text, I make reference to the statistical significance of various religious effects using the confidence intervals provided here.

Table D1. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Taking a Conservative Position On Businesses/Birth Control (Figure C2)

Religious Tradition	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.253	0.042	0.193	0.313
	Max.	0.482	0.036	0.430	0.534
Mainline	Min.	0.207	0.052	0.132	0.281
	Max.	0.349	0.068	0.250	0.447
Black Prot.	Min.	0.310	0.131	0.122	0.499
	Max.	0.429	0.114	0.265	0.592
Catholic	Min.	0.228	0.043	0.165	0.290
	Max.	0.432	0.066	0.337	0.526
Jewish	Min.	0.209	0.070	0.108	0.309
	Max.	0.477	0.149	0.263	0.690
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.207	0.026	0.170	0.244
	Max.	0.250	0.128	0.066	0.433

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Table D2. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Taking a Conservative Position On Businesses/Serve LGBT People (Figure C2)

Religious Tradition	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.298	0.048	0.230	0.367
	Max.	0.818	0.030	0.775	0.862
Mainline	Min.	0.520	0.054	0.442	0.598
	Max.	0.473	0.066	0.378	0.567
Black Prot.	Min.	0.666	0.108	0.510	0.821
	Max.	0.679	0.082	0.561	0.797
Catholic	Min.	0.355	0.049	0.284	0.425
	Max.	0.538	0.058	0.454	0.622
Jewish	Min.	0.379	0.091	0.247	0.510
	Max.	0.373	0.156	0.149	0.597
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.406	0.028	0.366	0.447
	Max.	0.416	0.129	0.229	0.602

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Table D3. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Taking a Conservative Position On States/Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills (Figure C2)

Religious Tradition	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.357	0.057	0.274	0.439
	Max.	0.732	0.037	0.679	0.786
Mainline	Min.	0.490	0.065	0.396	0.584
	Max.	0.425	0.071	0.323	0.528
Black Prot.	Min.	0.444	0.125	0.264	0.624
	Max.	0.683	0.079	0.569	0.798
Catholic	Min.	0.422	0.056	0.342	0.503
	Max.	0.564	0.060	0.478	0.650
Jewish	Min.	0.195	0.081	0.078	0.312
	Max.	0.526	0.136	0.330	0.722
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.357	0.027	0.318	0.397
	Max.	0.366	0.117	0.198	0.535

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Appendix E. Bivariate Analysis of the Effect of Religion and Partisanship on Polarization

This section provides a bivariate test of hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. These analyses are referenced in the main text, but were cut in order to save space.

The bivariate data provide initial support for Hypothesis 4. Beginning with the birth control item, Figure E1 shows that 20% of evangelical Protestants could be classified as conservative and polarized, compared to just 2% of Black Protestants and 4% of the religiously unaffiliated. In contrast, about 49% of Jews and 47% of the unaffiliated could be classified as liberal and polarized. A similar dynamic appears for the item about whether businesses should be able to refuse services to gay and lesbian people. Here, 41% of evangelicals are polarized on the conservative side of the issue, compared to just 9% of Jews and 9% of the unaffiliated. In contrast, 43% of Jews and 38% of the unaffiliated could be classified as polarized on the liberal side of the issue. Finally, on the bathroom bill item, 37% of evangelicals, 21% of mainline Protestants, and 20% of Catholics are polarized on the conservative side of the issue. In contrast, the unaffiliated and Jews were the most likely to be polarized on the liberal side of the issue, at 32% and 28%, respectively. In short, this analysis provides strong support for Hypothesis 4's prediction that religious tradition would be an important factor in explaining polarization on religious liberty and transgender rights.

Consistent with the "religious restructuring" literature, a divide was also apparent when looking at religious commitment. Figure E2 shows the results of my analysis, which provide strong support for Hypothesis 5. On the birth control item, 16% of weekly attendees were polarized on the conservative side of the issue, compared to just 6% of those who attend seldom or never. In contrast, 38% of those who attend seldom or never were polarized on the liberal side of the issue, compared to just 14% of weekly attendees. Turning to the item about whether

businesses should be required to serve gay and lesbian people, 31% of weekly attendees were polarized on the conservative side of the issue, compared to 13% of those who attend seldom or never. In contrast, 31% of those who attend seldom or never were polarized on the liberal side of the issue, compared to just 11% of those who attend weekly or more. Finally, on the item about anti-transgender bathroom bills, 30% of weekly attendees were polarized on the conservative side of the issue, compared to just 16% of those who attend seldom or never. In keeping with previous trends, 24% of those who attend seldom or never were polarized on the liberal side of the issue, compared to just 6% of weekly attendees. In short, the data in Figure E2 provide initial support for Hypothesis 5's contention that church attendance would be a strong predictor of polarization on religious liberty and transgender rights.

Finally, Figure E3 provides bivariate evidence of party polarization on the three items. On the birth control item, we see that almost 40% of Democrats hold a polarized liberal perspective, compared to only 15% of Republicans. About 19% of Republicans hold polarized conservative views, compared to just 2% of Democrats. The differences were even more stark on the item about businesses denying service to gay and lesbian people. About 35% of Democrats held polarized liberal views, compared to 9% of Republicans. Likewise, about 34% of Republicans held polarized conservative views, compared to 7% of Democrats. Finally, on the item about anti-transgender bathroom bills, about 26% of Democrats and just 5% of Republicans held polarized liberal views. In contrast, about 34% of Republicans and 10% of Democrats held polarized conservative views. The stark differences apparent here provide strong initial support for hypothesis 6.

Figure E1. Religious Tradition and Polarization on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20).



Figure E2. Church Attendance and Polarization on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20).



Figure E3. Party and Polarization on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20).

Appendix F. Predicted Probabilities for Figures 3 & 4

Figures 2 and 3 do not show confidence intervals in order to preserve the clarity of the graphs. In the text, I make reference to the statistical significance of various religious effects using the confidence intervals provided here.

Table F1. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Holding a Polarized Conservative View On Businesses/Birth Control (Figure 2)

	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.103	0.027	0.065	0.141
	Max.	0.147	0.023	0.114	0.181
Mainline	Min.	0.061	0.017	0.037	0.085
	Max.	0.068	0.022	0.036	0.100
Black Prot.	Min.	0.078	0.076	-0.032	0.187
	Max.	0.054	0.040	-0.004	0.111
Catholic	Min.	0.042	0.019	0.016	0.069
	Max.	0.150	0.035	0.099	0.201
Jewish	Min.	0.136	0.090	0.006	0.265
	Max.	0.083	0.057	0.000	0.165
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.069	0.018	0.043	0.095
	Max.	0.113	0.109	-0.045	0.270

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 5.

Table F2. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Holding a Polarized Conservative View On Businesses/Serve LGBT (Figure 2)

	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.178	0.035	0.128	0.228
	Max.	0.359	0.040	0.300	0.417
Mainline	Min.	0.128	0.028	0.088	0.168
	Max.	0.163	0.037	0.109	0.216
Black Prot.	Min.	0.335	0.197	0.052	0.618
	Max.	0.371	0.152	0.152	0.591
Catholic	Min.	0.114	0.032	0.068	0.160
	Max.	0.126	0.032	0.080	0.171
Jewish	Min.	0.084	0.059	0.000	0.169
	Max.	0.167	0.106	0.016	0.319
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.122	0.021	0.093	0.152
	Max.	0.131	0.099	-0.011	0.273

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Table F3. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Holding a Polarized Conservative View On States/Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills (Figure 2)

	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.166	0.036	0.115	0.218
	Max.	0.334	0.037	0.281	0.387
Mainline	Min.	0.213	0.049	0.143	0.283
	Max.	0.164	0.041	0.105	0.223
Black Prot.	Min.	0.212	0.149	-0.002	0.426
	Max.	0.314	0.110	0.156	0.472
Catholic	Min.	0.197	0.044	0.134	0.260
	Max.	0.164	0.038	0.108	0.219
Jewish	Min.	0.065	0.051	-0.009	0.139
	Max.	0.392	0.104	0.242	0.542
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.160	0.025	0.124	0.196
	Max.	0.039	0.036	-0.013	0.090

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Table F4. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Holding a Polarized Liberal View On Businesses/Birth Control (Figure 3)

	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.198	0.048	0.129	0.266
	Max.	0.158	0.033	0.110	0.206
Mainline	Min.	0.292	0.041	0.233	0.351
	Max.	0.242	0.041	0.182	0.301
Black Prot.	Min.	0.363	0.116	0.196	0.529
	Max.	0.154	0.051	0.080	0.228
Catholic	Min.	0.316	0.046	0.249	0.382
	Max.	0.130	0.036	0.079	0.181
Jewish	Min.	0.362	0.077	0.252	0.473
	Max.	0.350	0.117	0.181	0.519
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.419	0.029	0.377	0.460
	Max.	0.221	0.103	0.073	0.369

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Table F5. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Holding a Polarized Liberal View On Businesses/Serve LGBT (Figure 3)

	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.267	0.060	0.180	0.354
	Max.	0.090	0.029	0.048	0.131
Mainline	Min.	0.208	0.040	0.150	0.267
	Max.	0.164	0.044	0.100	0.227
Black Prot.	Min.	0.114	0.058	0.031	0.197
	Max.	0.079	0.031	0.035	0.123
Catholic	Min.	0.279	0.045	0.214	0.343
	Max.	0.176	0.045	0.112	0.241
Jewish	Min.	0.295	0.084	0.174	0.417
	Max.	0.361	0.122	0.185	0.537
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.322	0.027	0.283	0.361
	Max.	0.207	0.089	0.079	0.335

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Table F6. Predicted Probabilities and Confidence Intervals for Holding a Polarized Liberal View On States/Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills (Figure 3)

	Attendance	Prob.	SE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Evangelical	Min.	0.217	0.055	0.138	0.296
	Max.	0.047	0.021	0.017	0.078
Mainline	Min.	0.144	0.035	0.093	0.195
	Max.	0.152	0.037	0.099	0.205
Black Prot.	Min.	0.182	0.079	0.069	0.296
	Max.	0.108	0.043	0.045	0.170
Catholic	Min.	0.161	0.033	0.113	0.209
	Max.	0.078	0.021	0.047	0.108
Jewish	Min.	0.114	0.038	0.059	0.169
	Max.	0.252	0.099	0.110	0.394
Unaffiliated	Min.	0.229	0.022	0.197	0.260
	Max.	0.224	0.087	0.099	0.348

Source: Weighted Pew American Trends Panel (wave 2). Probabilities Calculated from model shown in Table 3.

Appendix G. Testing for Interactive Effects Between Religious Tradition and Party

In this appendix, I examine the possibility of interactive effects between religious tradition and party. Table G1 shows a new multinomial regression model that includes a series of party X religious tradition interactions. Thus, in this model, the coefficient for party represents the effect of party among evangelicals, and the interaction terms indicate the change in the effect of party for the tradition indicated. For the most part, these interactive effects are not statistically significant. One important exception is that the effect of party is significantly different among Jewish people for the birth control item.

Because interaction terms are difficult to interpret substantively, Figure G1 shows the impact of party on the probability of taking a polarized conservative perspective on each issue, and Figure G2 shows the probability of taking a polarized liberal perspective on each issue.

Table G1. Interacting Party and Religious Tradition

	Businesses/Birth Control		Businesses/Serve Lesbian and Gay People		States/Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills	
	Conservative & Polarized	Liberal & Polarized	Conservative & Polarized	Liberal & Polarized	Conservative & Polarized	Liberal & Polarized
Party ID	0.965	-0.909**	0.896*	-0.945*	0.379	-1.384**
	(0.629)	(0.344)	(0.355)	(0.445)	(0.334)	(0.474)
Ideology	1.936***	-0.748***	1.237***	-0.694**	1.154***	-1.061***
	(0.371)	(0.185)	(0.263)	(0.211)	(0.256)	(0.248)
Female	-0.635***	0.524***	-0.524***	0.292*	-0.482***	0.431**
	(0.178)	(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.142)	(0.140)	(0.166)
Age	0.721**	-0.030	0.555*	-0.104	0.762**	-0.604*
	(0.240)	(0.215)	(0.231)	(0.228)	(0.233)	(0.241)
Income	0.034	0.809**	0.440	0.670**	0.649*	0.702*
	(0.315)	(0.248)	(0.308)	(0.253)	(0.305)	(0.286)
Education	0.739**	0.328#	0.258	0.286	-0.213	0.635**
	(0.249)	(0.187)	(0.224)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.228)
South	-0.039	0.036	0.046	-0.186	0.348*	0.018
	(0.177)	(0.144)	(0.152)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.167)
Black	0.015	-0.828*	-0.346	0.143	0.005	-0.811#
	(0.813)	(0.351)	(0.826)	(0.340)	(0.584)	(0.426)
Hispanic	-0.026	-0.303	-0.036	-0.297	0.345	-0.239
	(0.435)	(0.211)	(0.317)	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.285)
Mixed/other Race	-0.039	-0.281	-0.281	0.064	0.216	-0.347
	(0.397)	(0.229)	(0.305)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.273)
Know Gay	0.260	0.854**	0.100	0.214	0.184	0.109
	(0.355)	(0.331)	(0.217)	(0.355)	(0.224)	(0.448)
Know Trans	0.226	0.185	0.219	0.435**	-0.102	0.872***
	(0.207)	(0.136)	(0.177)	(0.151)	(0.183)	(0.155)
Mainline	-1.330	0.648	-0.815	-0.513	0.245	-0.566
	(1.218)	(0.433)	(0.634)	(0.476)	(0.593)	(0.556)
Black Protestant	-0.834	0.980	0.630	-1.002	-0.146	-0.301
	(1.487)	(0.706)	(1.233)	(0.715)	(1.124)	(0.787)
Catholic	-1.993*	0.510	-0.857	-0.153	-0.224	-0.626
	(0.916)	(0.475)	(0.767)	(0.485)	(0.592)	(0.543)
Jewish	-24.812***	1.025#	-1.466	0.045	-1.633	-1.113#
	(2.066)	(0.565)	(0.983)	(0.629)	(1.106)	(0.649)
None	-0.758	1.290***	-0.965#	0.258	-0.822	-0.015
	(0.764)	(0.392)	(0.508)	(0.427)	(0.608)	(0.485)
Attendance	0.512	-0.279	0.991*	-1.287*	0.939*	-1.881*
	(0.475)	(0.549)	(0.415)	(0.599)	(0.399)	(0.814)
Attend X Mainline	-0.421	-0.039	-0.703	0.996	-1.297#	1.883#
	(0.773)	(0.694)	(0.666)	(0.812)	(0.675)	(1.036)
Attend X BP	-1.879	-1.141	-0.683	0.962	-0.214	1.266
	(1.234)	(0.882)	(1.202)	(0.894)	(1.201)	(1.053)
Attend X Catholic	0.935	-0.873	-0.976	0.636	-1.269#	0.885
	(0.901)	(0.751)	(0.728)	(0.791)	(0.695)	(0.968)
Attend X Jewish	-1.933	0.760	-0.292	1.944	1.631	3.783**
	(1.877)	(1.234)	(1.978)	(1.224)	(1.304)	(1.441)
Attend X None	-0.114	-0.823	-0.964	0.580	-2.532*	1.743
	(1.497)	(0.960)	(1.198)	(0.937)	(1.192)	(1.093)
Party X Mainline	0.845	-0.179	0.335	0.155	0.033	-0.089
	(1.162)	(0.441)	(0.601)	(0.552)	(0.524)	(0.666)
Party X BP	1.943*	0.774	-0.644	-2.135	-0.663	-0.996

	(0.932)	(1.025)	(0.865)	(1.474)	(0.657)	(1.166)
Party X Catholic	1.192	0.379	0.322	0.347	0.563	0.576
	(0.834)	(0.478)	(0.652)	(0.537)	(0.493)	(0.614)
Party X Jewish	25.966***	-1.798#	0.808	-0.615	0.675	-2.411#
	(2.604)	(1.024)	(1.624)	(0.852)	(1.113)	(1.357)
Party X None	0.581	-0.118	0.629	-0.143	1.126#	0.254
	(0.862)	(0.440)	(0.554)	(0.533)	(0.617)	(0.593)
Constant	-4.661***	-2.141***	-2.998***	-0.908	-3.025***	-1.019
	(0.727)	(0.505)	(0.458)	(0.553)	(0.474)	(0.656)
N	4,045	4,045	4,045	4,045	4,045	4,045
Wald X^2	709.4***		459.27***		513.79***	
Pseudo R^2	.2144		.1884		.2079	

Source: Pew American Trends Panel (wave 20).



Figure G1. The Influence of Party (by Religious Tradition) on the Probability of Holding Polarized Conservative Attitudes on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. 85% confidence intervals have been omitted for clarity.







Figure G2. The Influence of Party (by Religious Tradition) on the Probability of Holding Polarized Liberal Attitudes on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights. 85% confidence intervals have been omitted for clarity.

[i] Probabilities were calculated by averaging across imputed values for religious tradition and church attendance, using each respondent's personal values on each of the control variables.

[ii] Research in statistics shows that overlapping 95% confidence intervals around predicted probabilities provide an overly conservative test of statistical difference, providing a type I error rate of .006 rather than the conventionally desired .05 (Maghsoodloo and Huang 2010; Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker 2003; Schenker and Gentleman 2001). These authors recommend using 83.5 percent confidence intervals to achieve type I error rates of five percent and recent work in political science has followed their advice (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013; Castle et al. 2017; Lindstadt and Vander Wielen 2014). Here, I round up to 85% confidence intervals.

[iii] In order to preserve the clarity of the graphs showing the effect of church attendance across the six traditions considered here, I do not show confidence intervals. However, they are available in Appendix C.